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Abstract 
This dissertation explores the ethnic and religious dimensions of the northern 
Nigeria conflict, in which gruesome killings have intermittently occurred, to determine 
whether there are genocidal inclinations to the episodic killings. The literature review 
provides the contextual framework for examining the conflict parties and causation 
factors to address the research questions:  Are there genocidal inclinations to the ethno-
religious conflict in northern Nigeria? To what extent does the interplay between 
ethnicity and religion help to foment and escalate the conflict in northern Nigeria?  
The study employs a mixed content analysis and grounded theory methodology 
based on the Strauss and Corbin (1990) approach. Data sourcing was from 197 
newspaper articles on the conflict over the study period spanning from the 1966 northern 
Nigeria massacres of thousands of Ibos up to present, ongoing killings between extremist 
Muslims and Christians or non-Muslims in the region.  Available texts of the conflict 
cases over the research period were content-analyzed using Nvivo qualitative data 
analysis software involving processes of categorizing, coding, and evaluation of the 
textual themes. The study structures a theoretical model for determining proclivity to 
genocide, and finds that there are genocidal inclinations to the northern Nigeria conflict, 
involving the specific intent to ‘cleanse’ the north through the exclusionary ideology of 
imposition of the Sharia law through enforced assimilation or extermination of Christians 
and other non-Muslims who do not assimilate or adopt the Muslim ideology. The study 
also suggests that there is latency in the recognition of these genocidal manifestations due 
to their episodic nature and intermittency of occurrence.  
 xvi 
 
The study provides further understanding of factors underlying and sustaining the 
violent conflict between extremist Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria. It 
contributes new perspectives and a theoretical model for determining genocidal proclivity 
to the field of conflict analysis and resolution, and proffers alternative strategies for 
relationship building and peaceful coexistence among different religious groups. The 
findings will guide recommendations on policy formulations for eliminating religious 
intolerance in northern Nigeria. The study creates further awareness on the need for 
global intervention on the region’s sporadic killings to avert full blown Rwandan type 
genocide in Nigeria. 
 
  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Nigeria as a nation-state has encountered a myriad of complex problems 
involving different variables and stakeholders, as a result of which it has experienced 
economic downturn, political upheavals, coups d’état, civil war, and a deluge of ethno-
religious conflicts (Williams, 2011). As a regional giant inundated with political 
instability, organized and pervasive crime influences, prodigious corruption, and a 
climate of entrenched ethno-religious violence (Chalk, 2004), Nigeria’s internal religious 
politics could affect its West African region’s neighboring states (Chalk, 2004). Most of 
the conflicts have predominated northern Nigeria, with the Middle Belt region, primarily 
Jos in Plateau state (Ostien, 2009) as the major conflict zone, and such other cities as 
Kano in Kano state (John, Mohammed, Pinto, & Nkanta, 2007), Kaduna in Kaduna state 
(Aliyu, 2009; Kazah-Toure & Human Rights Monitor, 2003), and Maiduguri in Borno 
state (Aliyu, 2009), where mass killings and exterminations have remained sporadic and 
have persisted for decades, primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians or non-
Muslims. 
Several studies have linked the prevalence of conflicts in northern Nigeria to a 
myriad of factors including, economic factors (including resource allocation inequity) 
and indigene-settler issues (Gberie, 2006; Harnischfeger, 2004; Omeje, 2004; Osaghae, 
1995; Ostien, 2009), and political factors and unbridled power tussle (Ukiwo, 2003). 
Some of these studies have also identified religious factors and politicization of religion 
(Ibrahim, 1989, 1991; Osaghae, 1998a; Suberu, 2009; Williams, 2011), ethnicity factors 
and colonialism’s amalgamating of various ethnic groups (Aguwa, 1997), as leading to 
Nigeria’s high ethnocentric politics (Anthony, 2002; Osaghae, 1998a), as well as Islamic 
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fundamentalism (Chalk, 2004; Harnischfeger, 2004). Kukah and Falola (1996) present 
Islam’s political impact in Nigeria as causal factor, primarily in northern Nigeria in which 
Islam predominates, which, based on the North’s vast Muslim population, the Muslim 
world perceives Nigeria as a key member, with Islam’s politicization impact further 
compounded by its ideology of non-separation of religion from politics. Harnischfeger 
(2004) presents an Islamists redefinition of the demos entitled to rule with the 
enforcement of Sharia law which is based on the Muslims’ exclusionary ideology in 
Sharia operational states against non-Muslims (p. 431). 
Thus, gruesome killings have continued to take place in northern Nigeria, and 
according to Ibrahim (1989), an incursion has occurred between Christians and Muslims 
with extensive loss of life and destruction of property for which researchers have 
identified several causation factors. However, while a confluence of causes may be 
underlying the conflict in northern Nigeria, there is no significant understanding of 
whether there are genocidal inclinations to the conflict, and the extent to which the 
interplay of religion and ethnicity helps to foment and escalate the conflict. 
Underlying Factors Influencing the Study  
The episodic gruesome killings in northern Nigeria have persisted and remained 
unabated up to present. The non-abating nature of these atrocious killings has framed the 
researcher’s thoughts namely, that there are other underpinning factors to them. The 
motivation for this study is rooted in a dire need to raise awareness on the gruesomeness 
of the ongoing carnages, with an unflinching desire for efforts to be mobilized towards 
putting an end to such intermittent atrocities. This desire derives from personal family 
experiences encountered during the 1966 pogrom which was directed primarily against 
3 
 
 
the Igbos in northern Nigeria. Many personal relations were killed in the pogrom. The 
researcher’s parents, then living in Malumfashi, Katsina State in the North, lost all of 
their wealth through looting and arson, only narrowly escaping with their lives. Such 
carnages have continued unabated since then even though sporadic. This history of 
systematically targeting a victim group(s), who more often than not are Christians or non-
Muslims by the perpetrator group(s) who usually are extremist Muslims, continues to be 
played out in northern Nigeria today (Chalk, 2004; Harnischfeger, 2004; Ibrahim 1989, 
1991; Ostien, 2009). These insights have birthed the desire to investigate the northern 
Nigeria conflict, involving an in-depth analysis of conflict cases in northern Nigeria 
spanning from the 1966 crisis to the present in order to explore the plausibility of 
genocidal inclinations to the conflict. 
Context of Study 
Situate in the sub-Saharan, West African region, Nigeria at independence in 1960 
was made up of four regions, Northern, Western, Eastern, and Midwestern Regions (see 
Map I in Appendix A), a structure that was changed in 1967 with the creation of  twelve 
new states which replaced the regions (see Map II in Appendix A). Prior to the 1967 new 
states creation, northern Nigeria, which is the focus of this study, spanned more than half 
of the country extending up to the area now known as the Middle Belt including Abuja 
and Jos, and covering the whole of the former Northern Region under the colonial powers 
(see Map delineating the Old Northern Region up to its southern part in Appendix A). 
The resulting breakup of the country led to the division of the Northern Region into six 
states out of 12 states nationally in 1967, and these were subsequently further broken up 
into 19 northern states out of 36 states nationally in 1996. 
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Furthermore, Nigeria is politically zoned into six “geo-political zones” which 
include “the north west; north east; north central; south west; south east; and south 
south,” the grouping of which, while not referring to administrative entities, form the 
country’s geo-political zoning for its federal employment allocation (International Crisis 
Group [ICG], 2010, p. 1). The expansion of the country’s federal administrative units to 
36 states by 1996 altered the relationship between majority and minority groupings, 
particularly fracturing and eroding the major ethnic groups’ dominance over minority 
groups. While this majority eroding process in the far north did not lead to a shift to the 
minority overtaking the majority holding in any state, it undercut the Hausa-Fulani vision 
of regional unity, and in Kaduna particularly, it reduced the power of the Hausa-Fulani 
dominance over the minority population (ICG, 2010). Nigeria is, thus, roughly split 
between a mostly Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south, with a Middle Belt 
or central region that has a near Christian and Muslim balancing, with each of the regions 
incorporating some minority traditionalists (Osaghae, 1998a). 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore the ethnic and religious dimensions of the 
continuing northern Nigeria gruesome killings to determine whether there are genocidal 
inclinations to the episodic killings. It is recognized, for instance, that “between 1966 and 
1970, a genocide-in-part occurred in Nigeria, following the U.N. definition” (Melson 
1996, p. 163). As defined by the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide, the crime of genocide constitutes such acts in which patterns of 
religious, racial, or ethnic massacres have a solid indication of genocidal intent (Hinton, 
2002;  Jones, 2006). In analyzing the commonalities between the partial genocide that 
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occurred in Bosnia and the Armenian genocide, for instance, it is observed that the 
Serbian nationalists just as the Young Turks, and the Croat to some extent, are also 
imagining a large state which would comprise their people while excluding other national 
and ethnic groups. Thus, the Bosnian Muslims, like the Armenians as an ethno-religious 
community with claims to land, are being driven out and massacred by Croatian and 
Serbian nationalist movements seeking to destroy their culture, to “cleanse” their 
presence from the area, and to appropriate their lands (Melson, 1996, p. 166). Hence, the 
Nigerian derivative that is being played out in northern Nigeria today involves extremist 
Muslims intent to ‘cleanse’ the north of Christians and other non-Muslims through the 
‘exclusionary ideology’ of imposition of the Sharia Law (Harnischfeger, 2004) to ‘force 
assimilation’ or ‘extermination’ (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 30; Harnischfeger, 2004) 
through massacres and genocidal killings of those who refuse to assimilate or adopt the 
Muslim ideology (Harnischfeger, 2004; Melson, 1996; Stuijt, 2009). 
This study presents that there are genocidal inclinations to the northern Nigeria 
conflict which also have latency or covertness as a result of the episodic and 
intermittency of killings that have been going on for decades in the conflict. The study 
aims to establish similarity of genocidal patterns to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious 
conflict by examining genocidal occurrences and massacres in history, particularly the 
20
th
 century deluge to contemporary genocides, for an understanding of genocide, how it 
presents, and the forms it takes. It will examine the underlying causes of genocide, 
explore some examples and types of genocide, and also investigate measures to forestall 
and prevent further escalation of the conflict. 
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Research Problem 
Previous studies on the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria have identified 
a multiplicity of causation to the conflict which has persisted intermittently for decades.  
A review of such studies reveals, however, that there is no significant study to investigate 
the existence of genocidal undertones to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. 
This mixed qualitative content analysis and grounded theory study seeks to examine the 
parties to the conflict, the mechanisms involved, and the conditions that led to their 
outcome, to inquire whether there are genocidal inclinations to the conflict. The 
phenomenon is presented as ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria involving 
Muslims and Christians or non-Muslims (Creswell, 2007, p. 101). The fundamental 
issues explored involve determining the parties in the varying conflict cases, examining 
conflict causation, and investigating whether there are genocidal inclinations to the 
conflict. 
Outline of the Study 
The dissertation has six chapters. Chapter one is the introduction for the study. 
Chapter two covers an extensive literature review on the northern Nigeria ethno-religious 
conflict, providing a historical background to the conflict in two sections: Northern 
Nigeria – Pre-Colonial and Colonial to Independence, and the North at Independence to 
Present. The chapter also reviews the conceptual framework of genocide, covering its 
definitions and origins, causes, typology and examples of genocide, alternative 
methodological approaches in Genocide studies, as well as the prevention and 
punishment of genocide. Lastly, the chapter examines different theoretical perspectives 
for proffering an understanding of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. Chapter 
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three presents the study’s research design and the rationale for the mixed qualitative 
content analytic and grounded theory methodology used for the study. The chapter also 
presents the procedures for data collection and data analysis for the study. 
Chapter four presents the data analysis results delineated from content analyzing 
and coding of newspaper articles of cases of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, 
focusing on causation and intentionality to inquire on genocidal inclinations to the 
conflict. The chapter also presents the grounded theory model for determining proclivity 
to genocide in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, deriving from the 
consistency of the emerging patterns (Stake, 1995) of the Nvivo coding and data analysis 
of the five study phases. The model derives from the theoretical framework of Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) and is developed from this study. The presentation of the study’s 
findings indicates that the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict has genocidal 
undertones to the conflict. Chapter five discusses the findings addressing the study’s 
research questions, presents a summary of the findings, and proffers recommendations 
for conflict resolution, as well as genocide prevention and intervention for aversion of 
further escalations of the conflict. Chapter six discusses the implications of the study and 
provides a conclusion to the study. The next chapter covers the literature review for the 
study. 
 
  
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction  
This chapter covering the literature review on the ethno-religious conflict in 
northern Nigeria consists of three sections. The first section examines the ethno-religious 
conflict in northern Nigeria, exploring its background and significance. The second 
section examines the conceptual framework of genocide. To foreground an investigation 
of the plausibility of genocidal inclinations to the ethno-religious conflict in northern 
Nigeria, it is essential to understand the contextual meaning of genocide, its conceptual 
framing and causal factors, as well as the forms and typology of genocide. This involves 
examining and distinguishing genocidal concepts from other forms of exterminations 
such as massacres and ethnic cleansing, as well as exploring the underlying and 
contributory causes of genocide. To address these issues, the focus of this second section 
of the literature review has been organized into five parts. The first part explores the 
origins and definitions of genocide, and the second covers the causes of genocide. The 
third part investigates the types of genocide, and the fourth presents some examples of 
genocide. A fifth part looks at alternative methodological approaches in genocide studies, 
and explores some preventative and intervention measures to stop genocide. The third 
and last section of the literature review presents the theoretical framework to explain the 
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict and its genocidal framing. 
Significance of Study 
Nigeria is “a ‘regional giant’ whose internal religious politics could affect 
neighboring states in the West African region” (Chalk, 2004, p. 414). Nigeria has, since 
its 1960 independence, been inundated by a myriad of socio-political, socio-economic, 
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and socio-religious crises which have manifested in coups, countercoups, political 
assassinations, and mass killings involving national, regional, or intergroup ethnic and 
religious based conflicts. The prevalence of these conflicts has been in northern Nigeria, 
primarily in the Middle Belt region, where sporadic mass killings and exterminations 
have persisted for decades between Muslims and Christians (Ibrahim, 1989, 1991; 
Osaghae, 1998a; Ostien, 2009). Other northern states of intense conflict conflagration 
include, Kano in Kano state (John et al., 2007), Kaduna in Kaduna state (Aliyu, 2009; 
Kazah-Toure & Human Rights Monitor, 2003), Maiduguri in Borno state (Aliyu, 2009), 
and Bauchi in Bauchi state, etc., where mass killings and exterminations have also 
remained sporadic and persisting for decades, primarily between Muslims and Christians 
or non-Muslims. While different perspectives including economic factors such as 
resource allocation inequity and indigene-settler issues (Harnischfeger, 2004; Osaghae, 
1995; Ostien, 2009); political factors such as unbridled power tussle (Ukiwo, 2003); and 
cultural, ethnic, and religious factors among others have been used to explain the conflict, 
it is noted that, following the Sharia law institution as penal code in 12 out of the 19 
northern states since 1999, more than 50,000 people have been killed in religious 
violence in northern Nigeria (Christian Solidarity Worldwide [CSW], n.d., para. 1). 
Several studies have linked the prevalence of conflicts in these areas of northern 
Nigeria to factors such as poverty, retarded development, and political factors. Some of 
these studies have identified religious and ethnicity factors as undergirding the waves of 
killings in northern Nigeria. In its article, Northern Nigeria: Background to the Conflict, 
the International Crisis Group (ICG) observes that a myriad of complex and inter-locking 
factors undergirds the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria, “including a volatile 
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mix of historical grievances, political manipulation and ethnic and religious rivalries” 
(ICG, 2010, p. 1). The ICG report though focused on the twelve states of the north that 
have adopted the Sharia law (see Map VI in Appendix A) on the basis of their uniqueness 
in some aspects of the conflict and their similarity in other aspects, such as the Muslim 
Christian tensions or the skirmishes involving land use which applies to all Nigerian 
states, it is, thus, applicable to the entire northern states on which this study is focused. 
According to the ICG (2010), while the Sharia adopted region may have 
historically shown ample capacity for peaceful coexistence between its religious and 
ethnic communities, local conflicts are primarily taken by outside observers as 
representative of the northern Nigerian society as a whole which is contrary to the case. 
However, conflicts between Muslims and Christians have been predominant in the entire 
northern states. And while both religions adherents might have generally coexisted 
peacefully in various areas of the north, there is the aggravation of long existing tensions 
particularly between Islamic groups and Christian groups with the Sharia’s 
reintroduction, as a result of which, hundreds or even thousands were killed in Kaduna in 
February/March 2000 (Angerbrandt, 2011; p. 15; ICG, 2010, p. 1), for instance. There are 
also other dimensions of conflicts between disparate Islamic sects, between Islamic 
groups which are anti-establishment and security forces or the Nigerian state, and lately, 
between long established indigenous communities and the settler group. Framed by the 
competition for communally based distribution of public resources, such conflicts are 
widespread in the country. Hence, the ICG observes that: 
Many factors fuelling these conflicts are common across Nigeria: in particular, the 
political manipulation of religion and ethnicity and disputes between supposed 
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local groups and “settlers” over distribution of public resources. The failure of the 
state to assure public order… Economic decline and absence of employment 
opportunities, especially as inequality grows, likewise drives conflict. As 
elsewhere in Nigeria, the north suffers from a potent mix of economic malaise and 
contentious, community-based distribution of public resources.  
But there is also a specifically northern element. A thread of rejectionist 
thinking runs through northern Nigerian history, according to which collaboration 
with secular authorities is illegitimate….calls for an “Islamic state” in 
Nigeria…demonstrate that many in the far north express political and social 
dissatisfaction through greater adherence to Islam and increasingly look to the 
religious canon for solutions to multiple problems in their lives. (2010, pp. i-ii) 
However, while a confluence of causes may be underlying the conflict in northern 
Nigeria, there is no significant understanding of whether there are genocidal inclinations 
to the conflict, and, the extent to which the interplay of religion and ethnicity help to 
foment and escalate the conflict, which are the thrusts of this study. 
Background to the Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious Conflict 
To examine the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria, it is essential to 
understand the historical background of the region’s ethnic and religious societies. It is 
also essential to understand the North’s Sokoto Caliphate “center-periphery” model, 
which has profoundly impacted community relations and discussions on religion’s 
position in the politics of the region (ICG, 2010, p. 2). This section is organized into two 
parts. The first covers the pre-colonial and colonial northern Nigeria to Independence, 
and the second outlines the North from independence to present. 
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Northern Nigeria: Pre-Colonial and Colonial to Independence. Home to 
several ethnic and religious communities, the northern Nigeria is primarily rural, while 
also including historically, such key urban centers as Sokoto, Kano, Kaduna, Zaria and 
Maiduguri which for centuries have been eminent Islamic world centers of learning (ICG, 
2010, p. 2). The Hausa, Fulani, and the Kanuri are the predominant groups in the region, 
all three of which are primarily Muslim, in addition to other smaller groups of about 160 
in number, many of which are Christians or animists. There are Muslim majority in most 
of the far northern states which in such states as Sokoto and Borno are overwhelming and 
in other states such as Kaduna and Jos being more mixed. The delineations crystallized 
into majority and minority groupings since the early 1900s British colonization, with its 
complexity further compounded by the substantial mainly Christian southern migrants to 
the region. Other than the north east which is dominated by the Kanuri, the Hausa and 
Fulani predominate across most of the region and is reflective of its political and 
numerical hegemony. It is observed, however, that: 
Neither the Hausa nor the Fulani is a rigid lineage group – one can become Hausa 
by adoption or conversion to Islam, although in doing so one enters at the bottom 
rung of a highly stratified society. As large Islamized ethnic groups closely 
associated with the nineteenth-century Sokoto Caliphate, the Hausa and Fulani are 
often seen as dominant in the region and grouped together as a single Hausa-
Fulani group. This is encouraged by Nigeria’s politics of communal rivalry and to 
some degree reflects their own political strategies. However, Hausa and Fulani are 
distinguishable in terms of names and languages and consider themselves distinct. 
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While nearly all Fulani in the region speak Hausa, the region’s lingua franca, not 
all Hausa speak Fulani. (ICG, 2010, p. 2) 
The region’s earliest peoples comprised several smaller groupings organized in 
community based or autonomous polities, most with state structures which are merely 
rudimentary with neither imperial rulers nor expansionist ambitions (ICG, 2010, p. 2). 
The Hausa, a self-identifying group formed partly in-situ as well as from migrations 
emerged in the twelfth century, and in the absence of forming a unified empire due to 
internal rivalries, “established seven major city-states and seven other associated-states – 
collectively now known as Hausaland” which extend into present-day Niger Republic 
(ICG, 2010, p. 2). These states had by the thirteenth century gained much control over the 
region and incorporated different smaller groups into Hausa-speaking multi-ethnic 
polities (Falola & Heaton, 2008; ICG, 2010) and by the seventeenth century the Hausa 
Empire flourished, significantly controlling the trans-Saharan trade in slaves, gold, and 
salt. It is observed that the Hausa had in this pre-colonial era established commercial and 
social linkages in the presently known northern Nigeria, up to the Senegal valley far west, 
and as far east as the Arabian Peninsula far east (Falola & Heaton, 2008). 
The Kanuri who originated, on the other hand, from the Kanem Empire emerged 
in the ninth century in south-west, present-day Chad, and migrated towards Lake Chad, 
subdued the locals, and by the eleventh century established the Borno Kingdom separate 
from the Hausa states, becoming in the north-east the largest ethnic group through inter-
marriage and assimilation of the locals. The Fulani migrated in the thirteenth century 
from present-day Senegal through the empires of Mali and Songhai to Hausaland and in 
the fifteenth century to Borno mainly as nomadic herdsmen with their scholars gradually 
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gaining influences with the Hausa nobles through appointments in Hausa royal 
households as scribes, advisers, tax collectors, and judges (ICG, 2010). Both the Hausa as 
well as the Borno kingdoms were equally prominently engaged in the trans-Saharan 
trade, as people and goods traversed the north-south desert routes, linking societies of 
sub-Saharan Africa with North Africa as well as Europe, with the fourteenth to the 
sixteenth centuries observed as the trans-Saharan trade “golden age” during which period, 
slaves and gold were mostly traded (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 245). Relationships were 
established between the Borno and Kannem-Borno kingdoms and the Hausa states, with 
Borno and the north Africa Maghrib states having long-drawn commercial ties through 
their trans-Saharan trade engagement, with the back and forth movement of people and 
goods creating mutual commercial exchanges and relationships. Islam was, thus, brought 
to both Hausa and Borno states between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries through 
these trade routes (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 246). 
The spread of Islam, commerce, slavery, and war shaped the initial interactions 
besides the early settlements and migrations, with many states waging wars for expansion 
of territorial claims and acquiring slaves for export to North Africa or to work the feudal 
plantations. The major interactions that occurred through the spread of Islam took place 
in two phases—its peaceful introduction by Arab and North African merchants and 
clerics through West Africa from the eleventh to the seventeenth century. The Borno 
Empire rulers converted first in the eleventh century and were followed by the Hausa 
kings from the fourteenth to the fifteenth centuries through interactions of Mali scholars 
and traders across Songhai Empire, with Mali Muslim scholars already occupying key 
administrative positions in Hausa city-states by the fourteenth century (ICG, 2010). 
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Islam’s second spread phase was the early nineteenth century Shehu Usman dan Fodio, a 
Fulani preacher’s led revivalist revolution jihad to purify the region’s Islamic practices 
and subsequently install righteous leadership. The missionary activities benefited Dan 
Fodio who drew large discipleship crowds, and criticizing the state, he swayed many 
towards identifying with his new societal vision by emphasizing the maltreatment of the 
poor by the Hausa kings who were pagans and lived grandiosely without practicing the 
Islamic law. Constituting an alternate center of power, Dan Fodio’s jihad which started in 
1804 proved successful, with a resultant emergence of a Fulani aristocracy that presided 
over a caliphate and which was a federation spanning many emirates (Kukah & Falola, 
1996). The jihad invaded and subdued the fourteen Hausa city-states from 1804 to 1808 
aided by Fulani nomads and Hausa peasants dissatisfied with their kings’ corruption and 
nepotism, and installed Fulani emirs to replace their chiefs. Though partially conquered 
by the new regime from 1808-1812, only Borno was not fully subdued by the Sokoto 
Caliphate (ICG, 2010). 
Thus, formed between 1804-1808, the Sokoto Caliphate “is a reference point for 
many in the region…[and] a source of great pride” (ICG, 2010, p. i). Deriving cohesion 
from Islam, its empire comprised autonomous emirates with separate emirs and 
administration, and the Sokoto-based caliph at the head doubling up as spiritual guide and 
political leader. Retaining the feudal pre-jihad system, the caliphate had the Hausa 
aristocracy replaced with Fulani royal families, with tithes paid to the emirs by the 
communities and tribute paid to the caliph by the emirs. Islamic practices and values 
were entrenched in the region by the Fulani rulers (Pierce as cited in ICG, 2010) though 
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with the populace’s passive resistance at times, in order to foster an ethnicity 
transcending common culture to hold the caliphate together. It is, thus, observed that: 
Sharia was applied “more widely, and in some respects more rigidly ... than 
anywhere else outside Saudi Arabia,” and indigenous religious practices, such as 
traditional Hausa ceremonies (Bori), were suppressed, or at least became less 
visible. However, the Fulani rulers also assimilated many elements of Hausa 
culture, thus creating the basis for what some see as a progressively homogeneous 
Hausa-Fulani identity…[T]he caliphate also promoted a culture of “knowledge 
and intellectualism”, such that “education became the yardstick for all 
opportunities in the state and knowledge a ladder for climbing heights of respect 
and dignity.” (ICG, 2010, p. 3) 
Under this Shari’a recognition, a relationship developed between the emirs and 
the sultan. The caliphate in its first formation, however, was not like the jihadists 
anticipated, being plagued by such disturbing features as slave raiding, unjust practices 
including the corruption of the judiciary, and power rivalry (Kukah & Falola, 1996). It 
was, thus, far from ideal as a kingdom as “Resistance to Fulani rule, including resistance 
from Fulani nobles who felt excluded from emerging power structures, and more general 
insecurity, especially along its periphery, continued throughout the nineteenth century” 
(ICG, 2010, p. 3). Hence, while Islam aided the consolidation of political rule, it 
simultaneously inspired revolts especially among those suffering intensive taxation, with 
several communities devastated by the nineteenth century ending by revolts arising from 
grievances on economic and religious doctrinal differences. Still haunting relations 
between the smaller plundered groups and the Fulani, are the memories of the emirates 
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warriors’ raids and looting of such periphery regions then considered heathen territory, to 
capture slaves for the caliphate’s plantation. The caliphate’s late years witnessed rising 
tensions between the Sufi two major brotherhoods (Tariqa)—the Tijaniyya and the 
Qadiriyya—which presenting from the fifteenth century in the region, became the 
caliphate’s dominant/official order. The Tijaniyya, with its bureaucratic and rich traders 
social base, grew more popular in the nineteenth century and in time was linked with 
resistance to the region’s ruling aristocracies, and in particular, to Sokoto (Loimeier as 
cited in ICG, 2010). 
With the advent of colonization in the late nineteenth century, the Europeans were 
recognized to have arbitrarily drawn Nigeria’s present day borders in the 1884/85 Berlin 
Conference in line with the United Kingdom mutual agreements with Germany and 
France, as part of the colonization process for West Africa (Falola & Heaton, 2008). 
These borders were not linked to any pre-existing ecological, geographical, or social 
boundaries as people, as well as goods, had in the pre-colonial days freely moved across 
those borders, forming historical and commercial linkages with other African societies. 
As the twentieth century approached, however, there had been a decline in the trans-
Saharan trade to negligible levels due to the growing Atlantic coast trade with the 
Europeans which started in the sixteenth century, and which diminished the trans-Saharan 
routes significance. With colonialism and the delineation of Nigeria’s official boundaries, 
therefore, there was an even greater difficulty in sustaining the trans-Saharan trade which 
had served to transfer people and goods across Nigerian territories (Falola & Heaton, 
2008).  
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Colonialism ushered in the establishment of the protectorate of Southern Nigeria 
and the Lagos colony by the British government in the late nineteenth century, and this 
was followed by a northward extension in 1900 which also established the Northern 
Nigeria protectorate. Slowly negotiating for the acceptance of colonial rule with the  
northern emirs, Frederick Lugard, appointed as the Northern Nigeria High 
Commissioner, got cooperation from most kingdoms with internal dissent having 
weakened them already with the ending of the profiteering slave trade, while also 
defeating those that resisted, including Sokoto in 1903 (ICG, 2010). Thus, it is observed 
that “The killing of the fleeing Caliph Attahiru I, in July 1903, marked the end of the 
caliphate as a sovereign political formation” (ICG, 2010, p. 4). However, there was a 
continued prominence of the caliphate in both political and religious structures of the 
region on which the ICG observes that: 
The Sokoto Caliphate occupies an important, but ambivalent, position in the 
consciousness of Muslims in northern Nigeria. Its history is a source of pride, and 
its legacy gives a sense of community and cohesion…It has also left behind a 
structure of traditional governance, centered on the caliphate emirs and their 
inheritors… 
The fact that the caliphate continued to exist under British sovereignty for 
nearly 60 years has given its heritage much ambivalence. Equally, attitudes to the 
caliphate and its heritage differ greatly in different locations, following the center-
periphery structure of the entity itself. Over the decades, it has become, in the 
eyes of many, the locus of a northern Muslim “establishment” that is vulnerable to 
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accusations of selling out to non-Muslim outside powers and, more generally, of 
moral or material corruption. (2010, p. 4) 
Thus, while the caliphate was put to an end by Europeans through colonization 
with most of it becoming a portion of the colonial Nigeria, the Fulani aristocracy adopted 
a civil strategy in relating with the British, without adopting their Christian religion, and 
although some powers of the aristocracy were lost, its Islamic law system remained 
(Kukah & Falola, 1996). The British colonial administration governed Nigeria by indirect 
rule from its 1900 proclamation to the country’s 1960 independence, thus, controlling the 
populace and raising revenue using local rulers under supervision of British officials. 
This involved reorganizing traditional local authorities and creating a local compliant 
power base to further British interests, while deposing resisting office holders. British 
indirect rule allowed traditional authorities, mostly the Sultan of Sokoto, to expand 
though with such power subject to the British, and while colonial rule aimed to avert 
disrupting social structures in the region, its religion, and culture, it introduced crucial 
cultural, judicial, and political changes. The caliph’s defeat and the establishment of a 
new capital for the region in Kaduna diminished the sultan’s influence and authority, 
partially transferring the aristocratic power to an emergent political class, but retaining 
the sultan’s spiritual leadership of the region’s Muslims (ICG, 2010). Shortly prior to 
independence, fifty years later, concerns were turned towards the reformation of the legal 
system that would accommodate migrants and the interests of foreign investors, with the 
power transfer to Nigeria at the end of World War II finally providing the opportunity of 
using the caliphate’s legacy “to build a strong political party based on Islam and 
ethnicity” (Kukah & Falola, 1996, p. 3). 
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Hence, although curtailing the emirs powers through indirect rule, they were in 
contradistinction relied on by colonial power for indirect rule, with significant 
consequences, as it worked effectively in emirates already relatively well-established 
administratively but not in those without effective administrative systems mainly due to 
minority group resistance (ICG, 2010). And, with indirect rule somewhat reinforcing 
emirate administration, several minority sectors became increasingly subordinate to the 
power of the emirate with no concern for their distinctive identities. Converting to 
Christianity was common with the minority or the non-Hausa-Fulani groups, frequently 
in response to their perception of the emirate administration’s power. It is observed, for 
instance, that:  
These smaller groups expressed fears of domination in a post-colonial Nigeria, 
but a 1958 commission largely dismissed their concerns. Nevertheless, colonial 
rule facilitated the domination of Hausa and Fulani elites, especially in areas that 
minority groups had historically considered their exclusive domains, and sowed 
the seeds for conflicting claims to political space, economic rights and societal 
values. (ICG, 2010, p. 5) 
Although the Islamic law that the caliphate established was retained by the 
British, it was in time restricted to civil cases, while the applications of punishments such 
as lashings were also restricted, and subsequently, the Sharia’s jurisdictional enforcement 
was scaled down to the native courts at the local-level. The colonial period saw an 
imprecise labor division for Islamic judges referred to as the alkalis, presiding over 
family matters, and the legal councils of the emirates who applied principles of common 
law to such issues as commercial property. There was a frequent application of the 
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“Islamic principles of compensation for violence and murder” ICG, 2010, p. 5). Sharia 
content was, however, expunged by the British in 1959 towards the end of colonial rule 
on the basis “that some of its provisions were incompatible with the rights of all citizens 
in a religiously plural society” (ICG, 2010, p. 5).  In the context of the alkalis’ increasing 
political role against the emerging pro-independence parties and following the colonial 
government’s mounted up pressure (Bello as cited in ICG, 2010), the region's 
government in compromise accepted the Penal Code which established a Sharia appeal 
court applying solely to Muslim personal law in its jurisdiction. Several Muslim leaders 
in the region saw such changes as Christian jurisprudence being elevated over their 
Islamic legal heritage (Crisis Group Interview as cited in ICG, 2010). 
Western innovations were largely discouraged by the colonial administration, 
with Christian missionaries along with their schools only permitted in the defunct 
caliphate’s non-Muslim fringes. By replacing the ajami with the Roman script for Hausa 
language writing and establishing together with the Islamic system a European system of 
education, pre-existing scholarship was much jeopardized with the cleric’s status and that 
of the English unlettered diminished (Aliyu as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 5). There was, in 
time, a further sharpening of existing cleavages between the Hausa-Fulani Muslim and 
the smaller groups. More so, while most northern parts were shielded from missionary 
activities, education, and other Western influences by a pact signed between the Laggard 
administration and the northern emirs, a free rein of these Western influences were 
allowed in the south, which gave the southerners a head start in education as well as in 
political development (Osaghae, 1998b). 
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Furthermore, the demography and economy of the region was also altered by 
colonial developments. There was an influx of southern migrants in response to the 
emergent economic opportunities in Zaria, Kaduna, and Kano with the railway lines 
construction from Lagos to Kano from 1898 to 1912, and the 1914 Southern and 
Northern Nigeria protectorates amalgamation. The North’s Ibo presence has its origins 
with their thousands of rail lines workers from the 1910s to 1920s, increasing and 
becoming more permanent as British activities increased in the North based on “push” 
and “pull” migration factors (Elegalam as cited in Anthony, 2002, p. 35). Such factors 
include an unprecedented pressure on the agricultural resource base in Igbo land with the 
increasing population, the need for cash to cope with the demands of a changing 
economy and colonial taxation, and the incapacity of the mainly agricultural economy of 
the Eastern region to absorb the increasing mission-educated Ibos. The culminating effect 
of these led to the Ibos’ migration, initially to Lagos, the country’s colonial capital, and in 
time increasingly to the North with opportunities for skilled employment and trading 
“pulling” them to Northern Nigeria (Anthony, 2002, p. 35). There was also reluctance by 
the British to introduce mission schools in the far North’s emirates as their structure of 
Islamic authority worked smoothly with the British indirect rule system, thus, 
occasioning a phenomenal imbalance in western education between the south and the 
north. And, additionally compounding the far North’s problem was the imbalance 
resulting from increasing educated students and teachers in the Northern Region coming 
from the Middle Belt with a limited Islam presence and a large Christian presence that 
rapidly expanded within the colonial period. These factors, therefore, created the 
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opportunities for public service and private enterprise for southerner’s disposition to 
migrate to the north (Anthony, 2002). 
However, though positively contributory in some respects (such as the railway 
boosting of agriculture particularly that of cash crops), migration did not entirely produce 
interethnic integration. Partly undergirding this was the territorial nature of the ruling 
caliphate era and the originated aristocracies’ unwillingness to allow “strangers” within 
their areas, which while also partly undergirding it, was the British policy of preserving 
the Islamic identity of the North to potentially deter inter-group tensions. Hence, ICG 
observes that: 
…the British discouraged the movement of non-Muslim migrants into the core 
Muslim areas of some of the region’s cities, pushing them instead into the 
sabongari (strangers’ quarters). Over time, the distinction between locals 
(“indigenes”) and strangers emerged as a key feature of Nigerian social and 
political life. (2010, p. 5) 
It is recognized that such multiple communal and overlapping identification 
mechanisms referred to as “associational ethnicity,” offer particularly important social 
networks to new immigrants (Nwaka as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 5). In combination with 
segregation, however, ethno-religious identities have become sharpened by them, in 
addition to reinforcing discriminatory practices which have continued to influence the 
Hausa and Fulani relationships with the other city dwellers. The beginning occurrences of 
major inter-ethnic violence manifested in the period leading up to the independence, 
particularly in 1953 when the southern parties’ efforts to hold pro-independence rallies 
resulted in a clash between the Hausas and the Igbo migrants in Kano, with about 36 
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deaths recorded in the riot, out of which 21 were Igbos and over 200 injured (ICG, 2010, 
p. 6). The riot is observed as reflecting the opposition of the northern politicians to 
independence based on their fear of being dominated by the more advanced south 
(Feinstein as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 6), while also indicative of the resentment felt locally 
against the economic domination  of the Igbos as in trading, for instance (ICG, 2010). 
Thus, in fear that the southerners’ head start educationally and politically will 
advantageously place them in political dominance after independence, northern 
nationalists in 1953 objected to self-government. Rather, they capitalized on the 
preponderance in northern size and population and insisted on counter-measures that 
would nullify their fears while also paving the way for northern dominance as basic 
conditions for remaining in the country and agreeing to eventual self-government 
(Osaghae, 1998b). These measures included the allocation of 50% center House of 
Representatives; the allocation of national revenue resource on the basis of population; 
the non-granting of the demands of the Yoruba in the northern areas of Ilorin and Kabba 
to be joined to the Western region; and the introduction of ministerial responsibility only 
at the instance of the North’s readiness for it. There were also the demands for regional 
autonomy which northern delegates presented in the 1953 Constitutional Conference in 
London following their threat to pull out from the colonial union, which the granting of 
all these demands “conferred political advantages on the Northern region in the 
federation which emerged, and underlay the problem of Northern domination which was 
a major source of the country’s political problems after independence’ (Osaghae, 1998b, 
p. 6). 
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Furthermore, religious tensions and conflicts that marked the colonial period 
include “Madhism,” an anti-colonial, Muslim oriented, trans-Saharan movement which 
posed a major threat to the authorities (ICG, 2010, p. 6). Professing a doctrine of the 
return of a messianic Mahdi at each century’s turn that would lead to the triumph of 
justice and strengthening Islam, the movement drew an enormous following, and as an 
anti-colonial influence (ICG, 2010, p. 6), instigated clashes with the British officials. 
Tensions also intensified between the Muslim Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods 
towards the end of the colonial period, with the Sokoto ruling aristocracy (mainly 
Qadiriyya) aligning with colonial authorities, increasingly indicted with charges of 
amassing wealth and power, as well as collaborating and condoning Western decadent 
influences. In consequence, the region’s different section leaders began aligning with 
Tijaniyya given its obvious anti-Western and anti-colonial posture. Hence, while tensions 
between the two orders were initially restricted to political elites and scholars, by the 
early 1940s under the ruling of prominent Tijaniyya leaders, the order transformed into a 
mass movement with much influence, possessing extensive economic and political 
networks as the conflict between them grew into direct confrontation (ICG, 2010, p. 6). 
Both orders’ political importance increased greatly with the election in 1951 and 
competition for their allegiance by the then, two northern based political parties, the 
Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the Northern People’s Congress 
(NPC). In consequence, having religious authority started being connoted with political 
implications as both orders’ bargaining power grew, and by the mid-1950s there were 
several clashes between the two orders in Sokoto with the challenge posed to the 
Qadiriyya by the Tijaniyya’s aggressive presence. The influence of the caliphate, 
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however, remained strong notwithstanding these developments, and by the independence 
run-up, the primary political party was the NPC, which was a Hausa-Fulani 
predominantly elite group controlled by the caliphate or Sultan also called the Sarduana 
of Sokoto (Alhaji Ahmadu Bello) and an Usman dan Fodio descendant (Paden as cited in 
ICG, 2010, p. 6). While a break-away of the party’s more radical younger elements 
formed NEPU on the grounds of “seeking to free the talakawa (commoners) from the 
oppressive hold of the sarauta (aristocracy),” the region was NPC led at the country’s 
independence in 1960 (p. 6). Thus, while occasioning new economic opportunities, new 
cities and population movements, colonial rule stimulated new identities and reinforced 
existing ones, thus setting in some cases, the stage for violent, long-lasting identity 
conflicts. There was a strong reinforcement of wider Islamic community links, hence, it is 
recognized that: 
In the far north, with its tradition of religiously informed public authority, there 
remains a strong feeling that colonial rule was an alien domination that disrupted 
or eroded the region’s legal, political and cultural values.  
…ambivalent views among Muslims concerning public authority in the far 
north – mistrusted in its relations with secular or Christian “others” (external 
powers, neighbors or compatriots) - continued after independence. (ICG, 2010, p. 
6) 
And, equally ambivalent and varied was the non-Muslims’ experience under 
colonial rule among both the Christian indigenous groups and the southern immigrants, 
with some taking advantage of the opportunities for education, to their Muslim 
counterparts’ chagrin on occasions, and others suffering from their perceived Sokoto 
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establishment reinforced powers (ICG, 2010). Such state of ambivalence, thus, existed 
among the North’s varied ethno-religious groups up to the country’s independence in 
1960. 
The North at Independence to Present. At independence, the Sarduana Ahmadu 
Bello led NPC governed the Northern Region out of the country’s three regions - the 
others, Eastern, and Western Regions, and was the power dominating the Nigerian 
federation-run coalition, with its position nationally reinforced by the fact of the British 
leaving behind a more populous and larger northern region than the combination of the 
two other regions. Intense regional competition and squabbling characterized this first 
republic (Falola & Heaton as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 7). The Northerners had two primary 
aspirations: “to enhance their influence relative to the more developed south and [to] 
preserve their religious and cultural identity, inherited from the caliphate era but 
disrupted by colonial rule” (p. 7). In consequence, the NPC and Sarduana aimed at 
unifying the northerners as one bloc that would continue to wield dominant power 
nationally, as well as restore the region’s cultural identity and religious heritage (Ostien 
as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 7). Hence, it is observed  that: 
Proclaiming a principle of “One North, One Destiny,” Ahmadu Bello pursued a 
“northernization” policy favoring northerners (of all religious persuasions) in 
employment in regional and local administrations. This policy, which dated back 
to 1954, was informed by fears that migrants from the south, with the advantage 
of their Western education, would continue to establish themselves in the 
administration and the economy. (ICG, 2010, p. 7) 
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The northernization policy served for the replacement of provincial and regional, 
non-northern civil services employees with northerners. Observing the goals of the policy 
as going further than public administration, the Sarduana is stated to have articulated 
(Kurfi as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 7) that: 
…the Northernization policy does not only apply to clerks, administrative 
officers, doctors and others. We do not want to go to Lake Chad and meet 
strangers [i.e., southern Nigerians] catching our fish in the water, and taking them 
away to leave us with nothing. We do not want to go to Sokoto and find a 
carpenter who is a stranger nailing our houses. (ICG, 2010, p. 7) 
In order to realize this goal, crash programs were introduced by the Sarduana to train and 
equip civil servants of northern origin with adequate qualifications for assumption of 
greater governmental control both at regional, as well as federal levels. Aimed at 
fostering solidarity of all peoples in the region, the policy widely benefitted the minority, 
predominantly Christian groups given their missionary school and high educational level  
making them feel belonged. The 1960s is seen by many as an era of much northern unity 
with minimized religious differences. No major reforms were, however, undertaken 
administratively by the Sarduana to address the region’s minorities’ age-old fears and 
their local autonomy demands to be excised from the rule of the emirate. 
The suppression of the minority groups’ rallying point opposition parties 
undermined, to the contrary the regional unity which the aristocracies and the ruling party 
sought to sustain. While the efforts to boost the “House of Islam” or the dar al-Islam 
drew strong Muslim majority support, this campaign, in addition to the Sarduana’s 
election in 1963 as the World Muslim League vice president, raised an alarm of Islamic 
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hegemony among the North’s non-Muslim minorities and the South’s Christian migrants 
(ICG, 2010, p. 7). Community relations became affected with such fears, and contributed 
to the first military coup in January 1966 against the northern region led federal 
government (ICG, 2010). Furthermore, with the Sarduana and the northern leaders’ 
second priority of promoting Islam “as a unifying instrument,” to ensure the preservation 
of cultural identity of the region, Bello established an umbrella body, “Jama’atu Nasril 
Islam (JNI, ‘Victory for Islam’)” in 1962 to unite Muslim sects, propagate Islam, and 
provide the NPC with an ideological base (ICG, 2010, p. 7). However, the Sarduana’s 
efforts to forge Muslim unity achieved minimal results, as violent confrontations 
continued among rival Sufi orders’ adherents, while the state-resource-supported 
campaigns  of minority “pagan” groups’ conversion to Islam were more successful (p. 7). 
Hence, in reaction to the religious and political tension prevailing in the country, 
the mostly Ibo officers-led coup of January 1966 in which many prominent northern 
leaders including Ahmadu Bello and senior  military officers were killed, “was partly a 
revolt against the perceived religious and political agenda of the ruling NPC” (Gumi as 
cited in ICG, 2010, p. 8). However, the initially mixed reactions the coup elicited in the 
region: 1) to the northern elites, there was a clear setback with the abrupt termination of 
Sarduana’s efforts at forging greater northern cohesion and of restoring the caliphate’s 
heritage in the region, and 2) to the non-Muslims, there was the partial relief of a seeming 
liberation from the stronghold of the NPC, but which soon turned into outrage with the 
realization of the killing of their high-ranking military officers as well. The January 
killings further worsened the perception of northerners of the southern ploy to control the 
center, with many northern leaders such as Sheikh Abubakar Gumi viewing the coup as 
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having exposed “the deep-seated hostility held by people in the south against the north” 
(Gumi as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 8). 
Shortly following the first coup, Ibos in the north witnesses the first onslaught in 
May 1966 in which hundreds were killed by Hausa mobs (Garrison, 1966d, para. 11), and 
this preceded the July 1966 counter-coup staged by mainly Hausa-Fulani and some 
minority northern ethnic groups in “a rare closing of ranks” (ICG, 2010, p. 8). In this 
ensuing second coup coming six months after the first, Maj. Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi was 
killed along with over 200 Ibo army officers and men (Garrison, 1968a, p. 38). In part 
compromise “to retain the solidarity of the non-Muslim minorities in a united Northern 
Region,” Muslim leaders installed as head of state, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon 
who is from the Middle Belt region of the north and a Christian (ICG, 2010, p. 8), 
without unanimity on his accession to office within the military, however (Osaghae, 
1998b, p. 61). 
After the July counter-coup, the spate of Ibo killings in the north intensified with 
episodes of massacres and pogrom occurring in July and September which were of 
greater magnitude than the May, 1966 killings. The fall of 1966 witnessed “the organized 
killing of up to 50,000 Ibo civilians in the North” massacred by northern mobs and troops 
which set in motion the flight of about two million Ibos from all parts of the country, to 
the safety of their region (Garrison, 1968a, p. 38). Osaghae (1998b) further observes that, 
“Between May and September 1966, an estimated 80-100,000 Easterners were killed and 
several thousands more wounded in different parts of the North” (p. 63), (see also Falola 
& Heaton, 2008, p. 174). The massacres triggered revenge killings of some northerners 
living in the Eastern region, even as Ojukwu fearing the non-safety of easterners outside 
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their region urged them to return home, and the non-easterners to leave the region. In 
reaction to these killings and the returning refugees to the Ibo-dominated Eastern region, 
the region seceded from Nigeria to declare a sovereign state of Biafra on May 30, 1967, 
under the leadership of Colonel Ojukwu, “on the grounds that easterners were no longer 
safe in Nigeria” (Falola &d Heaton, 2008, p. 174). This was after the Aburi Ghana accord 
reached in the negotiations between Ojukwu and Gowon failed (Falola & Heaton, 2008). 
A three-year civil war ensued from 1967 to 1970 as the Federal Military Government 
(FMG) moved in to forestall the secession which ended in the collapse of Biafra and 
surrender on January 12, 1970 (De St. Jorre as cited in Falola & Heaton, 2008), with 
about one million lives lost in the war, mainly through starvation (Garrison, 1968b; 
GlobalSecurity.org., n.d., para. 16). 
At the start of the war in 1967, the structure of the country became altered by the 
Nigerian government with the creation of 12 states nationally from the four regions, of 
which the Northern region had six states (see Map II in Appendix A). Subsequent states 
creations led to the North’s present nineteen states in 1996 out of the country’s present 36 
states, the process of which has altered the nations’ majority-minority relations by 
fracturing and eroding the regional platform and dominance over minority groupings. 
This majority eroding process, while undercutting the Hausa-Fulani regional vision of 
northern unity, particularly in Kaduna where it reduced the power of the Hausa-Fulani 
dominance over the minority, resulted in no minority shift and overtaking of majority 
grouping in the region. However, in some states new elites emerged from both the 
minority and majority groupings with the breakup. The north turned to military power as 
a route to power and influence. The federal government was northern dominated for most 
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of the military rule period, as the North’s “historic strength in the army was seen 
as…compensating for their disadvantages in Western education” (ICG, 2010, p. 8). 
However, with mostly Middle Belt soldiers predominating the force in the wake 
of Gowon’s emergence as leader following the July 1966 counter coup, “The Hausa-
Fulani oligarchy had to deal with their southern competitors and the upstarts in power, 
their ‘former slaves’ from central Nigeria” (Kukah & Falola, 1996, p. 56). The oligarchy, 
thus, adopted the strategy of focusing on “one north” regardless of religion or ethnicity, 
so as to defend the northern region, and some politicians vigorously worked to retain the 
old unity (p. 57).  Islam was once again brought to the fore through the transformation of 
Jamaatu Nasril Islam (JNI) into “a quasi political association” to work for attaining 
Northern objectives, and “with all Emirs and powerful Malams as members, the JNI met 
to discuss politics and how to defend the interests of the North” (p. 57). The use of Islam 
as a political strategy has thus, remained basically the same since the First Republic 
(Kukah & Falola, 1996). 
Furthermore, Nigeria experienced a continuous rule by military governments 
starting from 1966 through 1999, interlaced by a brief unstable civilian rule between 
1979 and 1983 which was cut short by General Buhari’s coup. While each of these 
military governments promised a speedy reversion to democracy, their transitions were 
on occasions either cut short or thwarted. However, after the dictatorial rule of northern 
General Sani Abacha from 1993 to 1998, returning to democracy started to be viewed as 
a way for the north to find political and moral renewal, and more so, for many, the 
traditional structure had also become tarnished by secular power’s corrupting influence 
(ICG, 2010). 
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The return to democracy by the nation in 1999 was celebrated across the country 
but far less in the north, as “For the first time since 1979…the region had lost control of 
political power at the center and was faced with the challenge of designing new strategies 
for regional self-assertion in the federation” (ICG, 2010, p. 9). It was, thus, in this context 
that the Sharia restoration campaign was initiated by the Zamfara state government, and 
between 1999 and 2002, twelve northern states adopted the Sharia law. While Muslims, 
as well as some Christians, were said to have lost faith in secular leadership and were 
supportive of a religious government idea, the concept of implementing Sharia 
exacerbated conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the region, and stimulated 
democratic debates over law imperatives. The controversy over the constitutionality and 
compatibility of Sharia with standards of international human rights, as well as 
Christians’ positions in its operative states, became equally intense (ICG, 2010). 
Furthermore, there were other transforming effects of the country’s return to 
democracy in the region with the emergence of the nation’s new generation political 
elites and more commanding substantial financial resources in the region. Thus, with the 
region’s authority figures increasing, although having less allegiance than the religious 
leaders and traditional rulers did, the political elites had control over funds which 
challenged the traditional authorities. With the access to resources conferred by state 
apparatus, additional tensions were created between religious and ethnic groups, as 
youths increasingly perceived politics as a crucial means for social upward mobility. At 
the same time, coupled with the unity of the north having been fractured with the states 
creation in the 1990s, the Hausa-Fulani grouping saw growing, more assertive minorities. 
Tensions also mounted between the Christians and Muslims amidst cynicism created by 
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economic problems, increasing government corruption, social institutions’ decline and 
perversion, and a rise in criminal activity (ICG, 2010). 
A long history of religious and ethnic differences between the Muslim-dominated 
northerners and Christian-dominated southern immigrants has undergirded the nation 
since its birth, which, however, has a stronger northern entry on politics given the more 
substantial number of Nigerian leaders from the north. Violence manifesting mainly as 
urban riots has, for decades, continued to periodically flare up in northern Nigeria, mostly 
pitting Muslims against Christians. Tensions in the region have also involved 
confrontations between different Islamic sects, which have particularly intensified since 
the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s, resulting in a predominance of violent conflicts in the 
north. More so, since the past decade there have been gruesome killings involving the 
Boko Haram radical sect in Yobe, Kano, Kaduna, Borno, and Bauchi states to name a 
few, especially from 2009 up to present, and has been predicative of more violence 
flaring up any moment (Akaeze, 2009). And, while seen as a “growing Islamic radicalism 
in the region” by some people in the West, the problem is recognized as being more 
complex with roots in Nigeria’s history, as well as its contemporary politics (ICG, 2010, 
p. i).  
Conceptual Framework of Genocide 
Definition and Origins of Genocide. Genocide is recognized as one of 
humanity’s most fundamental scourges, “the processes by which hundreds of millions of 
people met brutal ends,” with the understanding and challenging of it seen as a 
purposeful and needful energy exertion (Jones, 2006, p. xviii). Many scholars understand 
genocide as a global phenomenon which has been known through history, even where 
35 
 
 
fragmentary (e.g. Jones, 2006; Scherrer, 2002). Tracing genocide’s origins and evolutions 
has involved broaching a historical and legal analytical framework and exploring 
boundary cases in testing the genocidal framework, as well as examining various 
genocidal perspectives and cases around the globe (Jones, 2006). Presently, there is the 
recognition that virtually every identifiable human group which go by genocide’s legal 
definition, such as religious, racial, ethnic, national, and others, have been genocide 
victims, and today, are vulnerable in such contexts. Supporting this postulation, is the 
notion that, “humanity has always nurtured conceptions of social difference that generate 
a primordial sense of in-group versus out-group, as well as hierarchies of good and evil, 
superior and inferior, desirable and undesirable” (Jones, 2006, p. 4). 
Conceptually, the coinage of the word genocide was by jurist Raphael Lemkin of 
Polish-Jewish descent in 1944, prior to which time genocide as a phenomenon had no 
name up until WWII. Lemkin coined the word from a neologism derived from the Greek 
root word “genos,” connoting tribe or race, and Latin root word “cide,” connoting killing 
(Jones, 2006; Scherrer, 2002; Totten & Parsons, 2009). Genocide basically connotes “the 
intentional destruction of national groups on the basis of their collective identity” (Jones, 
2006, p. 10; Lebor, 2006; Totten & Parsons, 2009). In addition to the usage of Lemkin’s 
“new term and new conception for the destruction of nations” in his genocide coinage, he 
also proposed to incorporate “the whole conception of what is state organized mass 
murder, terrorism, vandalism and barbarity,” as well as detail proposals for the 
international community’s dealing with it (Lemkin as cited in Scherrer, 2002, p. 2). The 
Nazi occupation and analytical, law breaches work of Lemkin was the first work 
containing the word genocide (Lebor, 2006). Shortly after its coinage, genocide became 
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included in the indictments of Nuremberg’s Nazi war criminals, and in 1948 it was 
adopted as an international crime with the General Assembly’s “Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (CPPCG) (Jones, 2006, p. 12). 
Hence, Lemkin instrumented the formulation and adoption of the Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the United Nations in 1948 
(Lemkin as cited in Lebor, 2006; Gellately & Kiernan, 2003; Heidenrich, 2001; Jones, 
2006; Sells, 1998; Waller, 2002). 
An outline of Articles I to III of the Convention (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003; 
Heidenrich, 2001; Jones, 2006, p. 12; Totten & Parsons, 2009; Webster, 2007) follows: 
Article I. The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in 
time of peace or war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to 
prevent or to punish.  
Article II. In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, or racial 
or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Article III. The following acts shall be punishable: 
(a) Genocide; 
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(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide. 
It is argued that scholarly discourse has since focused on the issue of mass killing 
defining or not defining genocide and the stressing of national and ethnic groups, such 
victims of which predominated, as well as preceded the era of Lemkin’s work (Jones, 
2006). It is noted that political groups have, however, been seen as taking virtually 
dominant position as destruction targets since the 1940s and the 1950s of the Stalinist era. 
Hence, the onus of an operation having genocidal inclination lay on whether or not it 
ensued under policy rubric irrespective of its resulting or not in any or all of the group 
members’ physical destruction (Jones, 2006). 
More so, the Convention explicitly defines genocide as “acts committed with the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,” with 
such acts perpetrated “by killing members of the group, causing them serious bodily or 
mental harm, creating conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction, 
preventing births, or forcibly transferring children to another group” (Waller, 2002, pp. 
xi-xii). The Convention is observed to condemn specifically, such measures as “the 
prevention of births so that a people would die out and forcible transfer of a group’s 
children to another group” (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003, p. 3). 
In essence, genocide as a crime, fundamentally involves “a wide range of actions 
[which] are subordinated to the criminal intent to destroy or to cripple permanently a 
human group,” inclusive of “deprivation of life,” as well as “devices considerably 
38 
 
 
endangering life and health,” and it is argued that, “the acts are directed against groups as 
such, and individuals are selected for destruction only because they belong to these 
groups” (Lemkin as cited in Heidenrich, 2001, p. 3).  It is further argued generally that, 
“genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when 
accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation” (2001, p. 3). It is, however, 
also observed that contrary to Lemkin’s definition of the term, genocide is now 
frequently defined “as the organized extermination of a nation, people, or ethnic group,” 
as in the Rwandan 1994 Tutsis exterminations by Hutu, and the Nazi Holocaust (Lebor, 
2006, p. 11). 
It is recognized by many scholars (e.g. Heidenrich, 2001, p. 3; Lebor, 2006, p. 11; 
Totten & Parsons, 2009, p. 3) that, while such mass killings of a nation’s entire members 
or implementing plans of intent for mass killings constitute genocide, Lemkin’s definition 
of genocide has a broader meaning which connotes:   
the coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential 
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups 
themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political 
and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the 
economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal 
security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to 
such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the 
actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, 
but as members of the national group. (Lemkin as cited in Totten & Parsons, 
2009, p. 3) 
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Hence, it has been observed that, “the careful use of the term ‘genocide’ 
represents a fragile yet critical strand in the fabric of internationally shared and legally 
recognized values…a term that can be manipulated and misused…a name for something 
that seems to elude naming” (Sells, 1998, p. 10). It is argued that the Convention’s 
genocide definition is both “extremely broad and extremely narrow” (Totten & Parsons, 
2009, p. 3), with many scholars (e.g. Charny, Fein, and Horowitz as cited in Totten & 
Parsons, 2009) proposing alternative definitions in the absence of a generally accepted 
definition. Such definitive dilemma poses serious problems primarily for genocide 
prevention and intervention measures, as well as for prosecuting genocidal-like cases. It 
also compounds scholarly works in examining genocide’s preconditions, processes, and 
ramifications (Jonassohn; Charny; Dadrian; Fein; Kuper; and Schabas as cited in Totten 
& Parsons, 2009, p. 3). Furthermore, it is considered that an extensive listing of 
genocides as in Diamond’s exhaustive list of genocide cases through history to current 
stands the risk of expanding the concept’s frame to include most or all mass killing 
occurrences which retrospectively are considered to have been genocides (Diamond as 
cited in Webster, 2007). 
Additionally, it is argued that the Convention’s legal definition of genocide which 
came into effect only in 1948 limited the term to specified actions, events, intentions, and 
aims, and so, retrospectively designating various mass killing instances as ‘genocide’ 
loses the specificity of its meaning, primarily as a racial crime. For instance, Webster 
(2007) citing Morrison’s enumeration of “20 ‘major genocidal acts’ committed between 
1885 (Belgians victimizing Congolese) and 1994 (Hutu victimizing Tutsi in Rwanda),” 
observes that the United Nations have retrospectively recognized as genocides, nine out 
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of such lists (p. 171). Of paramount importance is the need for clarity on what genocide 
constitutes without narrowing its legal definition, given that, not having an internationally 
accepted definitive understanding of what specifically constitutes the crime of genocide 
poses the risk of using the term for political means, rather than for such humanitarian 
issues of protection, prevention, and punishment of genocide (Webster, 2007). 
It is further recognized that other definitive issues are omitted from the 
Convention’s definition of genocide, such as a totalitarian state’s destruction of its 
‘political’ opponents (Horowitz; and Overy as cited in Webster, 2007, p. 172). Also of 
essence is the importance of recognizing the Convention’s implied distinction “between 
direct (killing) and indirect means (preventing births through sterilization), both aimed at 
the biological destruction of the group,” with the first being illegal universally, and the 
second legal in a number of jurisdictions (Webster, 2007, p. 172). An instance of this is 
the Nazi’s forced sterilization and ‘euthanasia’ programs, which constitute the Nazi 
genocide integral aspects (Fein as cited in Webster, 2007, p. 172). Subsequent 
sociological and historical understandings can, therefore, be added to the Convention’s 
legal definition of genocide as argued by Webster: 
Genocide is a process that involves staged escalation; involves the biological 
destruction of a group (usually, but not always, racially or ethnically defined by 
the perpetrators); and is nearly always perpetrated by, encouraged or condoned by 
a state (and only the state can prevent it). (2007, p. 172) 
While also recognizing genocide to be legally defined as “the most serious 
crime…considered an “aggravated” crime against humanity,” it is argued that the 
Convention requires the perpetrator’s proven intent to destroy a people group—“the 
41 
 
 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such” (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003, pp. 14-15). Such proof of intent is not required of 
“other crimes against humanity and war crimes,” other than the mere criminal action of 
itself, as in the case of mass murder (2003, p. 15). Additionally recognized as genocidal 
is “the targeting of people for destruction on the basis of what are…inherited, perhaps 
genetic, shared group characteristics that the victims cannot divest…irrespective of their 
intentions or actions” (2003, p. 17). Further establishing a legal distinction between 
genocide and war, it is argued that: 
Wars are…fought only between armed forces. Genocide is inflicted upon the 
largely defenseless. In war, to preserve at least some civilized conduct, there is the 
concept of the noncombatant: infants, children, expectant mothers and women 
generally, the elderly, the infirm, civilians in general, and even some military 
personnel, including military physicians, medics, and prisoners. International law 
declares that anyone who wages war must actively try to avoid harm to 
noncombatants. Genocide, by contrast, is utterly contrary to international law, 
because its victims—no matter how innocent—are targeted intentionally. War 
perpetrates killing. Genocide perpetrates murder. (Heidenrich, 2001, p. 1) 
Moreover, a differentiation of ethnic conflict from genocide has been recognized 
on the basis of two distinctions, each focusing on genocide’s definition of the victim 
target group, the perpetrators, and intentionality. The first distinction is that in principle, 
ethnic conflict may sometimes not be more than just a clash of armed ethnic forces, 
without necessarily being genocidal and may not target civilians, but often does, 
however, as in the 1999 Kosovo case (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003). The second distinction 
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is that ethnic conflict presumably entails a popular mass movement with widespread 
participation or acquiescence. Genocide on the other hand, may not of necessity entail 
that, although it may sometimes take the form of mass participation as in the 1994 
Rwandan case (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003). Thus, genocide decision, plan, and order can 
be carried out, even secretly sometimes, by only a few perpetrators, with genocide, by 
definition, however, often claiming many victims, a crucial imbalance that is not 
paramount in ethnic conflict. In resolving genocide’s definitional dilemmas by 
distinguishing it from ethnic conflict, it is argued that, “genocide could be considered a 
subcategory of ethnic conflict, if all we need to define is a specific form that targets 
civilians for destruction,” but not where broadly defined as a social phenomenon, in 
which case, “genocide, with its essential feature of perpetrator intent, need only be a 
political operation” (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003, p. 20). 
Additionally, it is argued that “ethnic cleansing” in principle also involves 
territory “purification” essentially, not of a population, which entails an ethnic group 
deportation from a territory, and may typically be threatening without necessarily being 
violent (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003, p. 20). It has been observed that, “Ethnic cleansing 
requires either a protected reservation within a state or a free exit for the victims to 
escape; genocide precludes both protection and exit” (Fein as cited in Gellately & Kierna, 
2003, p. 20). It is considered, therefore, that in practice genocide is usually preceded 
and/or accompanied by ethnic cleansing though not always, as in the 1975-79 Khmer 
Rouge case of the Vietnamese minority annihilation in Cambodia; or the LonNol earlier 
regime’s massacres that expelled from Cambodia, 300,000 Vietnamese in 1970 (2003, p. 
43 
 
 
20). Thus, it is observed that ethnic cleansing could be a mere precedent or a burgeoning 
genocidal phase, but one which occurs separately (2003). 
Moreover, recognizing genocide’s coinage as referring to ethnic or national 
groups murdering, it is noted that genocide was directed at human groups that “shared 
racial characteristics” rather than against national groups, as “heredity determined the 
selection of the victims” (Friedlander, 1995, xii). There is, therefore, an argument for a 
redefinition of the Nazi genocide from its understanding “as the mass murder of human 
beings because they belonged to a biologically defined group” on the basis that, the 
“Jews were not the only biologically selected target” (Friedlander, 1995, p. xii). Hence, it 
is observed that: 
Alongside Jews, the Nazis murdered the European Gypsies. Defined as a 
“darkskinned” racial group, Gypsy men, women, and children could not escape 
their fate as victims of Nazi genocide. Biology also determined the fate of the 
handicapped, which, just as Jews and Gypsies, could not change their condition to 
escape death. The Nazis killed handicapped infants in hospital wards as well as 
elderly men and women in nursing homes…the Nazi regime systematically 
murdered only three groups of human beings: the handicapped, Jews, and 
Gypsies. (Friedlander, 1995, pp. xii-xiii) 
It is also contemporarily observed that “the word genocide is used so frequently to 
express hyperbole…[hence] the word’s international legal definition is controversial” 
(Heidenrich, 2001, p. 2). It is argued that the Convention’s genocide definition as a 
deliberate destruction primarily involving mass murder of “the targeted groups - national, 
ethnic, racial, and religious,” excludes socioeconomic and political groups, which groups 
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were seen as legally indefinable and imprecise by the various delegate negotiators of the 
definition in 1948 (p. 2). Hence, it is argued that, “whenever a government has committed 
mass murder without discriminating according to nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion, 
that government has not committed ‘genocide’ as international law defines the crime, 
even if its victims number in the millions” (p. 2). An instance of this is Cambodian 
Khmer Rouge Pol Pot followers in 1975-1979 who murdered eyeglasses-wearing people 
for “political” reasons with the intent to eliminate the bourgeois intellectuals, on 
assumption they wore glasses; and in attempt to socially reconstitute the Cambodian 
society by terrorizing and killing, had about 1.7 million Cambodians murdered out of the 
country’s seven million population. Thus, while Cambodia suffered in per capital terms a 
most awful mass murder inflicted by a government on its populace, in international legal 
terms, most of the victims were not “genocide” victims having been killed on purely 
political rather than racial criteria, with the only exceptions being the Cambodian ethnic 
minorities (Heidenrich, 2001, p. 2). Therefore, the argument has been made for the 
inclusion of social and political groups in the genocide definition by various scholars (see 
Drost; Whitaker; and Totten all as cited in Totten & Parsons, 2009, p. 3). 
It is further recognized that the issue of number was inconclusively left open by 
the Convention delegates with no agreement reached on what number of exterminations 
to constitute genocide (Heidenrich, 2001). Hence, the killing of a person by a thug gang 
simply on account of that person’s belonging to a specific race, ethnicity, nationality, or 
religion, such singular murder, legally speaking constitutes a genocidal act. It is, 
therefore, observed that as a result of the rather restrictive genocide definition by the 
Convention, some scholars today use the word politicide to connote politically based 
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mass murder, and democide to connote any deliberately caused mass deaths such as 
forced labor, direct massacre, avoidable famine, or willful neglect (Heidenrich, 2001, p. 
3). Furthermore, there is the recognition of genocide as implying “actions carried out by a 
state or ruler with the intention of systematically killing the members of a particular 
community or social collectivity and thus partially or totally destroying the target group” 
(Scherrer, 2002, p. 2). This raises the crucial issue of how the victim group is defined, 
with the argument made that any such definition should conform broadly with the 
Convention’s wording even though the Convention omitted some categorizations of 
victims (Scherrer, 2002). 
It is, therefore, argued that while the Convention in some areas is exceeding the 
current minimal consensus as in such gray areas of genocide’s indirect measures and 
practices, and in other areas such as in “the killings of members of a particular ethnic or 
cultural group (ethnocide), a particular political group (politicide), or a particular social 
group (democide)” they are not adequately covered (Scherrer, 2002, p. 3). Consequently, 
it is argued that:  
Genocide is state organized mass murder and the perpetration of crimes against 
humanity with the intention of exterminating individuals because of their 
affiliation to a particular national, ethnic, religious, or “racial” group. It is a 
premeditated mass crime that has been systematically planned, prepared, and 
executed. (Scherrer 2002, p. 3) 
It is also observed that two terms—mass murder and genocide—are used by 
scholars in classifying collective violence which stems from terrorism that is state-
directed, and providing a conceptual distinction between them, it is argued that mass 
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killing is “killing members of a group without the intention to eliminate the whole group 
or killing large numbers of people without a precise definition of group membership” 
(Waller, 2002, p. xi). On the other hand, “collective violence becomes genocide when a 
specific group is systematically and intentionally targeted for destruction” (p. xi). 
Genocide is also recognized as “the state-sponsored systematic mass murder of innocent 
and helpless men, women, and children denoted by a particular ethno-religious identity, 
having the purpose of eradicating this group from a particular territory,” thus, recognizing 
genocide as “mass murder short of eradicating the entire group, but including a 
significant subset of that group in the killing” (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 10). 
Furthermore, from an anthropological perspective, it is understood that genocide 
can be distinguished through an “othering” process in which an imagined community’s 
boundaries are reshaped with a group “included” previously being recast ideologically 
and usually, in dehumanizing narrative, as not existing within the community, and as a 
dangerous and threatening “other” to be annihilated, whether political, economic, racial, 
ethnic, or religious (Hinton, 2002, p. 6). To establish a distinction between genocide and 
other violence forms, the definition of violence in its present usage is recognized as the 
“exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage to, persons or 
property,” while generally it refers to any form of structural, physical, psychological, or 
symbolic force exerted against a person, group, or thing (Hinton, 2002, p. 6). Thus, it is 
argued that political violence is a violence subset which broadly encompasses covert 
forms, or “overt state-sponsored or tolerated violence” including “actions taken or not 
taken by the state or its agents with the express intent of realizing certain social, ethnic, 
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economic, and political goals in the realm of public affairs, especially affairs of the state 
or even of social life in general” (Nagengast as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 6). 
It is, therefore, understood that political violence subsumes conceivably various 
overlapping phenomena comprising war, ethnic conflict, terrorism, oppression, torture, 
and genocide (Hinton, 2002). Genocide is distinguished from other political violence 
forms by the perpetrators’ unrelenting and determined effort to destroy a people group. 
Thus, it is observed that Fein’s “sociological definition of genocide” as “a sustained 
purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or 
indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group 
members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim” 
(Fein as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 64) advantageously includes “the sustained destruction 
of nonviolent political groups and social classes” (Hinton, 2002, p. 64). Hence, 
definitively: 
while genocide may involve terrorism (or acts intended to intimidate or subjugate 
others by the fear they inspire), ethnic conflict (or violence perpetrated against 
another ethnic group), torture (or the infliction of severe physical pain and 
psychological anguish to punish or coerce others), oppression (or the use of 
authority to forcibly subjugate others), and war (or a state of armed conflict 
between two or more nations, states, or factions), it differs from them 
conceptually insofar as genocide is characterized by the intention to annihilate 
“the other.” (Hinton, 2002, p. 6) 
While recognizing the blending into each other of the boundaries of such different 
political violence forms, it is understood that as a conceptual category, genocide is also 
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undergirded by given presuppositions that are susceptible to discourse and challenge. 
Hence, delineating “an anthropology of genocide” domain is understood “as 
encompassing those cases in which a perpetrator group attempts, intentionally and over a 
sustained period of time, to annihilate another social or political community from the face 
of the earth” (Hinton, 2002, p. 6). 
Moreover, genocide is understood as an organized attempt aimed at 
systematically destroying an ethnic or politically defined group (Wood, 2001). From a 
geographic perspective, it is understood that to comparatively appraise genocidal 
orchestrations and consequences in its twentieth century recurrence and its international 
law formulation is undergirded by such geography-linked notions as territorial 
nationalism, Lebensraum, ethnic cleansing, and forced migration (Wood, 2001). In 
exploring the Bosnian 1992-95 and the Rwandan 1994 eruptions to understand the 
genocidal intentions involved, the processes, and the genocides’ effects, it is observed 
that genocidal actions involving planned and purposeful targeting of specific areas and 
groups are implemented methodically through murder and expulsion, and politically 
interweaved with territorial nationalism aspirations. Hence, it is argued that: 
Genocidal intentions are signaled through rhetoric and actions of political leaders 
that express an exclusionary and highly territorial form of nationalism. The 
mechanics of genocide are revealed through patterns of mass murder, destruction, 
and forced expulsion. The legacy of genocide is most apparent in the accounts of 
survivors, but is also seen in devastated landscapes and inadequate responses by 
the international community. (Wood, 2001, p. 57) 
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Still, on the conceptual explication of genocide, it is further recognized that 
genocide constitutes a “dispassionate,” controlled or instrumental violence which serves a 
political purpose, while massacres which though based on orders, usually involve 
“overkill” (Dutton & Kerry as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 22) or excessive violence beyond 
the military purposes intended, including torture, mutilation, rape, killing of civilians, and 
infants. However, mixes of genocide and massacre do occur, as in Rwanda where the 
government’s genocidal policy involved sequences of pogroms or massacres or pogroms 
representing two methods of political killings. It is recognized that in the case of 
genocide, sociopolitical reasons may be sufficient in explaining the selection of a target 
group as well as the group induction to kill. In the case of massacres, however, regardless 
of the training level, the military actions become violent and cruel, with restraint only, of 
the human imagination. Both massacres and genocide involve complicity of the 
international community which involves a deliberate decision to ignore the slaughter and 
to not regard what is going on (Dutton, 2007). 
Further on the definitional debate, genocide is understood as basically involving 
the entire processes through which specific “humans beings are both willed and 
empowered to deprive and deny other human beings, both individually and as part of 
broader familial and communal groupings, of their basic human dignity” (Levene, 2005a,  
p. 1). Thus, it is recognized that further exploring the definitions of genocide entails 
addressing such genocidal issues of “agents, victims, goals, scale, strategies, and intent” 
(Jones, 2006, p. 19). On varying perspectives regarding agency, it is observed that, 
among agents, there is a clear focus on state and official authorities, as in Dadrian’s 
“dominant group, vested with formal authority”; Horowitz’s “state bureaucratic 
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apparatus”; and Porter’s “government or its agents” (Dadrian; Horowitz; and Porter as 
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 19). Still, on the issue of agency, however, it is observed that the 
state-centric perspective is abjured by some scholars (e.g. Chalk & Jonassohn; Fein; and 
Thompson & Quets as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 19), with the Convention also citing as 
possible agents “constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals” (Article IV). Hence, it is recognized that most scholars of genocide in 
practice “continue to emphasize the role of the state, while accepting that in some cases – 
as with settler colonialism…– non-state actors may play a prominent or dominant role” 
(Jones, 2006, p. 19). 
On the issue of genocidal intent, it is acknowledged that legal theorists and most 
scholars see intent as defining genocide (Jones, 2006). Establishing a distinction between 
intent and motive, it is argued that a revolution or conquest which “causes total or partial 
destruction of a group legally qualifies as intentional and therefore as genocide whatever 
the goal or motive, so long as the acts of destruction were pursued intentionally” 
(Gellately & Kiernan as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 21). It is, therefore, recognized as being 
increasingly favored by legal opinion, the notion that “regardless of the claimed objective 
of the actions in question, they are intentional if they are perpetrated with the knowledge 
or reasonable expectation that they will destroy a human group in whole or in part” 
(Jones, 2006, p. 21). Accordingly, the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court is seen as reflecting a reasonably broad meaning of intent such that “a person has 
intent where…in relation to conduct, that person means to cause that consequence or is 
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events” (Greenawalt as cited in Jones, 
2006, p. 21). Similarly, the Rwandan International Criminal Tribunal in its 1998 Akayesu 
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judgment declares that “the offender is culpable because he knew or should have known 
that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group” (Schabbas as cited in 
Jones, 2006, p. 21). 
Hence, there is an understanding that the concept of genocidal intent combines in 
one hand, the notion of specific intent, with that of constructive intent in another (Jones, 
2006). It is considered, however, that specific intent is being inferred in instances “where 
actions with predictable results are taken over an extended period of time and the 
consequences of these actions regularly confirm their outcome” (Jones, 2006, p. 21). 
Constructive intent, on the other hand, included “cases in which the perpetrators did not 
intend to harm others but should have realized or known that the behavior made the harm 
likely… [and] clearly results in the destruction of that group of people, even if that result 
is neither intended nor desired” (Alvarez as cited in  Jones, 2006, p. 22). Instances of this 
include, systematic trailing and killing of a group’s members, forcible removal of 
members of a group to reservations while also withholding medication and food, and 
kidnapping a group’s children for enslavement outside of their culture. 
Further on genocide’s delineation, it is argued that the Armenian Genocide, the 
Jewish and Gypsy Holocaust, and the Rwandan Genocide are the only real genocides in 
contemporary history from a legal perspective (Schabas, 2000). It is also observed that 
genocide as a term is not to be applied to every atrocious mass killing situations; thus, 
legally such cases as Stalin’s Ukraine carnages, the Holodomor, and Nazi occupied 
Soviet citizens and Slav killings are not considered genocide (Schabas, 2000). 
Furthermore, the Bosnian massacres is presented as ethnic cleansing rather than genocide 
on the basis that the 1970s Cambodian Khmer Rouge did not have an ethnic dimension 
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and therefore, lacked a port essence of genocide, hence, deploring the United Nations 
categorizing of ethnic cleansing as genocide. Furthermore, it is argued that in the Darfur 
atrocities, genocidal intent is not established even though it involves the non-Arabs’ 
summary execution, and so it does not constitute genocide (Schabas, 2000). 
Causes of Genocide. A multiplicity of factors has been identified by genocide 
scholars as underlying genocidal orchestrations and processes. For instance, in an 
extensive investigation of genocidal dynamism involving an in-depth analysis of 
genocidal intent, dynamism and the contingency of its processes, the role of imperialism, 
state-building, social revolution ,and war in fueling genocide are identified (Jones, 2006, 
p. 4). Furthermore, there is recognition of the need and the process of directly addressing 
and understanding genocide, deriving from the combinations of widely present actions 
and influences in today’s world (Newbury, 1998). For instance, exploring the Rwandan 
genocide history identifies such broader issues of the genocide involving the dangers of 
associating genocide only with the world’s remote area. Thus, in setting out the 
genocide’s background, there is recognition of four conceptual frameworks including 
ethnicity, gender issues, outside influences, and ecological issues, with an 
acknowledgement of their importance in understanding genocide, as well as how these 
issues are illuminated by an understanding of genocide (Newbury, 1998). Accordingly, it 
is observed that, with the commonality rather than peculiarity of such issues to the 
Rwandan genocide, the tendency exists of presenting genocide as a remote phenomenon 
in spite of its widespread occurrence in North America, Asia, Europe, and Africa 
(Newbury, 1998). Further discourse on the genocide causation also, while arguing that 
primarily approaching genocide as a twentieth century occurrence, fails to grasp 
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genocide’s true origins; it is noted that genocide evolved fundamentally from the Western 
experiences of modernity and the struggle for the nation-state, which emanated from the 
Europeanist fifteenth to nineteenth centuries’ hemispheric expansion which provided the 
primary stimulus to genocide’s pre-1914 manifestations (Levene, 2005b). This section 
reviews such diverse views on genocidal causation factors as identified by various 
scholars. 
Imperialism, Colonialism, and Modernity. A theoretical conceptualizing of 
genocide account in history presents an understanding that underlying genocide in the 
modern world are such broad preconditions and interlinked elements often regarded as 
the normative underpinnings of ‘international society,’ which are, the ‘rise of the West,’ 
‘modernity,’ and ‘the nation-state’ (Levene, 2005a, pp. 10-11). It is observed that “the 
rise of the West” involved “massive expansion of European interference with non-
European societies and the forging of wholly new forms of dependency worldwide” 
(Bayly as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 11). Such expansion was done initially through 
mercantilist outreach and then followed by extensions of overtly capitalist core West 
European economies into the far-reaching ends of the globe, beginning in the later 
fifteenth century, and which were accomplished either by conquest or military coercion. 
This led to extensive or even total disruption, displacement, or destabilization of existing 
economic and social relationship patterns with their forcible reorientation towards 
aligning with the metropolitan new ‘core’ hegemonic interests, with previous world 
empires becoming subservient to the emergent world economy (Levene, 2005a, p. 11). 
While this shift accorded resource base and global market near-monopolization 
which advantaged the dominant elites and eventually the core metropolitan masses, it 
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created an inherent process for structural violence for ‘peripheralized’ or 
‘semiperipheralized’ societies at the receiving end, while also galvanizing previously 
independent-of-West societies, or later, imperial-bondage-released societies—to 
reformulate themselves to be able to compete and possibly evade the dominating 
dispensation. Hence, it is argued that: 
While the rise of the West was accompanied by no overarching political agenda 
for the annihilation of foreign peoples, it did create a broader cultural discourse in 
which such annihilation was considered perfectly conceivable; in which exactly 
such annihilations sometimes took place, not to mention further multitudinous 
interactions, tensions and fractures between, and within, extra-Western polities 
and societies which, in the long run, also carried an almost incalculable potential 
for extreme, exterminatory violence. (Levene, 2005a, p. 12) 
It is further argued, however, that the rise of the West intermeshes closely with 
Western epistemologies and thought systems, or essentially its worldview, which 
primarily refers to modernity—genocide’s underlying second factor. Thus, seen as a 
principle for organizing for rational awareness and a scientifically informed world, 
modernity was founded on the Enlightenment’s obsession for categorizing and 
classification (Levene, 2005a, p. 12). Hence, it is noted that, “in order to respond 
and…regulate the planet in the most efficacious and utilitarian manner” (Said as cited in 
Levene, 2005a, p. 12) “modernity became a quest to ‘divide, deploy, schematize, 
tabulate, index and record everything in sight (and out of sight) and…make out of every 
observable detail a generalization and out of every generalization an immutable law’” 
(Sengoopta as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 12). Furthermore, modernity posits the 
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knowableness and possibility of all things, as well as the applicableness to humans, of 
things applicable to things, “thus, just like other living species, human beings too can be 
‘apprehended, classified and theorized’” (Hinton as cited in Levene, 2005a, pp. 12-13). 
It is also argued that the use of “the fingerprint as the perfect identifying mark of 
individual difference” from the 19th century British colony, Bengal, (Sengoopta as cited 
in Levene, 2005a, p. 13) was also deployed by the Nazis based on “the same utilitarian 
premise” for “categorizing and hierarchizing whole groups of Eastern European peoples, 
on the basis of their ‘biosocial attributes’” (Schafft as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 13). 
Hence, describing such tendencies, variously, is understood “as the reifying, 
essentialising, biologising and manufacturing of difference” (Hinton as cited in Levene, 
2005a, p. 13). However, with these tendencies now generally recognized relative to 
Nazism, as throwing more light on modernity’s dark side, it is further argued that such 
tendencies, paradoxically, are equally founding “those basic self-referential 
Enlightenment wisdoms by which the world at large is…made a better, healthier, more 
productive and… more efficient place” (Hinton as cited in Levene, 2005, p. 13). 
Therefore, it is understood that progress as the positivist meta-narrative of modernity 
which links logically to a Western world order’s economic requirements, also implicitly 
carries the assumptions that non-conforming individuals or groups who, presumably, are 
unfit or insufficient to the order’s demands, are surplus to that ordering’s requirements 
(Levene, 2005a). 
Furthermore, modernity aggregates humans into single, static, invariable, and 
irreducible categories, with people normatively labeled members of particular races, 
tribes, religions, nations, etc. This shows on one end, its complex phenomenal 
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simplification and reduction capability, inclusive of humans, ‘into a more manageable 
and schematized form’ (Wallerstein as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 13), as well as its 
refusal or failure to envision humans’ potential for having multi-layered loyalties and 
identities. Hence, it is observed as historicized in the Armenian genocide that: 
analysis revolving around conflicts over irreducible categories such as race and 
religion turn history into a field where, instead of human beings interacting, 
abstract concepts do battle. It is as if hordes of individuals think and act as 
prescribed by ideologies of nationalism, religion, or race. Terminology then 
comes to reconfirm the view imposed by the genocide that, ultimately, one need 
not account for real Armenians leading real lives whose disappearance from their 
homes and from history must be accounted for; one is comforted by the thought 
that Armenians can be reduced to a corollary of a concept. (Levene, 2005a, p. 13) 
Additionally, it is argued that the indigenous peoples’ genocidal and inhumane 
treatment was frequently framed in modernity metanarratives, especially the conception 
of “progress” (Hinton, 2002, p. 10).  For instance, the Tasmanians annihilation was 
legitimized as an endeavor  to “bring them to civilization,” while the United States 
westward expansionism was justified by Theodore Roosevelt’s argument to not have the 
land remain “a game preserve for squalid savages” (Maybury-lewis as cited in Hinton, 
2002, p. 10). Also similarly noted is General Roca’s ill-famed “Conquest of the Desert” 
attack on indigenous Indians and his despicable voicing to fellow Argentineans that: 
our self-respect as a virile people obliges us to put down as soon as possible, by 
reason or by force, this handful of savages who destroy our wealth and prevent us 
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from definitively occupying, in the name of law, progress and our own security, 
the richest and most fertile lands of the Republic. (Hinton, 2002, p. 10) 
It is further observed that the massacre of the Herero thousands equally had such 
similar arguments legitimizing the killings, with an emphasis on the astounding cruelty 
and greed of the perpetrators, which is often described as “sickening” (Hinton, p. 10). It 
is noted that in this Herero example, the indigenous’ land was reason for their 
displacement and killings, while in other cases it was the need to terrorize them to 
perform slave labor. Additionally, it is noted that South American and Congolese rubber-
plantation owners as having been exceptionally brutal, and were seen as holding hostages 
of workers relatives, raping women, torturing and maiming the recalcitrant, and abusing 
and killing, sometimes for sheer amusement (Hinton, 2002, p. 10). In contemporary 
times, another modernity’s metanarrative imbued with developmental need discourses 
has become emblematic of the devastation trappings for indigenous peoples. Thus, it is 
further argued that “the “development” of Nigeria’s oil resources (through the 
collaboration of the government and multinational companies such as Shell), for 
example, has led to massive environmental damage and the enormous suffering of the 
Ogoni who reside in oil-rich areas” (Maybury-Lewis; and Totten, Parsons, & Hitchcock 
as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 10). Hence, a summation of contributory factors of 
indigenous peoples’ genocide is plausibly presented as their indigenous’ land resources, 
political weakness and marginality, extreme dehumanization, and modernity’s 
metanarratives,  with their plight improving in the globalization era, as nation states 
reorganize increasingly on greater pluralist lines (Maybury-Lewis as cited in Hinton, 
2002, p. 10). 
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Furthermore, it is argued  that indigenous peoples’ sufferings and death are often 
depicted by multinational corporations, companies, agencies, and governments as 
“progress” and “development” or a “necessary by-product” which are manifested in 
forms of mineral extraction, oil fields, logging, hydroelectric projects, and resource-rich 
zone land grabs (Hinton, 2002, pp. 11-12). There is an acknowledgement of the resulting 
displacement, extensive environmental damage, and indigenous peoples’ frequent deaths 
that emanate from such projects, as evidenced in the Ogoni case in Nigeria (Totten, 
Parsons, & Hitchcock as cited in Hinton, 2002). Hence, it is observed that: 
the very need for such harmful “development” projects is linked to other 
dimensions of modernity, the colonial endeavor and the creation of nation states. 
As European imperialists set out to conquer new territories, they laid claim to 
large swaths of land throughout the world. Colonial boundaries were “rationally” 
demarcated in terms of major landmarks and the claims of competing powers. 
This pattern of “rational planning,” establishing territorial borders, and ordering 
from above is one of the hallmarks of modernity. (Hinton, 2002, p, 12) 
Moreover, it is understood that, for creating a centrally manipulated or controlled 
grid/map, complex phenomena are simplified and reduced by the modern state into a 
schematized more manageable form, often with disastrous results, however, especially 
with disregard to local knowledge (Hinton, 2002, p. 12). As the colonial powers paid 
minimal attention to the indigenous understandings of sociopolitical differences in the 
mapping of new political frontiers, upon their withdrawal, newly emerged independent 
countries were found controlling minority as well as some majority population groups. 
These were inclusive of indigenous peoples, some of which clamored for more power, 
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greater autonomy, or the right for outright secession (Hinton, 2002). Furthermore, given 
the colonial powers’ economic exploitative tendencies, trained personnel and basic 
infrastructure were lacking in many of these nations, while also being poverty plagued 
with high population growth rates. Emphasizing colonization as a fundamental cause for 
the indigenous peoples’ destruction, particularly in their “conquest” and “pacification,” it 
is, however, observed that “[s]ome of the annihilations of indigenous peoples arose…in 
the course of…a genocidal process: massacres, appropriation of land, introduction of 
diseases, and arduous conditions of labor” (Kuper as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 65). Hence, 
colonialism is understood to have laid the foundation undergirding most of the suffering 
and violent conflict plaguing the contemporary world, as exemplified recently in the 
Rwandan genocide (Hinton, 2002). Also recognizing colonialism’s effect on the 
development on intra-societal violence in Rwanda and Burundi that framed the Rwandan 
genocide, it is observed that: 
It was the rapidly increasing strength of ethnicization and polarization fostered by 
the colonialists and by the postcolonial policies of the ethnopolitical power elites 
on either side that led to the demonization and dehumanization of the respective 
opposing group. In both countries there were repeated massacres that made any 
peaceful political solution difficult and ultimately impossible. (Scherrer, 2002, p. 
28) 
The Nigerian case has seen colonialism’s amalgamation of various ethnic groups as 
instrumenting Nigeria’s high ethnocentric politics, which is a fundamental factor 
undergirding the waves of killings in northern Nigeria (Anyanwu, 1982; Osaghae, 
1998b). 
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The Nation-state. The nation-state is recognized as the spatial arena in which 
such “selective reality” and “tunnel vision tendencies” are manifested (Scott; and Bayly 
as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 13). As an element of genocidal orchestration, the nation-
state is connected to the political organizational normative framework in the modern age, 
which notion provides our identities and assures freedom from threat of violence to our 
persons (Levene, 2005a). Citing Nobert Elias, Levene (2005a) observes that the nation-
state proffers the linked, two-fold benefits of reining in human tendencies for aggression 
through demands for greater self-control and non-violent social encounters, as well as 
provides legitimized universally recognized authorities monopolistic powers for ensuring 
social peace and instituting punitive measures against offenders.  It is noted accordingly, 
that “the consequent retreat of daily intrusions against our safety… powerfully enhanced 
the potential for a civilizing process” (Elias as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 14). 
While some historical sociologists have observed that in particular states’ 
modernizing trajectories, transition significant break-points have led to periods of 
extreme violence (Moore as cited in Levene, 2005a, pp. 14-15), such monopolization of 
violence, which was a primary outcome of the formation process of the nation-state, has 
only recently been questioned. The nation-state formation process was problematic in 
itself, except in “those most obvious cases where recognizably anti-democratic and 
overtly violent groups seized the apparatus” (Levene, 2005a, p. 15). The modern nation 
state’s general characteristics and broader implications, however, presuppose an 
absolutely uniform and unmediated authority for its policing, military, legal, 
administrative, and fiscal functions within its internationally recognized bounded territory 
and sovereign domain, entailing the entire land and all its appurtenances. This is 
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described as the aspiration of the modern state to make a ‘society legible’ for control and 
manipulation in its own interests (Scott; and Holquist as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 15). 
Hence, applications to cadastral surveys should plausibly apply also to humans through 
such administrative procedures as birth, marriage, and death registrations, and censuses. 
However, with some of the procedures preceding the dawn of modernity in some 
traditional systems of states, the tendency of ascribing equal cross-referencing statistical 
numbering to every registered individual for purposes of the administrative, fiscal, and 
military purposes, as well as for ascribing presumably equal uniform responsibilities and 
rights was essentially unique and revolutionary (Levene, 2005a). The individual 
citizenship concept that presupposes “an equality before the law,” is an extension of the 
universal suffrage notion which is generally accepted as the human condition’s 
fundamental benefit, as affirmed by the UN’s 1948 Declaration of Human Rights 
(Levene, 2005a, p. 15). 
It is contended, however, that three-fold danger inherency exists in the 
presumably liberating features of these new political state formulations. Firstly, Levene 
argues that: 
by defining each human being as an individual citizen, the state effectively 
subordinates all previous, traditional, and often multi-layered loyalties – whether 
to extended family, clan, tribe, community, sect, estate, or whatever – to itself, 
repudiating in the process the authority of these bodies to act as meaningful 
mediators or negotiators vis-à-vis the state, on behalf of those who otherwise 
might have understood themselves as component elements of exactly such social 
organisms. (2005a, pp. 15-16) 
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Levene (2005a) presents that while such bodies are not culturally, economically, or 
socially rendered redundant, they are politically done so, since only atomized citizens 
would be subsequently recognized as valid body-politic members, excepting where 
specific interventions are made for such ‘group rights’ bodies to be allowed by the state 
itself or other states in an international domain (Levene, 2005a, p. 16). Also significant is 
that in any temporal contending jurisdiction, while religious authority would be 
automatically overridden by the primacy of modern nation-state even with the polity’s 
former traditional organization having fundamentally been on religion, the affinity of the 
nation-state to the “omniscience and omnicompetence” principle of modernity infers that 
any spiritually emanating challenge to the political authority of the state would be 
inacceptable technically, such as any emanating from other dissenting voice, ethnic, 
social, or other voice. Hence, it is observed that: 
While, thus, there is no intrinsic reason why the nation-state has to be a secular 
one, the general point holds: the modern state’s primacy is absolute, regardless of 
religious authority or sanction, and hence to challenge it, whatever the manner or 
source of that opposition, is potentially to expose oneself to its monopoly of 
violence in whatever form the state might choose to respond. (Levene, 2005a, p. 
16) 
Secondly, the inevitable drive of the modern state to development bounds and 
amplifies this situation’s inherent dangers, being envisaged through its ongoing venture 
to achieve a more healthy, productive, and better society, with the modern state assumed 
as based on an upward continuing trajectory which confirms its fundamental 
indebtedness to modernity. Even with this as its raison d’être, it also carries a plausibly 
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implicit, or even explicit, human, technological, fiscal, and extractive resource organizing 
mandate for pursuing such terrestrially firmed goals (Levene, 2005a, p. 16). This does 
not, however, undermine its basic interest of mobilizing resources, human resources 
inclusive, for competing with other modernizing nation-states within the universal frame. 
Hence, it is argued that: 
the modern polity provides itself with a totalizing capacity largely undreamt of in 
the pre-modern world, the resulting options available to its subjects being of a 
zero-sum nature. As a group, or an individual, one can either be enthusiastic, 
obeisant or acquiescent in response to the state’s mobilizing demands, or, if one 
dissents or demurs, one ultimately, again, has to reckon with its monopoly of 
violence. (Levene, 2005a, p. 17) 
Thirdly, is the dominant mode of the modern polity, which refers mainly to the 
“homogeneous state-society” rather than the nation-state as such, given that the modern 
states have not all automatically maintained a legitimated existence based on the 
conceptualization of nationhood (Levene, 2005a, p. 17). Thus, ethnic monoculture 
grounding should not be assumed even where the case has been such.  While the United 
States and Britain and such “Avant-garde nation-states” have, in their national features, 
been notably hybrid, most others that are diversely ethnic such as Brazil, are virtually 
color-blind (Levene, 2005a, p. 17). Thus, in actual genocidal cases, in which conflict 
issues of race and ethnicity are seemingly turned on, the social coherence premium of the 
modern state is rather the underlying concern of the modern polities larger problem of 
sustainability among other competing nation-states in the international system. 
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Hence, both external, as well as, internal pressures serve as primary drivers 
towards the notions of uniformity and unity. There is, however, an unequivocal outcome 
to this, for which it is argued that: 
polities intent on long term sustainability in the modern, international political 
economy are those which, as a matter of necessity, demand that their citizens, or 
subjects, accommodate and/or assimilate themselves to a set of social, cultural, 
economic and often linguistic norms, as determined by the state. This usually 
means… recognizing oneself as a member of the national – or some other state 
defined notion of collective and unified - community. (Levene, 2005a, p. 17) 
It is observed that this recognition will result in the non-further acceptance of 
living on the state’s geographical or emotional borders as a way to avoid compliance, 
with such tactical means of avoidance becoming more unlikely as the economic 
imperatives of the modern state ensues (Levene, 2005a). In such circumstances, those 
that are unwilling to assimilate voluntarily will likely be encapsulated forcibly, through 
‘national’ value inculcation in state schooling universal programs among others, which is 
noted as another critical underlying indicator of the advent of the modern nation-state 
(Levene, 2005a, p. 17). The others that might be claiming exemption for reasons of say, 
religious non-conformism, will probably find their maneuvering scope profoundly 
confined. Also, recourse to the status of a minority group possibly by negotiating with 
authorities, could be a possible bolt-hole, but such that would only confirm a status of 
fixity, subordination, and subservience in relation to the state. It is observed that “any 
group which thus holds out against these norms is likely to find itself branded as pariahs, 
outsiders, troublemakers, or where simply individuals are concerned, as insane” 
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(Foucault as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 18). Furthermore, even in clearly multi-ethnic 
states with elitist exclusively manipulative behavior to ensure its own group’s ethnic 
dominance over the other(s), the unified nation’s rhetoric provides the most apparent 
apparatus for marginalizing its competitors (Human Rights Watch as cited in Levene, 
2005a). 
Additionally, it is argued that genocidal possibilities are not evidently manifest in 
all of such situations as can be seen, for instance, where the national state community 
embarks on the extrusion of a group for reason of its assumed “irreconcilable 
‘otherness’” or where, being unable to embrace the nation-state’s set down existence 
arrangements for the group, the group actively seeks to secede from the state (Heraclides 
as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 18). Rather, it is observed that “danger from the nation-
state’s monopoly of violence is implicit in all its fundamental arrangements (Levene, 
2005a, p. 18). This does not, however, present any particular thing as leading to genocide 
inevitably, nor that all nation-states are identical, but rather, that genocide occurrence can 
result only from an assemblage of a milieu of often special ingredients which are 
contingent mostly under crisis conditions. This also does not present the potentiality of 
genocide as exempt automatically from some states as a result of their supposedly being 
more attuned to development. Hence, it is argued  that: 
Few states especially liberal democracies, typically or openly exercise their power 
over their constituency through unmediated violence, though it is always held in 
reserve. Rather they try to ensure conformity to a set of images that create the 
illusion of unity, the illusion of consensus about what is and what is not 
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legitimate, what should and should not be suppressed. (Nagengast as cited in 
Levene, 2005a, p. 18) 
Thus, it is recognized that “the refusal of multiplicity, the dread of difference … is 
the very essence of the state” (Clastres quoted by Nagengast as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 
18). In essence, the analytical combination of the emergent nation-state, the rise of the 
West, and modernity, shows “that the fundamental reconfiguration of human society 
which these developments inaugurated was the harbinger of universal conditions in 
which genocide, as we understand it, became possible” (Levene, 2005a, p. 18). 
Moreover, in examining why genocide, ethnic cleansing, and forced displacement 
constitute part of the enduring features of the state system, it is observed that humans 
accept as morally justifiable, the “systematic mistreatment of other human beings” (Rae, 
2002, p. x). It is recognized that “pathological homogenization,” which involves “forced 
assimilation, expulsion, and genocide,” are practiced in the state-building process, with 
political elites frequently utilizing cultural resources for the redefinition of politically 
bounded communities as morally exclusive communities, with outsiders to be expelled 
from that exclusivity (Rae, 2002, p. x). It is argued that the international state system has 
through history been “replete with examples of states turning on their own citizens,” with 
no exception for the twentieth century, which rather witnessed increasing toll on citizens 
to unprecedented levels as states acquired greater military and bureaucratic capabilities 
(2002, p. 1). This is notwithstanding the international relation’s known scholarship of the 
state’s cardinal responsibility for “providing security for its citizens in an anarchical 
international environment” with norms of state’s legitimate behavior to its citizens 
developed by the international community since WWII ended (2002, p. 1). Hence, the 
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world has witnessed in the twentieth century’s last decade, an astounding level of 
brutality and targeting of population segments for expulsions and exterminations. 
The Human Agency and Collective Evil. Still on genocide causation, it is argued 
that people who commit extraordinary evil are ordinary individuals contrary to the 
common belief that extraordinary human evil perpetrators have historically mostly been 
extraordinary monsters, psychopaths, and sadists (Waller, 2002). Investigating why 
ordinary people commit evil extraordinarily, Waller (2002) presents that most 
perpetrators of genocide and mass killings, who are extraordinary by their acts rather than 
by their personalities which are ordinary and without identification as killers, mentally 
deranged, or sadists, in consequence elude demographical categorization. It is understood 
that most extraordinary evil perpetrators are not distinguishable by personality, 
background, past political affiliation, or behaviors portraying them as men and women 
who are not likely or unfit to be genocide executioners, such that “a purely evil person is 
just as much an artificial construct as a person who is purely good” (Waller, 2002, p. 18). 
Thus, extraordinary evil perpetrators are not to be considered so atavistic or irrational and 
beyond comprehension, but focus should be in understanding the factors that lead 
ordinary individuals into committing extraordinary evil. Extraordinary evil is connoted 
with extra capitalizing of human, with the deliberate harm being perpetrated on one 
another under social, political, or religious groups’ sanctions. Hence, it is recognized that 
the greatest atrocities are orchestrated with boundary dissolution between criminal 
conduct and the military; between barbarity and civility; and when social, political, or 
religious groups embark on collective violence as warfare or progress, towards a 
vulnerable victim group, such human evil acts of which writ large. In essence, “the 
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extraordinary human evil perpetrated in times of collective social unrest, war, mass 
killings, and genocide…the deliberate harm inflicted against a defenseless and helpless 
group targeted by a legitimating political, social, or religious authority - human evil in 
extremis” (Waller, 2002, p. 13). 
Additionally, the notion of doing evil is understood as the intentionality of 
inflicting pain on another against the person’s will and causing foreseeable and serious 
harm (Vetlesen, 2005). Investigating the reasons and circumstances underlying such 
desires, its exploitation, or the manner of its channeling on to collective evildoing, it is 
argued that such form of evildoing that pits entire groups against themselves derives from 
a fusion of social structure, situation, and character (Vetlesen, 2005). Further analyzing 
collective evil responses, there is recognition of the varying bystander types, 
differentiated on the basis of a pre-existing relationship with either victim or perpetrator, 
and the immediacy of the evildoing (Vetlesen, 2005). It is observed that a bystander who 
is aware of the atrocities being perpetrated, and has the capability to intervene but fails to 
do so, becomes the same as a perpetrator. Hence, it is argued  that: 
there is often but a thin line between the stance of bystanders and that of 
perpetrators: in denying human plurality (Arendt) and hence in denying 
uniqueness. Perpetrators targeting a ‘Them’ and bystanders deciding to remain 
indifferent (inactive) in the face of those victimized commit the same destruction 
of the moral foundation of the other by means of substituting the unique other 
with reifying categories of the It, making all others appear predictable and alike. 
(Tester as cited in Vetlesen, 2005, p. 231) 
69 
 
 
Moreover, reexamining some fundamental studies of conformity including the 
notable investigations of Milgram, Zimbardo, and Ash, there is recognition of the factors 
of emotional development and identity as contributing to genocide (Milgram, Zimbardo, 
& Ash as cited in Baum, 2008). Presenting a three personality type model of perpetrators, 
bystanders, and rescuers, Baum argued that the actions of people during genocide 
inevitably mirror their everyday behavior in daily living, with perpetrators prone to 
destruction, and rescuers prone to helping, while bystanders are the onlookers that remain 
uninvolved, and positioned between both extremes. By analytically combing eyewitness 
accounts and correlating these personality types with social-psychological factors, it is 
observed that similar emotional and mental traits are identified among all three 
personality types, with the divisions accounted for by conflict between the social and 
personal identity (Baum, 2008). 
Manipulation and Loyalty to Authority. Still on genocide causation factors, it is 
understood that undergirding the psychological inclinations motivating such violence 
extremities as prison riots, lynching, military massacres, and genocide are the issues of 
the means by which individuals are indoctrinated for military or political reasons into 
committing ghastly acts by leaders (Dutton, 2007). It is recognized that the group mind 
deriving from the crowd yearns for obedience and leadership. It is further observed that 
such crowd creates dangerous fanatical leaders with attachment only to self, as well as 
bounded followers to such leaders as representing an ideal self-type, who are, in turn, 
bounded to other followers through their idealized leader’s common connection—called 
the “common ego ideal” (Freud as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 24). This ideal holds the 
group together and allows freedom from social anxiety which directs normative rule of 
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everyday life behavior, with such freedom inhibiting in-group aggression. Ensuing from 
this will be violence regression referred to as the “primal horde,” a notional group 
depicted as slaying the father-figure and erecting totems in its stead (Freud as cited in 
Dutton, 2007, p. 24). Hence, there is an understanding of “the followers as slavishly 
presenting to the leader” with a yearning to obey which makes the synergy of the leader-
follower combination bidirectional and natural (Freud as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 24). 
Additionally, it is noted that a stronger motivation for the leader-followership relationship 
other than social anxiety freedom, which binds self to the group served, provides an 
emblematic panacea for avoiding the fear of death (Becker as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 
24). 
Furthermore, by tracing recurrences of massive human violence to determine 
causal factors for people’s willingness to kill others throughout history, it is 
acknowledged that politically contrived memory manipulation is fundamental in the 
unleashing of primal genocidal passions (Hirsch, 1995). Detailing the ways cultural 
memory becomes created to generate an understanding of the causes and ways mass 
murder episodes occur, it is observed that leaders are often invoking or creating past 
fictitious or real memories of injustices to instigate their cohorts to kill for politics or 
other motives, with generational accounts of happenings handed over as history. It is 
therefore, argued that politics is linked to psychology and culture, and people’s view of 
political systems and politics, as well as their learned manners of interaction with 
authority, are linked to issues they learned growing up (Hirsch, 2007). In consequence, 
cultural and political myths learned through the political socialization process present as a 
framework on which adult worldviews and behaviors are based (Hirsch, 2007). 
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Additionally, obedience reinforcing cues are directed by important culturally, socially, 
and politically positioned persons, and so where obedience is framed on a national 
mythology, such mythological link can be manipulated by leaders to plausibly sway 
participants’ views on the justification for mass destruction. Thus, where leadership 
spreads dehumanizing symbolizations of other people groups, they convey a justification 
message of the appropriateness of aggressively acting against such groups, based on the 
fact that peoples’ hostile impulses are often willingly acted out where reinforced by 
leadership. Hence, it is observed that: 
During the Holocaust, the continued description of Jews as vermin and bacilli was 
a prime example of dehumanizing symbolization. Anti-Semitism was also 
reinforced by the lack of opposition to the extermination of the Jews. The fact that 
political and religious leaders did not object seemed to confirm the legitimacy of 
the destruction…Leaders, consequently, may prepare a population for genocide in 
this fashion. (Hirsch, 1995, pp. 131-132) 
Moreover, Sells (1998) identified the role of Kosovo mythology manipulation in 
instigating and justifying the Bosnian atrocities. The Bosnian genocide is observed to 
have occurred with Western governments’ acquiescence in violation of the 1948 
Genocide Convention of the UN, as the genocide “has been motivated and justified in 
large part by religious nationalism, fueled financially and militarily from Serbia and 
Croatia, and grounded in religious symbols” (Sells, 1998, p. xxi). Thus, it is argued that 
the main victims are Bosnian Muslims who have been targeted for destruction as a result 
of their religion, with the Bosnian genocide being justified by “Balkanism” which 
connotes a particular historical abuse portending Balkans as fated genetically or 
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historically to kill each other (Sells, 1998, p. xxii). Furthermore, in examining the 
recurrences of massive human violence to determine causal factors for people’s 
willingness to kill others throughout history, and Hirsch (1995) presents politically 
contrived memory manipulation as fundamental in the unleashing of primal genocidal 
passions. While also exploring recent genocidal developments necessary for 
understanding the perpetrators, as well as other human behavioral aspects during the 
Holocaust, the issue of behavior shaping through obedience to authority and role 
conformity is identified as genocide causation factors (Newman & Erber, 2002). 
Additionally, it is generally observed that in examining genocidal causation, some 
genocide experts adopt “a top-down approach,” for instance, by examining authoritarian 
or utopian regimes, in contrast to “a bottom-up” approach to genocide which explores the 
average person’s thought and action frames with an absence or change of rules (Baum, 
2008, p. 6). Genocide theorists adopting the top-down approach are recognized as 
viewing manipulative elites as orchestrating genocide from a ‘get-go’ perspective, a 
notion that is supported by the apparent leading of genocides by demagogues, both 
charismatic and uncharismatic, including “Stalin (Russia), Mao/Chiang Kai-shek 
(China/Taiwan), Tojo (Japan), Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan (East Pakistan now 
Bangladesh), Pol Pot (Cambodia), Milosevic (Yugoslavia), Hitler (Germany)” (Baum, 
2008, p. 6). With the bottom-up approach, on the other hand, it is understood that the 
appearance of a demagogue only serves to echo the minds of the populace. For instance: 
Hitler and his ilk said nothing new, nothing that the volk hadn’t heard before. For 
years, people had retained all the social myths about Jews in the back of their 
minds. Such myths were reflected in fairy tales (the Grimms’ Jew in the Bush), 
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children’s rhymes, state-sponsored statues (such as the Judensau) and church-
sanctioned pilgrimage sites that honored sainthood for children martyred by “The 
Jews.” Like a good populist, Hitler echoed what everyone “knew.” It was as if 
God had read their minds. (Baum, 2008, p. 6) 
It is, therefore, argued that while there will always be manipulative leaders, they 
will not succeed without followership support, since without the masses’ support, the 
diatribe of a demagogue will only be regarded as a madman’s ranting (Baum, 2008). 
Thus, it is noted that “What really matters…is that the seductive quality of hate appeals to 
the average person’s irrational fears, their vanities, their greed and their blood lust” 
(Burma as cited in Baum, 2008, p. 7). 
Groupthink, Hate Processes and Dehumanization of ‘Other’. Moreover, on 
genocide causation factors, psychological forces have been identified as underlying 
massacres and atrocious massive killings in narration of dreadful occurrences which 
marked the 20
th
 century as eliciting the highest level of systemic human slaughters in 
history (Dutton, 2007). There is an understanding that such psychological factors 
undergird the process of Groupthink through which individuals are transformed into 
committing massive brutal murders with no compunctions. This is identified as the “B 
process dominance,” the mechanism of indoctrinating individuals to habituated brutality 
with the conviction to commit such hideous acts, which is often initially preceded by 
tortuous guilt, followed by dehumanization and belief of the target victim’s virus-like and 
unjust status which needs to be destroyed to avoid its destruction of the populace (2007, 
p. 153). It is argued that “the “groupthink” aspects drive the military decision outcome 
inevitably towards annihilation of the target group” (2007, p. 20). Also exploring the 
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human condition in analyzing violence generating situations and people’s responses to 
them, it is observed, citing Gustave Le Bon’s description of the French revolution, that 
the revolutionary mobs’ behavior is indicative of the “group mind,” which is a collective 
unconscious form all men share, even the civilized (2007, pp. 23-24). Thus, in 
“psychological groups” or crowds with everyone having the same goal, men’s behavior 
descends down the ladder of evolution several steps, to the place of “primitive people” 
(2007, p. 24). Hence, it is understood that: 
by the very fact that he forms part of an organized group, a man descends several 
rungs down the ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual, 
in a crowd, he is a barbarian - that is, a creature acting by instinct. In this group 
situation, the individual gains “a sentiment of invincible power which allows him 
to yield to instincts, which, had he been alone, he would have kept under 
constraint. (Le Bon as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 24) 
Moreover, such occurrence results from “anonymity and consequent loss of 
personal responsibility in crowds,” along with a tainting, in which usually proscribed acts 
are imitated and endorsed (Le Bon as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 24). The individual’s 
susceptibility in the crowd enables the group mind to control him or her, and is a racial 
consciousness form, which makes the individual perform acts contrary to his or her moral 
beliefs. Likened to primeval people, the group mind is presented as unconsciously driven, 
orchestrating impulsive acts, irritability and changeability, while also longing for 
obedience and strong leadership, such that, “the crowd…acted on “image-like ideas” - 
visual impressions lacking reason (Le Bon as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 24). 
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Additionally, examining various notions of hate, such as psychopathology, 
ideological attraction, and group processes, it is observed that such prior conditions are 
inadequate in explaining hate processes (Waller, 2002). Framed on several scholars’ 
works since WWII, Waller presents a four-pronged context model for explaining how 
people that are ordinary become involved in mass killings. The first two prongs are actor-
related factors of “ancestral shadow” involving, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and social 
dominance need; and perpetrators’ identities issues of cultural beliefs, moral 
disengagement, and self-interest; the third is the action’s social context or the “culture of 
cruelty” factors involving socialization, group binding factors, and person/role merger; 
and the fourth is response to authority based on “social death of victims” including 
dehumanization, us-them thinking, and victims blaming which legitimizes them as the 
enemy (Waller, 2002, p. 20). Hate is also recognized as “one of the most powerful 
forces…underlying mass killings…hate that is carefully nurtured and shaped to 
accomplish ends that are mindfully, planfully, and systematically conceived” (Sternberg, 
2003, p. 304). It is observed that “hate applies to whatever one calls the killings, from 
terrorism to massacres, genocides, and ethnic cleansing,” many of which are partly 
instigated by “fires of hatred” (Naimark as cited in Sternberg, 2003, p. 304). In his 
Duplex Theory of Hate, Sternberg’s (2003) triangular components of hate, namely, 
“negation of intimacy, passion, and commitment,” composed as derivative to his “triangle 
of love” (Sternberg as cited in Sternberg, 2003, p. 306), were used in combination with 
propaganda to incite hatred of the Jews. It is recognized that disgust was whipped up in 
several ways for instance, on the basis of which, Sternberg argues that: 
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The negation of intimacy was fostered by condensing the Jews into a single 
disgusting entity, as in references to the Jewish bacillus and smelly Jews. Jews 
were depicted as power crazed, greedy, and so forth, and Germans were depicted 
as handsome or beautiful, as pure, as saviors of the Aryan race, and even as 
Godlike. Passion was incited by Hitler’s rousing addresses to the masses, by mass 
demonstrations and parades, by use of films…by depictions of Jews in 
propaganda as defilers and rapists of Aryan women, and by depictions of Jews as 
evil (e.g., as Christ killers, devils, or purveyors of death). Finally, devaluation and 
diminution were fomented by youth organizations, control and censorship of the 
media and cultural artifacts, by demands for active but delimited active 
participation in persecution, by pressure to turn in Jews, and by the demand from 
the government for absolute obedience to hate-based government policies, on pain 
of death (e.g., if one harbored Jews). (2003, p. 307) 
Furthermore, hate remains an underlying factor not only in the Rwandan 
genocide, but also undergirds several of the world’s intricate problems. In the Rwandan 
1994 genocide, over 500,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates were killed within a few months 
(Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008, p. 2), with a majority of the Hutu population noted to have 
actively participated in the genocide, basically using such primitive weaponries as 
machetes, axes, knives, or guns. While humans’ capability for such violence predicates 
the workings of several psychological processes, hatred presents as a major facilitator for 
such mass killings. According to Sternberg & Sternberg (2008) such hate is not natural, 
in the sense of an inability of the individuals to act differently; on the contrary, it is 
“cynically fomented by individuals in power so as to maintain their power or by 
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individuals not in power, so as to gain it” (p. 2). Furthermore, in Rwanda, the radio 
station’s (RTML) broadcasts incited Hutus to slaughter their neighboring Tutsis, a 
strategy which was ultimately aimed at securing Hutu power in Rwanda. By the same 
token, just as in Rwanda, the Nazis cultivated hate and exclusionary feelings against the 
Jews, the Roma or Gypsies, the Communists, and other groups that were marginalized so 
as to increase and maintain power. Through the education and propaganda ministry 
established shortly after Hitler took over in March 1933, and the ensuing tight regulation 
of the media, literature, theater, art, and music, the radio became an essential means of 
disseminating socialist nationalist slogans that were aimed at manipulating the masses 
(Diller as cited in Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008). 
The Rwandan genocide resonates in several ways with the World War II events of 
Nazi atrocities against the Jews, Communists, Roma or Gypsies, and other supposedly 
inferior race groups, who were seen as obstructing the Nazis’ establishment of an 
economically independent nation and an exclusive reign of a seemingly purer race which 
would be stronger, healthier, and smarter than all other peoples on the globe. In this too, 
there was some power struggle with the Nazis aiming “to enlarge their sphere of 
influence to create the superior living conditions for Aryans at the cost of other people 
who were ‘unfit’ for the new nation” (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008, p. 2). Genocide and 
massacres are still continuing since the WWII Nazi genocide against the Jews, which are 
observed not as random killings or a mob’s spontaneous irrationality bursts, but are rather 
“carefully planned and orchestrated killings” with efficiency levels that on occasions 
nearly paralleled those of the Nazi’s death machine (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008, p. 2). 
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Furthermore, the intense hatred which accompanied the Rwandan genocide is not 
considered to be especially uncommon, as it also manifested in the genocide which 
occurred in west Darfur in Sudan where African groups in Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa 
inhabiting the region were being attacked by government forces and the “Janjaweed” 
Arab militias. The conflict which is noted as involving “territorial power struggles” 
intensified in February 2003, with the demand made by two African rebel groups for 
power-sharing and cessation of economic sidelining and marginalization (Sternberg & 
Sternberg, 2008, p. 3). Aided by Sudanese soldiers, the Janjaweed burned the African 
villages, poisoned their wells, raped the women, killed children, women, and men, and 
forced mass migrations of these African indigenes off the region for the occupation by 
Arabs (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008). 
Moreover, exploring such issues as stage setting for intergroup violent conflicts 
caused by difficulties in life conditions and crisis, the genocidal tendency of scapegoating 
some groups more than others is identified (Newman & Erber, 2002). It is further argued 
that a strong psychological projection element resides in mortals, the basis on which 
genocidal designs are imputed to perceived enemies with justifying of such designs 
(Jones, 2006). Hence, identified enemies such as the Jews, Bolsheviks, Croatians, and 
Tutsis “must be killed because they harbor intentions to kill us,” and without 
preventing/stopping/annihilating them, they will proceed to do so (Jones, 2006, p. 267). 
Before being killed, they are debased, brutalized, and dehumanized by which vein they 
are made to resemble “animals” or “subhumans” to justify their extermination. 
Additionally, projection also serves to displace blame and guilt from the perpetrators of 
genocide to their victims (Hatzfeld as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 267). 
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Narcissism. Narcissism is also one of the psychological factors motivating 
génocidaires (Jones, 2006). It is observed that humans have a “propensity for hubristic 
self-love,” in account for which Narcissus, the legendary Greek god so enraptured and in 
love with the pool’s reflection of him, without finding consolation died in sorrow by the 
pool (Freud as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 262). Accordingly, groups which are seemingly 
geographically, linguistically, and/or religiously close, such as the Tutsis and Hutus, 
Croatians and Serbians, and the Protestants and Catholics, accede to vicious inter-
communal conflict (Jones, 2006). It is recognized that “the communal feeling of groups 
requires, in order to complete it, hostility towards some extraneous minority” (Freud as 
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 262). Hence, it is argued that “the psychological dynamic by 
which the ‘Self’ and the ‘We’ are defined against the ‘Other’ is fundamental to genocide” 
(Jones, 2006, p. 262). 
Also recognized is the “malignant or pathological narcissism,” which refers to a 
state of idolized self with others only existing to magnify and fortify the self (Fein as 
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 262), and is informed by fear that, in absence of others’ 
validation, the self faces being annihilated or undermined, and derives from anxiety, 
unease, and profound insecurity (Kressel as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 262). It is noted as 
vanishing however, with malignant narcissism extremities of real psychopathy, and is “a 
murderous egotism, incapable of empathy with others, that considers human destruction 
inconsequential where it increases personal power and glory” (p. 262). Thus, 
psychopathy and malignant narcissism have been identified in contemporary history as a 
common feature among génocidaires. For example:  
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Consider Adolf Hitler, whose stunted, injured ego found transcendence in 
holocaust. (How Hitler, the failed artist and rootless ex-soldier, must have reveled 
in the version of the Lord’s Prayer devised by the League of German Girls: 
“Adolf Hitler, you are our great Leader. Thy name makes the enemy tremble. Thy 
Third Reich comes, thy will alone is law upon earth…”!). Consider as well Joseph 
Stalin and Mao Zedong, “fanatics, poets, paranoiacs, peasants risen to rule 
empires whose history obsessed them, careless killers of millions” or the Hutu 
Power extremists of Rwanda, convinced that their crushing of Tutsi 
“cockroaches” would enshrine their version of manifest destiny. (Jones, 2006, p. 
262) 
It is additionally recognized that “collective pathological narcissism” is also a 
genocide causal factor, with the diagnostic and analytic level shifting from individual to 
collective, a state in which a nation’s dominant minority or majority of its citizens hold 
sway to their country’s innate superiority, their God’s giftedness or destined, their 
limitless capability, or their being sole truth bearers (Jones, 2006, pp. 262-263). The 
conditions underlying narcissist collective pathology include all such factors which 
occasion cover-ups, antisocial behavior, and large scale criminal activities, a summation 
of which includes the group’s grandiose feeling and self-importance; obsession with their 
fantasies of indomitability, omnipotence, power, fame, unequalled brilliance, all-
conquering ideals, or all-surpassing political theories with firm conviction of the group’s 
uniqueness; requiring adulation, affirmation, and excessive admiration; wishing to be 
revered, feared, or seen as notorious; and devoid of empathy, unwilling to accommodate 
other groups needs or feelings, exhibiting haughtiness and rage when confronted or 
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frustrated (Vaknin as cited in Jones, 2006, pp. 262- 263). Examples of such narcissist 
countries include Great Britain, which in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries was “the world leader 
in collective pathological narcissism,” as well as “three totalitarian states - Nazi Germany 
(1933–45), Stalinist Russia (1928–53), and Maoist China (1949–76) - and, since 1945, a 
democratic one, the United States” in the past century (Jones, 2006, p. 263). 
In-group and Out-group Identity. Still on genocide causation, it is recognized 
that most people have the capability of visiting gruesome violence on others, particularly 
in social settings where there is the “us versus them” stratification as defined by their in-
group and out-group dichotomy, by which the in-group perceives the out-group as a 
dangerous threat to their world requiring extermination (Dutton, 2007). It is argued that, 
“the drive to kill is fueled by a societal sense of power and destiny - a sense of 
entitlement called narcissism in an individual but nationalism in a country” (Dutton, 
2007, p. x). While there may be individual aggressive differences in various societies, 
extreme cruelty capability may not be specific to any given culture. Rather, the capability 
may be stronger in any culture when the conditions for a “perfect storm” descend, 
entailing a transcultural reasoning that links extreme violence with humans’ predator, 
inherited, and vestigial remnant past of the complex “pain-blood-death” associated with 
ancient hunting success (Nell as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. x). It is further argued, “That 
the most powerful human motive by far is the striving for attachment to loved ones in 
perpetuity. Humans will do anything for this, including blowing themselves (and others) 
to pieces…tribalism is universal” (Dutton, 2007, p. xii). Starting with the human instinct 
for attachment, it is furthered by the in-group/out-group division which establishes “our 
capability for symbolism,” thus, humanity’s survival requires our awareness “of 
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humanity as a tribe and of humanity’s potential for radical violence” which, if ignored, 
dooms us to repeating past mistakes with devastating and more powerful weapons 
(Dutton, 2007, p. xii). 
Ideological Influences. Additionally, ideological influences comprising factors 
such as beliefs and specific cultural values underlie genocide facilitation (Newman & 
Erber, 2002). Detailing a social psychology of individually absolving meaning frame, 
there are insights drawn in understanding the formation of human beliefs and behavior 
shaping which are crucial to an understanding of genocide. For instance, in various 
contexts that were differentially constrained, the Khmer Rouge aimed at motivating its 
minions “to kill by invoking ideological discourses that played upon Cambodian cultural 
models related to revenge, power, patronage, status, face, and honor” (Hinton, 2005, p. 
31). Due to cultural knowledge’s dialectical duality, however, the understanding and 
motivational force of such Khmer Rouge instituted models varied for individual 
perpetrators.  Thus, in varying combinations and differing contexts, the Khmer Rouge 
cultural models have been a crucial aspect of the genocidal framing for many of the 
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) perpetrators, effectively motivating the perpetrators to kill. 
It is recognized that “Cultural models theory as inflected by practice theory, then, 
provides a strong theoretical basis for viewing perpetrators as meaning-making genocidal 
bricoleurs” (Hinton, 2005, p. 31). Framed in this ‘distributive view of culture’ approach, 
perpetrator motivation is noted as accounting for the intricate local understandings which 
influence people’s actions, even while such understandings are linked to and are 
impacted by macro level practices. Hence, it is argued that by observing perpetrator’s 
motivation to genocidal orchestration: 
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in a more complex manner, one that weaves macro level and micro level analysis 
to comprehend local motivation and the cultural patterning of mass violence…By 
regarding perpetrators as bricoleurs and not passive ideological automatons, we 
can gain a better understanding of their motivations for committing genocidal 
atrocities. Even if perpetrators are highly constrained in some circumstances, they 
remain active subjects who construct meaning and assert their self-identity 
through their violent practices. (Hinton, 2005, p. 31) 
Furthermore, religious violence resurgence has become prevalent in the post-cold 
war era, from Tokyo subways to the Indian mosque ruins, the World Trade center, the 
Oklahoma City federal building, and the Israeli prime minister’s rally in Jerusalem, with 
religious militants transgressing civil societal boundaries to pursue their goals (Sells, 
1998). Indeed, Bosnians have encountered the most vicious religious violence meted out 
in the cold war aftermath, with assaulting forces not of the “age old antagonisms” 
associated with the Balkans, however, but of “the same myth of the Christ killer that was 
exploited in the past to instigate attacks on Jews” (Sells, 1998, p. xxiii). In consequence, 
genocide perpetrators have been rewarded and the victims punished by Western 
policymakers. There is an acknowledgement of the assault destruction throughout 
Herzegovina, cultures, and communities that are non-Catholic particularly in the region 
of Mostar where the ancient bridge which symbolized the diverse peoples, cultures, and 
religions in Bosnia through the ages was destroyed. 
In essence, Islam and Christendom have been bridged by the Bosnian society’s 
multi-religious character, symbolized by the Mostar ancient bridge, now-destroyed, with 
the bridge also practically connoting five centuries of a society’s ability to flourish as a 
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culturally pluralistic entity amidst tensions between the diverse religious groups (Sells, 
1998). Observing the preservation of the Bosnian society in its multi-religious existence 
as crucially significant to the world at large, it is opined that “For those who choose a 
pluralistic society where different religions coexist - whether in Banja Luka, London, or 
Los Angeles - the struggle to rebuild that bridge is not something occurring over there 
and far away, but something frighteningly close to home” (Sells, 1998, p. xxiii). 
Also acknowledging that anthropologists have been involved as participants and 
contributors in different genocidal cases, there is an understanding that they have played 
a vanguard role in forging and deploying the idea of annihilating difference in humans, 
the basis on which genocide thrives, particularly in contemporary history (Hinton, 2002). 
Recognizing anthropologists’ duplicity in failing to utilize their vantage point for making 
more valuable contributions to genocidal projects, there is an establishment of genocide’s 
inextricable link with modernity, given modernity’s society re-ordering scope based on 
goals/rational principles. Thus, by anthropologically exploring genocide’s origins, 
genocide is plausible as in the cases of Rwanda, Burundi, and Cambodia. For instance, 
focusing on the Cambodian 1975 to 1979 devastation under the Khmer Rouge in 
exploring the causation for mass murder and perpetrators motivation to kill, it is argued 
that the Cambodian genocidal policies resulted in over 1.7 million deaths out of the 
country’s 7.9 million populace (Kiernan; and Chandler as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 23) 
killed through malnutrition, starvation, illness, overwork, and execution (Ebihara as cited 
in Hinton, 2002, p. 23). Further analyzing the dynamics of this violence, there is 
recognition of causal factors of manufacturing difference, involving meaning and identity 
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construction, and the combination of emotionally charged cultural knowledge into 
genocidal ideologies (Hinton, 2002). 
In the Armenian genocide whose primary perpetrators were the central committee 
and leaders of the “Committee of Union and Progress” (CUP) which was the Ottoman 
government’s ruling faction, “The CUP was formed out of the heterogeneous opposition 
groups collectively known as the Young Turks that developed in the late nineteenth 
century” (Bloxham, 2005, p. 4). The orchestrated Armenian murder accepted as a given 
is, thus, observed as a starting discourse point rather than the end, contrary to the 
‘Armenian’ profound historiography which is keen, mainly as a denial response of 
enforcing the usual interpretation line of the genocide’s inadequate debating scope, on the 
“specific relationship between intention and contingency in the development of the 
CUP’s destruction policy in 1914–15” (Bloxham, 2005, p. 20). It is argued, however, that 
such debate, while being emblematic of mature historiography, also touches crucial 
sensitive issues for both Armenians and Turks. It is essentially noted that the Ottoman’s 
1914-15 policies on the Armenians were significantly shaped by the nationalist activism 
of the Armenians, also impacting the run-up to the massacres in 1894-96 (Bloxham, 
2005, p. 20). Yet, while identifying the policies influencing contingencies without any 
inexorable determinism in force, the alternative courses available for the Ottoman main 
actors should constantly be borne in mind, while also remembering the role that prejudice 
and ideology played in their conclusions, as well as the visceral hatred. Hence, while 
allowing: 
the Marxian caveat that choices are inevitably conditioned by circumstance, that 
‘man’ makes history, but not just as ‘he’ would like, Armenians were killed 
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because of choices made by players who were in the strict sense of the word 
responsible. …the Armenian genocide was one ideological response to the very 
real, related external and internal structural stresses that had accumulated on the 
Ottoman Empire by 1915. (Bloxham, 2005, p. 21) 
Threat and Vulnerability. Further on genocide causation, a comparative 
analytical study of twentieth century mass genocides, ethnic cleansings, and politicides 
show genocide’s occurrence and magnitude, focusing on threat and vulnerability which 
are two vital conditions for genocide to occur (Midlarsky, 2005). Conditions for this 
causation require a perception of the targeted population as threatening or as having some 
tenuous connections to external agents that are threatening irrespective of that 
perception’s reality, and there must be the vulnerability of the targeted population to mass 
murder (Midlarsky, 2005). Similarly, the potential genocide perpetrators must also 
experience vulnerability for generating fantasized or real images of the civilian 
population that are threatening. Any threat increasing process to the state, which 
simultaneously also increases the state’s vulnerability, as well as, the targeted civilian 
population’s vulnerability, also increases genocide’s probability of occurrence 
(Midlarsky, 2005). Hence, examining two theoretical foci of loss and realpolitik, the 
state’s threat management is recognized as a critical realpolitik function, while loss most 
often signals the state’s vulnerability or probable civilian targets (Midlarsky, 2005). 
Fear. Moreover, it is argued that fear is a powerful psychological factor that 
motivates genocide and quoting Edmund Burke, it is noted that “No power so effectively 
robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear” (Burke quoted by Green 
in Hinton as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). There is a distinction made between “mortal 
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terror” which is the “fear of a threat to physical being and integrity,” and “existential 
dread” which “revolves around our sense of personal identity, destiny, and social place,” 
and is evoking or threatening to evoke the feelings of humiliation, dishonor, and shame 
(Jones, 2006, p. 265). Mortal fear, also referred to as “animal fear,” which while not 
easily distinguishable in form from simple reflex, is a commonality across species, and 
particularly attains an intensity pitch in humans who are presumably the only species able 
to foresee death (Piven as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). Accordingly, such “death 
anxiety” is acknowledged by some philosophers and scholars as the worm in the psychic 
apple of humanity and a fundamental genocidal factor (Jones, 2006, p. 265). 
Hence, it is noted that “Driven by nameless, overwhelming fears…men turn to the 
primitive tools of self-protection, including the belief that they may spare themselves the 
terrible fate of death by sacrificing another instead of themselves” (Charny quoted by 
Kuper as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). This animal fear is seen in predatory animals, with 
the phenomena recognized as disparately traced from infants’ separation anxiety, 
religious rituals including human sacrifice and other religious rituals, as well as inter-
communal warfare, to prehumans’ and primitive humans’ terrifying encounters with 
predator animals (Ehrenreich as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). This predator is observed as 
having been the primary “Other,” which transformed into predator out-group as humans 
gained dominance in the animal kingdom, with this human “Other” then bounding and 
delineating the in-group, such as ethnic group, tribe, or clan, in which support, 
sustenance, and communal self-defense can be found (Staub as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 
265). In this case, evolutionary psychologists are deploying such connections and arguing 
that “human behavior in the present is generated by universal reasoning circuits that exist 
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because they solved adaptive problems in the past” (Waller as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 
265). 
On the other hand, social psychologists present that people who believe they will 
be attacked by others respond more aggressively than they would towards targets 
believed to be benign (Jones, 2006). Presenting such phenomena as intricately linked to 
genocide and inter-communal violence, it is argued that: 
Fear of the immediate or more distant future is a pivotal element in a number of 
approaches to ethnic warfare…Fear induces people to support even very costly 
violence, because the choice seems to be between becoming a victim or becoming 
a participant…According to this approach, a high degree of affect is expressed 
when the stakes are large (genocide involves large stakes), and so emotion 
follows a rational assessment by ordinary people of their situation. The 
improbability of genocide is not decisive, for the stakes are too high to chance it. 
(Horowitz as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 266) 
Furthermore, when manipulated and intensified by architects of genocide, mortal 
terror is a common feature of genocide, with notable examples such as the 1990s 
Rwandan genocide and the Balkan genocide (Jones, 2006).  Likewise, genocidal 
atrocities perpetrated against the Serbs by the Ustasha fascist regime during WWII, 
which were part of their prominent historical memories, along with the Ustasha-style 
symbolism revival and the Croatian nationalist, Franjo Tudjman’s rhetoric, caused deep 
anxieties that became further heightened when the discrimination against Serb 
professionals/officials in Croatia started (Jones, 2006). Similarly, the Rwandan 1994 
holocaust ensued in the aftermath of the Burundian massive bloodletting in which about 
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50,000 to 100,000 mainly Hutu civilians were exterminated by a Tutsi-dominant military, 
following a foiled coup (Jones, 2006, p. 266). As a result, about 350,000 Hutu refugees 
on fleeing to Rwanda, brought firsthand reports of the atrocities, among which “were 
some of the most unrestrained genocidal killers of Tutsis in 1994,” as the slaughter only 
further revived memories of the 1972 even worse Hutu killings involving an “eliticidal” 
attempt at exterminating virtually all professional or educated Hutus, primarily, its adult 
males (Jones, 2006, p. 266). It is observed that, along with the 1990 Rwandan invasion by 
the Tutsi-led rebels, the “image of the Tutsi as the embodiment of a mortal 
danger…[was] hauntingly evident” (Lemarchand as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 266). 
Causing further complexity for the Rwandan Hutu males was their leaders’ mortal 
retribution threat should they fail in participating in the mass murder; indeed, “Many 
Hutu were driven to kill their Tutsi neighbors because they knew they had no other 
option; refusal to comply meant that they themselves would be killed the next day” 
(Lemarchand as cited in Jones, 2006, pp. 266-267). 
Moreover, even in a genocide prototypical case involving an objectively non-
threatening and entirely defenseless group, as in the Jewish Holocaust, mortal terror may 
have also featured presumably in a greatly hystericized form (Jones, 2006). Thus, it is 
observed that, “the Germans drew a picture of an international Jewry ruling the world and 
plotting the destruction of Germany and German life” (Hilberg as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 
267). While the depiction of Jewish elderly, women, and children as a “threat” to the 
Germans may have appeared preposterous, it was easier to present the Jewish adult males 
in this manner. Hence, this demographic group’s demonization in both Germany and 
Eastern Europe’s Nazi-occupied territories, in the generated propaganda guide for the 
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genocide, as well as the first directive for physical extermination and incarceration 
against the group. Furthermore, close linkage of the Jews with the Bolshevik/communist 
presented a fear-evoking element to the Nazi mindset, with Slavic civilization and Soviet 
Russia portending as logically threatening to the German essence. Such notions conveyed 
in a propaganda handout were circulated to German troops stating: 
Anyone who has ever looked at the face of a red commissar knows what the 
Bolsheviks are like. Here there is no need for theoretical expressions. We would 
insult the animals if we described these mostly Jewish men as beasts. They are the 
embodiment of the Satanic and insane hatred against the whole of noble 
humanity…The masses, whom they have sent to their deaths by making use of all 
means at their disposal such as ice-cold terror and insane incitement, would have 
brought an end to all meaningful life, had this eruption not been dammed at the 
last moment. (Bartov as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 267) 
It is also argued that the notions of psychological or physical dispossession and 
displacement underlie existential dread, and that “desperation…runs through a great deal 
of ethnic violence” with many groups convinced of their impending inundation, control, 
dispossession, or possibly even extinction by their neighbors (Horowitz as cited in Jones, 
2006, pp. 267-268). With the individual’s physical annihilation not imminent, existential 
dread may wrongly be viewed as subordinating mortal terror, but given a group identity’s 
supreme value, many individuals will sacrifice their lives defending it. Also, people will 
often rather opt for physical death than face existential dishonor, shame, and “respect” or 
status loss in the presence of one’s peers (Des Pres as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 268), with 
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examples of such respect or honor including sexual fidelity/female virginity, masculine 
honor, and warrior-hood time-honored codes. 
Demographic Factors, Resource Scarcity, and Greed. Further on genocide 
causation, it is recognized that demographical factors and resource constraints also 
contribute to genocide orchestration. The surge in genocide in the twentieth century is 
attributed to the two underlying factors of exploding population growth and resource 
scarcity (Waller, 2002). A further psychological factor which motivates genocidaires is 
greed. Presenting the “Nazi ‘Aryanization’ of Jewish properties” as an epitome of greed, 
it is observed that most Germans saw the dispossession as an “once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity, and made the most of it” (Jones, 2006, p. 264). The Nazis encouraged the 
exploitation of the Jews’ plight by the “Aryan” Germans, as well as fully took advantage 
of it themselves. Even close to the peak of the Holocaust in 1941-42, Hitler was 
“sanctioning opportunities to extort foreign currency in return for ransoming very rich 
Jews” (Burleigh as cited in Jones, 2006, p, 264). Furthermore, “in the Nazi death camps, 
Jews were robbed not only of their few remaining possessions, but of their hair, which 
was sold for mattress stuffing – and (after death) of the gold fillings in their teeth, melted 
down for bullion” (Jones, 2006, p. 264). 
It is acknowledged that as a dominant subject in human affairs (Marchak as cited 
in Jones, 2006) greed is a primary motivating factor for genocide perpetrators, as well as 
bystanders. The opportunity of stripping victims’ property and wealth, either by outright 
looting or desperation-priced purchasing, and occupation of forcefully vacated dwellings, 
frequent genocidal accounts. Hence, it is argued that at the climax of the Soviet Union 
Stalin’s purges, the Soviets had “frequent house-moving because every execution created 
92 
 
 
a vacant apartment and dacha which were eagerly occupied by survivors and their 
aspirational Party housewives, ambitious for grander accommodation” (Montefiore as 
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 264). Similarly, in 1994 Rwanda, opportunity for the land and 
cows owned by rural Tutsi victims had to be taken over by someone upon death of the 
owners served as significant incentive amidst the country’s poor and rising 
overpopulation (Prunier as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 264). 
Presenting greed as exceeding a desiring of material goods over and above 
survival necessities, there is an understanding of its close connection to the lust for 
power, prestige, and dominance. Hence, it is argued that “Man does not strive for power 
only in order to enrich himself economically…Power, including economic power, may be 
valued ‘for its own sake.’ Very frequently the striving for power is also conditioned by 
the social ‘honor’ it entails” (Weber quoted by Gerth & Mills as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 
265).  Accordingly, Jewish Holocaust “Functionalist” analysts stressed the underlings’ 
eagerness in implementing the grand plans of Hitler with such dynamo that was 
tantamount an independence of direct orders (Burleigh as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). 
Hence, Simon Sebag Montefiore’s notion of “Terror entrepreneurialism” is observed as 
reigning in Stalinist Russia, with a stream of Stalin’s enemies’ ambitious torturers only 
too eager to please and kill for him (as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). While such 
individuals were often marked for execution next, there usually were ambitiously 
inspiring men and women substitutes waiting (Mandelstam as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 
265). Furthermore, the génocidaires can be adequately motivated even by a momentary 
sun, as in the Rwandan genocide’s vengeful targeting of Tutsis by “street boys, rag-
pickers, [and] car-washers” (Prunier as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). Hence: 
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Greed reflects objective material circumstances, but also, like narcissism, the core 
strivings of ego. Greed is never satiated; but when it is fed, one feels validated, 
successful – even omnipotent. Perhaps the only force that can truly match it as a 
motivator for genocide is fear. (Jones, 2006, p. 265) 
Power Politics and Genocide Denial. Still on genocide causation, in examining 
the origins of the Armenian genocide, its development, and consequences from a broad-
based perspective of reappraising all the involved major parties’ secondary and primary 
sources, genocide’s underlying causation is attributed to the interplay of power politics 
(Bloxham, 2005). This power politics interplay involves the Ottoman Empire’s 
interactions within the decades of its final decline, the European imperial power’s self-
interested policies, and some Armenian nationalists’ agenda within the Ottoman territory 
and beyond. Of special emphasis is the international context’s ethnic polarization process 
which culminated with the 1912-23 massive destruction and particularly the Armenian 
community obliteration in 1915-16 (Bloxham, 2005). An interconnectedness is, thus, 
observed in the relationship between the ‘eastern question’ power politics from 1774, the 
‘Armenian question’ narrower politics from mid-nineteenth century, and the internal 
questions of the Ottoman Empire’s ethnic and social order reforms which were under 
intense external pressure (Bloxham, 2005, p. 1). 
Furthermore, in an in-depth investigative study on imperial Germany’s role in 
WWI and the genocide, different conclusions emerge from prevailing notions on their 
complicity (Bloxham, 2005). In examining the Entente wartime and Anglo-French 
postwar axis to contextually place the various related genocide politics and denial themes 
into perspective, the interwar phase political interest of America in the Middle East which 
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framed the policy refusing to recognize the genocide is identified. It is, therefore, argued, 
that the Armenian question’s historical frame is undergirded by the genocide’s continuing 
international denial due to several similar relationship concerns that are still underlying 
interactions between America, Europe, and Turkey as were in operation prior to WWI 
(Bloxham, 2005). Hence, it is observed that, “great power involvement in Ottoman 
internal affairs was a key element in exacerbating the Ottoman–Armenian dynamic 
towards genocide while Turkish sensitivity about external intervention on behalf of the 
Armenians - whether directed towards reforms before 1914 or independence after 1918 - 
was a vital contributory factor to the emergence of denial” (Bloxham, 2005, p. 5). 
Moreover, perpetrators’ self-deception and denial of acts committed are genocide 
orchestrating factors, the understanding of which is essential for eliciting insights on 
forestalling and preventing genocide (Newman & Erber, 2002). There is the recognition 
of various governments’ attempts to minimize or cover up genocidal acts with such 
governments’ efforts at rationalizing mass killings exposed, in addition to an observation 
of the external governments’ compromises and excusing of their deterrence to intervene 
to stop or prevent the perpetration of genocide (Totten & Parsons, 2009). Also addressing 
denial is the holocaust’s ongoing cultural hegemony against which contending advocates 
of other human devastations clamor to present genocide as also applying to their cases, 
some of which emanated centrally from European power. It is noted, however, that 
whether the events are occurring in urban or distant peripheries—colonial, post, or neo—
the underlying assumption for understanding them, lies in using the same reference 
frame, which has its beginnings rooted in Western development’s initial power bases and 
that power’s extrusion into the world at large (Levene, 2005a, p. 4). 
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It is further argued that the inadequacy of the terms, ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ 
in explaining interactions between state and groups that occasion genocide, presents an 
erroneous notion of the existence of only two absolute human types worldwide—the 
perpetual wrongdoer and the other perpetually at the receiving end, such notions of which 
“legitimize and, thus, perpetuate cycles of violence, including genocide” (Levene, 2005, 
p. 5). Paradoxically, genocidal perpetrators usually claim to be the victims, while 
similarly, where the actual victimized group has the ‘international community’ validate 
its victimhood, such validation status can be used to absolve itself or justify its own 
heinous acts in generations to come. Thus, Western contemporary culture’s accordance of 
celebrity to ‘victimhood,’ and the tendency of valorizing and even making sacred one’s 
own memory of genocide or catastrophe, undermines the ability to break away from such 
transmissions (Levene, 2005a, p. 6). 
Humiliation. Still on genocide causation, it is acknowledged that the notion of 
humiliation is a crucial genocidal factor, a phenomenon the fear of which greatly 
underlies existential dread (Jones, 2006). It is observed in world affairs, citing Thomas 
Friedman, a columnist with The New York Times, that “The single most underappreciated 
force in international relations is humiliation” (Jones, 2006, p. 268). This phenomenon 
has also been explored at the individual level by others including psychologists. Defined 
as “the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or 
strips away their pride, honor or dignity” by Evelin Lindner, humiliation is increasingly 
acknowledged as a key human behavioral motivating factor,  especially violent behavior 
(Jones, 2006, p. 268). Furthermore, “humiliated fury” plays a crucial role “in escalating 
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conflict between individuals and nations” (Retzinger & Scheff in Lindner as cited in 
Jones, 2006, p. 268). In addition: 
Humiliation involves feelings of shame and disgrace, as well as helplessness in 
the face of abuse at the hands of a stronger party. These are among the most 
painful and indelible of human emotions. He who has known extreme shame and 
humiliation may forever struggle to recover a sense of agency and self-respect. 
(Lifton as cited in Jones, 2006, p, 268) 
In a study of US hardened prisoners, psychologist James Gilligan observed that 
“the basic psychological motive, or cause, of violent behavior is the wish to ward off or 
eliminate the feeling of shame and humiliation – a feeling that is painful and can even be 
intolerable and overwhelming – and replace it with its opposite, the feeling of pride” 
(Gilligan as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 268). Moreover, humiliation predominantly features 
in human’s most extreme expressions of aggression such as war, murder, and genocide, 
and serves as a principal motivating force in virtually every genocidal case in history or 
contemporary (Horowitz as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 268), for instance, as in the Armenian 
genocide, the Young Turkish authorities’ humiliation in Constantinople as a result of the 
1909-13 military defeats they sustained in northern Africa and the Balkans, as well as by 
the imperial territories’ secessions inclusive of Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia. It is argued 
that: 
They were humiliated by the presence of a religious and ethnic minority in their 
midst (Christian Armenians) that included a prosperous “middleman” sector, and 
was supposedly assisting Russian designs on Turkey at a time of imperial 
vulnerability (the First World War). (Jones, 2006, p. 268) 
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Accordingly, this feeling of humiliation is further extended to current Turkish authorities 
and contemporary commentators, were they to acknowledge the Armenian genocide and 
proffer apologies. Hence, humiliation is noted as a primary genocide denial underpinning 
factor (Jones, 2006). 
Moreover, it is argued that the Nazi Germans attained prominence through the 
exploitation of national humiliation by transforming it into hatred and vengefulness 
against their perceived tormentors. Stunned by the collapse of their army at the western 
front in 1918 following four years fighting in WWI, there was a resultant formation of the 
extreme right-wing core groups out of the withdrawn, defeated forces astride the Rhine. 
Proliferating in early 1920s, one of these groups thrived round Adolf Hitler who had 
declarations and writings replete with trepidation on the humiliation of Germany (Lifton 
as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 269). The penal Versailles 1919 Treaty imposition, having 
been met with humiliation and outrage, further aggravated revanchist and extremist 
movements. Thus, seeking a scapegoating outlet for their humiliation, the Nazis 
presented the Jews as having treacherously delivered a “stab in the back” of Germany, to 
have them prostrated before Bolshevism, Western Allies, and capitalism. As the country 
shifted from the 1920s hyperinflation to the end of the decade’s Great Depression, 
privation and economic pressures intensified the humiliation feelings, particularly those 
of the men, whose “provider” status bounded up their self-image (Jones, 2006, p. 269). 
Furthermore, in Belgian colonized Rwanda, Tutsis were indoctrinated as having 
descended from the Nile region “civilized” peoples, depicted and in time viewed 
themselves as educated, powerful, tall, and attractive, while the Hutus were depicted as 
“unrefined bumpkins” and “humiliating antithesis” (Jones, 2006, p. 269). Established 
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with the revolution of 1959, the Hutus’ political dominance portended (for the Hutu 
masses) a conquering of humiliation on the premise of putting the Tutsis “in their place” 
(Jones, 2006, p. 269). However, the Hutu dominance was threatened in 1990 with the 
invasion of an exiled Tutsis (from Rwanda) movement. Furthermore, an economic 
downturn experienced around the same period meant hundreds of thousands of Hutus 
facing humiliating unemployment, again especially affecting the male adults, a vast 
number of which were recruited as genocidal agents. Thus, it is observed “That gratuitous 
and humiliating cruelties are routinely inflicted upon victims” is understandable “given 
the intense humiliation of the génocidaires” (Jones, 2006, p. 269). 
Accordingly, humiliation also strongly features in the “genocides by the 
oppressed” or subaltern genocide, with virtually every génocidaire considering himself or 
herself oppressed by the genocide target, for instance, the “Turks by Armenians, 
Germans by Jews, Khmers by Vietnamese” (Jones, 2006, p. 269). It is argued that while 
such framings may usually derive from paranoia and myth, in some cases the convictions 
may have more objectivity to them, as in the Rwandan Hutus who had experienced 
humiliation and social subordination by Tutsis. Similarly, the Kosovo extremists, having 
been motivated by the years of Serb suppression and brutalization, launched a campaign 
of persecution and plausible genocide against the Serbians in Kosovo (Jones, 2006). 
It is further observed that subaltern genocide also manifests in Islamist terrorism, 
with its exponents keenly feeling “the humiliation of centuries of conquest and 
domination by Western ‘Crusaders’” (Jones, 2006, p. 270). Hence, Osama bin Laden’s 
proclamation that “What America is tasting now is only a copy of what we have 
tasted…Our Islamic nation has been tasting the same for more than 80 years, of 
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humiliation and disgrace” (Stern quoted by Gilligan as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 270). In 
fact, commentators have been amazed that Arabs, who are relatively privileged and even 
those exposed directly to and benefiting from Western cosmopolitanism and affluence, 
can organize and launch terrorist attacks that could degenerate into genocidal massacre 
(Jones, 2006, p. 270). The key to understanding such phenomenon is humiliation, which 
is more strongly felt by the privileged and the educated than by the masses (Jones, 2006, 
p. 270). Quoting James Scott, it is argued that “The cruelest result of human bondage…is 
that it transforms the assertion of personal dignity into a mortal risk,” as well as observed 
that revolting against that form of bondage by aiming to subdue humiliation in order to 
re-establish self-respect and dignity can involve vicious and genocidal practices (Jones, 
2006, p. 270). 
Race, Racism, and Crime. Additionally on genocide causation factors, a critical 
examination of the controversies and debates on the issues of race, criminal justice, and 
crime, focusing on America and Britain, while also taking an international perspective, 
identify these factors as underpinning genocide (Webster, 2007). Analyzing the United 
States historical lynching legacy case studies, the Nazi state racist crime, and the 
Rwandan genocides, a conceptual framework for a better understanding of race, racism, 
and crime is recognized. Exploring the historical origins of the association of crime with 
racism, it is understood that anxieties and fears concerning crime and race are rooted in 
fast-social-change destabilized places. The primary focus is, thus, in understanding the 
relationships between and social processes of “‘criminalization’ and ‘racialization’ 
…which construct and label certain groups and assign them negative attributes such as 
‘criminality’ or ‘inferiority’” (Webster, 2007, p. xi). Lone factors such as ethnicity and 
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race are capable of significantly explaining the divergent ethnic groups’ patterns of 
offending and victimization. Additional insights are drawn from further exploration of 
race and the system of criminal justice, particularly the issues and evidences of 
differential treatment of visible minorities by the police and the court system, as well as 
the crime of a racist state, and genocide primarily—a racist crime that often eludes the 
attention of criminologists (Webster, 2007). 
Moreover, identifying euthanasia as the beginning of the Nazi genocide—which 
derived from the predicament of Jews with handicaps first targeted for murder, it is 
argued that these individuals were murdered purely for racial reasons. Hence, “the killers 
were motivated by an ideological obsession to create a homogeneous and robust nation 
based on race…to purge the handicapped from the national gene pool” (Freidlander, 
1995, pp. xi-xii). Thus, drawing from Germany’s increasing eugenics and racist 
ideologies, the euthanasia of people with handicaps is identified as providing the ideal for 
mass murder, thus, originating the Holocaust (Freidlander, 1995). Furthermore, an 
analysis of the African Great Lakes region, focusing on Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo 
development with emphasis on Rwandan and Burundian ethno-based conflicts, sporadic 
wars, and genocide, presents the conflicts’ negative impacts on the region (Scherrer, 
2002). There is recognition of European colonialism and its racism, as well as the 
region’s 40-year postcolonial ideology of genocide derived from the colonial history of 
German and Belgian’s indirect rule and segregation. Exploring the region’s pre-
independence history highlights the Rwandan and Burundian colonialism experience, 
ethnicization, and state formation processes which transformed the Tutsi and Hutu, who 
were initially competing ethnic groups, into irreconcilable opposing castes. Furthermore, 
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there is the contemplation of an escalation into another genocidal round in the region, 
given the 1994 Rwandan genocide with conceivably one million Tutsis and thousands of 
Hutu moderates killed, the Burundian civil war, and genocidal killings since 1993, with 
about 200,000 Burundians killed, and the Congolese extremely internationalized war 
(Scherrer, 2002). 
Types of Genocide. Genocidal orchestrations can be identified with diverse 
manifestations, presenting the different typologies of genocide. For instance, Fein 
identified genocide typologies comprising four categories, including developmental, 
despotic, retributive, and ideological genocides (Hinton, 2002, p. 64). For developmental 
genocide, it is observed that the perpetrator harms the victim deliberately with or without 
deliberation, due to economic exploitation or colonization. Thus, in this typology of 
genocide, intentional as well as unintentional consequences are addressed, contrary to the 
United Nations Convention’s focus only on intentional consequences. Additionally, for 
despotic genocide, the perpetrator aims to clear from his or her territory, any form of 
opposition to his or her reign, whether imagined, potential or real. Also, for retributive 
genocide, “the perpetrator responds to a challenge to the structure of domination when 
two peoples, nations, ethnic groups, tribes, or religious collectives are locked into an 
ethnically stratified order in a plural society” (Fein as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 64). And, 
lastly, it is observed that the causes of ideological genocide “are the hegemonic myths 
identifying the victims as outside the sanctioned universe of obligation or myths based on 
religion [that] exclude the victim from the sanctified universe of salvation and obligation” 
(Fein as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 64). 
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Additionally, diverse genocidal forms springing from varied roots are observed 
among indigenous groups. For instance, seeing genocide as developmental and a war 
product, it is noted that the destruction of the Brazilian, Paraguayan, and Peruvian Indians 
was done “out of cold calculation of gain, and, in some cases, sadistic pleasure rather 
than as the result of a political or economic crisis” (Smith as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 64). 
Furthermore, there is a distinction between “domestic genocides,” which arise from a 
society’s internal divisions, and genocides occurring in an international warfare context 
(Kuper as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 65). 
More so, it is recognized that genocidal typologies evolve through different 
phases or stages of genocide. In examining the Nazi program, for instance, there is an 
understanding of its evolution from secret extermination of persons with disabilities and 
handicaps to systematical destruction of Gypsies and Jews. The Nazi genocide’s 
development is trailed with the regime primarily excluding from the general community, 
the targeted groups’ members, through escalating persistent persecution, imbibing more 
intense exclusionary policies of forced handicapped people’s sterilization, gypsies’ 
incarceration, and mandatory emigration of Jews. Ultimately, the regime adopted and 
implemented a mass murder program for the eradication of the three target groups 
(Friedlander, 1995). Additionally, insights can be drawn from the forms of genocidal 
violence, which create the plausibility of genocide always occurring given the 
multiplicity of symbolic type violence which occurs even in presumably non-genocidal 
countries such as the United States. Genocide is also recognized as existing along the 
lines not only of everyday type violence, but also as imperceptible genocides as in the 
systematic murdering of street-children by the Brazilian police in attempt at street “clean-
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up” (Hinton, 2002). A further distinction is made in genocidal typology between total 
cum “genocide in whole,” and partial cum “genocide in part.” For instance, it is observed 
that “the Rwandan genocide was a total domestic genocide, what the United Nations 
would call a “genocide in whole” over against a “genocide in part,” and as such it was the 
African version of the Holocaust” (Scherrer, 2002, p. xi). 
Examples of Genocide. A multiplicity of genocidal examples litters and 
permeates history up to contemporary times. For instance, many people groups are 
identified when examining the psychological patterns of the atrocities committed in 
genocides, which in the twentieth century have tragically claimed lives totaling above 
262 million, involving Armenians, Jews, Cambodians, Kosovons, Rwandans, and 
Darfurians, and many others (Baum, 2008). Further exploring genocide cases of the 
twentieth century, there is a recognition of historical genocide cases of the Armenians, 
the Holocaust, Stalin’s victims, and that of imperial Japan, as well as more recent 
genocidal cases and mass murders in Ethiopia, East Timor, Cambodia, former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Guatemala (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003). Also, identifying 
archeology’s role in providing historical material foundation for the creation of the 
Nationalist Socialist Party’s notion of a pure German race, as well as anthropologists’ 
involvement in the Jews and others exterminatory campaigns during the Third Reich, the 
Holocaust is additionally acknowledged among others (Hinton, 2002). 
One of the critical outcomes of modernity’s turning point is the Vendee 
destruction during the French Revolution, with the ‘rise of the West’ destabilizing effects 
on such older empires as the Ottoman, Russian, Chinese, and Austrian, having extensive 
devastating impacts on such people groups as the East European Jews and the Armenians 
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(Levene, 2005b). It is observed that genocide and massive exterminatory deeds 
perpetrated against indigenous peoples by these four empires in consequence of the half 
century’s hegemonic pressures led up to the 1914 general global catastrophe (Levene, 
2005b). Furthermore, with the pathological homogenization factors of expulsion, forced 
assimilation, and genocide as are practiced in the process of state-building, and with such 
practices understood as predating the nationalism era, genocidal cases spanning pre-
nationalist as well as nationalist era have been identified, including the fifteenth century 
Spanish expulsion of the Jews and the Huguenots persecution, both under Louis XIV, and 
in the twentieth century, the genocide of the Armenians and former Yugoslavia’s ethnic 
cleansing (Rae, 2002). It is argued that such atrocities impelled the development of 
international norms to define the states’ legitimate behavior with sovereignty increasingly 
streamlined as conditional (Rae, 2002). While also examining the factors that can deter 
pathological homogenization processes in state-building, the genocidal cases of 
Macedonia and the Czech Republic are recognized (Rae, 2002). 
Moreover, the 1780-1782 Upper Peru region’s (of South America) great rebellion 
is identified in the context of genocide and millennialism, with insights proffered in 
understanding the rebellion, its paradoxes, heterogeneity, and avoidance of any singular 
perspective (Robins, 2002). It is argued that while most genocidal cases with the native 
peoples have mainly focused on genocide by colonizers, there have been instances in this 
region where the perpetrators were Indians and the targets were Spaniards. In fact, the 
discourse focusing on the Indians as victims of varying genocidal forms which evolved 
over time has obscured “the fact that the native peoples experienced genocide not only as 
victims, but also as perpetrators” (Robins, 2002, p. 1). However, the rebellion countered 
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such generally held genocidal notions of victims’ lack of weaponry and organization in 
confronting their enemies, as the Indian revolutionaries in the rebellion faced the loyalist 
army that were more organized and better armed. Furthermore, it is observed that while 
leadership structure that is centralized usually characterizes genocidal policies, the 
insurgence’s leadership was basically confederate in nature and highly fragmented 
(Robins, 2002). Also it is further noted that the rebellion’s further unusual characteristic 
of the genocide victims similarly becoming the victors, with the natives—the Indians, 
Mestizos, Creoles, and the Spaniards—recognizing explicitly its genocidal nature. 
However, it is observed that: 
As with almost all genocidal movements, this one was not free of coercion and 
internal divisions, and as such was riddled by internal contradictions. Not all 
rebels supported the genocidal cause…Other rebels, while supportive of the goal 
of eliminating nonIndian culture from the region, were reluctant to embrace 
genocide. It was at the field level where the genocidal tendencies and conscription 
were strongest, and those who refused to join or to follow orders were subject to 
summary execution. In other instances, the rebel leaders tried to deceive people 
into participating, presenting their goals and actions as the implementation of 
Spanish royal orders. (Robins, 2002, pp. 3-4) 
Alternative Methodological Approaches in Genocide Studies. Various 
methodological approaches are used by scholars in genocidal studies. For instance, 
Dutton (2007) uses the methodology of ethology involving mimicking the animal 
behavior naturalistic studies citing Tinbergen, and argues for obtaining “an ethology of 
human aggression…from descriptions of violence by perpetrators and eyewitnesses” (p. 
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xi). He provides some descriptions in his review of massacres in several countries 
including Nanking, Viet Nam, El Salvador, and Rwanda. Another approach used involves 
exploring such underlying themes of modernity, ideology, and genocide’s relationship 
with the body politic; drawing conclusions across case studies; and presenting a 
multidisciplinary approach to understanding current human atrocities (Gellately & 
Kiernan, 2003). While also noting that genocide is not a predated twentieth century 
notion but a contemporary phenomenon and an inherent human nature product, a 
functionalist approach is adopted to examine the preceding and accompanying mass 
murder decision-making processes underlying the directives to kill, thus, providing 
insights that are not revealed by the conventional top-down, leadership directives focused 
approach (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003). There is also an examining of genocide at the 
victim level going beyond the state decision-making formal dynamics on the premise of 
espousing full understanding of genocide by taking cognizance of survivors’ accounts, 
thus, proffering new avenues for understanding and investigation of genocidal policies. 
By adopting this approach, such new genocidal forms as rape, which eluded the legalistic 
1948 genocide definition, become evident, and hence, deserving of present efforts at 
prosecution (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003). 
Furthermore, it is recognized that an ad hoc explanation of the Post-Holocaust 
sequential, relatively independent aspects that traces the origins of connections to facts of 
the genocide and exploring their consequences, will enable a challenge of the Holocaust’s 
basic historiographical, theological, philosophical, and moral implications. Underlying 
the study’s approach is the understanding of the provocativeness of speaking about the 
Holocaust’s interpretations based on the enormity of the event’s systematic genocide, 
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given that “the facts speak for themselves…leaving nothing over to interpret, nothing to 
ponder or contest,” (Lang, 2005, p. xi). Thus, the dilemma and tension of the term’s 
evoked evil and sadism sustain its recasting by scholars and survivors in new and 
differing ways that reconfigure its events and impacts (Lang, 2005). It is, therefore, 
observed that Post-Holocaust reflection analysis, which is focused in different directions, 
is categorized under the four rubrics of “the Archival, Explanatory, Testimonial, and 
Representational modes” comprising sets of different reflecting emphasis (Lang, 2005,  p. 
xii). The “Archival works” aim at recording, recovering, or reconstructing physical or 
empirical evidences of plans, actions, and conditions directed at or initiated by anyone 
involved during the Holocaust, reflecting teleological concerns for understanding the how 
and why certain outcomes occurred historically in sequence; the “Explanatory design” 
addresses issues of the relationship between the corporate “mentality” and individual 
“decision making” or the causes and reasons; the “Testimonial” involves expressive 
forms that extend from monumental or memorials—whether individual, group, or 
national—to the testimony; and the “Representational” deals with the descriptive art 
works of the Holocaust emphasizing its inception, as well as its reception (Lang, 2005, 
pp. xii-xv). 
Further proffering a focused examination of genocide contemporarily in a world 
history contextual framework, while also broaching genocidal studies’ abstraction issues, 
the study addresses genocide definition related core problems, and offers conceptual 
understanding of perpetrators and victims within world historical background (Levene, 
2005a). This involves examining the patterns and processes linking up earlier modern 
century’s genocide up to the present, inclusive of colonial exterminations of the sixteenth 
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through the nineteenth centuries, and the more current genocidal eruptions of the 
twentieth century (Levene, 2005a). By presenting individual genocides as “part of a 
whole” rather than in isolation, connecting threads and comparative grounds are 
identified for the genocides (Levene, 2005a, p. 4). The study, in essence, proffers an 
understanding of genocide in the modern world, with an analysis of genocide’s meaning 
within a broad based world historical context. Following up on this is another study 
setting out genocide’s conceptual issues, addressing its fundamental definitional 
problems, and proffering an understanding of victims’ and perpetrators’ meaning frames, 
as well as placing such meaning frames contextually in world history (Levene, 2005b). 
Furthermore, analyzing collective evildoing dynamics, generally, a combination 
of Hannah Arendt’s philosophical approach, C. Fred Alford’s psychological approach, 
and Zygmunt Bauman’s sociological approach is drawn upon (Arendt; Alford; and 
Bauman as cited in Vetlesen, 2005, p. 7). Adopting this hybrid approach, which is 
employed in examining the former Yugoslavian ethnic cleansing and the Holocaust, is 
theoretically aimed at a “synthesis between functionalist and intentionalist approaches to 
collective evil” (Vetlesen, 2005, p. 2). There is an understanding of the closeness of 
interactions between victims, perpetrators, and bystanders, as well as the manner of 
recognizing, denying, and projecting of human agency aspects by other agents (Vetlesen, 
2005). Additionally, an approach of historical comparative case study is adopted, with an 
analytical framework that highlights the numerous genocidal underlying factors such as 
lack of education, past social traumas, deep-seated poverty, common historical 
grievances, economic or political dislocation, colonization, or war (Gellately & Kiernan, 
2003). Of paramount importance is the human-agency factor which primarily translates 
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such identified underlying conditions into genocidal episodes, derivative of 
regimes/political sects, extremist leaders, and criminalist decisions. The analysis offers 
insights on myriad genocide causal factors, and also proffers challenges for further 
genocidal investigations and averting future genocides (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003). Also 
proffering insights on the Holocaust and genocide, it is further noted that social 
psychological approaches are employed for understanding mass killing episodes with 
such factors as the genocidal inclined personality, and the adaptation to aggression 
through violent behavior engagement, identified as genocide causation factors (Newman 
& Erber, 2002). 
It is further recognized that employing a geographical perspective for analyzing 
genocide and its effects provides a vantage point (Wood, 2001). Over the past century, 
political geographers have become involved with issues of cultural homelands, ethnic 
distribution, natural resource based conflicts, subnational and international political 
boundaries, and competing state ‘organisms’ geopolitical struggles, all of which are 
pertinent for contextually understanding civil war occurrences (Bowman as cited in 
Wood, 2001, p. 57). There is a proposition for the mapping of genocidal patterns across 
the areas affected, involving the specific neighborhoods and villages that are targets of 
destruction, sites of massacres, particular cultural landmark destruction or defilement, 
and mandatory displacements from definite areas (Wood, 2001). 
Genocide Prevention and Intervention. An examination of genocide prevention 
and intervention measures calls for an understanding of the Genocide Treaty’s primary 
provisions, which is a continuing area of disagreement and debate (Schabas, 2000). With 
genocide remaining the international efforts’ spur for human rights prevention and 
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punishment, the need for a careful crafting of prospective prosecutions into the 
Convention is recognized (Schabas, 2000). Thus, tracing the 1948 Genocide Prevention 
and Punishment Convention’s drafting and development, in analyzing contemporary 
genocides’ international tribunals and the United Nations responses using definitive 
portions of the Convention, Schabas (2000) examines the treaty reforms and revisions. 
With recognition of the treaty interpretation norms and foreign policy’s interrelationship 
with international law, and with the incorporation of a genocide legal literature 
bibliography, there is an understanding of the different Genocide Convention 
implementation approaches limiting the treaty’s impact. Examples of such limitations 
include several states ’omission from genocide definition and various groups’ emergent 
crimes, acts, or incitement (Schabas, 2000). Hence, Schabbas recognizes that:  
‘The fact of genocide is as old as humanity’. The law, however, is considerably 
younger. This dialectic of the ancient fact yet the modern law of genocide follows 
from the observation that, historically, genocide has gone unpunished. Hitler's 
famous comment, ‘who remembers the Armenians?’, is often cited in this regard. 
Yet the Nazis were only among the most recent to rely confidently on the 
reasonable presumption that an international culture of impunity would 
effectively shelter the most heinous perpetrators of crimes against humanity. 
The explanation for this is straightforward: genocide was generally, 
although perhaps not exclusively, committed under the direction or, at the very 
least, with the benign complicity of the State where it took place. Usually, the 
crime was executed as a quite overt facet of State policy, particularly within the 
context of war or colonial conquest. Obviously, therefore, domestic prosecution 
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was virtually unthinkable, even where the perpetrators did not in a technical sense 
benefit from some manner of legal immunity. Only in rare cases where the 
genocidal regime collapsed in its criminal frenzy, as in Germany or Rwanda, 
could accountability be considered. (2000, p. 1) 
It is therefore, observed that the obligation of the international community for 
genocide prevention and punishment has contradictorily resulted in the unwillingness of 
the Western authorities to invoke the term. This is due to the fact that genocide 
recognition presupposes a tenacity of underlying forces that are primordial, and which 
negate tenets of universal human rights and democratic principles, while also lending 
enormous emotive power to the genocide concept by its close linkage with the Nazi 
Holocaust (Schabas, 2000). Through the examination of the Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnic 
conflict dynamics and the international involvement dilemmas surrounding it, for 
instance, there is the recognition of the war causes and its conduct, and the reasons 
behind the failure of the international efforts to resolve the Bosnian conflict for over three 
years, as well as why success was finally achieved in late 1995 (Burg & Shoup, 1999). 
The 1995 produced Dayton accord with an expectation of its implementation experience 
after two years occasioning long-term peace for Bosnia was also reviewed. There is an 
observation of the warring Bosnian Muslim, the Croatian, and the Serbian communities’ 
goal incompatibility, their disinclination to negotiate in good stead, and the international 
community’s reluctance to indefinitely enforce negotiated settlement, or to incur the cost 
of ending the fight, hence, presenting the dilemmas of intervention (Burg & Shoup, 
1999). 
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In proffering a detailed analysis of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, there is an 
insightful understanding of the ethnic conflict dynamics, which also sheds light on the 
developing of strategies for managing, as well as preventing, ethnic conflicts from 
disrupting international peace (Burg & Shoup, 1999). Specifically examined are the 
actions of the crisis’ major participants including the international community, as well as 
the actors in former Yugoslavia, with the study’s first part tracing the conflict origins, the 
war years’ major developments including the media role, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, 
and the second part providing a detailed analytical description of the international 
community’s efforts to resolve the conflict based on the war account background (Burg 
& Shoup, 1999). 
Further on preventing genocide, in the twentieth century there were no external 
party interventions found in nine genocides until the violence exacerbated itself (Dutton, 
2007). Such behaviors of willfully ignoring and remaining disconnected from the 
occurrences and the obligations to intervene under the international law are recognized as 
political decisions (Dutton, 2007). Exploring ways that policymakers, scholars, the 
media, and others can contribute towards preventing genocide, the difficulties of 
preventing genocide are identified along with a genocide prevention guide proffered for 
policymakers, scholars, and others (Heidenrich, 2001). Limitations of imposing trade 
sanctions are additionally recognized which usually take upwards of two years to become 
effective, and in some cases may only become effective after a decade, with limitations 
also on military interventions, covert actions, and the issue of using multinational forces. 
The need is also recognized for the United Nations’ mobilization of its own military 
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force, independent of members’ force contributions, to serve as an international volunteer 
for emergent peacekeeping situations (Heidenrich, 2001). 
Moreover, it is recognized that the relationships between the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council, the Secretariat, and the superpowers, are essential in the understanding 
of the United Nations in the modern genocide age (Lebor, 2006). It is also observed that 
the “symbiotic entwining” of the Security Council’s relationship with the Secretariat, 
“has helped shape the United Nations’ failures in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur” (Lebor, 
2006, p. 7). More so, there is an understanding of the insider details of the behind-the-
scenes negotiations and diplomacy which resulted in the Council’s 1993 resolutions 
defining the safe areas and the UN’s response limits to attacking them.  Observed, for 
instance, are the tensions within the Secretariat’s different departments particularly 
between the Zagreb based UNPROFOR and the Peacekeeping Operations Department 
(DPKO) in New York which prevented a forceful intervention for the Bosnian genocide, 
thus providing fresh views and insights on the UN’s inner workings (Lebor, 2006, p. 8). 
While also detailing the Srebrenica catastrophe’s causes and consequences, to draw on its 
contemporary resonance, a template details is proffered to help understand why the 
Darfur genocide has not been stopped by the United Nations. Thus, it is argued that “the 
same feeble response mechanisms, inertia, bureaucratic infighting within the Secretariat, 
and crucial lack of political will by the Security Council to stop the killing remain 
entrenched” (Lebor, 2006, p.8). Additionally, there are further insights and lessons 
learned on plausible courses of actions to take for preventing genocide (Lebor, 2006). 
Still on the possibility of protection against genocide, the problems involved in 
trying to safeguard against genocide are recognized, such as identified in the military and 
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diplomatic efforts at achieving a humane and just solution to the crisis in Kosovo 
(Reimer, 2000). Observed as hideously persisting and continuing, the problems highlight 
the international community’s tragic failure in developing a powerful response to 
genocide’s tenacious evil after the Holocaust. While the international community passed 
the UN’s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide after 
the World War II in 1948, atrocious genocides have continued to occur in Bosnia, 
Cambodia, Rwanda, as well as in other parts of the world. The challenge is presently 
clear for the international community today, after more than fifty years of adopting the 
UN anti-genocide treaty, with the crafting of an effective and judicious response still 
needed (Reimer, 2000). In response to the challenge of addressing the central question, 
“Can a Global Human Rights Regime to protect against genocide be put into place - or is 
this an impossible mission?” four strategic needs are outlined for carrying out such a vital 
and particularly difficult mission (Reimer, 2000, p. ix). These strategies include the 
strengthening of actors and institutions of a “Global Human Rights Regime”; articulating 
of a practical prevention philosophy that is cogent; crafting of prudently targeted 
sanctions; and developing of a “just humanitarian intervention” theory and practice that is 
judicious (Reimer, 2000, p. ix). Further exploring key follow-up questions relating to 
actors, institutions, policies, principles, problems, and practices of the Global Human 
Rights Regime, there is recognition of solving the world order problem of genocide by 
institutions and norms, as well as the existence of tension between mustering the political 
will for eliminating genocide and transcending the enormous obstacles of genocide 
prevention (Reimer, 2000). 
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Also, through the analysis of both the Burundian and Congolese developments 
there is an understanding of the conflicts’ intricate roots and seemingly interminable 
sequences of violence, as well as how to contain and transform such conflicts by 
employing local cultural mechanisms of dispute resolution systems particularly the 
“gachacha and abashingantah” (Scherrer, 2002, p. xiii).  Additionally identified as 
dispute resolution mechanisms is the international community’s role on human rights 
pursuits, disaster relief, development aid, and peace restoration in order to break the 
tragic violence cycle (Scherrer, 2002). While outlining strategies for genocide prevention 
and intervention for averting future genocidal occurrences, the need is also identified “to 
inform, educate, cajole, prod, and encourage people to break out of their mold of silence, 
to collectively reach out to the victims and the voiceless, and to demand that such 
atrocities be halted” (Totten & Parsons, 2009, p. 2). For instance, there is an 
understanding of politically contrived memory manipulation being fundamental in the 
unleashing of primal genocidal passions, based on its framing of people’s willingness to 
kill others through history and its resultant recurrences of massive human violence. 
Hence, understanding the ways cultural memory becomes created enables an 
understanding of the causes and ways mass murder episodes occur, as well as fosters 
preventative efforts against their occurrences (Hirsch, 1995). 
Furthermore, employing the international community’s actions and inactions in 
the Bosnian and Rwandan genocidal there is a demonstration of such bystander covert 
responsibility, with an observation of the purported posture of politicians, the military, 
and major Western diplomats to the issues of balance and neutrality rather than proffering 
their authoritative explicit intervention (Vetlesen, 2005). However, the 1994 Rwandan 
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genocide analysis to explore whether the genocide could have been prevented through a 
rapid military intervention with minimal human and financial outlay to the interveners, 
had adequate political will been mustered by the international community, is observed as 
dispelling the conventional notion that the Rwandan genocide and plausibly others could 
have been averted by a small contingent of about 5000 troops (Kuperman, 2001, p. 2). 
Enunciating impeding obstacles that would necessarily have been overcome to forestall 
the genocide which occurred in such limited timeframe within weeks, there is an 
outlining of such impeding factors of historical background, as well as cultural and 
geographical settings (Kuperman, 2001). Thus, it is argued that it would have been 
virtually impossible both logistically, as well as militarily, to stop the genocide based on 
the notion of effective intervention involving the airlifting of troops from the U.S. as this 
would have been constrained by time. Discountenancing this on a personal level, 
however, the international community’s failure to intervene to stop the Rwandan 
genocide is a dearth of political will and apathy, since any other readily available military 
contingent could have been deployed, even as an addition to the UNAMIR peacekeeping 
force of 2500 and other Belgian and French troops in Rwanda at the time, as observed by 
Kuperman (2001, p. 40). 
Theoretical Framework 
The ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria derives from a variation of socio-political, 
socio-economic, as well as cultural and religious factors. In particular, the conflict’s 
inherent phenomena of massacres and wanton killings are complex features involving 
multiple causes, and therefore, also require multiple theoretical approaches to explicate 
the different facets of the conflict. In this section several theories are accordingly 
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examined to proffer an understanding in the plausible interpretation of the many varied 
dimensions of the conflict. It is noteworthy, however, that while these theories are 
discussed singularly as alternate theories, they are essentially complementary, and given 
the conflict’s indistinctiveness from its larger contextual framework, the theories 
basically provide some insights into the study’s assumptions on the conflict parties’ 
behavior and actions as are linked to the conflict. The study’s research question is thus, 
consequentially grounded from this theoretical construct. 
Social Cubism Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious 
Conflict. The ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria can be examined using the 
social cubism lens.  Social cubism is an analytical framework conceptually designed from 
a cube’s image of six sides developed by Byrne and Carter (1996), and adopts a holistic 
method of examining social conflict using a six-dimensional model of interrelated 
historical, religious, demographical, political, economic, and psycho-cultural factors. 
These six components of social cubism are seen as working in tandem for a better 
understanding of the causal factors or social conditions undergirding the conflict. By 
adopting the social cubism approach in the explication of ethno-territorial conflict, Byrne 
and Carter (1996) present that an adequate consideration of the combination of all six 
elements provides an illuminating image that sheds light on emergent societal or inter-
group behavior. Hence, the theory captures the multidimensional complexity of any 
particular social conflict. 
The social cubism model can, therefore, adequately explain the northern Nigeria 
ethno-religious conflict given the multi-dimensional framing of the conflict. And, by 
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using the six elements of social cubism to analyze the conflict, its multi-dimensional 
composition can be seen.  
Historical Factors. Social cubism’s historical perspective draws on past 
happenings, traditions, or precedencies that were set in the past. Historically, the northern 
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict can be traced from the country’s colonial past and history 
of ethnic hostilities. The formation of Nigeria like most other African nation-states 
started with the superimposition of diverse nationalities with the coercive machinery of 
the state (MacFarlane, 1984). There was no gradual politicization of a nationality to 
achieve political autonomy and subsequently transform into a nation-state; rather, Nigeria 
and such other African states were created haphazardly by European imperial powers, 
and as a result, pre-existing independent ethno-political societies were forcibly 
amalgamated into one state (MacFarlane, 1984). In essence, colonization brought 
together different ethnic groups inclusive of three majority groups—the Hausas, Ibos and 
Yoruba—under one nation state, resulting in Nigeria’s characterization by a high degree 
of ethnic divergence, presently with over 250 ethnic groups (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2012). The merging of these different ethnic groups into one national government has 
continued to frustrate the attempt at creating new political loyalties, as the country’s 
political structure is deeply grounded in ethnic and regional loyalty and makes for 
unstable governance which, in turn, impacts the ethno-religious conflict in the North. 
Hence, the prevalence of conflicts in northern Nigeria can be linked to ethnicity factors 
and colonialism’s amalgamating of various ethnic groups leading to Nigeria’s high 
ethnocentric politics as undergirding the waves of killings in northern Nigeria (Anthony, 
2002; Osaghae, 1998a). 
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Furthermore, colonialism brought fundamental changes in Nigeria, primarily in 
castigating and de-legitimating of traditional religions, which were from then on referred 
to as 'paganism,' and the rapid implanting of Christianity (Ibrahim, 1991). This 
transformative process was so rapid that within a few decades, pagan practitioners’ 
census figures showed a sharp decline from 50% in 1931 to 34% in 1952, and 18.2% in 
1963. In contrast, over this same period the census data showed an increase from 44% to 
47% for registered Muslims, and a corresponding increase from 6.25 to 34.6% for 
Christians (Ibrahim, 1991, p. 116). The colonial authorities were said to put in place a 
system that aimed to virtually remove all ‘pagans’ and all ‘sects’ that had forms of ‘non-
orthodoxy,’ as these connoted ‘resistance to existing political authority,’ a campaign 
which has remained unabated since independence (Ibrahim, 1991, p. 116). And the 
justification for imposing Christian and Muslim orthodoxy derives from the strategy to 
promote unity in Nigeria, based on the notion of their shared philosophical and 
Abrahamic origins. However, the unity and peaceful national co-existence expected to 
emerge from the institutionalized religious orthodoxy has yet to materialize, as there is an 
evolution of conflict and political tension between the proponents of the two rival 
universal religions of Christianity and Islam in Nigeria. There is the tendency of both 
religions to delay national integration due to their negative inclinations to generate 
competing social orders (Ibrahim, 1991). 
Additionally, Kukah and Falola (1996) in tracing the history of Islam’s emergence 
in Nigeria, “as a political force,” acknowledge that “the use of Islam to initiate a large-
scale jihad in the North during the 19
th
 century provided a successful case for the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria,” and argue that “the legacy of this continues 
120 
 
 
to the present day” (pp. 2-3). It is, thus, recognized that as Islam penetrated the North in 
the 11
th
 century, linking the region with North Africa, Western Sudan, and the Middle 
East, the social revolution produced by Uthman dan Fodio’s jihad caused the creation of 
an Islamic state in the Northern region (Kukah & Falola, 1996). Adebayo observes, for 
instance, that: 
Boko Haram though a loose albeit a highly effective network of terror is driven 
and sustained by a fascist and racist ideology of domination. That is the fact. The 
quest of the power establishment in the North led mainly by the Fulanis to always 
dominate other Nigerians following the vision of Ahmadu Bello, who considered 
the country an "Estate" bequeathed by his grandfather Othman dan Fodio to 
Fulanis, is the source of our inability to build a united, democratic and modern 
nation since 1960. (2012, para. 17) 
Religious Factors. Religion refers to a people group’s article of faith in relation 
with both the supernatural as linked to both the physical and the metaphysical world. 
Religion helps to preserve and maintain a people’s way of life. On the religious 
dimension, there are two major powerful religions in Nigeria, the Islamic religion and 
Christianity, but also with some traditionalists following, and while Islam predominates 
most of the northern region crossing linguistic and ethnic boundaries as its dominant 
religion, Christianity predominates across most of the south, including the Ibos of the east 
and the Yorubas of the west, many of whom view Islam as threatening to secular 
government (Noble, 1992c, para. 16). Each of the two religions is, thus, trying to assert 
its meaning frame, and while one of the religions, Islam, is a political religion that does 
not divorce religion from the state, the other religion, Christianity, a non-political 
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religion, separates religion from the state. And, tracing both religions’ different 
dispositions to violence, for instance, Kukah and Falola observe that: 
while Islam’s early propagation by prophet Muhammad and his initial followers 
met with violence, they quickly adopted violence in self-defense waged as jihad 
which has become institutionalized in Islam. By contrast the propagation of 
Christianity as preached by Jesus Christ is to be by love and persuasion rather 
than the sword. However, the quest for political and economic power among those 
who became Christians in history blurred this injunction for peaceful propagation 
as the Crusades showed. (1996, p. 195) 
Furthermore, it is recognized that religion appeals to millions as an avenue for 
mobilizing sentiments in choosing their role models and mentors from its rank amidst a 
public that is alienated from the state, as well as for developing an enduring future hope. 
More so, religion is leaned upon by the elite for engaging in political competition on both 
intra and inter-regional basis, and for the northern ambitious elites, Islam serves as a 
political tool, as the level of corruption notwithstanding, a politician would always “claim 
the fear of God as a principle of existence” (Kukah & Falola, 1996, p. 2). Thus, Nigeria 
has had an inundation of religious crisis and conflicts which are often orchestrated by the 
assertiveness and militancy of the extremist Islamists in the country (Kukah & Falola, 
1996). More so, the activities of some Muslim groups, particularly in the northern parts 
of Nigeria aimed at Islamizing the country, are the cause of the ongoing violence 
(Haberson & Rothschild, 1991). Hence, the recognition of Islam’s revolutionary force, its 
tendency to shape national as well as international politics, (Mazrui; Currey; Rubin; and 
Pipes as cited in Kukah & Falola, 1996) and its aim to create an Islamic state in Nigeria, 
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“is the ultimate evidence of the place of religion in politics” (Kukah & Falola, 1996, p. 
2).  
Thus, in the final analysis, the effects of this religious politicking are clashes 
between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, with religion frequently becoming fertile 
eruption grounds for political conflicts through manipulation and intrigues of the 
Nigerian Muslim politicians, with the resultant effect being that the country has, since 
independence, been in a tug of war concerning its leadership. Religion is an instrumental 
factor, with Muslims vying to have a Muslim leader and Christians, in the same vein, also 
vying for a Christian leader. On this perennial power tussle in the country’s presidential 
race, it is observed, for example, that: 
The intense debate following the death of President Yar’Adua in May 2010 over 
the informal “zoning” arrangement, wherein presidential power is swapped 
between north and south, shows that ethno-regional politics is alive and well at 
the national level. The far north is thus still a single unit in the country’s power 
politics. (ICG, 2010, p. 9) 
Thus, each religious group desires to be in control, with the exploitation of 
religious differences further entrenching the ethnic divide, and greatly intensifying 
political instability in Nigeria (Haberson & Rothschild, 1991). Hence, religious factors 
and its politicization have been identified among the myriad of causal factors 
exacerbating the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict (Ibrahim, 1989, 1991; 
Osaghae, 1998a; Suberu, 2009; Williams, 2011). 
Demographic Factors. Demographics refer to the number and composition of a 
population in a given place, as well as such factors as birthrate, gender, age, etc., which 
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affect it. With its north-south dichotomy, Nigeria is unevenly divided into a mainly 
Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south, with the Middle Belt or central region 
which has a near balance of Christians and Muslims, straddling the nation. Each of these 
regions also has some minority traditionalists (ICG, 2010, p. 1). Northern Nigeria 
comprise the twelve states of Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, 
Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara which adopted the Sharia law from 1999-2002 
(see Map VI in Appendix A showing the Sharia adopted states in northern Nigeria), as 
well as the other seven non-sharia adopted states of Adamawa, Benue, Kogi, Kwara, 
Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba in which there is a large Christian following. Hence, 
northern Nigeria as presently constituted, covering all 19 states in the north (see Map III 
in Appendix A) spanning the far north key conflict zones of Maiduguri, Bauchi, Kano, 
and Yobe, as well as the perennial Middle Belt conflict zones of Jos, Kaduna with 
minority ethnic groupings, and a large Christian following. Hence, demographically, 
northern Nigeria has a large Muslim majority with a substantial Christian minority who 
are either northern indigenes or migrants from the south. To the south are the majority 
ethnic groups of the Yoruba, to the West are minority ethnic groups who are a near equal 
mix of Christians and Muslims, and to the East are the Ibos, the Ibibios, Efik, and other 
minority ethnic groups who are mostly Christianized with minority traditionalists 
(Osaghae, 1998a). 
It is recognized, however, that ethnicity often does not exist in its pure form, but 
rather in combination  with religion, regionalism, class, race, or “other conflict-
generating cleavages” in ways that are mutually reinforcing, as a result of which 
managing ethnicity problems have tended to be somewhat complex (Osaghae, 1998a, p. 
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3). Furthermore, Osaghae (1998a) observes that, “Ethnic minorities are usually defined in 
contradistinction to major groups with whom they coexist in political systems, as groups 
which experience systemic discrimination and domination because of numerical 
inferiority and a host of historical and sociological factors,” with hegemonic and 
dominant minority groups as Nigeria’s Fulani ethnic group, however, excluded from such 
minority grouping (p. 3). Thus, minorities in Nigeria are classified relative to the three 
major ethnic groups—the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo. However, while southern 
minorities in the south are basically ethno-linguistic in form, northern minorities are 
additionally and primarily religious minorities, and this presents a more complex ethnic 
setting than the south (Osaghae, 1998a).  
Similarly, in the north, three levels of minorities are additionally distinguished, 
each of which has its political implications as Osaghae delineates: 
At the broadest level, the corporatist, cross-ethnic bond of Islam which is built 
around the Fulani Sultan of Sokoto who, as Commander of the Faithful, is the 
head of the Muslim community, has made predominantly Muslim minorities ... 
and Muslims from other minority groups politically powerful, having access to 
political privileges at all levels as protégés of the Hausa/Fulani. 
At the next level is the dichotomy between the Sokoto (Hausa/ Fulani) 
‘axis’ and the Borno (Kanuri) ‘axis’ which is built around the pristine Kanem-
Bornu empire-state (and its vassals), and which was and remains a contending 
center of Islamic civilization and influence. Relations between the Kanuris, who 
are a political minority and the Sokoto axis have been a mix of separatism..., 
accommodation ..., and struggles for supremacy.  
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At the third level are the non-Muslim minority groups which have since 
the jihad fought and resisted Fulani overlordship and islamisation. These groups 
are mainly located in the middle-belt, southern Zaria, and Adamawa provinces 
which were open to Christian and other Westernising influences at a time the 
Muslim areas were quarantined. (1998a, p. 8) 
Consequently, the implication of this development is that Christian groups such as 
the Zurus of Sokoto in states like Bauchi that are predominantly Hausa/Fulani Muslims, 
have become political minorities, with Christianity serving as a primary ‘minority 
diacritic’ in such states. Furthermore, in attempt to mobilize northern unity against the 
south through the bonds of Islam, Christianity has become a counter-mobilization 
ideology for the Hausa/Fulani elites in the region, but also a rallying point for opponents 
of their domination (Osaghae, 1998a). Thus, these northern minorities have frontally 
opposed Sharia’s introduction at the federal court of appeal in the 1970s/1990s 
constitution-making bodies, articulating their interests through the Christian Association 
of Nigeria (CAN) as their main channel. In consequence, most Hausa/Fulani, minority-
involved conflicts in the 1980s/1990s in such areas as Bauchi, Zaria, Kafanchan, Zangon-
Kataf, and Funtua were primarily religious conflicts. These minority groups, though 
small and isolated, have continuously demanded freedom from Muslim emirates, for 
increased autonomy and own local government, and for a customary court of appeal for 
non-Muslims to complement the operative Sharia court of appeal (Osaghae, 1998a). 
Additionally, there is the issue of land distribution in Nigeria with the north being 
arid and more desert-like (the farther north one goes from the south), while the south is  
grassland and swampy with mangrove forests around the coastal regions, and with the 
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country’s vast oil deposits found mainly in the southern parts, primarily, in the delta 
region. The Muslims want to control the petroleum which is in the south where the 
Christians are. The northern extremist Muslims are destroying the churches, killing the 
Christians in the north, and encroaching southwards on the Christians as a gradual way of 
gaining control and taking over power in the country. Ultimately, the idea is to turn 
Nigeria into an Islamic nation (Haberson & Rothchild, 1991; Kukah & Falola, 1996).  
Political Factors. Politically, the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict can 
also be explained with political factors entailing processes of control, collective decision-
making which are not indicative of the individual will, and authoritative resource 
allocation. There are two very powerful political units in Nigeria, the Muslims and 
Christians, each struggling for hegemony with conflicts between the two units 
exacerbating the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria. The experience being 
played out between these two powerful units is the manipulation of political differences 
in regional and national politics with manifest instability and political upheavals in the 
region. Thus, the prevalence of conflicts in northern Nigeria has been linked to political 
factors and unbridled power tussle as part of the myriad of factors undergirding the 
conflict (Ukiwo, 2003). Furthermore, according to Haberson and Rothchild (1991), an 
attempted Christian coup against the Northern Muslim leadership foiled in 1990 is said to 
have given rise to fears of the imposition of Islam in Africa and accentuated the 
differences between countries with Muslim and Christian majorities in Africa. Politically, 
the spread of Islam has been through jihadist conquests, and as past warriors, extremist 
Muslims want to continue in that rein of warfare, with Islamic assertiveness seen to have 
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further exacerbated conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Africa, and Nigeria in 
particular (Haberson & Rothchild, 1991).  
More so, Kukah and Falola (1996) identify the political impact of Islam in 
Nigeria, primarily the Islam predominated northern Nigeria with its vast Muslim 
population, the basis on which the Muslim world perceives Nigeria as a key member. 
Islam’s politicization impact is even further compounded by its ideological stance of non-
separation of religion from politics, a system which is prevalent and deeply entrenched in 
the north, as distinct from the Muslims of Western Nigeria who peacefully coexist with 
Christians. Thus, given Islam’s intricate positioning in the nation’s political sphere, 
Kukah and Falola argue that: 
Islam is both a religion and a political force in modern Nigeria. Like Christianity, 
it aims to win more converts. The motive of the Islamic intelligentsia is, however, 
more ambitious than just number-counting: in the surface, a tiny but powerful 
Islamic elite wants to turn Nigeria into an Islamic country. (1996, p. 2) 
Hence, this Islamization stance of political Islam and some of its adherents continues to 
significantly undergird and exacerbate the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict 
(Kukah & Falola, 1996). 
Economic Factors. Economically, the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria 
can be traced to a myriad of such factors as resource allocation inequity, indigene-settler 
issues, unemployment, poverty etc. The economic factor is seen as playing a crucial role 
in exacerbating the conflict. For instance, Anthony (2002) observes that, “in 
understanding Northern Nigeria’s 1966 riots, the material and the effective are 
inseparable, just as the inward face of ethnicity  is inseparable from its political aspects” 
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(p. 7). The mobilization of fear and anger for generating and sustaining the anti-Igbo 
violence was primarily “to advance the material interests of Northern elites, and those 
elites succeeded because ordinary Northerners, driven by their own material concerns, 
participated” (Anthony, 2002, p. 7). 
Towing an economic perspective, therefore, will involve looking at economic 
differences and resource distribution parameters which are commonly found to be 
unevenly spread among groups. Economic inequities breed discontent and tensions which 
may, in turn, escalate to riots and violent protests. Inequitable resource distribution is 
primary conflict causation in the nation, as Nigeria’s vast oil and mineral resource is 
highly politicized, and conflicts often arise from issues of resource allocation. With more 
than 90 percent of the country’s oil sourced from the Niger Delta region in which most of 
the population are minority groups, incessant conflicts occur in the area with protests 
against perceived inequities of the federal revenue allocation structure. Furthermore, 
given that oil presently accounts for over 90 per cent of the nation’s foreign exchange 
earnings and most of its tax revenue (The Economist as cited in Harnischfeger, 2004; 
Mitee, 1994), resource distribution involves a lot of power-play and intrigue.  This factor 
coupled with the immunity of Nigerian politicians from accountability and transparency, 
due to lack of effective probity of public officers but sustained by the enormous inflows 
of oil revenues for the country, worsens the impoverishment of oil producing areas 
through deprivation and marginalization.  
Impoverishment has occasioned widespread communal violence and armed 
rebellion, especially in the Niger Delta region where incidences of blown up oil pipelines, 
as well as kidnapped and sometimes murdered oil workers have created a level of 
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anarchy in some parts of the region (Gberie, 2006). Such blatant resource abuse has, by 
extension, also left in its wake a phenomenal privation of the country as a whole, and in 
particular the northern region which is the focus of this study. Nossiter (2010c) observes 
for instance, that in the oil-producing south as in the north, “the restiveness is fueled by 
corruption and glaring economic inequality,” and he also notes that states in the northern 
region “are the country’s poorest, with over 70 percent of the population living in 
poverty, according to the United Nations, while the few rich live in mansions behind high 
walls” (para. 6).  
Psycho-Cultural Factors. Psycho-cultural factors refer to the psychological 
orientation and dispositions of matters, and involve factors such as emotions and tensions 
which emerge as a result of conflict and escalate with social change. This dimension 
involves how people are feeling and how those feelings are translated into their 
understanding. Thus, the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria can be explained by 
the psycho-cultural factors undergirding the conflict from a cultural paradigm 
perspective. There are two distinctive cultures in the conflict, an Islamic culture and a 
Christian culture, each with strong feelings regarding which should survive or which 
should be in the center. On the one hand, Muslims believe the Islamic culture will rid 
Nigeria of corruption, and psychologically, they see an Islamic culture solving the 
problem of corruption and nepotism in the country. Christians, on the other hand, have 
strong feelings and believe that the constitution will provide democracy and freedom of 
expression to all Nigerians—Muslims, Christians, and traditionalists alike—though the 
Nigerian Constitution being secular is neither Christian nor Muslim. On the state of 
profligacy for which the Muslims have their bent, Falola observes that: 
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religious organizations…rejected the corruption of political (and even religious) 
leaders. They characterized the society as decadent and excessively materialistic. 
Electoral malpractices and rivalries among the political parties convinced 
reformist religious leaders that the secular state was not ideal for the country. 
Some began to reject the constitution, calling instead for a theocratic state with 
moral leaders. Colonel Ghaddafi of Libya and the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran 
provided alternative models of leadership, both widely believed to be strong, 
popular, honest, moral, and committed to their people. (1999, pp. 168-169) 
Thus, the conflicting perspectives and worldviews of these two religious groups 
contribute to the tensions that exacerbate the northern Nigeria conflict. More so, 
Haberson and Rothchild (1991) observe that with the spread of the Arabic language, 
Islam, and Islamic culture, Islam has become an integral part of African contemporary 
experience with the result that Islam’s significance as a political factor in the Nigeria has 
considerably increased. On the playing out of such cultural divergences between the two 
religious groups, Falola observes, for instance, that: 
A major and long-standing source of Christian anger was the belief that Muslims 
were trying to turn the new capital of Abuja into an Islamic city. Very quickly 
mosques and Id el Fitr praying ground appeared, a National Mosque was built 
close to the presidential mansion, and the designs for the city gate and some other 
places were Islamic. Using the Hausa language and wearing the Hausa garb and 
cap associated with the president became common as a way to attract notice, 
while some southern Christian politicians shamelessly converted to Islam for 
political advantage. In the contest for re-election in 1983, northern politicians 
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demonstrated their commitment to hang on to power and to promote the cause of 
Islam. (1999, pp. 169-170) 
On this control and manipulation of symbols for political advantage, Kukah and 
Falola (1996) observe, for example, the use of a simple, effective strategy of reminding 
visitors to Nigeria, as well as citizens, of Islam’s dominance with the North’s main 
airports and hotels, for instance, having mosques and prayer grounds attached to them, 
with a mosque also pronouncingly sited close to the major airport in Lagos. Kukah and 
Falola accordingly, further recognize that: 
Nowhere is the use of symbols more effective than at Abuja, the country’s new 
capital city. For long, the Northern oligarchy detested Lagos as the federal capital 
because it is located among the Yoruba, a rival ethnic group. When Abuja was 
chosen as a new site in the 1970s, it provided the Northern ruling class the 
opportunity to realize the dream of shifting the economic and political center to 
the North…. (1996, pp. 60-61) 
Given social cubism’ conception of a generic world view presumably, of all 
things being equal (a ceteris paribus scenario), which is far from the case in the northern 
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, the elite theory lens will be next employed to examine 
the conflict. 
Elite Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious Conflict. The 
elite theory provides insightful understanding of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious 
conflict. Propounded by C. Wright Mills (1956), elite theory focuses on power 
relationships in modern society, and argues that a small minority comprising of the 
economic, policy making, or political elites’ control power dynamics, which power is 
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distinctive of the democratic electoral processes of the state. The theory’s epistemological 
framework postulates the existence of a clear divide between the brokers and users of 
power, and those at their disposition. The elite theory’s configuration is that the 
organization and determination of every political and economic system are for the benefit 
of an elite few. Hence, Mills sees society as constantly organized with the elite few 
welding overall power over the larger others, and posits that equipping the public with 
information regarding the nature of societal power distribution will aid the generation of 
an essential social shift that will greatly alter existing class and other social structural 
arrangements. 
Fundamental causal factors for the intermittent killings in the northern Nigeria 
ethno-religious conflict is the phenomena of political manipulation and power tussle 
between the political elites in the north and those in the south that was entrenched into 
Nigerian political system from the colonial days. According to Osaghae (1998a), 
preceding Nigeria’s creation of regions, there were neither minority nor majority 
groupings. Using the Native Authority (NA) system, however, the colonial administration 
created and ensured the autonomy of the various groups and sub-groups which later 
became majority groups. Thus, citing Tseayo (1975) and Yahaya (1980), Osaghae 
(1998a) observes that “the adoption of the administrative machinery of the Fulani-run 
caliphate and emirates as the NA prototype, and the pact that Lord Lugard made with the 
emirs, not only kept pre-colonial relations of domination intact, but also led to the 
imposition of Muslim overlords (appointed by the sultan or emirs) on non-Muslim areas 
which had successfully resisted Fulani suzerainty before colonization” (p.4). Although 
every group constituting an NA unit in the north had enjoyed some autonomy despite 
133 
 
 
this, however, everything changed with the creation of regions. This was due to “power-
seeking elites” capitalizing on the new regions’ opportunities to unify the various sub-
groups, the Yoruba, Ibos, and Hausa/Fulani which were previously autonomous under the 
NA, into what then became the majority groups (Osaghae, 1998a, p. 4). It is, thus, 
recognized that virtually all of Nigeria’s heads of states from independence up to Sani 
Abacha’s regime have been Northerners including “Tafawa Balewa, Yakubu Gowon, 
Murtala Mohammed, Shehu Shagari, Muhamadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, and Sani 
Abacha,” and as each “had the power to distribute power, they did so with their 
constituency as their paramount consideration,” to the chagrin of southerners (Kukah & 
Falola, 1996, p. 50). 
Furthermore, in his seminal works, The Power Elite, Mills (1956) presents an 
analytical structure of society as composing of three distinctive groups—the economic, 
political, and the military—which completely control the power dynamics. Thus, the 
society’s two major groupings of elites and masses have the elites grouping further 
broken into competing power brokers of the economic, political, and the military. The 
northern elites are recognized as “members of the intermingled ‘patrimonial aristocracy’ 
(sarauta), mercantile capitalists, and politicians” (Lubeck as cited in Anthony, 2002, p. 
20), who broadly constitute the national elite members that are recognized as “a 
comprador bourgeoisie in power not because of its control of economic resources, but 
rather over political resources, which it uses to channel state resources through ethnicized 
channels” (Nnoli as cited in Anthony, 2002, p. 20). 
Furthermore, it is recognized that “the dominant Northern Nigerian political elite 
manipulates Islam to acquire and consolidate power,” and these northern elites are seen 
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by southerners to have “enjoyed a predominant share in the distribution of the national 
cake (wealth) and federal power” (Kukah & Falola, 1996, pp. 49-50). Thus, the northern 
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict is being fundamentally sustained because of the 
economic and political interests of the northern elites that it serves, with such interests 
being cloaked over by an ostensible fanatical support for religious values. Ezeibe (2009) 
argues that “behind these seeming passion and love for religious values and dogma 
shown by religious leaders lies the domination of religious values by religious leader’s 
selfish economic benefits,” and there is the need to educate the masses to “appreciate and 
identify the voice of a fanatic religious elite who seek to advance his economic interest 
through religious mask at the masses’ perils” (para. 43-44). 
Additionally, the elite theory is akin to Marxist humanist perspective of social 
class, given its focus of aiming to have power structures, and political or government 
setups to connect to society, as harm will be brought to people with these entities 
disinterest in the society. In essence, Mills aims to show a disjuncture in relationships 
among society’s different organs. The elites, as well as their subordinates to which 
privileged status are accorded, seek to utilize and control by manipulating social, 
economic, and political domains at large. Power contestations are dominated by the elites 
who, in Nigeria, are characteristically defined as “the rich and the powerful” (Dudley as 
cited in Osaghae, 1998b, p. 25). Expatiating further on the nature of these socio-political 
entities, Osaghae observes that: 
The elite in Nigeria is factionalized mainly along ethnic, regional, religious and 
institutional lines, being product of the uneven development and rivalry which 
British colonial administration fostered among the different segments. It has 
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accordingly built its support constituencies from communal, ethnic, religious and 
regional groups depending on the level of contestation, and has sought to 
manipulate and exploit the differences and anxieties arising from unequal size and 
population to further its interests. At the macro national level, powerful ethno-
regional elite blocs have emerged at various times to forge constitutive interests in 
competition with others. (1998b, p. 25) 
For instance, the Kaduna mafia were said to have emerged from a “group of 
young northern Nigerian intellectuals, civil servants, business tycoons, and military 
officers residing or conducting business in the former northern capital city of Kaduna 
during the end of the first republic,” and who, prodded by “the loss of many northern 
leaders in the January 1966 coup,” rallied round and opposed the new Aguiyi Ironsi 
government (Jibo as cited in Osuntokun, 2012, para. 6). Though operating mostly 
underground with speculation on its existence and membership, the Kaduna mafia is 
solidly politically driven, and manifests as the powers behind the nation’s military and 
civilian ruler-ship (Osaghae, 1998b), with the group having powerful and extensive 
political connections (Kukah & Falola, 1996). Osaghae (1998b) presents the Kaduna 
mafia as comprising “core Northern elites, ‘old brigade’ and ‘newbreed’ alike – 
intelligentsia, serving and retired military officers and bureaucrats, and members of the 
business and political classes – and its objective is believed to be in defence and 
advocacy of Northern interests, the most important of which is to sustain Northern 
political domination of the federation” (p. 25). The group is recognized as thriving “on an 
elaborate network of power alliances among northern aristocrats and government 
sympathizers who favored the groups pro northern and Islamic bent,” and are known for 
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their “commitment to the traditional values and socio political interests of northern 
Nigeria” (Osuntokun, 2012, para. 7-8). Thus, the North’s emergent elites exist alongside 
the region’s traditional power elite without displacing them (Kukah & Falola, 1996), with 
both elitists groups bringing their machinations to bear on the northern Nigeria ethno-
religious conflict. 
In the 1987 Muslim Christian crisis in Kaduna, for instance, General Babangida 
alluded “to the sinister men who instigated the riots,” and promising summary justice 
while speaking “against ‘group interest’ and powerful subversives,” threatened not to 
recognize or spare “any sacred cow” in reference to the Kaduna Mafia, whose influence 
was said to have waned since his seizing of power in 1985 (Kotch, 1987, para. 4, pp. 11-
13). Babangida’s view was also observed to have collaborated with some northern 
Christians’ view “that the rabble of young and uneducated Moslems who attacked them 
and their property…were sponsored by unidentified barons seeking conflict” (Kotch, 
1987, para. 5). 
While recognizing patrimonialism as “getting out of control,” the Kaduna mafia is 
derisively cited as an ill-defined organization formed “to acquire power and wealth by 
ties with the government officials” starting with the Gowon administration (Falola, 1999, 
p. 147). The elite theory’s explication of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict is 
manifest in the elitists’ main purpose of exploiting human and material resources. For 
instance, Ezeibe quoting Nwachukwu acknowledges, that:  
Policies are carried by emotional sentiments rooted in ethnicity or religion, 
politics in Nigeria is characterized by religious cleavages. The education religious 
and political elites (class) prey upon the masses and use them as satellite to 
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achieve their socio-political and economic objectives. This is done through 
orientation, indoctrination or violence using the masses on the already conceived 
stereotypes against their political and religious opponents. (2009, para. 43) 
The elite theory, thus, proffers an understanding of the system of social control 
processes of elites, which does not include the rest of the society, with the notion that one 
segment of the society controlling the rest of the populace generates conflict levels, the 
resolution of which can only occur when such power comptrollers share this resource. 
Such form of arrangement may, however, be deemed impossible as social elites see 
themselves alone as having the sole philosophies and ideologues capable of engendering 
and sustaining society (Okosun, 2012). 
Exclusionary Ideology Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria Ethno-
Religious Conflict. The ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria can also be 
examined using an exclusive ideological lens. Exclusionary Ideology is recognized as an 
ideology that is specifically aimed at selecting and justifying the extermination of 
members of a targeted group (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 18). Exclusionary 
Ideologues is sometimes a particularly complex set of ideologies that involves 
phenomenal orchestration, extensive systematization levels, planning, and organization. 
The system of exclusive ideology is aimed to target. Its whole essence is to select a given 
population group for whatever differential criteria (physiological, biological, ethnic, or 
religious) and target such selected people on the pre-conceived notion that people with 
such defining criteria “are dangerous and dangerous people should be killed” (Campbell, 
2010, Video Series 18). On the basis of such selection and valuation, these people are 
then targeted for extermination.  
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It is observed in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, for instance, that 
the adoption of Sharia involves a redefinition of political self-determination in religious 
terms based on an exclusionary ideology against the non-Muslim others from 
participation, in determining the central aspects of public legislation (Harnischfeger, 
2004). Harnischfeger (2004) argues that with the Sharia law in force “Muslims redefine 
the demos that is entitled to rule” (p. 431). This exclusion of non-Muslims became 
apparent in January 2000 with Sharia’s first adoption in Zamfara state in the north with 
its declaration as ‘the unanimous wish of the people’ (Hotline Magazine as cited in 
Harnischfeger, 2004, p. 431), and other states following later. Presently, twelve out of 
Nigeria’s 36 have adopted the Sharia or Islamic law. While Muslims who are in majority 
in the north welcome such revival of Islamic traditions, however, it is observed that some 
of the twelve sharia adopted states have sizeable Christian or non-Muslim minorities. 
Hence, Christians and some traditionalists in Sharia operative states feel threatened by 
state-enforced Islamization, and as noted by Harnischfeger (2004), this religious 
campaign has triggered several clashes with loss of lives of five to ten thousand people 
(p. 432). It is paramount to note as Adar observes, that: 
At the core of Islamization lie the doctrines of Islamic culture and religion… 
implementation of…Sharia…cannot be brought about in isolation and without the 
concomitant internal political realities. Islamization…is used as a tool for political 
power and legitimacy…Sharia, therefore, controls and regulates socio-political 
and economic life which form the basis of political authority – “reinforced by the 
dogma of the divine guidance of the community.” The incorporation of Sharia 
law in a constitution offers the basis for the promotion of Islamic principles. 
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Islamization is therefore an important vehicle for promoting values associated 
with Islam and Arabic culture. (2001, pp. 85-86) 
It is however, recognized that non-Muslims, primarily Christians, constitute about 
half the population of Nigeria, and these non-Muslim populace now fear that the secular 
principles which have prevailed since Nigeria became an independent sovereign state are 
being eroded. This is notwithstanding the fact that “adopting of any religion as State 
Religion” is prohibited in Section 10 of the Nigerian constitution (Harnischfeger, 2004, p. 
432). Thus, the Sharia law is seen by Christians as state apparatus for political 
maneuverings, control, and dominance; they (Christians) fear that Sharia will apply to 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike, in spite of assurances of the sharia-operating state 
governments that it will apply strictly to Muslims. Evidently, Sharia’s adoption in the 
predominantly Muslim northern states has heightened the already entrenched hostilities 
between Muslims and Christians in the country. In the Middle Belt, for instance, the 
introduction of Sharia has resulted in violent conflicts, as Islamic laws set up claims over 
territories in which Muslim dictates prevail. Hence, parts of the Middle Belt experience 
violent conflicts between the mainly Hausa/Fulani migrants from the north, and the 
indigenous ethnic groups who are mainly Christians and traditionalists (Harnischfeger, 
2004). 
Thus, looking at the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict which is ethno-
territorial in nature, it is essential to examine the factors that explain relationship on the 
basis of exclusionary ideology on each side of the conflict which, as coined exclusivity, 
leads to alienation, and alienation causes tension between groups. Because of exclusivity, 
there is mistrust (don’t trust that you can do anything for me), suspicion, and distrust (my 
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not allowing you to do anything for me) which is typical of extremist Muslims. There is 
exclusionary ideology among extremist Muslims because they want to set themselves out 
among others. Essentially, they want to be separate and distinct from others. Thence, on 
the basis of these exclusionary tendencies, Christians are being discriminated against, 
targeted, and exterminated in northern Nigeria. It is observed, for instance, that: 
Islamic zeal is strong in the northern state of Kano. Kano’s governor, Ibrahim 
Shekarau, was elected on a radical, hardline, pro- Sharia platform. Christians 
suffer intense persecution in Kano, their schools and churches having been closed 
and burned. It is compulsory for all public-school girls to wear Islamic hijab, and 
as the Christian schools have been closed Christians don’t have much choice. On 
the night of Shekarau’s election (21 May 2003), pastor Chikezie (Sunday) 
Madumere and his whole family were burned to death in their home in “No Man’s 
Land” Kano city, by Muslim mobs celebrating Shekarau’s win. (Kendal, 2004, 
para. 17) 
What are the circumstances that have created exclusionary tendencies among the 
northerners? And, are there also circumstances that are creating exclusionary tendencies 
among the southerners? It can be argued that the southerners are not so exclusive because 
they have gone to the north to work and mix with the northerners. The Christians are not 
exclusive but are rather creating commerce in the north and other places they reside. But 
have the northerners of themselves, accepted the southerners and the Christians into their 
midst? Is it that the Islamic folks are afraid because the southerners and Christians will 
Christianize them? What is the population of Muslims, Christians, and others? According 
to the World Factbook data, religious composition estimates for the country is about 50% 
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Muslim, 40% Christian, and 10% indigenous beliefs (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). 
Is that why the extremist Muslims are angry? To answer that question an examination of 
geography assists by observing the distinction between the North’s arid and dry region, 
and the south with vast oil resources, and the need to control the country’s oil wealth as 
was typified by the Sudan/Darfur conflict (Batruch, 2004) prior to the recent delineation 
and independence of southern Sudan. 
Looking back from 1966, there is no significant change in population mix, and so 
there is no need for the extremist Muslims to get agitated over the issue of being 
overtaken by Christians. Thus, if no proof exists that the population mix is changing 
adversely for the Muslim population, the exclusion is being created. Why is this 
exclusion being created? It can be argued, firstly, that extremist Muslims want to be 
different. Secondly, they want to maintain their Islamic tradition. Thirdly, they want to 
maintain their own Islamic legal system which is the Sharia. And, fourthly, they want to 
be different because they do not want dilution in their religious, social, and political 
spheres, or the dilution by Christianity from Western education as the Boko Haram 
professes. They are anti-Western philosophy and Western constitutional law, either of 
which are part of the secular system. Exclusivity resonates with Islam as defined by 
Sharia, and extremist Muslims cannot go beyond that while Christian exclusivity 
resonates with secularism. Tension is, therefore, bred with extremist Muslims in negation 
of the Christianity that brought in parliament and the secular paradigm.  
The question in the ethno-territorial discourse, therefore, is why are these two 
religious groups excluding themselves from each other? Exclusivity suggests that the end 
of the road is violence “because I don’t want you in my territory, and you are not part of 
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my religion,” and this basically is the positioning of extremist Muslims. Thus, in 
“Victims of Riots: Their Pains, Woes and Regrets,” Ahiante observes that: 
From Kano to Sokoto, Kaduna to Kebbi, Bauchi, Taraba, and Plateau to name a 
few, the story is the same. Killings, maiming, and kidnapping. These have been 
the lots of the ordinary citizens of the area. Mostly affected are Christians 
irrespective of tribe or race. If you are a southerner leaving in the area, the 
situation is worse. Even soldiers with all their training are unable to escape the 
ravaging youths turned terrorists who take delight in killing their neighbors in the 
name of religion. (2004, para. 17) 
What is the position of Christians? Do they also adopt this exclusionary 
ideological stance? Christians, probably do not. While Christians, as well as Muslims, 
proselyte for converts, Christians basically are not involved in exclusionary tendencies 
against Muslims on the parameters of their faith as the extremist Muslims do on grounds 
of Islam or Sharia practices and implementation. Thus, because the Islamic population 
did not open themselves to the Christian group, that is why there is this latent genocide 
emanating from such exclusionism. In addition to this framing of the Islamic religious 
escapade, there is also the 1966 Nzeogwu assassination of the Sarduana of Sokoto, the 
anger over which never left the northerners, and exclusivity is further created as a result. 
The caveat, however, is that while exclusivity may explain the northern Nigeria 
conflict in terms of one group excluding the other, Post Modernists on the other hand, 
may argue that ethno-religious conflict is occurring in the region because the Muslims are 
living in the historic past, while Christians are bringing education to the north and they 
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are refusing. Thus, the southerners are the post modernists, but the northerners are 
refusing to move from their conservative past. 
Hate Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious Conflict. The 
ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria can further be explicated applying the hate 
theory. Hate is recognized as a contributing causal factor of numerous genocidal killings 
and massacres (Sternberg, 2003). Although agreement has as yet to be reached among 
scholars on the definition of ‘hate’ as a term (Perry as cited in Walters, 2011, p. 315), 
with laws on hate crime proliferating the Western world there has primarily been an 
increase in legal scholarship on the meaning of hate (Jacobs & Potter as cited in Walter, 
2011).  It is, however, generally recognized that ‘hate crime’ can be committed without 
the need for an offender to actually ‘hate’ the victim, and thus, for most people, ‘hate’ has 
been conceptualized to mean ‘prejudice’ (Jacobs & Potter; and Lawrence as cited in 
Walters, 2011, p. 315), which further raises the onerous task of defining criminally 
under-girded prejudice. Whereas some prejudices such as anti-racist or anti-fascist are 
seen as positive, and some as innocuous, e.g. dislike of green color (Jacobs & Potter as 
cited in Walters, 2011), such other prejudices as homophobia, anti-religious, and racism 
are seen as damaging to societal social cohesiveness and are considered entirely 
unacceptable (Walters, 2011). Thus, ‘ethnic prejudice’ is recognized in Gordon Allport’s 
The Nature of Prejudice, a seminal contributory work to the conceptualizing of prejudice, 
“as ‘an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. [This]…may be felt 
or expressed. [And] It may be directed towards a group as a whole or towards an 
individual because he is a member of that group’” (Allport as cited in Walters, 2011, p. 
315).  
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It is thus, observed in the 1966 Igbo massacre, for instance, that though the 
January 1966 coup presented as the anti-Igbo hostility pretext, the actual reasons for the 
massacres “were more deep rooted and went back several years,” with the coup 
extracting “long held prejudices and negative stereotypes about Igbos” (Siollun, 2009, p. 
83). Essentially, there must be the feeling or expression of animosity towards a people 
group deriving from generalizations made about members of the group, which usually 
result from stereotyping, with the perpetuation of such negative stereotyping done 
through communication networks primarily between friends and families (Byers et al. as 
cited in Walters, 2011), or via the news media and television (Green et al. as cited in 
Walters, 2011). While it is also observed that resentment and economic competition can 
influence hate crime, other than having a faulty generalization of a people group (Green 
et. al. as cited in Walter, 2011), it is also argued that “the economic strain and the ensuing 
resentment felt towards some minority groups may well be based on false generalizations 
about the perceived economic prosperity and access to state welfare that certain minority 
groups supposedly receive” (Ray & Smith as cited in Walter, 2011, p. 315).  
For instance, while recognizing the economic or material undertone to the 
northern Nigeria 1966 riots and killings of the Ibos, Anthony acknowledges that: 
…material interests alone do not explain elite’s success in generating and 
sustaining support. Their appeals succeeded because they could also tap into an 
established vocabulary of fears and insecurities, emotions that had been imbued 
over preceding decades with ethnic overtones. How big a part ethnically framed 
fears played depended on a range of factors, many of which – particularly media 
representations – elites could control. Since to “illuminate what is ‘our own’ 
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darkens the shadow of ‘the other,’” the project of vilifying Igbos was 
accompanied by appeals to Northern virtue (Lonsdale as cited in Anthony, 2002, 
p. 8). 
It is, thus, recognized that there is complexity in the way that hate operates, as in 
Rwanda where a lot of Hutus and Tutsis came to hating one another (Sternberg, 2003). It 
is recognized as essentially challenging for most people, to not hate a group’s members 
that are systematically exterminating one’s own group, including one’s family, or are 
forcing one to be involved in that extermination (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008). There 
may, however, be several other contributing factors as “social pressure to act in certain 
ways, emotional reasoning, fear for one’s own life if one disobeys an order from a 
powerful other, and false beliefs systematically implanted by cynical leaders,” Sternberg 
& Sternberg (2008) observe that hate cannot be understood in a vacuum (p. 2). Thus, 
Sternberg (2003) observes that “Not all massacres are perpetrated on the basis of hate,” 
(Browning; Arendt; and Milgram as cited in Sternberg, 2003, p. 305) as “Ordinary people 
can be propelled by unfortunate circumstances into behaviors in which…they might 
[normally] never engage” (p. 305). Hence, in the discourse of hate processes in relation to  
terrorism, massacres, and genocides, there is the caveat that “Within a given massacre or 
genocide, some people may be propelled by hate and others by factors that are quite 
different, such as the desire to advance their careers or to save their own lives” 
(Sternberg, 2003, p. 305). It is, thus, essential to recognize that hate can only be 
examined in its complex occurring contexts rather than in isolation. On such complexity 
of hatred in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, Onishi observes, for instance, 
that: 
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the conflicts are rooted in all-too-real hatreds and divisions, like the abyss 
between Sokoto [Hausas] and Aba [Igbos]. These hatreds and divisions are 
staggeringly complex, fueled by the misrule and corruption that has left one of the 
world’s top oil producers in poverty. What is more, these rifts have been 
encouraged and exploited by the country’s rulers, from the British to the military 
governments to the European and American oil companies that pump crude in the 
Niger Delta, an area largely abandoned by the federal government. (2000, p. 22) 
Furthermore, the role of propaganda in fomenting mass murders is recognized. 
Sternberg (2003) links hate to mass killings and observes some hate forms as being more 
prone to generating such killings than others, and presents propaganda as systematically 
nurturing hate elements to foment mass murders which, in turn, lead in combination to 
massacres, terrorism, and genocides. Propaganda is, thus, seen as usually fomenting or 
reinforcing hate when directed against the target group, or reinforcing love when directed 
towards the perpetrating group (Sternberg, 2003). In the Rwandan genocide, for instance, 
a contributing factor to its gravity was the radio propaganda broadcast that incited hatred 
feelings, insinuating that Hutus killing of remaining Tutsis would significantly advance 
the formation of a better Rwanda (Des Forges as cited in Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008). 
Furthermore, the Rwandan genocide is known to have occurred basically in the full glare 
of the world, as other nations’ governments failed to intervene where they could have 
done so. Similarly, in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict these features are also 
seen at work in varying situations of the conflict. For instance, propaganda featured 
prominently in the Nigeria-Biafra war to help draw the attention of foreign collaborators 
to their side, to the detriment of the opposing side (Osaghae, 1998b). Additionally, while 
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the starvation of the million Biafrans in the war occurred in full glare of the world—the 
international community watched on as the Nigerian government through economic 
blockade had these Biafrans starved to death on the basis that “starvation is a legitimate 
weapon of war” (Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1968b, p. 93). Furthermore, the decades of 
ongoing mass killings in northern Nigeria which is focused mainly on Muslim-Christian 
conflicts have also continued to occur with the international community just watching 
(Ahiante, 2004; CSW, 2008a). 
Relative Deprivation Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria Ethno-
Religious Conflict. Relative Deprivation theory can explain the phenomenon of the 
ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria. Relative deprivation theory posits that actors 
predispose to conflict as a result of a perceived discrepancy between values expected and 
values actually derived, with lower value expectations relative to manifest realities of life 
conditions causing lower predisposition to feelings of discontentment than higher value 
expectations. Hence, relative deprivation theory focuses on “perceptions of deprivation” 
(Jeong, 2000, p. 69). Ted Gurr (1971) who is a key proponent of relative deprivation 
theory argues in his Why Men Rebel that as social beings humans comparatively evaluate 
themselves with other groups, as well as with their perceived image of entitlements on 
the basis of which any gap observed provides grounds for discontent and conflict. Gurr 
(1971) adopting this psychological approach in explaining political violence as derivative 
from collective discontent argues, however, that it is one’s perceived relative deprivation 
of achieved welfare with respect to those of others that fans discontent, rather than the 
absolute deprivation positioning, thus, linking frustrations of (or perceptions of) being 
marginalized with aggressive ness. It is, thus, observed that “Religious violence is also 
148 
 
 
frequently an expression of frustration with inequities or perceived marginalization, or 
even of poverty” (Falola, 1998, p.  283). 
In the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, for instance, as the spate of 
killings intensified in the north with reprisals in some southern states following the 
adoption of the Sharia by some northern states, it is noted that “Defusing the tension is 
extremely difficult for Obasanjo, a Christian southerner who does not want to offend 
northern sensibilities after being accused of marginalizing the region that has dominated 
politics since independence from Britain in 1960” (Tostevin, 2000, para. 9). Thus, the 
perception of marginalization is undergirded by a sense of a perceived gap between 
expected and achieved welfare which creates collective discontent. Relative depreciation 
theory also applies to groups or individuals who find their own welfare to be inferior to 
those of others with whom they compare themselves, as seen in the 1966 massacres of the 
Ibos, where the Ibos were perceived as being more educated and dynamic (Garrison, 
1968a). 
Also, drawing on Walter Runciman’s (1972) work which presents a 
“generalization hypothesis” that a group’s relative deprivation derives from the 
“experiences of personal relative deprivation,” recent relative deprivation theorists focus 
on translating “personal disadvantageous experiences” at the group level (p. 120). 
Relative deprivation theory provides insight on groups’ basis for seeing themselves as 
marginalized or deprived with such perception precipitating widespread unrest. Thus, 
socio-economic factors such as unemployment and lack of education are considered as 
contributing to or intensifying the perception of deprivation, for instance, with the 
economic downturn in Nigeria increasing unemployment and producing higher poverty 
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levels particularly in the north where the educational level among Muslim youths tend to 
be lower than those of their Christian counterparts. In the Kaduna 1987 attack of 
Christians and their property by the rabble of uneducated Muslim youths, it is observed 
that “severe unemployment and a general economic depression were blamed for the 
condition of hordes of listless youths receptive to any call to violence” (Kotch, 1987, 
para. 8).   
Furthermore, increases in the general prices of goods and services and lower 
consumer spending caused by the slowing down of economic growth will bring about 
rapid societal changes with greater inequitable distribution of wealth occurring. Such 
inequities increasingly create feelings of relative deprivation among the teeming 
uneducated youths, or almajirai in the north, who mostly roam the streets panhandling 
(Falola, 1998). Thus, as the economic downturn persists, inflation and poor economic 
performance heighten poverty levels for marginalized groups, and their feelings of 
relative deprivation accentuate. Also, relative deprivation theory presents that an 
individual or a group’s perception of entitlements rises faster than the potential for its 
fulfillment. In essence, the expected ability for the satisfaction of social needs and 
material benefits increases disproportionately faster than the society’s ability to deliver 
(Gurr, 1971; Runciman, 1972). 
Consequently, with the slow economic growth, the potentials of a society for 
meeting the expectations of its populace reduce as does the actual delivery of such social 
needs and benefits. In May 1992, for instance, there were skirmishes in Lagos and some 
other southern cities involving anti-government demonstrators against the authorities, 
which were triggered by an austere economic slump in the country, following which a 
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Muslim-Christian sectarian violence ensued in Kaduna which lasted for 10 days with 
hundreds of people killed. The estimates for the death toll and casualties figures in the 
violence were put at between 500-800, and hundreds of others wounded. Low oil prices 
were noted to have devastated the nation’s export earning-stream, which as a leading 
African oil exporter, oil accounts for over 95 percent of its export earnings (Noble, 
1992c, para. 1-4). As the economy floundered, the discontent and frustration grew such 
that analysts, both Western and Africans, spoke of “the explosion of discontent” as 
threatening the political stability of the country (Noble, 1992c, para. 5).  
Hence, the widening gap between expectations and actual fulfillment of a 
people’s social needs in a period of economic decline and rising general prices, plus the 
actual increasing poverty levels, provides confirmatory basis for a group’s viewing of 
themselves as marginalized and relatively deprived with such perception precipitating 
widespread unrest. 
Social Identity Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious 
Conflict. The ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria can also be examined applying 
the framework of social identity theory. Social identity theory is a social psychology 
theory which posits that an individual does not have one, but multiple selves which 
correspond to the group membership’s widening circles. Social identity theory focuses on 
self-conception’s role in group process, membership, and inter-group relationships 
(Forsyth, 2010). The key proponents of Social identity theory, Henri Tajfel and John 
Turner (1979) emphasize intergroup differentiation based on cognition and motivation, 
and present that in different societal contexts, an individual may be triggered to think, 
feel, or act based on his family or personal, national or self-level. Social identity theorists 
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argue that self-categorization and in-group enhancement is created by group membership 
in ways favorable to the in-group at the out-group’s expense (Forsyth, 2010; Hogg, 
2006).   
Social identity theorists emphasize the existence of a closer in-group bond at the 
expense of the out-group. Hence, rather than a perception of deprivation, the in-group’s 
identifying with a super-ordinate group, for instance a global community, makes 
individuals more prone to showing increased support for policies beneficial to the larger 
group even when involving subordinate group sacrifices. For example, Muslim groups by 
identifying with the larger Muslim body nationally or even globally will bond in unison 
to compete dis-favorably against the out-group. Consequently, the in-group’s struggle 
over resources and social benefits will increase against the out-group based on social 
identity group’s favoritism stance. The resource scarcity and increased conflict levels will 
further exacerbate poverty among the groups, thus, impinging on religious issues more 
adversely through divisions between the groups. 
Furthermore, it is recognized that underlying social identity are two premises of a 
categorical distinctive organizing of individuals’ understanding of their world, such 
categorization of which minimizes within-group differences and accentuates the inter-
group differences. Also, with individuals being members of certain social groupings and 
not of others, categorization portends with it, the in-group and out-group, or the ‘us’ and 
‘them’ classification which, due to social categories’ self-relevance, is a superimposed 
categorical distinction that has emotional and affective significance (Brewer as cited in 
Senholzi, 2008). Thus, social phenomena has for decades been analyzed using social 
identity theoretical framework, specifically, with issues such as political violence, 
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intergroup relations, discrimination, prejudice, stereotyping, language use, and 
negotiation examined through its lens, as in such situations the in-group and out-group  
categorizations are more often than not made salient (Senholzi, 2008). The 
conceptualization of such social settings produces a schema of: (i) inter-group 
accentuation principle, in which in-group boundaries assimilation, and between group 
contrast gives the perception of the in-group’s greater similarity to the self than are the 
out-group members; (ii) in-group favoritism principle, in which fellow members of the 
in-group’s positive affect as trust or like are selectively generalized towards, but not 
towards members of the out-group; (iii) social competition principle in which in-group 
and out-group inter-group social comparison, negatively associates their perceived 
interdependence (Brewer as cited in Senholzi, 2008, pp. 9-10). 
In a study of the northern Ireland conflict between the Catholics and Protestants, 
for instance, it is observed that centuries old conflict generated hatred which made it 
practically impossible for both community groups to trust themselves, and there was in-
group favoritism as well as negative, out-group association as social identity theory 
outlines. And, while solidifying the within group boundaries, there is a further ostracizing 
of the out-group (Senholzi, 2008). This typifies the northern Nigeria ethno-religious 
conflict, where the phenomena of the different ethnic groupings are even further 
compounded by differences of religious affiliations, with the Hausa-Fulani Muslim in-
group categorization disfavorably pitted against the out-group, non-Muslim or Christian 
other ethnic-groupings based on “in-group favoritism and out-group hostility” (Senholzi, 
2008, p. 13).  
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Furthermore, the conflict experience between the two groups is predicative of 
negative intentions that are accentuated by delineations of in-group identity which 
underscores a relationship of antagonism with the out-group (Senholzi, 2008). Religious 
categorizations are evidential along majority and minority groupings, which validate the 
social identity theory in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, based on an in-
group and out-group dynamics of “us versus them” positioning which is a core 
component underlying social identity theory (Senholzi, 2008, p. 14). In consequence, 
there are ethnic and religious rivalries which undergird the social identity theory found 
replete in the context of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, with a resultant 
polarization and religious divide among the opposing groups.  
The conflict is polarized mainly along a Muslim-Christian fault line other than on 
cases of intra-conflicts between different Muslim sects, while also additionally polarized 
along Muslim north and Christian south lines where both northern, as well as southern 
Christians are involved on occasions with the Christian Ibos as prime targets (“Muslim 
Mobs,” 2004; Lobel, 2012). In the March 2010 killings in Dogo Na Hawa of Jos, Plateau 
State axis, for instance, Nossiter observes that: 
Sunday’s killings were an especially vicious expression of long-running hostilities 
between Christians and Muslims in this divided nation. Jos and the region around 
it are on the fault line where the volatile and poor Muslim north and the Christian 
south meet. In the past decade, some 3,000 people have been killed in interethnic, 
interreligious violence in this fraught zone. The pattern is familiar and was seen as 
recently as January: uneasy coexistence suddenly explodes into killing, amplified 
for days by retaliation. (2010d, para. 4) 
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Furthermore, there are segregated areas in some states as in Kano “Sabon Gari” or 
strangers quarters, where Christians or southerners, notably Ibos live (Ehiabhi, 2012c; 
Okpi, 2012). Additionally, Kaduna which is said to be “Once a lively urban mélange of 
faiths and tribes… [has become] a partitioned city, [with] the Kaduna River cutting a line 
through its heart,” with its delineation into two distinctive areas of Kaduna north and 
Kaduna south respectively for Muslims and Christians who now live apart in their 
separate quarters (Sengupta, 2003, para. 5). Moreover, following years of tensions and 
violence, as well as reprisals and revenge which have continued to escalate the conflict, 
“Jos became a balkanized city, with Muslims and Christians retreating to separate 
neighborhoods” (Polgreen, 2008, para. 11).  
More so, there is stereotyping which is shown by the in-group towards the out-
group and usually manifested with discrimination (Senholzi, 2008). As in the northern 
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, there is inter-group discrimination against Christians in 
northern Nigeria, a factor which further undergirds social identity theory (Senholzi, 
2008). Such religious discriminatory practices being meted against Christians in the 
region are in diverse areas, including “discrimination in employment,” “discrimination in 
access to education,” “the threat of violence in educational establishments,” 
“discrimination in access to and provisions to services,” and “discrimination in 
construction of churches and the unwarranted seizure of property (CSW, 2008b, pp. 4-8). 
It is, thus, recognized that: 
In almost every state in northern and central Nigeria non-Muslims, and 
particularly Christians, continue to experience discriminatory policies enacted or 
tacitly sanctioned at state governmental level. These policies appear designed to 
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engineer their social, economic and political marginalization and to severely 
impair, if not wholly deny, their federally guaranteed right to practice their 
religion without let or hindrance. (CSW, 2008b, p. 4) 
An instance of such discriminatory practices against Christians is in the non-
allocation of land to build churches, while also, Christians are being discriminated against 
in the take-over of their schools and turning them into Muslim schools. Thus, it is 
acknowledged that: 
There is a pervasive sense among Christians here that the military authorities have 
long favored the northern Islamic groups, who make up about half the 
country's…people. Nearly all of Nigeria's leaders, in fact, have come from the 
north, and nearly all have been Muslims. Under the government of the previous 
military leader, Maj. Gen. Mohammed Buhari, many Christian schools were taken 
over by the state, and permits to build churches were held up while the 
construction of mosques was stepped up. (Noble, 1992c, para. 18) 
Summary 
To analyze the underlying causation to the conflict, analytical perspectives of 
social cubism, elite, exclusionary ideology, hate, relative deprivation, and social identity 
theories have been employed. The area of focus has been that of exploring the plausibility 
of genocidal inclination to the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria. The analysis 
has shown that social cubism theory explains the conflict from a six-dimensional 
framework of history (religious, demography, psycho-cultural, political, and economic 
factors), all of which intermeshed have been seen to have undergirded the conflict (Byrne 
& Carter, 1996). The elite theory has presented the perspective of elitist manipulation, 
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power tussle, and the system of social control processes as generating and sustaining 
conflict levels in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict (Mills, 1956). The northern 
elites are seen as manipulating Islam for power acquisition and consolidation, with the 
conflict basically sustained as a result of the elites’ economic and political interests that it 
serves, even as such interests are being cloaked over by ostensible religiosity (Ezeibe, 
2009; Kukah & Falola, 1996).  
The exclusionary ideology perspective views the northern Nigeria ethno-religious 
conflict from an ideological framework that specifically aims to select and justify the 
extermination of members of a targeted group (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 18). The 
adoption of Sharia redefines political self-determination in religious terms through an 
exclusionary ideology against non-Muslims’ participation in core public legislative issues 
(Harnischfeger, 2004). With the implementation of Sharia “at the core of Islamization” 
(Adar, 2001, p. 85), this exclusivity has left Christians and other non-Muslim minorities 
in Sharia operative states particularly threatened by state-enforced Islamization, through 
sustained religious campaigns and clashes that have claimed thousands of lives in the 
conflict (Harnischfeger, 2004).  
Hate theory perspective views the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria 
with the recognition that hate is a contributing causal factor to the numerous genocidal 
killings and massacres (Sternberg, 2003). Hate is, thus, conceptualized as ‘prejudice’ 
(Jacobs & Potter; and Lawrence as cited in Walters, 2011, p. 315), while ‘ethnic 
prejudice’ is seen as an antipathy which derives from a faulty-based generalization that is 
directed or expressed towards a group or its member(s) (Allport as cited in Walters, 2011, 
p. 315). 
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From the relative deprivation theory perspective, the ethno-religious conflict in 
northern Nigeria is seen as undergirded by poverty relative to the individual or a group’s 
perception of deprivation of social benefits (Gurr, 1971; Runciman, 1972). From the 
social identity theory perspective, the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict has been 
observed as being framed by intergroup differentiation between Muslims and Christians 
through cognition and motivation in different societal contexts (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Thus, while relative deprivation theory focuses on the perceived marginalization of a 
people group or individuals, social identity theory looking at self-categorization and in-
group membership enhancement at the out-group’s expense (Forsyth, 2010; Hogg, 2006), 
emphasizes in-group favoritism against the out-group as providing the analytical basis for 
the discriminatory practices by the Muslim in-group and their motivation to exterminate 
the Christian out-group in their midst (Senholzi, 2008). 
In conclusion, social cubism, elite, exclusionary ideology, hate, relative 
deprivation, and social identity theoretical frameworks have been applied in explaining 
the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. However, given the complexity of the 
phenomena, involving both regional, national, and to some extent international 
dimensions, an eclectic synthesizing of these theoretical perspectives will provide a more 
holistic understanding of the underlying causation, its religious overtures, and the 
plausibility of genocidal undertone to the conflict. Given this theoretical framework, the 
research problem is constructed, and the core research question to address the subject of 
this study developed. 
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Research Problem 
The literature review on the phenomena of ethno-religious conflict in northern 
Nigeria shows there has been little or no study to investigate the incidence of genocidal 
proclivity to the conflict. The purpose of this study is to examine the plausibility of 
genocidal inclinations to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. The phenomenon 
is generally defined as ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria (Creswell, 2007, p. 
101).  
Research Questions 
The goal of this study is to explore the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict to 
proffer an understanding of the factors which foment violence and escalate the conflict. 
The purpose of the research is to examine whether there are genocidal undertones to the 
ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. The research will address the questions: Are 
there genocidal inclinations to the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria? To what 
extent does the interplay between ethnicity and religion help to foment and escalate the 
conflict in northern Nigeria? 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter covers an extensive literature review on the northern Nigeria ethno-
religious conflict, providing a historical background to the conflict, covering northern 
Nigeria—pre-colonial and colonial to independence, and, the north at independence to 
present. The chapter also reviewed the conceptual framework of genocide, covering its 
definitions and origins, causes, typology and examples of genocide, alternative 
methodological approaches in Genocide studies, and the prevention and punishment of 
genocide. Finally, the chapter examines different theoretical perspectives including social 
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cubism theory, elite theory, and relative deprivation theory to proffer an understanding of 
the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. The theoretical framework also includes an 
examination and application of the exclusionary ideology, hate theory, and social identity 
theory, in explication of the genocidal underpinnings of the conflict. 
 
  
 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
Introduction 
The type of study is a mixed qualitative method involving content analysis and 
grounded theory analytical approach which will be focused to address the core research 
questions in order to gain insight on the possibility of genocidal inclinations to the ethno-
religious conflict in northern Nigeria. This section presents the research design and 
discusses the rationale for adopting a qualitative methodological approach employing 
content analysis for the study on the basis of the method’s apt application on previous 
genocidal studies (Winton, 2008). This rationale is foregrounded by a section detailing 
the underlying factors influencing the study. The next section presents an overview of 
content analysis methodology and examines a number of content analytic studies. For 
data analysis, the Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory technique will be used to 
interpret and structure a theoretical model for the content analysis findings. The section 
also presents the study’s methodological application, examines data sourcing and 
collection, and outlines the procedures for data collection and data analysis.  
Rationale for Content Analysis Methodology 
The study employs a content analysis methodology which will involve analysis of 
the texts available for carrying out the research and further, it adopts the grounded theory 
analytical approach to present the theoretical framework for the content analysis. Content 
analysis is defined as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences 
from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004, 
p. 18). Content analysis refers to “the manual or automated coding of documents, 
transcripts, newspapers, or even of audio of video media to obtain counts of words, 
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phrases, or word-phrase clusters for purposes of statistical analysis” (Garson, 2008). It is 
also recognized as the “analysis of the manifest and latent content of a body of 
communicated material (as a book or film) through classification, tabulation, and 
evaluation of its key symbols and themes in order to ascertain its meaning and probable 
effect” (Weber as cited in Krippendorff, 2004, p. xvii). It is noted that content analysis 
involves “the analysis of available text, but it applies also to analysis of ongoing 
conversations that are part of a conflict-resolving process” (Druckman, 2005, p. 255). 
The investigation of genocidal intent of a perpetrator group and establishment of 
religious undertones to the northern Nigeria conflict from textual analyses of conflict 
cases in newspapers, archives, and web data, places this study in a qualitative research 
methodological framework. Genocide scholars have used varying qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies for examining genocidal cases, for instance, the use of 
ethology (Dutton, 2007); comparative case study (Vetlesen, 2005); social psychological 
approaches (Newman & Erber, 2002); geographical mapping (Wood, 2001); also with 
Hannah Arendt’s philosophical approach, C. Fred Alford’s psychological approach, and 
Zygmunt Bauman’s sociological approach (Arendt; Alford; and Bauman as cited in 
Vetlesen, 2005, p. 7). This qualitative study adopts a mixed content analysis methodology 
for data analysis, and the Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory analytic technique 
for theory development. 
The study’s focus on exploring the plausibility of genocidal inclination and 
religious undertone to the northern Nigeria conflict by analyzing texts, archives, and web 
data on the conflict cases, presents the content analysis method as an analytical approach 
that adequately serves the research goals. Using the techniques of content analysis 
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enables the systematic organization of the research data and materials either for 
comparative or time-series analyses. The content analysis qualitative method of inquiry is 
appropriate for the study given its availability of a “wide range of investigative tools” 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 44). The Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory analytic 
technique adequately frames the development of theory for the study. 
Overview of Content Analysis Methodology 
Potentially recognized as “one of the most important research techniques in the 
social sciences” (Krippendorff, 2004. p. xiii), content analysis is conceptually a diffused 
approach that can be transformed into any specific scope, with virtually all social 
scientists seen in a sense as concerned with the analyzing of content. Its varied scope in 
application is seen in studying original documents by historians, in analyzing case law 
development by legal scholars, in evaluating congressional hearings proceedings by 
political scientists, and in folk tales classification by anthropologists. Thus, “Wherever 
symbolic behavior is being scrutinized, the analysis of content is involved” (Laswell as 
cited in Janowitz, 1968, p. 647). As a research methodology, content analysis is used “for 
the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic 
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon as 
cited in Winton, 2008, p. 613). Its analytic technique enables the systematic organization 
of material data for comparative, as well as time-series studies, and applies to the analysis 
of texts, as well as ongoing conversations. Based on its flexibility of approach, content 
analysis “can be applied to a wide variety of written or oral communications,” thus, 
allowing communication content comparison by analysts across varied settings 
(Druckman, 2005, p. 257). 
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Content analysis as a research method “classifies textual material, reducing it to 
more relevant, manageable bits of data” (Lewis-Beck as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 5), and 
“uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text” (Stone et al.; and 
Krippendorf as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 10). Hence, it therefore involves “any technique 
for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified 
characteristics of messages” (Holsti as cited in Druckman, 2005, p. 257). Such inferences 
relate to the message sender(s), the message being sent, or the message audience, with the 
inferential process rules varying based on the investigator’s substantive and theoretical 
interests. The rubric of content analysis, however, comprises various approaches ranging 
from “simple mechanical word counts to broad-gauged interpretations of themes” 
(Druckman, 2005, p. 257). Furthermore, there is a distinction in content analysis 
“between text and interaction process analysis,” with texts referring to “written 
documents that describe activities that have taken place in the past” for which coding 
decisions do not need much urgency as “the text can be read and reread at the 
convenience of the analyst” (Druckman, 2005, p. 257). However, process analysis—
which involves “on-the-spot coding of statements made during interactions” and has its 
tradition traceable to Bales’ developed coding system for small-group problem-solving 
processes, unlike the analysis of text—has time urgency which needs coders’ conjunctive 
process decision-making (Bale as cited in Druckman, 2005, p. 257). 
Content analysis methodology can be applied with either quantitative or 
qualitative data, adopting either a deductive or inductive approach for the purpose of 
building “a model to describe the phenomenon in a conceptual form” (Elo & Kyngä, 
2008, p. 107). While the deductive content analysis involves operationalizing the analytic 
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structure on previous knowledge basis, the inductive approach applies to cases with 
fragmented or no prior studies on the phenomenon. Thus, for the inductive content 
analysis “the concepts are derived from the data,” while the deductive approach analysis 
generally aims “to test a previous theory in a different situation or to compare categories 
at different time periods” (Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 107). Both the deductive and inductive 
analytic processes involve three core stages of preparation, organization, and reporting, 
with a similarity in the preparation stage for both approaches (Elo & Kyngä, 2008). 
Examples of studies in which content analysis has been employed in various 
research settings abound, including the business ethics empirical studies which usually 
rely on data that is self-reported with such reliance subject to criticism. Observing 
interviews and questionnaire responses as being predisposed to the participant’s view of 
whatever the researcher might be expecting to hear, or by unwillingness to discuss ethical 
sensitive issues, as well as by recalling imperfectly, the study uses content analysis to 
determine the extent to which business ethics relies on published research on 
questionnaires and interviews. It further explores the likelihoods of secondary data usage, 
involving newspaper reports and company documents as a source for applied ethics 
empirical studies. Thus, employing content analysis, the study examines “the extent to 
which the executive virtue of courage was observed or called for in items published in 
four international daily newspapers,” as well as explores the papers attributed meaning to 
“courage” (Harris, 2001, p. 191). Another study adopting content analysis approach 
examines the type and quantity of articles of higher education in Boston’s two 
metropolitan newspaper dailies over one month. In the study, articles were assigned and 
measured to eight main categories of news, features, sports, columns, editorial pages, 
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reviews, cutline photos, and news analysis (Quartararo, 1978, p. 151). The study’s results 
showed both newspapers as having greater news spot stories of only few inches length 
rather than the features in-depth articles covering current major higher education trends 
and issues, while reviews, news articles analysis, columns, and editorials had little 
coverage. It also showed well-known, most prestigious universities as receiving the 
greatest coverage (Quartararo, 1978, p. 151). 
Additionally, content analysis is used in a study to comparatively analyze “the 
legislative summaries of three states, Nevada, Minnesota, and South Carolina in 1979, 
1982/83, and 1985” (Zimmerman & Owens, 1989, p. 190) to show the marked difference 
in substance and quantity of family legislation explicitly enacted by these states. 
Differences which seem to mirror the political cultures are mirrored in the differences 
identifying the three states: “Nevada, individualistic; Minnesota, moralistic; and South 
Carolina, traditionalistic” (Zimmerman & Owens, 1989, p. 190). Given that family 
policies enacted by the states are crucial to family professionals’ practice and to families, 
such family professionals essentially need to actively ensure that the states they reside 
and work in enact family life enhancing, rather than diminishing policies (1989, p. 190). 
Another study recognizing more corporations as disclosing their environmental 
performance’s information today, in responding to the demands of stakeholder for 
environmental accountability and responsibility, explores the information disclosed on 
corporate websites by analyzing the environmental management practices and policies of 
the world’s largest 200 corporations. Employing content analysis “of environmental 
reports of Fortune's Global 200 companies,” the study analyzes the environmental 
disclosures content of corporate entities relative to seven areas involving “environmental 
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planning considerations, top management support to the institutionalization of 
environmental concerns, environmental structures and organizing specifics, 
environmental leadership activities, environmental control, external validations or 
certifications of environmental programs, and forms of corporate environmental 
disclosures” (Jose & Lee, 2007, p. 307). 
Also aiming to bridge a gap in methodology between two research traditions of 
content analysis of news media and the analytic framework of policy sciences, another 
study recognizes that Lasswell, in pioneering both the framework and the method 
decades ago, argued their mutual benefits, noting only few researchers as having formally 
linked them. Hence, the study uses content analysis of news media to inform analytic 
research framework for policy studies, introduces its original categorical content analysis 
system, explores the system studying 90 articles of national news on “stratospheric ozone 
hole,” and compares the system with other news content examining systems (Howland, 
Becker, & Prelli, 2006, p. 205). The study finds that its system using human coders is 
adequately suited for mapping and describing social process trends surrounding the 
Montreal Protocol development of the ozone treaty during the data sample, encompassed 
phases of promotion, and intelligence gathering. It presents other systems of content 
analysis as falling short in purpose and structure, and in fulfilling the promise the study 
holds for policy scientists (Howland et. al., 2006, p. 205). 
Furthermore, content analysis is used in examining a review’s principal assets in 
the book entitled Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis 
(Smith, et al. as cited in Simonton, 1994). This work involves a particularly 
comprehensive treatment of the content analysis and thematic principal methods, and 
167 
 
 
provides practice materials and coding manuals to aid researchers in mastering the 
techniques. While emphasizing motivational variables, the study also provides strategies 
for content analysis in other areas, such as interpersonal and cognitive domains, and 
offers an important measurement literature contribution (Simonton, 1994, p. 603). It is 
further observed that several content analytic studies which involve temporal data have 
some measure of autocorrelation bias, the effect of which deflates or inflates the 
significant differences possibly existing among the texts’ different parts being compared. 
The proffered solution for this involves removing autocorrelation effects, even where not 
significant statistically. It is noted that such statistical procedures as “Crosbie's (1993) 
ITSACORR” can, at the least, remove first-order autocorrelation effects, and is usable 
with a small sample. The SPSS (1994), AREG procedure, and the SAS (1993) 
AUTOREG procedure can be used for detecting and removing first-order 
autocorrelations, with the AUTOREG being capable of removing higher-order 
correlations as well, with several methods now developed specifically for small samples 
(Huitema & McKean as cited in Hogenraad, McKenzie, & Martindale, 1996/97, p. 433) 
The study proffers examples of content analytic studies with autocorrelation and without 
(Hogenraad et al., 1996/97, p. 433). 
A detailed review of content analysis application in research involves a study on 
the display of loyalty in China, based on the notion of sycophants’ plausible signaling of 
affinity to a given leader to deter their being recruited by factional rivals into alternative 
coalitions, thus, bearing the social cost of others despising them (Shih, 2008). It is 
observed that in Communist China, top leaders engaged in factional politics encourage 
subordinates to pander to them by launching personalist ideological campaigns, which 
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provide junior officials with groveling opportunities while allowing senior leaders to 
maintain a norm against them (Shih, 2008, p. 1177). Hence, the study hypothesizes that 
even with a relatively weak, personality cult opposing norm, junior officials who 
unashamedly praise a senior leader, project credible signs of violating such norm while 
also incurring a political and social cost as a groveler (Shih, 2008). The study uses the 
China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database with full-text searchable 
capacity for 350 Chinese newspapers for the period spanning 2000 to 2004. The database 
covers most of the provincial newspapers for the period (Shih, 2008, p. 1181). With this 
database containing articles after 2000, the study is focused on “Three Represents” (TR) 
(sange daibiao), an ideological campaign launched in 2000 by the Party’s Secretary 
General (SG) calling for a transformation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCR) from 
being a peasants’ and workers’ representative to an “all advanced social productive 
forces” representative, including skilled professionals and private entrepreneurs. Content 
analyses of the provincial newspapers which are the main mouthpieces of the provincial 
party committees, and as such, capture the TR’s widest official activities range, the study 
focuses on the SG’s TR campaign, inquiring on provincial faction members’ likely 
echoing of their patron’s ideological campaign. 
Utilizing the CNKI database, the researcher did an annual counting of the number 
of provincial newspapers articles containing the phrase “Sange Daibiao” (Three 
Represents), over the campaign period from 2000 to 2004. The count raises two 
fundamental issues, firstly, of what this indicator captures, which basically is a given 
newspaper’s willingness to publish TR related items, including TR article republication 
of national publications, original campaign articles and editorials, provincial publications 
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on the campaign policy statements and regulations, national and local coverage of 
campaign activities and meetings, and publications of local leaders’ speeches and articles 
on the campaign (Shih, 2008, p. 1182). Secondly, it raises an issue with the indicator 
count involved, the campaign experiencing periods of ebbing and flowing based on the 
highest level actions taken, and the average article number mentioning TR fluctuates 
substantially annually. Thus, a 200 articles count, for example, in 2000 connotes a 
different meaning from a 2003 same number count of articles. By content analyzing these 
provincial newspapers, using “ordinary least squared” (OLS) and “panel-corrected 
standard errors” (PCSE) estimations (Shih, 2008, p. 1185), the study examines whether 
fiscal dependence, economic development, the provincial leader’s professional expertise, 
or factional loyalty signaling need explicates the degree of echoing of the ideological 
campaign, by the provincial leaders, and crafts “a measure of such ‘nauseating’ displays 
of loyalty” or pandering activities in China (Shih, 2008, p. 1177). The study further 
explores whether poor and rich locale faction members were different in their ways of 
echoing the campaign. The findings showed the ideological campaigns constituting 
radars enabling senior leaders’ discerning of the faction members loyalty. The findings 
present economic backwardness, past affiliation with the SG, and propaganda work 
experience as the key motivating factors for the provincial officers’ heaping of praises on 
the SG’s ideology. Also, the SG’s followers in impoverished regions presented a greater 
tendency of using the press in demonstration of their loyalty (Shih, 2008). 
Validation of the study involved determining that “credible signaling is one of the 
raison d’etre of ideological campaigns in China,” and required the derivation of a 
measure for various junior officials’ response to senior leaders’ launched ideological 
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campaigns (Shih, 2008, p. 1181). Chinese Communist systems’ features enabling 
indicator construction included the interest in only ideological campaigns public 
adulation displays for practical and theoretical reasons; the CCP’s ideological campaigns 
are usually condensed to key media, widely used short phrases; and, every Chinese 
province has one newspaper at least, being controlled by the department of provincial 
propaganda directly, with the newspapers’ content monitored closely by the department, 
as well as its standing committee members (Wu as cited in Shih, 2008, p. 1181). The 
newspapers are also required to report on every official major event, and publish every 
official important document, while publishing articles and editorials on a specific 
ideological campaign; thus, their content analyzing would cover the provincial party 
committee’s entire activities. This involved recording the frequencies of ideological 
campaign key phrases in the provincial various newspapers, as indicator for capturing 
how each province sought to enthusiastically echo the national campaigns ideology. With 
the continuation of China’s authoritarian posture of closely monitoring the provincial 
major newspapers’ content, every key phrase mentioning would be supportive of specific 
ideological campaign, thus, the technical issue involved feasibly “reading and counting 
articles in 30 provincial dailies over the course of 20 years of reform” (Shih, 2008, p. 
1181). 
An example of a genocide study using content analysis methodology is a study on 
the Rwandan genocide analyzing published texts selection which provided interpretations 
and quotations of perpetrators’ interviews with perpetrators, on the basis of their 
containing information on the perpetrators’ and other actors’ construction and meaning 
making of their actions (Berg; Feldman; and Weber as cited in Winton, 2008, p. 611). 
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Analyzing the variables on the genocide, the study adopted the data evaluation processes 
of “credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability” to measure the study’s 
trustworthiness (Shenton; and Lincoln & Guba as cited in Winton, 2008, p. 611). 
Creditability issues were addressed “by using accepted content analytic strategies, 
searching multiple sources of perpetrator reports, analyzing previous research findings, 
looking for negative cases, and presenting the research for peer review,” identifying only 
one genocide, qualitative study linked to violentization theory (Rhodes as cited in 
Winton, 2008, p. 611), and only the researcher’s genocide, quantitative study linked to 
the circumplex model (Winton as cite in Winton, 2008, p. 611), in addition to a Bosnian 
study using violentization and the circumplex model (Winton & Unlu as cited in Winton, 
2008, p. 611). Presenting specific procedures of data collection, dependability issues 
were addressed, while for confirmability, accounts supporting the circumplex model and 
violentization were identified. The data were coded using the violentization theory and 
circumplex model variables, and using the processes of “directed qualitative content 
analysis” which involves developing of prior coding scheme before the analysis, the 
study analyzed “how the collected data fit within the two theoretical models” (Hsieh & 
Shannon as cited in Winton, 2008, p. 611). 
Content Analysis Key Processes (Sourced from Weber, 1990). Textual 
analysis for social science purposes is underlined with several problems, with inherent 
difficulties fundamental to the content analytic processes involving, measurement, 
indication, representation, and interpretation, which issues are examined below (Weber, 
1990). 
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Measurement. Measurement involves counting the meaning units occurrences 
such as themes, phrases, specific words, and content categories (Weber, 1990). There are 
two standard practices of measurement, irrespective of whether the coding of text is 
manually done or by computers, and these are 1) usage of proportion or percentage 
transformation for controlling the length of document (Namenwirth & Weber as cited in 
Weber, 1990, pp. 71-72), and 2) counting every word occurrences or other meaning units 
equally. Difficulties identified with each practice include, for the Percentage 
Transformation, the specific problems of percentages and proportions having limited 
range and being asymptotic, with the resultant measurement not being linear, e.g. a 5% to 
10% increase not being same as a 60% to 65% increase (Weber, 1990, p. 72). Secondly, 
with percentages variance and mean not independent, when used in variance designs 
analysis as dependent variable, proportions become subjected to square root arcs in 
transformation, a statistical procedure for making the variance and mean independent 
(Freeman & Tukey; and Schuessler as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 72). Thirdly, there is an 
indication of varied theoretical assumptions with different strategies of measurement. For 
instance, a percentage distribution that is inconsistent with a secular concerned 
hypothesis than that of sacred themes will linearly increase over time, thus, with farther 
future extension, such trend will eventually exceed 100%. Thus, researchers are to take 
cognizance of their measurement procedures in order to not conflict unwittingly with 
their substantive theories, as well as methodological and epistemological assumptions. 
Fourthly, many content analysis statistical procedures have distributional assumptions 
which are likely to be violated with percentage distribution. For instance, content 
analytical data are not likely to be normal multivariate or univariate. Thus, other than the 
173 
 
 
use of proportions or percentages, some personal communication analysts have proffered 
modeling content analysis frequency counts which is generated “as a Poisson process” 
and basing the procedures of statistical estimation on such distribution (Weber, 1990, p. 
72). Hence, most content-analytical studies have relied on curve-fitting, factor analysis, 
ANOVA, and additional statistical procedures in combination with validation techniques 
of validation based on examination of the original text (Weber, 1990).  
For Counting Occurrences Equally, its standard practice of involving equally 
counting the occurrence of each semantic unit given creates the problems, firstly, of all 
the words classified in a particular category not reflecting the category in the same 
magnitude; and secondly, of subsequent mentioning of a topic or category requiring more 
effort than its first few mentioning (Weber, 1990, p. 73). Further expounding on this, it is 
observed that content analysis measurement procedures “are based on frequency counts 
of semantically equivalent textual units such as words, word senses, phrases, issues, or 
themes” with the underlying procedures presented as “connotative categorical 
equivalence” (Weber, 1990, p. 73). Textual units are recognized as “connotative 
categorically equivalent” where they suggest or connote ideas, certain meanings, ideas, 
etc., in addition to their primary or explicit meanings, such as, for instance, in a category 
scheme with allowance and bonus classified in the WEALTH category because of their 
sharing of a common connotation of economic matters (Weber, 1990, p. 73). While each 
word classification in a given category should not of necessity equally represent the 
content of the category, it is, however, desirable that each entry be counted equally given 
a current procedural lack in validly and reliably assigning weights, thus, showing an 
unequal category content representation for different entries of a particular category 
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(Namenwirth & Weber as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 73). Another problem identified 
involves investigators equally counting each occurrence of every entry in a given 
category of a document. An example of this is, giving the same importance or weight to 
an entry’s 25th occurrence in the AFFECTION category as its 5th or 125th occurrence 
(Weber, 1990, p. 73). 
Content analysts who primarily assume that a text containing more mentions of a 
given category indicate a greater concern for it; however, it is noted that a word’s initial 
mentioning requires more energy or effort than its successive mentions (Stone as cited in 
Weber, 1990, p. 73). In other words, while it is noted that more effort or energy is 
required to raise a new topic than to continue with a previous topic, continuing a  topic 
after succeeding mentions may up to a point, however, require more effort than less 
(Weber, 1990). Reasons for this include stylistic considerations causing pronouns 
substitution (Namenwirth & Weber as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 73); redundancy of 
continuing category concern, causing a decline in information communicated with the 
text continuing; with text length as contextual constraints, continuing focus on a theme, 
category, or issue prevents focus on other issues; and where no contextual constraints 
exist, text producing resources are finite, thus, text producers will basically allocate such 
resources to various themes and issues (Weber, 1990, p. 73). It is also noted that it may 
also be wrong to think of zero mentions as requiring no effort, since refraining from 
mentioning could also involve much effort given the Freudian notion of urges of 
unconscious ego driving and causing us to repress others and ourselves for maintaining 
civilization (Weber, 1990). 
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Indication. Indication refers to the researcher’s inferences made of some text 
latent or unmeasured characteristics using numbers for representing some of the text’s 
manifest aspect (Weber, 1990, pp. 73-74). For example, factor analysis, for instance, is 
often used for inferring textual theme. Critics are, however, observed as arguing that 
indication questions the validity and reliability of every inference on the text’s latent 
characteristics, or of that kind of inferences without accompanying detailed semantic and 
syntactic information (Weber, 1990). However, two aspects of indication are important 
involving, first, “the rationale for analyzing latent characteristics of the text at all; and 
second, “the latent characteristics of texts that may not be discernible through detailed 
semantic analysis without quantification” (Weber, 1990, p. 74).  
Statistical procedures often in use in social science studies—including factor 
simple correlations, structural equation models, and factor analysis—assume that latent or 
unmeasured variables are existent. As often applicable to content analysis, the entire 
document is the unit of analysis in such statistical procedures (Saris-Gallhofer et al. as 
cited in Weber, 1990, p. 74). Hence, latent variables specify the entire text’s or other 
analytic or coding unit (e.g. document sections, chapters, or paragraphs’ features), with 
such latent-variable models raising interesting possibilities and problems seldom found in 
social studies (Mohler as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 74). For example, mental states which 
validate the results interpretation cannot be observed directly in mental ideas latent-
indicator models which, given the relational problems between behavior and attitudes, 
attitudes cannot be inferred from behavior. However, the relationship between the 
original text that is being analyzed and the latent variables can be examined by the 
researcher in content analysis. Reasons for quantification concerns on observable texts 
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and models of latent-indicator are firstly, that counting generated results enable more 
precise textual comparisons; secondly, that it informs on the extent of attention relatively 
given to issues; and thirdly, that procedures of quantitative analysis usually reveal 
differences and similarities among texts which would otherwise be virtually impossible to 
detect. Examining an observable text is essential for improving the validation and 
interpretation of its substantial findings (Weber, 1990, p. 74). It is, however, noted that 
issues are rarely explicitly stated in documents, but rather are “merely” indicated, thus, 
the semantic information’s value in constricted contexts reflect the important fact that 
content-analytic procedures restricted to explicitly stated themes would categorically 
miss several of such important indications (Weber, 1990, p. 76). 
Representation. Representation refers to the analysis of content in which the 
researcher “views data as representations…of texts, images, and expressions that are 
created to be seen, read, and acted on for their meanings,…and, [to] be analyzed with 
such uses in mind” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. xiii). Representation is, thus, a means of 
classifying “the meaning of words, phrases, or other textual units…into a set of 
categories” (Weber, 1990, p. 77). Critics of this form of text classification raise the issue 
of the procedure’s non-utilization of text or language essential semantic features or 
syntactic in the analysis, on the basis that the coding procedures of both the computer and 
human-based systems “do not encode or represent the richness of language or of specific 
texts” (Weber, 1990, p. 77). It is, however, observed that by categorizing meaning units, 
not all the nuances or connotations of meaning are pertinent, and this is without insisting 
on the more fine-grained, linguistic distinctions other than the categorized distinctions, 
thus, having the classification procedures “safely ignore irrelevant distinctions” (Weber, 
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1990, p. 77). On the issue of determining what distinction is relevant, however, it is noted 
that a differentiation of the various homograph senses can be made by the General 
Inquirer’s improved computer system version developed in the 1970s by Stone and 
colleagues (Kelly & Stone; and Zuell, Weber, & Mohler as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 77). 
An example of this is distinguishing the meaning of state with its varied connotations, 
and the word frame as a noun or as a verb. The “disambiguation” (Kelly & Stone as cited 
in Weber, 1990, p. 77) of words for its varied meanings is possible, therefore, it is argued 
that “not every shade of meaning or nuance, however, will be relevant to a particular 
investigation…Convenience and parsimony are important factors in deciding how much 
detail to maintain” (Weber, 1990, p. 77).  
Interpretation. Interpretation refers to the translation of “one set of linguistic or 
linguistically expressed elements into another” (Namenwirth & Weber as cited in Weber, 
1990, p. 78), with such “mapping” procedure or translation raising several difficulties 
(Weber, 1990, p. 78). For instance, in an analysis of British Throne Speeches from 1689–
1972 (Namenwirth & Weber; and Weber as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 78), each 
document’s content analytic procedures produced quantitative processes of issues 
assigned to different content categories. A subsequent analysis of such quantitative data 
postulated an existence of themes or political issues which periodically recurred in the 
texts. Underlying a theme or issue is the interpretation of the text itself, and it is noted 
that “the process of interpretation constitutes translation from one language to another 
(Namenwirth & Weber as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 78), and mainly involves mapping the 
semantic and syntactic structures which the text is comprised of in its first language into 
valid structures of the second which convey the first language’s meaning (Weber, 1990). 
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Given the difficult process of translation (Steiner as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 78), 
however, a validity checking procedure referred to as “back-translation” exists (Weber, 
1990, p. 78). This involves translating back the text from the “target language” to the 
original language, and comparing the original with this translation, with the first 
translation considered valid when the original text and the back-translation are alike. 
Such translations are reversible or bidirectional, with the capability of reconstructing the 
original text once the text is translated into a second language (Weber, 1990). 
However, transformations that are unidirectional or irreversible usually map 
textual content into theoretical, more abstract structures, and the specialized language for 
the analysis of content is often the social science theory (theories) which the researcher 
uses for interpreting the text, as well as for explaining its substantive results. Hence, the 
mapping involved is from the text’s many words into fewer and more abstract categories, 
and into relations suggested by the theory” with the analyst determining “the principal 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks for labeling the common underlying issue” 
(Weber, 1990, p. 79).  There is, however, no one-to-one theory, and text mapping and the 
text-to-theory translation is irreversible. An instance of choosing to interpret a given 
phenomenal underlying issue with the notion of Bales and Parsons’ integrative concerns, 
which focuses mainly on coordination of the various societal subgroups coordination 
(Namenwirth & Weber; Bales; Parsons; and Parsons & Bales as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 
79), can enable the generation of an infinite quantity of excerpts with Bales/Parsons’ 
integrative themes interpretation sense. Thus, the text-to-theory mapping cannot be 
validated by the means of the back-translation strategy. 
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Given, however, that differing theoretical or even antithetical frameworks can be 
adopted for interpreting the texts, it is recognized that there is an availability of diverse 
interpretations and the researcher has to choose with the quest to search for “true” or 
“valid” interpretation deemed fruitless (Weber, 1990, p. 79). Hence, “it is not the validity 
of an interpretation per se that is at issue, but rather the salience of an interpretation given 
one or another theory” (Slater as cite in Weber, 1990, pp. 79-80). Furthermore, given the 
truth of quantitative data not speaking for themselves, e.g. the radical empiricism doctrine 
being false, so is the truth “that texts do not speak for themselves either,” and the 
speaking must be done by the analyst using “the language of theory” (Weber, 1990, p. 
80). 
Methodological Application for the Study 
This study involves the content analysis of texts which is done for the purposes of 
description or for drawing inferences.  Such inferences are made in a research design 
context that “ensures that the data gathering, analysis and interpretation are integrated” 
(Holsti as cited in Druckman, 2005, p. 258). Content analytical tools can be applied to the 
process of conflict analysis and resolution over a time period, with such tools comprising 
the methodological decisions to be made in investigating the research problem, and like 
every other research methodology, the analysis of content involves technical procedures 
that require analytic decisions. First is deciding on the materials to code, and determining 
such issues as the availability of sufficient materials for describing the phenomenon, and 
to draw inferences on its influencing factors, as well as determine whether other methods 
can be used for investigating the phenomenon (Druckman, 2005). Thus, the fundamental 
technical analytic issues involve deciding on “the unit of text to be coded, the categories 
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to be used, conducting reliability checks, and ways of combining codes for analysis” 
(Druckman, 2005, p. 255). A tasks checklist adapted from Druckman’s (2005) Technical 
Issues for the Content Analyst is detailed below for organizing the study (p. 256). 
Following the checklist is a content analysis performance model for implementation 
within a research design context Druckman (2005) to serve as guide for the study. 
Content Analysis Checklist. (Adapted from Druckman, 2005, pp. 264-265) 
1. Construct a research design as study guide. 
2. Formulate research questions for evaluation by the analysis.  
3. Develop a content analysis system’s conceptual framework. 
4. Define the system’s categories. 
5. Develop the categories coding rules (to be regarded as operational definitions). 
6. Identify the (often verbal) material universe for making inferences (can include original data 
collecting). 
7. Design a (random) sampling frame for choosing the coding materials (from the universe). 
8. Decide the unit of analysis – whether on meaning or thematic units. 
9. Conduct reliability analyses of the independent coders on a sampling of the material. 
10. Pretest the rules of coding to assess the simplicity of the application, and its face validity. 
11. Revise coding rules and the categories based on the analysis of reliability and pretests. 
12. Engage coders that are not cognizant of the research propositions or design. 
13. Educate coders on criteria of reliability and confidence. 
14. Prepare forms for final coding and code the material selected. 
15. Aggregate data on basis of relevant categories for analysis. 
16. Conduct sensitivity analyses for comparing results with varied categories aggregations. 
17. Conduct statistical analyses or other qualitative evaluation of the data aggregated. 
18. Correlate the variables coded with other collected study data. Interpret results of the analyses, 
determine implications for the research question(s), and make inferences from the sampled 
materials to the universe they were drawn from. 
19. Prepare the report to include the research problem as well as the content analysis system’s learned 
lessons. 
 
Figure 1. Content Analysis Checklist. 
 
Content Analysis Stages. 
Stage I – Categorization. The model’s first two components (checklist steps 1-2) 
deal with design issues and formulation of the research question or hypothesis, and are 
followed by three aspects (checklist steps 3-5) of content analysis construction system 
(Druckman, 2005). Content analysis basically involves classifying the texts many words 
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into content categories that are much fewer, with each category plausibly consisting of a 
single or several words, and such textual units of words, phrases, etc., classified into a 
specific category are recognized as having the same meanings (Weber, 1990). Such 
similarity could derive from the words’ precise meaning, for example, synonyms grouped 
together, or from words with shared meanings or connotations, for example, several 
words that imply concern for a concept are grouped together, as in POWER, or 
WEALTH, based on the purpose of study (with categories specified, however, in lower 
case) (Weber, 1990, p. 13). The categories of the system are connected with the 
theoretical background by a conceptual framework, with the categories recognized as 
efforts at operationalizing the concepts, and rules for coding defined in terms of the 
categories definitive terms, for example, defining threats as connotative of negative 
consequences (Druckman, 2005). It is essential that the classification process be 
consistent and reliable in order for valid inferences are made from the text with different 
people similarly coding the same text. The classification system is also required to 
generate valid variables with a variable regarded as valid to the extent of its measuring or 
representing what the researcher intends that it measures (Weber, 1990). 
Stage II – Sampling / Data Collection for the Study. The checklist next steps (6-
8) deal with the textual materials that are for coding. A problem also develops with 
having too much material for coding based on the resources available, in which case a 
sampling strategy will be developed. Thus, with the relevant study material availability 
often either insufficient or too voluminous for analysis, the use of random sampling 
design is recommended where there is an abundance of materials, such as in memoranda 
or transcripts from a multi-year dialogue. For instance, the representation of each strata or 
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time period in the analysis can be ensured by use of stratified sampling (Druckman, 
2005). When carefully done, sampling produces the confidence “that the coded material 
represents the larger extended” phenomenon or issue problem “within which the sampled 
material is embedded” (Druckman, 2005, pp. 260-261). 
Hence, a fundamental issue in qualitative research is the adequacy of the 
evidential data used, or the “extensiveness of the body of evidence used as data (Erickson 
as cited in Creswell, 2007, p. 289). Data sourcing for the study involved texts from 
newspapers articles on the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria spanning the 
period from 1966 to present collected from different databases and various newspapers’ 
websites. The study uses newspaper articles from different databases with full-text 
searchable capacity for Nigeria newspapers including The New York Times (1923-
Current file); ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009), 
LexisNexis, and different newspaper websites including New York Times, British 
Broadcasting Corporation, AllAfrica News, and Nigerian newspaper websites, local and 
foreign including, Guardian Newspapers, Daily Times of Nigeria, Vanguard Newspapers, 
New Nigerian Newspaper, Punch, etc. A comprehensive listing of the Study Data 
Sources of the Newspaper Articles Used for the Study is provided after the References 
section of the study. The various newspaper websites and databases used for the study 
covered most of the newspaper reported cases of the conflict for the study period from 
1966 to present. With these databases and the newspaper websites containing articles 
with some dating backward from 1850 to present, such as The New York Times archives, 
the study is focused on the ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. Utilizing the 
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newspaper articles from these databases and newspaper websites, the researcher used 
Nvivo software for the content analysis of the data for the study. 
Stage III – Unit of Analysis. The next step is deciding on the unit of analysis, and 
this involves weighing the benefits and disadvantages of using either smaller or larger 
analytical units. The coding unit is the meaning unit undergirding the research purpose, 
and involves issues of “the size of the unit and how it will be counted,” and this ranges 
“from single words or sentences to large sections of text” (Druckman, 2005, p. 261). 
Thus, the analytic unit for content analysis could either be a word(s), sentence, or a 
textual chunk (Druckman, 2005), and based on the research question, the unit of analysis 
could also be a letter, some pages of text, a number of discussion participants, or 
discussion time used (Robson; and Polit & Beck as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 108), 
with the choice of contents to analyze also guided by the research question and study aim 
(Robson as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 108). Using a meaning unit comprising more 
than a sentence and which contains several meanings compounds the analysis process, 
making it challenging and difficult (Catanzaro; and Graneheim & Lundman as cited in 
Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 108). Also, using a too narrow unit of analysis, such as one word, 
may lead to fragmentation (Graneheim & Lundman as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 
108).  Decisions on the size of the unit involve trade-offs between reliability and validity, 
and usually “the smaller the unit, the more reliable the coding,” while also “the larger the 
unit, the better the chance of capturing connected themes” and the wider context 
(Druckman, 2005, p. 261). Validity is, thus, enhanced with the broader frame or context 
actually captured, as well as with the coding categories reflecting a range of variations. 
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Stage IV – Coding. The checklist next steps (9-14) deal with the process of 
coding, and this begins with a sample of the material being independently coded by a 
minimum of two coders. The categories’ reliability is contingent on the extent of the 
coders’ agreeing on the categories’ assignments, and their assigning of same unit to same 
category indicates agreement. Such results will provide the researcher with guidance 
regarding basic meanings and simplicity of use. Revisions can be made to the 
categories/definitions for improving the coding system, with such new categories also 
tested for reliability. The checklist next steps involve engaging and training about two 
more coders and also preparing forms for use in the coding final process. Coders’ 
selection criteria include remoteness from the study and its assumptions, coding 
experience, and adequate training result. While coding decisions have no accuracy 
criterion and have answers that are neither right nor wrong, coders can, however, indicate 
the extent of confidence they have in their coding decisions, as well as discuss the 
reasoning behind their decisions, particularly when differences emerge between coders 
(Druckman, 2005). When the coding decisions are all made, the data has been prepared 
for analysis, and this can be done in various ways ranging from in depth time series to 
generally interpretative narrative. 
Stage V – Data Analysis. The next technical decision deals with the manner of 
using codes in analysis, and involves the issue of “aggregation-disaggregation” whereby 
the coding unit emphasizing meaning differs from the analytic unit emphasizing 
relationships and patterns (Druckman, 2005, p. 261). For example, threat frequency used 
in negotiation is a tough posturing indicator, with others being attacks, accusations, 
warnings, commitments, and ultimatums, combining such categories to form a 
185 
 
 
“toughness” index, and also, “soft posturing” indicated by acceptances, accommodations, 
arguments, and promises, which support the “other’s positions, the combining of their 
categories of which forms a “softness” index (Druckman, 2005, p. 261). Thus, the first 
decision involves whether or not to combine the coding categories into a bigger unit, 
depending on the conceptualization of the research problem, under steps 1-3. For 
example, all the different kinds of codes on a concept of interest can be combined into a 
single index. The differential coding of the concept’s separate kinds has the advantage of 
enabling the distinction among the different kinds of the concept used. Hence, 
aggregated, as well as disaggregated, analysis can be done (Druckman, 2005). 
Combining categories can be done in several ways, and the implications of the 
decisions of different aggregations can be generated by means of sensitivity analysis 
involving comparison of results obtained from same analysis carried out using different 
aggregations. With the decision on aggregation made and providing for the plausibility of 
no categories’ aggregation, the data analysis can begin (Druckman, 2005). If the coding 
of the textual data is chronologically ordered, a time-series varied analyses is adequate, 
where time is inconsequential, and thematic interpretations or cross-sectional correlations 
are then relevant (Druckman, 2005). The analyses are framed within the research 
design/assumptions context formulated before constructing the content analytical system 
(Druckman, 2005). Efficiency is recognized as one benefit of codes aggregation, with the 
analysis focusing on one variable rather than on many. Aggregation is also useful in 
comparative analysis. Its methodological critique is the disadvantage of the loss of 
distinctions among conceptual types. Both disaggregated and aggregated trends analyses 
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can, however, be performed by coding the various components of these concepts’ or 
meaning unit’s various components (Druckman, 2005, p. 262). 
Hence, while there are different approaches to the rubric of content analysis, this 
study utilizes the content analysis approach of thematic coding and “broad-gauged 
interpretations of themes” (Druckman, 2005, p. 257). The study employed the use of 
NVivo 9 software, which is data analysis software that is designed for the organization 
and analysis of unstructured information or data, for drawing inferences, and making 
informed decisions. NVivo provides a workspace that enables the researcher keep close 
to source data at every stage of the project, from data collection and organizing through 
analysis and reporting. The study’s content analytic trail using Nvivo 9 software involves 
initial word frequency queries followed by Nvivo coding of the units of analysis into 
emerging themes, categorization and aggregation of themes into nodes for observation of 
emergent patterns and themes for making inferences. Data analysis for the study involved 
examining, categorizing, and coding which, in turn, involved data evidence 
recombination for the purpose of addressing the core research question of the genocidal 
proclivity. The analysis focused primarily on the key variables of conflict parties, conflict 
causation, and intentionality.  The analysis of the data content involves in-depth thematic 
analysis in which each theme traced back to the research question to ensure that it has 
been answered, using a generic thematic analysis, inductive model. The data were taken 
apart with meanings given to parts regarded as essential and reducing misconceptions in 
the analysis of unfamiliar phenomenon was assured by drawing systematically from past 
knowledge (Creswell, 2007). 
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Furthermore, the strategy of categorized aggregation strategy was used in finding 
meanings to multiple instances, as well as for direct interpreting of meanings, focusing on 
particular instances. The meaning findings enabled the searching out of consistency 
patterns or “correspondence” for a better understanding of the conflict cases (Stake, 1995, 
p. 78). Additionally used is the triangulation of claims and essential data requiring 
validation. Lastly, line coding was used to discover categories or strong patterns, which 
are followed by organizing the analysis and interpreting the meaning of the examined 
conflict cases (Creswell, 2007, p. 75). Thus, this analytic process involves the 
researcher’s effort “to make sense of the data and to learn ‘what is going on’” (Morse & 
Field as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 109), “and obtain a sense of whole” (Tesch; and 
Burnard as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 109). It is crucial to note that “interpretations 
of statistical manipulations based on quantified text must be validated by reference to the 
text itself” (Weber, 1990, p. 62), as examining the texts provides evidence for or against 
the interpretations, while also suggesting the need for revising or discarding of the 
factor’s initial interpretation. Hence, upholding the radical empiricism doctrine (the data 
or texts speak for themselves) as untrue, it is observed that “the content analyst 
contributes factual and theoretical knowledge to the interpretation” (Namenwirth & 
Weber as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 62). 
Ethics and Reflexivity 
This study involves the analysis of textual data on the conflict cases and does not 
involve human subjects. The approval of the Nova Southeastern University Research 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) for ensuring the protection of human subjects was, 
therefore, not required for the research. However, reflexivity has been employed to 
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address the issue of trustworthiness and subjectivity of the study. It is essential to 
examine trustworthiness for the purpose of ensuring reliability in a qualitative study, as 
Golafshani (2003) observes that “reliability and validity are conceptualized as 
trustworthiness, rigor and quality in qualitative paradigm” (p. 604). The inferences that are 
derived from the coding are crucially important, involving a trade-off between the 
accuracy (reliability) of coding and the coding categories’ meaning (validity) (Druckman, 
2005, p. 258).  This trade-off deals with decisions of either developing original systems 
of content analysis or adopting categories that others have used in similar applications. 
Original systems are understood to have preference for validity, as does the emic research 
design which favors original categories, while the adapted systems stress reliability and 
align with the emic tradition which prefers standard categories. Also, in original designs, 
the categories are created to capture the phenomenon’s essence, and they are interlinked 
with the data, with comparison not being the analytical purpose (Druckman, 2005). 
Hence, validity refers to the defined meaning in the single case context, while reliability 
is underlined by the required specialized knowledge for coding the case materials. The 
etic tradition’s preference for standard categories assumes an independence of the coding 
categories from the data, as well as for the purposes of making comparisons and results 
generalizability. With no specialized knowledge required for the application of the 
categories to process or the textual material, reliability is to that extent strengthened 
(Druckman, 2005). 
This qualitative content analytic study has ensured reliability and validity by 
means of triangulation, which helped address the issue of researcher’s bias, as well as 
increase the study’s truthfulness on its propositions. The use of triangulation is essential 
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for achieving reliability and validity in research from the perspectives of the qualitative 
researcher, and for eliminating bias and increasing truthfulness on proposition(s) 
regarding the social phenomenon being examined (Denzin as cited in Golafshani, 2003). 
Triangulation procedure used for the study involves searching “for convergence among 
multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories” (Creswell & 
Miller as cited in Golafshani, 2003, p. 604). Furthermore, the study’s analytic process and 
results involved providing adequate detailed descriptions to give “a clear understanding 
of how the analysis was carried out and its strengths and limitations” (GAO as cited in 
Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 112). This involves dissecting the process of analysis and the 
results’ validity, recognizing that while the “elements of validity in content analysis are 
universal to any qualitative research design there are additional factors to take into 
consideration when reporting the process of analysis and the results” (Elo & Kyngä, 
2008, p. 112). 
Thus, the study’s results are the categories’ described contents, which are the 
categories meaning frames with the description of the categories’ content done through 
subcategories (Marshall & Rossman as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008). The categories 
created from the study are conceptualized in essence, and grounded empirically (Dey 
1993) with the study data analyzed and formed into simplified categorical forms that 
reliably reflect the study phenomena (Kyngä & Vanhanen as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 
2008). The effectiveness of the categories in covering the data additionally speaks to the 
research findings credibility (Graneheim & Lundman as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008), 
with the use of defensible inferences making based on reliable and valid data collection 
for the study (Weber as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008). Furthermore, the researcher 
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demonstrated links between the data and the results in order to increase the reliability of 
the study (Polit & Beck as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008), hence, addressing the need for 
detailed description of the analytic process in reporting the findings. 
Additionally, the study uses tables and appendices for demonstrating the links 
between the results and the data, based on the need of the study’s findings and 
“demonstration is needed of the reliability of the findings and interpretations to enable 
someone else to follow the process and procedures of the inquiry” (Elo & Kyngä, 2008, 
p. 112). Furthermore, the study’s trustworthiness has been increased by means of 
authentic citations, while also providing information on the data sourcing or the kinds of 
data categories originally formulated (Patton; and Sandelowski as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 
2008, p. 112). It is, however, also essential to note that the use of software programs for 
analyzing qualitative data can enable a more ordered and manageable content analysis of 
the study while also facilitating new analytic levels (Gerbic & Stacey as cited in Elo & 
Kyngä, 2008, p. 113). However, too much compression of the qualitative data may lose 
the essence of maintaining the narrative materials’ integrity in the analysis phase, and 
where “the conclusions are merely summarized without including numerous supporting 
excerpts, the richness of the original data disappears” (Elo & Kyngä, 2008, pp. 113-114). 
Data Analysis and Presentation of Results  
Following the successful completion of data collection and coding, the content 
analysis of the study data using Nvivo 9 data analysis software is presented in Chapter 4. 
The study utilizes content analysis methodology in analyzing published newspaper texts 
on the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria from 1966 to present, which provided 
the thematic insights on the actions of the perpetrators, and on occasions, the 
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perpetrators’ claiming responsibility for the killings, sometimes with reasons stated for 
their actions, the basis on which valid inferences have been drawn using a set of 
procedures (Druckman, 2005; Krippendorf, 2004). The study period is classified into five 
phases of 1966 to 1976; 1976 to 1987; 1987 to 1996; 1996 to 2005; and 2006 to present, 
delineated on the basis of operative regional or states creation structure in the country 
over the period. And, using NVivo 9 software, the sourced study data in these five phases 
were imported into the software and coded into Nodes which are containers that enable 
the gathering of related material together so that emerging patterns and ideas can be seen. 
The nodes were created and organized into themes for attacks, causal factors, conflict 
parties, effects or consequences, perpetrators and targets, or victims of attack, the basis 
on which a theoretical model for determining proclivity to genocide is developed using 
the Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory techniques. 
The discussion of the results and findings of the analysis are presented in Chapter 
5, and addresses the findings in light of the study’s main research question of genocidal 
inclination in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict in each of the five phases of 
the study. The second research question of the extent to which religion foments and 
escalates the conflict is also addressed in Chapter 5. The findings are presented in 
narrative form for a better understanding of the phenomena (Yin, 1994) to ensure that the 
study results convey the interpreting and meaning findings of the conflict cases 
(Creswell, 2007), as derived from the consistency of categories or strong patterns (Stake, 
1995) over the study’s five phases, based on the application of the genocidal proclivity 
theoretical model developed in the study using the Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded 
theory techniques. 
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Summary 
Intermittent gruesome killings have been and remain a key feature of the ethno-
religious conflict in northern Nigeria for decades with several causation factors identified, 
with little or no significant emphasis on the genocidal undertone to the conflict. This 
study further investigates the ethno-religious dimension to determine the plausibility of 
genocidal inclinations to the continued, intermittent, and atrocious killings in northern 
Nigeria employing a qualitative content analysis methodology of the conflict cases 
spanning from 1966 to present using Nvivo coding and data analysis. Content analysis 
methodology is ideally suited for analyzing the sensitive and intricate phenomena of 
genocidal intent in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. The benefit of the 
method lies in the enormous volumes of conflict cases textual data from varied textual 
sources that will be collated for use as corroborating evidence for the study. Content 
analysis has particularly served as an important means of proffering phenomenal 
evidence in the qualitative paradigm on genocide studies, as well as dealing on sensitive 
topics such as in nursing research (Elo & Kyngä, 2008). The limitations of content 
analysis involve issues of the research questions being too extensive or ambiguous, as 
well as the problem of researcher bias which is a generic qualitative methodological 
limitation (Elo & Kyngä, 2008). These limitations have been addressed in the study using 
different and multiple data sources, and triangulation of assertions and essential data 
requiring validation (Golafshani, 2003). 
The data analysis processes of examining, categorizing, and coding through data 
evidence recombination utilizes Nvivo coding of emerging themes, categorization and 
aggregation of themes into nodes for observing of emergent patterns, and themes for 
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making inferences. The analysis of the data content involves an in-depth thematic 
analysis, with each theme traced back to answering the research question using a generic 
thematic analysis, inductive model, to reduce misconceptions in the analysis by drawing 
systematically from past knowledge (Creswell, 2007). The analysis focuses primarily on 
the key variables of conflict parties, conflict causation, and intentionality for the purpose 
of addressing the core research question of the genocidal proclivity. Based on the 
categories’ consistency and strong patterns (Stake, 1995) over the study’s five phases, a 
theoretical model for determining proclivity to genocide has been developed using the 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory techniques for building theory with a 
substantive theory also developed in the study. The data analysis results are presented in 
Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 outlines the discussion of the findings in the different phases of 
the study addressing the research question. 
 
  
 
Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Presentation 
Introduction 
Nigeria as a nation-state is faced with a myriad of complex problems involving 
different variables and stakeholders, with the country having experienced economic 
downturn, political upheavals, coups d’état, civil war, and a deluge of ethno-religious 
conflicts. These conflicts have predominated northern Nigeria, with the Middle Belt 
region, primarily Jos in Plateau state and such other cities as Kano in Kano state, Kaduna 
in Kaduna state, and Maiduguri in Borno state, being the zones of conflict where mass 
killings and exterminations have persistently been sporadic for decades, primarily 
between Muslims and Christians or non-Muslims. Accordingly, Ahiante observes that: 
The first ethno-religious crisis was said to have been recorded before the nation 
got its independence. It was in 1953. Another followed in 1966, 80, 85, 91, 95, 
99, 2001 and 2004. But from 1987 to date ethno-religious crises have become 
common phenomena in the northern parts of Nigeria. The most offending states 
being Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, Taraba and Plateau. Between 1987 and 2004 
thousands of people have lost their lives and property worth billions of naira 
destroyed. (2004, para. 26) 
These problems have been viewed from different perspectives ranging from 
economic, political, religious, cultural, and ethnic among others, with several studies 
linking the prevalence of conflicts in these northern Nigeria areas to such factors as 
poverty, retarded development, and political factors, as well as religious and ethnicity 
factors as undergirding the waves of killings in the region. This study explores the 
probability of genocidal undertone to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. 
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The study derives from the qualitative research tradition and employs a content 
analysis methodology involving the analysis of available texts on the conflict cases 
spanning from the 1966 pogrom in which massacres of thousands of Igbos were 
massacred in the north up to present, on-going ethno-religious killings in northern 
Nigeria. The content analysis processes involve categorizing, coding, and evaluation of 
the textual themes for making of inferences. Through analysis of the content of the 
newspaper articles which are the reported cases of the ethno-religious conflicts in 
Northern Nigeria, the study focuses on causation and intentionality behind the protracted 
and wanton killings to inquire on the plausibility of genocidal inclinations to the killings. 
The emergent categories and nodes or coding themes from the data over the different 
phases of the study have been used to develop a model for determining inclination to 
genocide. Figure 1 presents a Theoretical Model for Determining the Inclination or 
Proclivity to Genocide that is developed from the analysis of the study data using the 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory techniques. 
Overview and Logic for Data Analysis  
The grounded theory technique developed by Strauss and Corbin (1990) is an 
analytical tool for examining the phenomenon being studied which is the core category or 
central idea of the research with which other categories in the study are related. These 
other categories are causal conditions which lead to the phenomenon; the contextual 
framework in which the phenomenon developed; the intervening conditions for the 
phenomenon; the strategies mapped out for the phenomenon to develop; and the 
consequences or outcomes of the phenomenon. In the northern Nigeria ethno-religious 
conflict, these categories have been identified as (1) causal conditions of phenomena 
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relating to genocidal proclivity, which include (i) immediate or trigger factors, (ii) 
underlying or root causes, and (iii) perceived threat of the “otherness,” and (iv) exclusive 
ideological framing; (2) phenomena resulting from trigger factors, underlying causation, 
perceived threat of the “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing; (3) context in 
which ethno-religious conflict and genocidal proclivity developed; (4) intervening 
conditions influencing proclivity to genocide; (5) strategies of attack foreshadowing 
proclivity to genocide; and (6) consequences or effects of proclivity to genocide. 
Drawing from the Strauss and Corbin (1990) analytic tool, the study has developed a six-
part grounded theoretical model for determining proclivity to genocide in the northern 
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, and this is presented in Figure 1. 
Research Question 
Gruesome killings have remained on-going phenomena in the ethno-religious 
conflict in northern Nigeria in which colossal loss of life and property has continued to 
occur, albeit in a sporadic and intermittent manner. With the focus of this study being to 
inquire on the proclivity towards genocide in the conflict, the research questions are 
constructed specifically to determine: Are there genocidal inclinations to the ethno-
religious conflict in northern Nigeria? And furthermore, to what extent does the interplay 
between ethnicity and religion help to foment and escalate the conflict in northern 
Nigeria? 
Data Analysis  
In the analysis of the study data involving content analysis of newspaper articles 
reported cases in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, the study focuses on 
causation and intentionality behind the protracted and wanton killings to inquire on the 
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plausibility of genocidal inclinations to the killings. The emergent categories and nodes 
or coding themes from the study data are presented with the details of the coding list for 
the study summary provided in Appendix B. Appendix C lists A-E contain the coding 
lists for the five phases of the study delineated from 1966 to 1987; 1987 to 1996; 1996 to 
2005; and 2006 to present. 
Given the consistency of the emerging patterns (Stake, 1995) from the Nvivo 
software coding and analysis of the study data, these emerging patterns have been used to 
develop a theoretical model to explore the study’s meaning frame (Creswell, 2007) which 
involves the determination of the plausibility genocidal inclination to the northern 
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict over the study’s delineated five phases. 
Findings 
The grounded theory model for determining proclivity to genocide in the northern 
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict deriving from the theoretical framework of Strauss and 
Corbin (1990) and developed from this study is presented in Figure 1. This findings 
section has two parts. Findings Part I presents the model for determining proclivity to 
genocide covering the model’s six-part components. Part II of the Findings is the 
application of study data over to the model for genocidal proclivity over the five study 
phases. This part delineates the context and synopsis of the study’s five phases with an 
application of the genocide proclivity model’s six-thronged components to each phase. 
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Findings Part I: Presentation of Model for Determining Proclivity to Genocide 
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena  
 Relating to Genocidal Proclivity 
 
Four types of causal conditions which lead ultimately to genocidal proclivity 
emerged from the data. These causation factors include (i) immediate or trigger factors, 
(ii) underlying or root causes, (iii) perceived threat of the “otherness, and (iv) exclusive 
ideological framing. 
Immediate or trigger factors to the conflict consist of the various issues which 
may be related or unrelated to the parties in conflict but form the basis from which the 
killing spree sparks. Trigger factors identified as “catalytic” (Suganami as cited in 
William, 2011, p. 6) “refer to those factors which generate actions…that represent the 
conscious choices of particular actors to engage in…violence” (William, 2011, p. 6). 
Such trigger factors identified in the study include: the first coup d’état of January 1966 
and the killing of mainly northern army officers in the coup; reprisal mission, revenge or 
counter-coup; massacres of Ibos and returning refugees; secession and self-determination 
(Garrison, 1968a, 1968b); insurgency, uprising or anti-government riots; anti U.S.-led 
Afghanistan air strikes (“Violent,” 2001); arrests or persecution of fundamentalist sect 
members, religious extremism and violence or other fundamentalists activities; election-
related and engineered violence; Islam degraded, desecration and/or misinterpretation of 
Koran (Brooke, 1987a 1987b), the Danish Cartoon and the Miss World Publications 
(Mcveigh, 2002). 
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The second set of causal conditions comprises underlying or root causes to the 
conflict which have become entrenched into the relational fabric of the conflict parties. 
Underlying causes defined as “permissive” (Suganami as cited in William, 2011, p. 6) 
“identify disposition which make organized violence more likely, [but] do not…explain 
why wars [or violence] break out in some cases where these underlying factors are 
present but not in others (William, 2011, p. 6). Underlying causes are the factors that 
make a conflict intractable (Hauss, 2003). Such underlying causation identified in the 
study include: historical factors; colonial influences, exploitation and fear of 
balkanization; culture of bad governance and corruption or oppressive military rule; Al 
Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian links including illegal aliens; and political 
underpinnings or power struggle. This includes issues of coalition government or 
federalism versus regionalism disputes (Garrison, 1966a); dynamism and fear of Ibo or 
southern dominance; infiltration and politicization of religion (Onishi, 2000, 2001b); 
political divisions and tensions; and political elites or Kaduna mafia perspectives (Kotch, 
1987). Underlying causations also include socio-economic factors, including ethnic 
groups vying for control of fertile lands, as well as political and economic power (“At 
Least 21 Are Killed,” 2011). Others are indigenes and settlers issues (Polgreen, 2008), 
and poverty, unemployment, lack of education, and discontent (Nossiter, 2010c). 
The third set of causal factors is the perceived threat of the “otherness,” and for 
the ethno-religious conflict in Northern Nigeria comprises: anti-Ibo rioting following the 
first coup d’état of January 1966 and other anti-Ibo riots in succession particularly in the 
first phase of the study (Garrison, 1966a, 1966c, 1966g, 1966l, 1968a); ethnic-religious 
hatreds, rivalries, divisions and animosities (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967); dynamism 
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and fear of Ibo or Southern dominance (Garrison, 1966a, 1967a, 1968a); North-South 
split or largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south (“100 Feared Dead,” 1992; 
Polgreen, 2006, 2008; Purefoy, 2010); annihilation attempts by targeting (Abdulkadir, 
2012b; Bello, 2012a, 2012b; “Christmas Carnage,” 2011; Ehiabhi, 2012c; Kaita, 2011); 
and/or forceful conversion of Christians to Islam (Brooke, 1987b; “Christian Groups,” 
2009); and ultimatum to southern Christians living in the North to leave the region (Lobel 
2012; Ohai, 2012; Orude, 2012a, 2012b). 
The fourth set of causal conditions involves issues of exclusive ideological 
framing.  Exclusive ideology aims at selecting and justifying the extermination of a 
targeted member group on the basis of their different world view, religion, or ethnicity 
(Campbell, 2010, Video Series 18). For the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, 
framing of exclusive ideology primarily comprise matters revolving around issues with 
religious dimensions; anti-Western or ideological differences; fundamentalism and 
religious fervency; and Sharia or Islamic law institution in northern Nigeria. Ideological 
framing underlie much of the excessive blood-letting which continues to occur in 
northern Nigeria, particularly with the introduction of Sharia in some northern states 
[presently 12 states in Nigeria have established the Sharia as their penal legal code, (ICG, 
2010)]; with other Islamic law related causal factors involving, non-Muslim opposition to 
Sharia, its constitutionality, and matters regarding the violation of fundamental rights of 
Christians and non-Muslims in Sharia operative states (“Christian Groups,” 2009); 
gender segregation matters; issues on the strict implementation of Sharia; postures of 
anti-establishment  or rejection of westernized institutions and ideology under Sharia 
(“700 Die,” 2009; “Muslim Sect,” 2011); and moves towards imposing Sharia across 
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Nigeria or establishing an Islamic state (“Boko Haram,” 2012; Brooke, 1987b; “In 
Nigeria’s North,” 2011; Mojeed & Nossiter, 2012). 
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors, 
 Underlying Causation, Perceived Threat of the 
 “Otherness” and Exclusive Ideological Framing 
 
The study shows that the causal conditions—the trigger factors, underlying 
causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing in varying 
situations and contextual settings—resulted in varying forms and degrees of 
exterminations and killings primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians, as well 
as other conflict parties which more often than not are divided along ethnic and religious 
lines. Such subjective phenomena as identified in the study data reveal core categories of 
attacks and violence unleashed to varying target victims with emergent themes including: 
assault, shoot-out, killings, arson and looting (“300 Believed Killed,” 1982; Garrison, 
1966g, 1966i; Jaynes, 1981; Fisher, 2006); and blockade, embargo and civil war 
(Friendly, 1967a; Garrison, 1968a; “Nigeria: Slow War,” 1967). Other emergent 
phenomenal themes in the study include bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, 
massacres or barbarism (Brooke, 1987b; Ejembi, 2012; Garrison, 1966b, 1967f; 
“Hundreds Flee,” 2002; Koinange, 2001; “Nigeria Quells,” 1992; “Nigerian Death Toll 
Rises,” 2009; “Nigerian Muslims,” 2004; Noble, 1992a; Nossiter, 2010b, 2010d, 2010e, 
2010f, 2011; Obateru & Mamah, 2004; Onishi, 2001a; Purefoy, 2010); and bombings, 
suicide bombings, and coordinated gun and bomb attacks (Akau, 2012; “At Least 200 
Die,” 2008; Ehiabhi, 2012a;  Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1968a; Mgboh, 2012a; Ohai, 
2012; Onyeose, 2012; Pedro, 2011; Tilley-Gyado, 2012). Additional emergent 
phenomenal nodes also include genocide (Emerson, 1970; Friendly 1967a; Garrison, 
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1968a, 1968b; “Nigerian Muslims,” 2004; Nossiter, 2010e; Okoye, 2011). Phenomenal 
themes identified in the study further include political violence, coup d’état and political 
assassinations (“Emergency Declared,” 2011; Garrison, 1966a, 1967h, 1968b; “Nigeria 
Group Threatens,” 2011; Ohai, 2012); religious and ethnic violence (“1,000 Are Reported 
Dead,” 1984; “300 Believed Killed,” 1982; Brooke, 1987b; “Deadly Rioting,” 2000; 
Emerson, 1970; Jaynes, 1981; “Nigeria Quells,” 1992; Noble, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c). 
The phenomenal themes also include reprisals from southern states (Onishi, 2000; 
Polgreen, 2006; “Reprisal Attacks,” 2006; “Toll Rises,” 2006; “Violent,” 2001); sectarian 
violence (“718 Deaths,” 1984; Ahiante, 2004; Chidiogo, 2011; Noble, 1992a, 1992c; 
Ohai, 2012; Sengupta, 2004a); and spiral or escalation of violence (“‘Irate Youths’ Burn 
Down,” 2006; “Muslim Mobs,” 2004; Nossiter, 2011; Sokunbi, 2012). Additionally 
emergent in the study are the phenomenal themes of targeted, pre-meditated or 
orchestrated killings and assaults (Abdulkadir, 2012b; “Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; 
Bello, 2012a, 2012b; “Boko Haram,” 2012; Brooke 1987b; “Christmas Carnage,” 2011; 
Ehiabhi, 2012c; Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1966a, 1968a; Kotch 1987; Mshelizza, 2011; 
Myers, 2006; Nossiter, 2011, 2012; Onishi, 2001a; Pedro, 2011; Sokunbi, 2012; “Suicide 
Bombing,” 2012). Further included as phenomenal nodes are terrorist activities (Ahiante, 
2004; Akau, 2012; Batty & Mark, 2012; “Christian Groups,” 2009; “Christmas Carnage,” 
2011; “Emergency Declared,” 2011; Onah, Shiklam, & Olugbode, 2012); and threats or 
fears of more attacks, protests or warnings of secession or full scale war (“Boko Haram,” 
2012; “Dozens Dead,” 2004; Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1966e, 1967d, 1968a; Mshelizza, 
2011; “Nigeria Muslims,” 2004; Okpi, 2012; Ola & Orude, 2012; Simmons, 2000; 
“Violent,” 2001). Other phenomenal nodes that emerged from the study are those of tit-
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for-tat killings in northern states (“At Least 200 Die,” 2008; Brooke, 1987b; Garrison, 
1966i, 1967f; Jaynes, 1981; Lobel, 2012; Nossiter, 2010f; Polgreen, 2006; “Religious and 
Ethnic Clashes,” 2001; Sengupta, 2004a, 2004b). 
Further phenomenal themes in the study include uprising, anti-government 
rioting, protests or demonstrations (Brooke, 1987b; Garrison, 1966a, 1966e, 1966h; 
"Hundreds Die in Religious Riots,” 1984; Kotch, 1987; Noble, 1992c; “Nigeria Quells,” 
1992; Koinange, 2001; Lacey, 2002; “Miss World,” 2002; Sengupta, 2003; Fisher, 2006; 
“Nigerian Police Station,” 2010; Sokunbi, 2012). Lastly, the phenomenal themes include 
violent or deadly clashes, rioting or gun battles (“1,000 Are Reported Dead,” 1984; “700 
Die,” 2009; “718 Deaths,” 1984; Brooke, 1987b; Chidiogo, 2010; Cowell, 1982; Dash, 
1984; “Dozens Dead,” 2004; Garrison, 1966c, 1967h; Jaynes, 1981; Koinange, 2001; 
“Nigeria Quells,” 1992; Noble, 1992c; Nossiter, 2009a; Ohai, 2012; Shiaondo, 2011). 
The details of each of the emergent phenomenal themes in the varying settings of 
the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are analyzed and discussed in the different 
phases of the study. By comparing and contrasting these phenomenal nodes and 
categories, two major categories involving targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated 
killings and assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism 
are identified as being closely associated with the proclivity to genocide. 
3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious Conflict  
 and Genocidal Proclivity Developed 
 
Additional emergent nodes from the study show the contexts, that is the social 
space or lebensraum, which provide a geographic perspective, the framework on which 
genocide or its proclivity can develop (Wood, 2001). For the ethno-religious conflict in 
northern Nigeria the contextual settings identified in the study are presented in Table 1 
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below. Also presented in Table 2 are contexts identified in the study with reprisal attacks 
in some southern states, as well as the State of Biafra, the secession of which led to the 
1967-70 civil war. Nodes emerging from the study reveal virtually all northern Nigeria 
states, in addition to Abuja (the federal capital territory) as the various contexts for the 
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, some cases of which have evidences of 
inclinations to genocide.  
The contextual locations within the various conflict settings identified in the study 
are presented in Table 1 below, with reprisals in some southern states or regions 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 1 
Contexts for the Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious Conflict 
Context Study Phase 
 
S/N 
Northern                         
Region/States 
I 
1966-1976 
II 
1976-1987 
III 
1987-1996 
IV 
1996-2005 
V 
2006-Present 
1. Abuja 
Jabi 
Zuba 
   X  
X 
X 
2. Adamawa State 
Yola 
Jimeta 
Lamurde 
Mubi 
 
X 
X 
    
X 
X 
X 
X 
3. Bauchi State 
Bauchi 
  X 
X 
X X 
X 
4. Benue State 
Makurdi 
Gbeji; Vaase 
Zaki Ibiam 
Dooga; Kpata 
Lokobi; Ajimaka 
Ekaae; Giza 
Yogbo; Mbgawem 
Gwer West LGA 
 Zongo Akiki 
Nyijir, Tse Taki, & Agbeke in 
Guma areas 
 
X 
   
 
X X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
5. Borno State 
Maiduguri 
Dala 
Yan’tebura, Bulukuntu 
Tsallake 
Zajeri 
 
X 
X 
X 
  X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
6. Gombe State  X   X 
7. Jigawa State 
Dutse 
     
X 
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8. Kaduna State 
Kaduna 
Kafanchan 
Zaria 
Zonkwa 
Zango-Kataf 
Kufara 
Ori-Apata 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
9. Kano State 
Kano  
-Sabon-Gari 
-Bompai 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
10. Katsina State 
Katsina 
  X 
X 
 X 
X 
11. Kebbi State    X  
12. Kogi State     X 
13. Kwara State 
Ilorin 
    
X 
 
14. Nasarawa State 
Alago 
Doma Town 
Eke & Giza Areas Kadarko 
Tiv settlements at: Kpata, 
Donga, Lokobi & Ajimaka 
   X 
 
 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
X X 
X X 
15. Niger State 
Minna - 
Angwan Kuje  
Madalla 
 
 
 
  X  
X 
 
X 
16. Plateau State 
Jos 
Bukuru 
Kadyal 
Kanam District 
Langtang 
Yelwa 
Barkin Ladi 
Dogon Na Hauwa Kuru 
Karama Wareng 
Zot and Ratsat 
 
X 
X 
  X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
17. Sokoto State    X X 
18. Taraba State 
Jalingo 
Akwana 
  X 
 
X 
X X 
X 
19.  Yobe State 
Damaturu 
Gadaka 
Geida 
Hawan Malka 
Potiskum 
    X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
20. Zamfara State    X X 
 
 
Table 2 
Contexts for (i) Biafra War and (ii) Reprisals in Southern States and/or Extrajudicial 
Killings** 
Context Study Phase 
(i) 
S/N 
Southern                          
Regions  
(See Map ***) 
I 
1966-1976 
II 
1976-1987 
III 
1987-1996 
IV 
1996-2005 
V 
2006-Present 
1. Eastern Region or Biafra (See 
map ***) 
 
X 
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2. Mid-Western Region (See 
Map ***) 
 
X 
    
(ii) 
S/N 
Southern States      
1. Abia State 
Aba 
 
 
   
X 
 
 
2. Lagos State 
Lagos 
 
 
   
X 
 
3. Niger Delta State 
Odi** 
 
 
   
X 
X 
4. Anambra State 
Onitsha 
Awka 
Nnobi 
Nnewi 
     
X 
X 
X 
X 
5. Delta State 
Asaba 
 
 
    
X 
6. Imo State  
 
   X 
7. Akwa Ibom  
Uyo 
    
X 
 
 
Note. ** Cases of Extrajudicial Killings 
Additionally providing the contextual framework are the emergent nodes or codes 
and categories also identified from the study data which reveal varying conflict parties in 
the different phenomenal settings for the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. The 
emergent conflict parties identified include: Muslim mobs/gangs, civilian mobs or sect 
and Ibos; Muslim mobs or sect and security forces; Muslim sect and other Muslims or 
sect; the northern-led federal government and Ibos; Muslim mobs, sect or groups and 
Christians; Nigeria and Biafra in war; security agents and unidentified civilians; different 
ethnic groups; northern states government and Christians; Fulani herdsmen or Hausa-
Fulani group and Christian or host communities. The details of each of the emergent 
conflict parties themes in the varying settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious 
conflict are analyzed and discussed in the different phases of the study. Such emergent 
nodes for the conflict parties were analyzed by comparison and contrasted with the 
phenomenal conflict nodes and categories and their causal conditions in order to identify 
conflicts in which there is the plausibility of a conceptualized annihilating difference 
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(Hinton, 2005) that give rise to exterminations involving perpetrator and victim 
situations, with other conflicts which are devoid of such annihilating difference 
considered as clashes or fighting between parties without an overt inclination to 
genocide. 
Emergent nodes and categories for varying perpetrator-groups identified in the 
study using the annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties described above 
include: Muslim mobs, rioters or rampaging Muslim youths; Islamic fundamentalists 
groups inclusive of the Maitatsine and Boko Haram sect; Fulani herdsmen, Fulani-Hausa 
group, or gunmen; and rampaging, unemployed or under-aged youths. The perpetrator 
category also revealed emergent nodes for civilian mobs, unidentified attackers or 
gunmen; Christian militia/youths; and security agents, soldiers/army/military, 
Hausa/Northern troops. Details of involvement of each of these perpetrator groups in the 
varying settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are analyzed and 
discussed in the different phases of the study.  
Emergent nodes and categories from the study also revealed the victim or target 
groups, which enable the fostering of annihilating difference amidst a perpetrator group 
and social space environment (Wood, 2001) to produce a well-rounded and complete 
contextual setting for genocidal proclivity to flourish. Target or victim groups for the 
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict include: Christians and churches, also involving 
Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian villages; civilian targets or innocent citizens; 
Southerners who are predominantly Christians, and especially Ibos as targets; security 
agents - police officers, military and government officials; symbols of government 
authority (including the United Nations offices in Abuja); civilian centers, schools and 
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school children; media offices and journalists; beer parlors, hotels, banks and other 
facilities (structures or institutions with Western connotations); Muslim clerics or 
mainstream/orthodox Muslims; and Muslims, Hausa-Fulani herders, Muslim sect, 
Northerners or mosques. The victimhood of each of these targets are also analyzed and 
discussed in the different study phases. 
4. Intervening Conditions Influencing 
 Proclivity to Genocide 
 
The study also identified nodes and categories for intervening conditions in the 
different contextual settings of the conflict in addition to the context nodes. These 
intervening factors generally involve such broad conditions that influence—increase or 
diminish—the tendency or proclivity to genocide. For the northern Nigeria conflict the 
intervening conditions include: press censorship and manipulation or deflation and 
inflation of casualty figures—this casualty information manipulation facto was used by 
government parties on occasions to minimize but also sometimes scale-up reprisals or tit-
for-tat violence; extrajudicial killings and army involvement in policing; government 
ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government; and the presence of collaborators or 
bystanders—foreign collaborators leading to the internationalization of the conflict, and 
local collaborators or bystanders. The details of the emergent intervening conditions 
themes in the varying settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are 
analyzed and discussed in the different phases of the study. 
The study further reveals that additionally influencing the tendency to increase or 
deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control the violence 
with their implementation. Emergent nodes and categories for intervention efforts in the 
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict include: aid and relief support, attempts at 
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dialogue, appeals for intervention or mediation; post-war re-unification policy (for the 
Nigeria Biafra War), rehabilitation efforts or calls for rebuilding of churches; 
reconciliation attempts; control measures taken (such as curfews and road checks by 
security agents), investigations and commissions of inquiries utilized; calls to address the 
constitutionality of Sharia law and security issues; military assault or crackdown of 
warring factions; mopping-up of rioters or arrests made; warnings and/or calls for action, 
restraint, justice, or self-defense; and attempts to dialogue, and appeals for intervention or 
mediation. The details of the emergent themes of the intervention measures in the varying 
settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are analyzed and discussed in the 
different phases of the study. 
5. Strategies of Attack Foreshadowing 
  Proclivity to Genocide 
 
Emergent nodes or codes and categories from the study reveal varying strategies 
of attack which foreshadowed the tendency towards genocide within the contextual 
settings and intervening conditions with the resultant phenomena as described above. 
Strategies foreshadowing inclinations to genocide in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious 
conflict include: organization and planning including weaponry; extermination plot 
involving mass murders, and blockade and starvation (Biafra war); and ideo-ethnic 
cleansing (or ideological and ethnic cleansing) involving, burning, bombing, or  
destroying of churches, forceful conversion of Christians to Islam, forced migration, for 
example refugees and displaced persons, and the ultimatum by Boko Haram 
fundamentalists sect to southern Christians to leave the north. The strategies also include 
indoctrination, manipulation, or instigation; and coordinated attacks involving shootings, 
bombings, maiming, and arson, as well as drive-by or hit and run shootings and suicide 
211 
 
 
bombings. The details of the emergent themes of the strategies of attack in the varying 
settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are analyzed and discussed in the 
different phases of the study. 
6. Consequences or Effects of 
 Proclivity to Genocide 
 
The strategies adopted by perpetrators in the ethno-religious conflict in northern 
Nigeria have varying effects or consequences in the different conflict scenarios 
examined. Emergent nodes and categories of the consequences identified in the study 
include: death toll and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned corpses; refugees and 
displaced persons, as well as persons fleeing homes or taking refuge or shelter for safety; 
starvation; secession and civil war; mass graves or mass burials; churches burned, 
bombed or destroyed; mosques burned or destroyed; police stations and barracks, 
government buildings bombed or burned; schools bombed, burned, destroyed or closed; 
Christian businesses, homes, hotels and properties destroyed; destroying, looting and 
razing of properties; denial of freedom of worship and desecration of Christian religion; 
and security threat, apprehension, anxiety or political and social chaos, including 
infiltration of police, military, and all areas of government by perpetrator groups. 
Emergent nodes for the consequences category also revealed normalcy or calm returning 
after episodes of gruesome exterminations, showing an intermittency of occurrence in the 
killings. The details of the emergent themes for the consequences or effects in the varying 
settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are analyzed and discussed in the 
different phases of the study.  
End of Model Summary 
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Findings Part II: Application of Study Data Phases to Model for Genocidal 
Proclivity 
Introduction and Context of the Study. This study on the ethno-religious 
conflict in northern Nigeria spans the period 1966 up to present, with focus starting from 
the 1966 pogroms against the Ibos up to on-going varied, targeted killings in the north. 
This entire study period—1966 to 2013—is phased into five eras, each era covering about 
a decade, drawn up on the basis of the changing geographic and structural composition of 
the country with the creation of additional states in Nigeria over the period of the study. 
The first phase of the study spans from 1966 to 1976, and sees Nigeria with four regions 
(see Map I in Appendix A) which were operative from 1963 up to 1967 when 12 states 
were created to replace the regions (see Map II in Appendix A). This first phase ends in 
1976 when seven new states were created increasing the states of Nigeria to 19 in total 
(see Map III in Appendix A). The second phase of the study spans from 1976 to 1987 
when two additional states were created bringing the total to 21 states (see Map IV in 
Appendix A). The third study phase spans from 1987 to 1996 and is inclusive of the years 
1987 to 1991 when nine additional states and the Federal Capital Territory (now Abuja) 
were created bringing the states of Nigeria to 30 in total (see Map V in Appendix A). 
This third phase also includes the years 1991 to 1996 when additional states were created, 
bringing the total to the present 36 states of Nigeria (see Map I in Appendix A). The 
fourth phase of the study spans from 1996 to 2005, and the fifth phase spans from 2006 to 
present, with both phases having Nigeria’s currently operative 36 states (see Map I in 
Appendix A). 
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Study Phase I – 1966 to 1976: Synopsis. Nigeria at independence in 1960 was a 
federation with three regions—the Northern, Western, and Eastern regions with a fourth 
region, the Mid-Western region, created in 1963 (see Map I in Appendix A), and in the 
same year the country also became a republic. This first republic ended with Nigeria’s 
first military coup of January 1966 by army officers led by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, with 
intent to change the status quo of corrupt government officials, election rigging, and 
nepotism in the country (Garrison, 1966d, p. 19). Nzeogwu’s inspiring words observed in 
his radio broadcast were: 
Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low 
places that seek bribes and demand ten percent, those that seek to keep the 
country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers and 
VIPs of waste, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country big for 
nothing before the international circle, those that have corrupted our society and 
put the Nigerian calendar backward. We promise that you will no longer be 
ashamed to say that you are a Nigerian. (Ojiako as cited in Falola, 1999, p. 123) 
While the coup succeeded in Kaduna, it failed in its other strategic areas of Lagos, 
Enugu, and Benin, with Odumegwu Ojukwu, then, the Battalion Commander in Kano, 
foiling the coup in the northern axis, and Major General Aguyi Ironsi foiling it in the 
Lagos axis (Falola, 1999).  The Prime Minister of the federation, Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa and the northern Premier Ahmadu Bello who was then the Sarduana of Sokoto 
were, however, killed in the coup in addition to some northern senior officers in the army. 
These killings, in addition to the fact that most of the army officers involved in the coup 
were mostly of the Ibo ethnic group, gave the impression of an Ibo plan to control the 
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center. Of this 1966 first coup, Enahoro had this to say of the civilian administration and 
senior army officers that were killed in the coup: “All of them had one thing in common 
– they were not Ibos” and for those in like positions that were not killed, “they had one 
thing in common – they were Ibos” (Enahoro as cited in Mwakikagile, 2001, pp. 192-
193). This first coup triggered off anti-Ibo riots in May of 1966 with a resultant massacre 
of 600 Ibos in the north (Garrison, 1966g).  
Furthermore, events following the coup which led to further resentment as 
indicated by Enahoro are that: 
The opportunities of January 15 were misused in several ways by the Ironsi 
regime in the months that followed…General Ironsi allowed matters to be taken 
out of his hands by prominent Ibo leaders in the army, in the public service, and in 
public life. Affairs in the public service and the armed forces appeared to lend 
colour to the impression that the coup of January 15 was designed to install Ibos 
in positions of power. Out of twenty-one promotions in the Army in April, 1966, 
for example, eighteen were Ibo officers. General Ironsi drew his principal 
advisers from the Ibo ethnic group. Ethnic groups tend to be chauvinistic but the 
Ibos were the most militantly chauvinistic and this naturally created apprehension 
in the minds of the others. (Mwakikagile, 2001, p. 193) 
Contrary to this positioning, however, Siollun (2009) in his book entitled Oil, 
Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture (1966-1976), observes that other 
than Aguiyi-Ironsi, the only Ibo member of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) 11 
members was Lt-Colonel Ojukwu, who had automatic membership, as the Eastern 
region’s military governor. Siollun observes that: 
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In an effort to prove that he was not heading an Igbo regime,” Aguiyi-Ironsi had 
with great, even daring courage entrusted his personal security to Northern 
soldiers. He posted the Principal Staff Officer Lt-Colonel Phillip Effiong out of 
Supreme Headquarters in Lagos and replaced him with Major T. Y. Danjuma of 
the northern Jukun ethnic group. He even appointed relatives if the January 
victims to sensitive positions. On the civilian side he appointed a close relative of 
the Sarduana (Hamzat Ahmadu) to be his private secretary in replacement of 
Abdul Kareem Disu. His police Timothy Pam was the younger brother of Lt-
Colonel James pam (who was murdered during the January coup), and most of his 
bodyguards were Northern. By surrounding himself with Northern soldiers, 
Aguiyi-Ironsi sealed his own fate. (2009, p. 84) 
However, only six months later the January coup was followed by a bloody 
counter-coup in July of 1966 which was staged by northern army officers led by Major 
Murtala Mohammed, in which Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, the then head of state, was 
killed. Also killed in the coup were over 200 Ibo officers and men in the army, in 
retaliation to the January killings (Garrison, 1967d). Yakubu Gowon, who was then a 
lieutenant-colonel, was by compromise made the new head of state. The July counter 
coup was then followed by continued bouts of targeting and massacring of Ibos in 
northern Nigeria in July, September, and October 1966, with over 50,000 Ibo civilians 
wantonly massacred in the fall of 1966, an episode that set off the displacement of tens of 
thousands of displaced Ibo refugees (Garrison, 1968a). The perpetrators in each of these 
carnages were civilian or Muslim mobs—mainly Hausas, and northern troops. In Kano, 
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for instance, where soldiers mutinied to participate in the Ibo killings in 1966, it is 
observed that: 
The troops raided the battalion armory, broke out of the barracks and headed into 
town to pick up local civilian yan daba [thugs]…to take them to locations where 
they could find Igbos…Igbos trying to escape were not spared. At Kano airport, 
the soldiers set upon a crowd of Igbo refugees boarding flight and killed them. 
Some were dragged out of the plane cabin and shot. Igbo workers at the airport 
were also hunted down and killed…The soldiers also [went to] the railway station 
where Igbo civilians were waiting to board trains to escape. Many of the Igbo 
would-be passengers and railway staff were shot dead….This massacre on 
October 1, 1966…was possibly the worst of the mutiny. The participation of 
soldiers with firearms greatly increased the kill rate. Several thousand Igbos were 
killed that day alone in Kano due to the combined efforts of the 5
th
 battalion and 
civilian mobs. (Siollun, 2009, pp. 134-135) 
Consequently, there were thousands of returning Ibo refugees who left the north 
for their home region in Eastern Nigeria, as well as a mass exodus of about two million 
Ibos residing all over the Federation who fled to the sanctuary of their home state in the 
east (Garrison, 1968b). As a result of these episodes of Ibo massacres in the north and the 
returning Ibo refugees to their homeland, coupled with the failure of subsequent attempts 
at resolving the conflict, on May 30, 1967 the Eastern region under the leadership of  
Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu seceded from the rest of the country to form a 
self-declared sovereign state of Biafra (Garrison, 1968a, p. 38). This declaration was 
made after unsuccessful calls by Ojukwu to have the country institute a fully regional 
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rather than a federated system that would accord full autonomy of the four states or 
regions, to ensure the safety of the Ibos as well as avert the perceived northern hegemony 
in federal government. The regionalism versus federalism disputes fell through as did the 
accord of the Aburi meeting in Ghana which was not sustained (Falola, 1999). Shortly 
after Biafra declared sovereignty, the north led federal government headed by Gowon 
passed a military decree on the eve of  Biafra’s secession (Falola, 1999, p. 122) creating 
12 states to replace the four regions then existing (see Map II in Appendix A). 
Thus, intent on keeping the unity of the country, the northern-led government of 
Gowon went to war with Biafra from 1967 to 1970, a war that on the onset was 
anticipated to be a “police action” but which lingered for thirty months and claimed about 
a million lives (Falola, 1999, p. 123). The Biafrans on their part, put up a spirited defense 
of their right to survival and soverieignty, being enthused by the ordeal of the massacres 
and refugee crisis they had endured and the quest to survive. Hence, the observation that 
“From the average Biafran’s point of view, the war is not over an abstract question of 
constitutional and terrirorial integrity. It is a fight for survival” (Garrison, 1968b, p. 87). 
The war was, however, lost by Biafra, which was unable to resist a larger fighting force 
in the face of food shortages, as “the federal side resorted to the strategy of starving the 
enemy” (Falola, 1999, p. 123).  
The preceding presents the contextual framework for the Nigeria Biafra War of 
1967 to 1970, which forms part of the first phase – 1966-1976 of analysis of this study. 
Applying the Genocide Proclivity Model: Phase I – 1966 to 1976. The coding 
list for the emergent nodes or themes for Phase I of the study is provided in Appendix C: 
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Coding List A. The application of the emergent nodes from study Phase I to the 
Genocidal Proclivity Model on page 199 follows. 
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena  
 Relating to Genocidal Proclivity: 
 Phase I - 1966 to 1976 
As indicated above, the causal conditions have been classified into four types of 
contributory factors that could lead ultimately to genocidal proclivity as emerged from 
the data, namely, immediate or trigger factors, underlying or root causes, perceived threat 
of the “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing. These causal factors which are 
overlapping are not static, with a trigger factor in a current conflict, for instance, 
sometimes becoming in time an underlying or root cause. For the varying times of the 
conflict in this first phase of the study, emergent nodes for the trigger causes identified in 
the study include the first coup d’état of January 1966 and the killing of mainly northern 
army officers in the coup; reprisal mission, revenge or counter-coup; massacres of Ibos 
and returning refugees; secession and self-determination; and insurgency, uprising, or 
anti-government riots at varying times of the conflict. 
For this period of the study, applying the theoretical model for identifying 
proclivity to genocide, the findings reveal the initial trigger or immediate cause of the 
conflict was the first coup which involved the killing of the Prime Minister (Sir Tafawa 
Balewa), the Northern Premier (Sarduana of Sokoto), and many senior northern army 
officers by the mostly Ibo army officers who staged the coup. The North’s perception of 
the coup as an Ibo conception to rid the north of their hitherto hegemonic hold on the 
central government interests buttressed the long-entertained fear of the dynamism and 
fear of Ibo or Southern dominance, factors which fed on the perceived threat of the other, 
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as well as served as part of the underlying causation. Investigating this emergent theme of 
the North’s fear of southern dominance, the study data substantiates, for instance, that: 
On the surface, the demonstrations… appeared to be directed solely against the 
attempts of the military regime that came to power after a coup d’état last January 
to impose central control. But the real root of the trouble is the traditional 
northern fear of domination by Nigeria’s Southerners. These fears have persisted 
even though the Northern Region’s 29 million conservative Moslem Hausas have 
made the region Nigeria’s dominant political force. Northerners have always 
outnumbered southerners at the polls. (Garrison, 1966a, p. 8). 
Hence, as the first coup triggered off anti-Ibo riots and the May 1966 targeting 
and killing of over 600 Ibo civilians in the north (Garrison, 1966c, para. 7), a subsequent, 
additional fodder became Aguiyi Ironsi’s decree dissolving the regions and declaring a 
Unitary republic which, though aimed at doing away with the regional politics then 
plaguing the country, was misconstrued and seen as threatening northern interests 
(Falola, 1999). This subsequent trigger set off the anti-government riots that paved way 
for a bloody second coup in July 1966 (Garrison, 1968a). Additional causal conditions in 
this phase of the study are the underlying or root causes to the conflict which had become 
entrenched into the conflict parties’ relational framework. In this phase of the study, the 
underlying conditions emergent themes include colonial influences, exploitation and fear 
of balkanization; culture of bad governance and corruption or oppressive military rule; 
political underpinnings or power struggle also involving coalition government or 
federalism versus regionalism disputes (Garrison, 1967f, 1967g) which culminated in the 
non-adoption of the Aburi accord and precipitated the secession of Biafra and the ensuing 
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civil war (Emerson, 1970; Falola, 1999). Also politically, there was the factor of 
politicization of religion (Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1967h), with other underlying 
causation involving socio-economic issues, involving poverty, unemployment, lack of 
education, and discontent, as in the wake of the 1966 anti-Ibo rioting in which civilians, 
largely unemployed and illiterate Hausa mobs along with northern troops perpetrated the 
atrocities against the Ibos, looting, killing, and maiming (Garrison, 1966g, 1966l, 1968b). 
Further causal factors in this study phase are the perceived threat of the 
“otherness,” which include dynamism and fear of Ibo or Southern dominance (Garrison, 
1966h, 1968a; “Nigeria: Slow War,” 1976); and ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, 
divisions and animosities (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1966f, 1966g). Other 
perceived threat of the “otherness” include anti-Ibo rioting which followed the first coup 
d’état of January 1966 and successive anti-Ibo riots which occurred within this phase of 
the study (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1966a, 1966c, 1966h); and the North-
South split or largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south (1968a). This perception 
of threat being posed is intensified by ethnic, social, and religious divides in the country 
which its structures defined in terms of the largely Muslim north and the predominantly 
Christian south, or as in this phase of the study, the mostly Christian Ibos. For instance, 
tracing the causes of the 1966 massacres of Ibos in the North, Garrison observes: 
Tribal and regional rivalries have severely strained Nigerian unity in the past… 
But the real root of the trouble is the traditional northern fear of domination by 
Nigeria’s Southerners…The violence against the nearly one million Ibos who live 
in the north may have been spontaneous. The Hausas have always looked upon 
the better educated Ibos in their midst as heathen “colonizers.” (1966a, p. 8) 
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The final set of causal conditions in this study phase are themes classified under 
exclusive ideological framing which border primarily on ideological perspectives or 
world views. These include issues with religious dimensions, anti-Western or ideological 
differences, and fundamentalism and religious fervency. The role played by religious 
differences in orchestrating most of the Muslim/Christian conflicts in northern Nigeria 
cannot be overemphasized, and in addition to colonial factors already discussed above, 
these differences have fundamentally been instrumental to the country’s North/South split 
along religious lines. Garrison (1968a) acknowledges that: 
Religious differences played an important role in this early North-South split. 
When the British conquered the far North at the turn of the century, missionaries 
were barred from the area and local rule left in the hands of the conservative 
Muslim Emirs (traditional kings). While the North was isolated from the winds of 
change the mission-educated Southern tribes adopted Western techniques, 
accepted the possibility of change – and soon demanded it politically. (p. 37) 
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors, 
  Underlying Causation and Exclusive 
  Ideological Framing: Phase I - 1966 to 1976 
Phase I of the study shows that the four-fold causal conditions—the trigger factor, 
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing 
in different contextual settings—resulted in varying forms and degrees of exterminations 
and killings, primarily between mainly Muslim northerners and troops and Ibos which are 
divided along ethnic but also religious lines. Such subjective phenomena as identified in 
the study data reveal core categories of attacks and violence unleashed to the Ibos as the 
target victims with emergent themes including: assault, shoot-out, killings, arson and 
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looting; blockade, embargo and civil war; bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, 
massacres or barbarism; bombings, coordinated gun and bomb attacks; and genocide 
(Emerson, 1970; Friendly 1967a; Garrison, 1968a, 1968b). Additional emergent 
phenomenal nodes also include political violence, coup d’état and political 
assassinations; religious and ethnic violence; spiral or escalation of violence; targeted, 
pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and assaults (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; 
Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1966a, 1968a); threats or fears of more attacks, protests or 
warnings of secession or full scale war; tit-for-tat killings in northern states;  uprising, 
anti-government rioting, protests or demonstrations; and violent or deadly clashes, rioting 
or gun battles. 
By comparing and contrasting these phenomenal nodes and categories, two major 
categories involving targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and assaults; and 
bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism are identified as being 
closely associated with the proclivity to genocide. In the September 1966 massacres of 
Ibos in the north, Garrison (1966b) observes, for instance, that in Kano:  
The bloodbath began on the night of September 29, when Northern troops opened 
fire on Ibo refugees standing by at the airport. By dawn, Northern soldiers with 
automatic weapons, and civilians with machetes had swept through the city, 
burning, looting and killing. (para. 2)  
The extent of the carnage perpetrated spoke of annihilating the Ibos in the then northern 
region, such that even the fleeing refugees were sought out by northern troops and 
civilian mobs and slaughtered. Hence, Garrison (1966b) observes:  
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If there was a plan to rid the North of all Ibos, it has succeeded. More than one 
million Ibos living in the North and in many other parts of the Federation have 
retreated to the sanctuary of the Eastern Region. (para. 7) 
Furthermore, this phase of the study which spans both prewar, the war years, and 
postwar years up to 1976, also shows blockade, embargo and civil war as another major 
phenomenal theme for the period. The study data reveal that the Nigerian Federal 
Government, in a bid to crush the secession in the ensuing war, employed strategies of 
blockade and embargo against Biafra, which turned out to be an instrument of 
extermination against the Ibos by means of starvation. The blockade led to famine and 
humanitarian disaster due to a widespread starvation of Ibo civilians, particularly the 
Biafran children with over a thousand dying daily, subjected to the severe pangs of 
hunger and malnutrition (Emerson, 1970). There was inertia in the international 
community—the plausible intervening conditions that would have served to ameliorate 
the situation. To the contrary, emergent themes from the study revealed that collaborators 
or bystanders, particularly foreign collaborators such as Europe and the United States, 
“knew of Biafra as a place somewhere in Africa where there were thousands of starving 
children who did not even seem to blink or whimper as photographs recorded their 
plight” (Emerson, 1970, para. 3). Hence, “it was the wasted children of Biafra, and the 
way they stared, that made the civil war a deeply disturbing, if inexplicable nightmare to 
many outside Africa” (Emerson, 1970, para. 4). Further affirming the countless Biafran 
children’s ill-fated agony, the study data reveal that: 
With every passing hour, Biafra becomes more and more a death trap…death 
from malnutrition grows in a mathematical progression. Once nutrition sets in and 
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the victim is deprived of protein, his energy disappears, his skin grows taut, his 
hair yellow, his limbs become matchsticks…the dreaded “point of no return” in 
the victim’s eyes, especially if he is a child. He stares at you blankly, without a 
flicker of recognition. You extend candy, a cup of powdered milk, anything, and 
the child just stares, too listless, too dehydrated even to taste. It is the irony of 
death from malnutrition that in the final, fading hours one is at last completely 
free from the pangs of hunger. (Garrison, 1968b, p. 29) 
The deployment of starvation by the Nigerian government as a strategy for 
winning the war is evident from themes from the study. The study data indicated that the 
death spiral which was charted for months by a representative of the international Red 
Cross in Biafra started with a record of 300 deaths a day, increasing gradually in two 
months to 6,000 a day, and up to 42,000 a week by July of 1968 (Garrison, 1968b, pp. 29, 
84). It was also noted that “Biafran officials and the relief administrators maintained that 
child deaths had risen 50 per cent after the Red Cross flights were halted” (Emerson, 
1970, para. 49). However, the data reveal that, whereas: 
observers in Europe believed that the original intent behind Nigerian invasion was 
purely military…many observers have concluded, as the starvation toll has 
mounted that the Nigeria Government - and the British Government as well – was 
willing to condone starvation as a means of winning the war and preserving the 
country’s unity. (Emerson, 1970, para. 30)  
Thus, the Nigerian government adopted a deliberate extermination policy against 
Biafrans on the basis that “starvation is a legitimate weapon of war,” and this was even 
further extended to sectors that were overran and reoccupied by the federal troops 
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(Garrison, 1968b, p. 93). Hence, it is observed that “the Nigerians have banned all Red 
Cross flights not only to Biafra, but to the Federally controlled Enugu and Calabar 
sectors, where six months after being ‘liberated,’ an estimated one million civilians are 
starving” (Garrison, 1968b, p. 93). 
Furthermore, emergent from the study are the pre-war, identified major categories 
of targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and assaults; and, bloodbath, carnage, 
pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism as phenomenal killings perpetrated against the 
Ibos in the war. Such categories in this study phase reveal themes showing killings of Ibo 
civilian targets by Nigeria troops and in places overran by the Nigerian government as the 
war progressed, and on occasions, as in the Mid-western region, in conjunction with 
Nigerian civilian mobs. The study reveals for instance that in August of 1967, as federal 
troops reoccupied the then Mid-Western state which previously had been seized by the 
rebel, Biafran troops, an estimate of about 5,000 Ibo civilians were killed (“Africa: Race 
Hatred,” 1967, p. 200). Again in September, as the state capital Benin was retaken by the 
federal troops, the tally made of Ibo civilians killed was 989. In Warri, about 400 to 500 
Ibo civilians were estimated to have been slaughtered by civilian mobs celebrating the 
Nigerian soldiers’ return. It was observed in the study data that “…a main thoroughfare 
in Warri, was so cluttered with dead bodies one day after the city’s liberation that cars 
could not use it” (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967, p. 200). Additionally, in Sapele, where 
federal advance was mostly resisted by Biafran troops, the data reveal civilian casualties 
to be close to that of Warri, and along the River Niger west bank, which is an Ibo-
speaking predominated area, several thousand Ibo civilians were killed by troops either in 
the battle, or in the mop-up operations (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1967b). 
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Furthermore, findings from the study data showed that the Nigerian Air Force 
using their MIGs embarked on a deliberate targeting and bombing of churches, missions, 
and schools in Biafra, and after one such bombing, involving bombing of the Catholic 
cathedral in Owerri, it was noted that “the Northern Region radio announced…that the 
cathedral had been destroyed” (Garrison, 1968a, p. 42). Such deliberate targeting of 
churches and schools led to the closure of all schools in Biafra. The data indicated that in 
addition to a Shell refinery, strategic target, countless air attacks had been made against 
Biafran front positions, and civilian centers totaling more than 50 had been bombed. 
Included in the study data is a listing sent to the UN of some of the Biafran civilian 
centers targeted and bombed by the Nigerian Air Force to support the Biafrans’ claim of 
the war being “a war of genocide,” each building noted as the only one hit in its area, 
including: 
Methodist Hospital at Ituk Mbang, the Mary Slessor Presbyterarian Hospital at 
Itu, the Lutheran Mission Hospital at Eket, the Holy Ghost Teachers’ Training 
College at Umuahia, the Christ the King Elementary School at Aba, the Lutheran 
High School at Uyo, Oruku Methodist Church and the Eja Memorial Hospital at 
Itigidi. (Garrison, 1968a, p. 42) 
Further evidential to these atrocities, in a speech by Liutenant-colonel  
Chukwuemeka O. Ojukwu to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) special 
conference on the nigerian Civil War, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on August, 5, 1968, 
Ojukwu reports that with hostilities against Biafra commenced July 6, 1967 on four  
fronts on its northern frontiers, Nigeria overran these border towns in the frist week of 
fighting after which Nigerian atrocities began in these towns: 
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Arson, looting, rape  and all kinds of torture became the order of the day. Whole 
villages were remorselesssly burnt to ashes, farms and barns completely looted, 
churches aand shrines outrageously desecrated. Defenseless civilians – men, 
women and children, fleeing their homes – gave accounts of their experiences of 
horror and anguish. Mothers told of the wholesale massacre and torture of their 
sons and of the rape and abduction of their young daughters. Children trekked 
miles of bush paths in tears, wailing the death at enemy hands of mother and 
father, sister and brother, aunt and uncle. (Ojukwu as cited in Mwakikagile, 2001, 
p. 175) 
Lastly attesting to the genocidal undertones eminent in this study phase, is an 
editorial by The Times of London entitled “A Policy of Famine” also with one 
subheading “A Deliberate Weapon” in which The Times observed that “All the evidence 
now shows that starvation as an act of war is the effective policy of the Nigerian 
Government” (The Times as cited in Jacobs, 1987, p. 193). The statement is noted to have 
punctured the British Government’s propaganda line which it had been successfully 
propagating for over 12 months. Furthermore, The Times in the said editorial reminded its 
readership of Biafra’s one million and half already dead, recalled the facts of a Red Cross 
relief aircraft that was shot down by the Nigerian foorces, the indiscriminate bombings of 
civilians and hospitals in Biafra, and the successful campign for cutting off night flights 
to Biafrasn airstrip, and finally, concluded: 
When one puts together these piecesof evidenceone can be left in no doubt that 
the Government of Nigeria, whatever intentions it may have had at the beginnig 
of the war, is now prepared to use blockade and starvation, even at the cost of a 
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further million deaths, rather than agree to secession. Leaving aside the massacre 
of the Ibos, this has the effect of a policy of genocide. 
[Arguing that British influence be used] to moderate and mitigate the evils 
of this war [and]…that we should not cut off the arms supply because that might 
destroy our influence…It is the argument that we should retain our influence on 
events which seems now the most discredited of all…Mass starvation unites a 
nation only in death. It is quite simply morally wrong to be the accessory to the 
slaughter of a million people in order to protect oil supplies and anyone who does 
not see that it is wrong is a moral imbecile… 
If one could only see this matter for what it is, the greatest tragedy or 
crime for which Britain has shared responsibility in this century, the worst since 
the Irish famine, we should now devote all our diplomatic power, all the influence 
that remains, all the efforts of the Government to securing effective relief in terms 
of food for Biafra, at all costs and at once. (Jacobs, 1987, pp. 194-195) 
3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious  
 Conflict and Genocidal Proclivity  
 Developed: Phase I - 1966 to 1976 
In this period of the study, Nigeria operated a four regional structure—Northern, 
Western, Eastern, and Mid-Western regions (see Map I in Appendix A)—up to 1976 
when the structure was altered with the creation of seven states, giving a 12-state 
structure (see Map II in Appendix A). Hence, emergent nodes for this phase of the study 
provide contextual themes for the conflict, which include Eastern Region or Biafra; Mid-
Western Region; and Northern Region, in Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Bukuru, Maiduguri, and 
Makurdi (see Tables 1 and 2 for the various contexts, respectively for the northern 
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Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, and for the Biafran war and/or reprisal attacks in the 
south). A number of these contexts are identified in the study as some of the notable 
locations in which the phenomena of targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and 
assaults; as well as, bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism took 
place. The phenomena of blockade, embargo and civil war and its resultant starvation and 
famine occurred in Biafra in its secessionist war of 1967 to 1970, while the war year 
killings of Ibos in re-occupied zones occurred mostly in the then Mid-Western region, 
notably in Benin, Asaba, Warri, Sapele, and the River Niger axis (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 
1967). The air raids and targeted bombings of civilians and civilian centers—hospitals, 
churches, schools, etc.—occurred in various locations in Biafra without protocols 
observed (Garrison, 1968a). 
In addition to the contextual framework of social space in the conflict, this study 
phase also includes emergent nodes and categories showing conflict parties involving, 
Muslim or civilian mobs and Ibos (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Brooke, 1987b; 
Garrison, 1966b, 1966c, 1966d, 1966e, 1966h, 1968a); and the northern-led federal 
government and Ibos (Garrison, 1966b, 1966g, 1967a, 1967b, 1967d). Conflict parties for 
this study phase also include Nigeria and Biafra in the civil war (Friendly, 1967b; 
Garrison, 1966j; “Nigeria: Slow War,” 1967); and different ethnic groups, and/or, 
different ethnic groups and Ibos (Garrison, 1966b). 
By analyzing such conflict-parties-nodes through comparison and contrast with 
the causal conditions and conflict phenomenal nodes and categories, this study phase 
identifies the plausibility of a conceptualized annihilating difference between the 
different perpetrator groups and the Ibos as victims, which gave rise to the various 
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extermination episodes during the period. These episodes as outlined above involve the 
1966 successive massacres or pogrom of Ibos in the north; the war years annihilation of 
Ibos by starvation, primarily Ibo children; the targeting and mass killings of Ibo civilians 
in the re-occupied war zones; and the bombings of Ibo civilian and centers in the war, all 
of which are evidential themes that portend to a proclivity to genocide. 
Using the annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties as described 
above, this study phase identifies emergent nodes and categories for perpetrator-groups 
involving, Muslim mobs, rioters or rampaging Muslim youths; the army/military, 
Hausa/Northern troops or the northern-led federal government; and civilian mobs 
(“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1967b, 1968a). In the 1966 Ibo massacres in the 
north, for instance, emergent themes from the study show the perpetrators of these 
carnages were Muslim mobs in addition to northern or Hausa troops in the army (“Africa: 
Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1966b, 1966c, 1966g, 1967a, 1967b, 1967d, 1968a). It is 
also, however, observed that civilian mobs which might have included Hausa mobs, as 
well as some of the other non-Hausa ethnic groups in the north, participated in the Ibo 
massacres (Garrison, 1966c). Details of the involvement of the perpetrator groups in the 
different conflict settings of this study phase are analyzed and discussed in the Phase I 
synopsis above. 
This phase of the conflict was, therefore, drawn more along ethnic rather than 
religious divide, with Ibos and Biafrans at large in the civil war as the object of 
victimhood or targets. Hence, additional emergent nodes and categories from this phase 
also revealed the victim or target groups which enable the fostering of annihilating 
difference amidst a perpetrator group, and social space environment produces a well-
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rounded and complete contextual setting for genocidal proclivity to flourish. The 
identified victim or target groups in this phase are Ibos, or Ibos as Christians, and Biafran 
civilians, as well as structures such as schools, churches, and other civilian centers also as 
targets. Details of victimhood of the targets in the different conflict settings of this study 
phase are also analyzed and discussed in the Phase I synopsis above. 
4. Intervening Conditions Influencing 
 Proclivity to Genocide: Phase I - 1966 to 1976 
In addition to the context nodes this phase of the study also identified intervening 
conditions in the conflict’s various contextual settings, and these involve general or broad 
conditions with capability to diminutively or incrementally influence the tendency 
towards developing a proclivity to genocide. This study phase reveals intervening 
conditions nodes and categories including government ineptitude, lethargy or weak 
central governance, which indicates the ineffectiveness of the government in mitigating 
the genocidal trend in the conflict. In the 1966 massacres of Ibos in the north, for 
instance, in which the northern led Federal Government forms part of the intervening 
conditions or factors capable of influencing or ameliorating the conflict, the study data 
reveal that there was ineptitude of the government in intervening. As the slaughter of Ibos 
occurred:  
Gowon “deplored” the violence, but extended neither condolence nor 
compensation to the victims. He had little choice but to keep silent; the very 
soldiers who put him in power were the ones with the most Ibo blood on their 
hands and they were in no mood for apologies. (Garrison, 1968a, p. 38)  
Furthermore, in the mass killings of the Ibos in the reoccupied war zones in the Mid-
western state, Friendly observes: 
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General Gowon has not emerged as a charismatic unifying figure…Widely 
admired for his honesty and sincerity, he is nonetheless criticized by diplomats 
and missionaries who receive reports from battle areas for his inability to enforce 
a code of conduct on his soldiers.  
The code was to have protected women, children and civilian men from 
any maltreatment. Its rigid enforcement was supposed to convince Ibos that they 
faced not a tribal pogrom but only a restrained drive to rid them of their dissident 
recessionist leaders. 
The code has all but vanished except from federal propaganda. In clearing 
the Mid-Western state of Biafran forces federal troops were reported to have 
killed, or to have stood by while mobs killed, more than 5,000 Ibos in Benin, 
Warri, Sapele, Agbor and Asaba. The explanation was that it was impossible to 
discriminate between civilians and combatants. (1968, para. 14-17) 
Additionally emergent from this study phase are the intervening conditions nodes 
of press censorship and manipulating or deflating and inflating of casualty figures—
which in this phase of the study involves understating of toll or casualty figures by the 
government to deflect publicity and approbation, whether local or international. For 
instance, the Sabon Gari area of Kano where about 30,000 Ibos had lived was said to 
have become a ghost town, even as other Ibo communities in the northern region became 
engulfed with the slayings in the September 1966 Ibo bloodbath, but the federal 
government conservatively put the region’s official toll of Ibo deaths at 7,000 in this 
killing episode (Garrison, 1966b).  
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Further emergent intervening conditions in this study phase involve collaborators 
or bystanders which involves both local and foreign collaborators leading to the 
internationalization of the conflict. Of the local bystanders, most stood in quiet 
complicity to the Ibo massacres in the north, while the few who attempted to appeal to 
the nation’s conscience were either jailed or ostracised. It is observed, for instance, that: 
Wole Soyinka…wrote with compassion about the traumatic effects of the 
September 1966 slaughter on the Ibos in the North, and argued that only a 
massive outpouring of national remorse could rescue the country from moral and 
political bankruptcy. But for the most part, Yorubas reacted to the Ibo 
bloodletting with ostrichlike withdrawal” (Garrison, 1967, p. 34).  
Furthermore, as the civil war broke out in 1967 with Soyinka’s insuccessful mediating 
with the seceeded Biafrans and appeal for cease-fire, he was arrested and jailed for 22 
months on accusation of conspiracy with Biafrans (Noble, 1989, para. 13). 
On the foreign scene, Britain initially “announced a policy of strict neutrality with 
an embargo of arms to either side” with the United States and France following suit, until 
the Russians waded in to supply Nigeria with MIG’s, torpedo boats, and more than 200 
“technicians” with ulterior motives of “trying to gain a foothold on a continent where past 
power plays had produced an almost unbroken chain of failures” (Garrison, 1968a, p. 40). 
Thus, as its vested traditional interests became threathened by Russia’s intervention, 
Britian quickly scrapped its arms embargo policy and marched fully behind Nigeria. 
British parliamentarian George Thomson was observed to have stated in parliament on 
August 27, 1968 that: 
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Nigeria is getting the bulk of her supplies (of weapons) from elsewhere. If Britain 
stopped supplies, we would lose our capacity to influence the Federal Governmnt. 
Russia would be only too willing to fill the gap and gain the influence we would 
lose. (Legum in Thomson as cited in Nwakikagile, 2001, p. 34) 
Taking its cue from Russia, Egypt also teamed to support Nigeria on which 
Garrison (1968a) observed that “Sentiment was also a factor: the principal leaders in 
Lagos were fellow Muslims, and the Ibos were not only Christian but had openly 
identified their cause with that of Israel’s struggle to create a homeland” (p. 40). Hence, 
internationally, the war had gone beyond being a “civil war,” with the great powers 
moving in, taking sides, contributing arms, funding, and tactical support. The lines were 
drawn along the interests of these collaborators, and as the study data reveal, none of the 
foreign power involvement with either side had been done “out of any sense of altruism” 
(1968a, p. 39). 
Furthermore, there were intervention measures taken or explored towards 
resolving the conflict in this study phase. The study data in this phase reveal, for instance, 
that the internationalization of the Nigeria Biafra War stifled the chances of resolving the 
conflict by dialogue and/or any other form of mediation other than militarily, 
consequently the war became drawn out with a high toll and war casualties of over two 
million Biafrans, especially through starvation and civilian targeted killings (Emerson, 
1970; Garrison, 1967h, 1968a). Foreign involvement tilted the balance both 
diplomatically and militarily against Biafra, with even the prospects for a cease-fire said 
to have been dim. Thus, Ojukwu in an interview on peace prospects indicated that 
“Biafra…would welcome a cease-fire and unconditional talks at any time…[But] The 
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key to peace is not in Lagos but in London. As soon as the British stop supplying Lagos 
with arms, talks will begin” (Garrison, 1968a, p. 51). More so, in a parliamentary 
exchange between the then British Minister of State, Foreign Affairs, Mr. Thomas, and 
that of Labor, Mr. Barnes was questioned on whether the Government was allowing the 
shipments of arms because it hopes to see the war end quickly, or that it might instead 
drag the conflict for a long time, in which case the best line of action would be for Britain 
to regain its neutrality. To which Mr. Thomas’s response was, “We want the war to come 
to an end speedily, and we do not think that stopping these arms would advance the 
cause” (Garrison, 1968a, p. 51). A further analysis of this development and its root causes 
in the study data observe that the conflict:  
…has become deeply internationalized that a peaceful solution depends on what 
Washington, London and Moscow do as on the combatants themselves. What 
went wrong? Why the sudden intervention from abroad? 
The answer has its roots in the basic failure of Western expectations in 
Nigeria. The U.S. and Britain saw in independent Nigeria the makings of the most 
populous, most powerful, most democratic of all African nations. Nigeria, it was 
proclaimed, would become a Western showcase, a communist-free bastion 
thriving on huge injections of Western aid and Western free enterprise. (Garrison, 
1968b, p. 88) 
Hence, it is evident from the findings that it was immaterial to foreign collaborators such 
as Britain whether or not the continued war led to the total annihilation of Ibos or 
Biafrans by bombing of civilians, mop-up operations, starvation, or whatever device 
possible, so long as their facade of Nigeria as a Western showcase was maintained to all. 
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This study phase also reveals that additionally influencing the tendency to 
increase or deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control 
the violence, with their implementation. For instance, in the 1966 mutiny of soldiers 
involved in the Ibo massacres in Kano, although the situation was said to have been 
“beyond police control,” the northern region military governor, Lt-Colonel Katsina, was 
observed to have “travelled to Kano to bravely confront the mutineers” (Siollun, 2009, p. 
135). Thus, intervention efforts in this phase include aid and relief support; post-war re-
unification policy for the Nigeria Biafra War and rehabilitation efforts; reconciliation 
attempts; control measures taken such as curfews and road checks by security agents, 
investigations and commissions of inquiries set up; mopping-up of rioters or arrests 
made; warnings or calls for action, restraint, justice, or self-defense; and attempts to 
dialogue, appeals for intervention or mediation. 
5. Strategies Foreshadowing  
 Proclivity to Genocide:  
 Phase I – 1966 to 1976 
This phase also reveals strategies which foreshadow the tendency towards 
genocide in the conflict within the contextual settings and above intervening conditions 
with the resultant phenomena as described above. The strategies in this study phase 
include organization, planning, and weaponry which are very essential for achieving an 
effective, coordinated outcome. For instance, on the northern Nigeria September 1966 
Ibo massacres the study data note “As if by signal – most foreign observers here are 
convinced that the pogrom was planned – the slayings spread to other Ibo communities in 
Nigeria’s vast Northern region” (Garrison, 1966b, para. 7). 
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Strategies in this phase also include nodes for weapons of attack or warfare for 
exterminations, as in the September 1966 Ibo massacres in which it is observed that “By 
dawn, Northern soldiers with automatic weapons, and civilians with machetes had swept 
the city, burning, looting and killing” (Garrison, 1966b, para. 6). Strategies also include 
extermination plot involving mass murders, as in the above referenced massacres of Ibos 
in the north and the various slaughters of Ibo civilians in the war years, re-occupied Mid-
Western region by Nigerian troops, and further include blockade and starvation strategy 
as was deployed in the Biafra war (Garrison, 1968b; Emerson, 1970), as well as the 
strategy of ideo-ethnic cleansing (or ideological and ethnic cleansing), for example 
burning or destroying of churches (Garrison, 1966b) or the killing of Ibos as Christians 
on the basis of their ethnicity as Ibos (“Africa: Arms,” 1967; “Africa: Race Hatred,” 
1967; Garrison, 1966g, 1968a). Also deployed as strategy in this phase is forced 
migration of the refugees and displaced Ibos living in northern Nigeria to the sanctuary of 
their home state in Eastern Nigeria or Biafra. The strategies also include coordinated 
attacks involving shootings, bombings, maiming, and arson, as well as looting of Ibo 
owned shops and businesses (Garrison, 1966b, 1966c, 1966k, 1966m). 
6. Consequences or Effects of 
 Proclivity to Genocide:  
 Phase I - 1966 to 1976 
The strategies adopted by the different perpetrators have varying effects or 
consequences in this study phase. Consequences identified in this phase include death toll 
and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned corpses, as in the several various massacres of 
Ibos discussed above; refugees and displaced Ibos from the north or Ibos fleeing to the 
safety of their home state (Garrison, 1966b, 1966); starvation as has been extensively 
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discussed above (Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1968b); secession and civil war as the 
resultant effect of the northern pogroms on Ibos and the refugee crisis (Garrison 1967b, 
1968a); and churches burned, bombed or destroyed (Garrison, 1966b). Other 
consequences identified in this study phase include Christian/Ibo businesses, homes, 
hotels, and properties destroyed (Garrison, 1966k; “Nigeria: Slow War,” 1967); 
destroying, as well as  looting and razing of properties (Garrison, 1966b, 1966c); and 
denial of freedom of worship and desecration of Christian religion, as in Ojukwu’s war 
call that Biafrans “be prepared to die that our children may live,” even as he “warned that 
a federal victory “would mean continued genocide for our people, bestiality, 
disease…anarchy, ignorance, poverty and desecration of our religion” (Friendly, 1967a, 
para. 3, 8). 
Further consequences in this phase are security threat, apprehension, anxiety or 
political and social chaos (Garrison, 1966e, 1966l, 1967a); and the consequences 
category also reveals normalcy or calm returning after episodes of gruesome 
exterminations, showing an intermittency of occurrence in the killings. For instance, after 
the May/July 1966 episodes of Ibo massacres in the north, and before the even more 
heinous fratricide of the Ibos in the September/October 1966 eruptions, it was observed 
that “An atmosphere of peace has finally returned to this vast Northern Region in the 
wake of the week-long rioting that took at least several hundred lives last month,” with 
the observation also that “Most of the dead were southern Ibos, the victims of political 
passions with deep roots in Nigeria’s past” (Garrison, 1966k, para. 1-2). 
End of Model Application for Phase I 
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Study Phase II – 1976 to 1987: Synopsis. The second study phase examines the 
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict from 1976 to 1987. This phase saw Nigeria’s 
creation of seven new states in 1976, which increased the number of states for the country 
to 19 in total (see Map III in Appendix A), as well as the creation of two additional states 
in 1987 bringing the total number of states to 21 (see Map IV in Appendix A). Politically, 
this phase saw a succession of coups and regimes transiting from military to civil rule and 
vice versa beginning with Lieutenant-General Murtala Mohammed who became Head of 
State following a bloodless coup that overthrew General Yakubu Gowon in January 
1975. Following his assassination in an unsuccessful coup in February 1976, Lieutenant-
General Olusegun Obasanjo, then his deputy, became the next Head of State. 
Additionally, in this study phase, Nigeria transited from military to civil rule in 
October 1979 with Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) elected into office as the President in the 
Second Republic (1979-1983). Ousted in his second term in office in a palace coup in 
December 1983, General Muhammadu Buhari (1983-1985) became Head of State and 
Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria SMC which ended the Second 
Republic. In yet another palace coup that overthrew Buhari in August 1985, General 
Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1992) came to power as Head of State and President of the 
Armed Forces Ruling Council of Nigeria (AFRC). The second phase of the study situates 
in the atmosphere of these successive regimes and structural changes in the country. 
In the years following the war, the Ibos who returned to the North had been 
changed by the 1966 riots and the debilitating effects of having fought and lost the civil 
war, in which processes ethnicity had functioned “as a carefully directed social and 
political toxin” (Anthony, 2002, p. 235). The promotion of the Northernization policies of 
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the pre-war era had aimed at limiting southerners’ ability at gaining political and 
economic footholds in the north. Threatened with Ironsi’s administrative unification 
policy, however, the regions political elites and power brokers’ intent on retaining control 
over the region was made resoundingly clear by the anti-riots, which they succeeded in, 
with the toppling of Ironsi’ government after which “the violent expulsion of Igbos from 
the North completed Northerners’ assertion of control” (Anthony, 2002, p. 235). 
Additionally, there was also an economic take-over and change of hands other than the 
political control as “Igbo property and their niches in local economies found their way 
into the hands of other Nigerians, often those of local elites” (Anthony, 2002, p. 235). 
Furthermore, the creation of states enabled the preferential engagement or promotion of 
each state’s own citizens as a result of which the hitherto perceived threat that 
southerners or Ibos had posed in 1966 became less threatening. More so, Ibos no longer 
occupied many top positions in the federal government administration then under the 
headship of Gowon from the Middle Belt, nor were they notable any longer in the 
parastatals, civil service, or private sector. Essentially, as Anthony (2002) observes, “The 
monolithic Igbo monster that Northern leaders of the 1950s and 1960s had painted as so 
fierce had, for all practical purposes, lost its teeth” (p. 235). 
Since the 1970s, pressure had been mounting up, primarily, over the issue of 
religion’s role in politics. With the structural changes brought about by the creation of 
states in Nigeria amidst the ensuing regime changes, there was a shift in focus from the 
hitherto mainly ethnic-fault divide to an intensification a religious-fault divide. To that 
end religious tensions have escalated in northern Nigeria since the civil war, and have 
remained high with religious issues and constituencies proving more robust than ethnic 
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constituencies in the inherent political fragmentation of smaller states, and its divisions 
also proving “resistant to the inhabiting effects of military rule” (Anthony, 2002, p. 234). 
This second phase of the study, therefore, sees the country witnessing “another episode in 
northern Nigeria's long annals of religious unrest,” with violence said to have “sputtered 
in the region” with the withdrawal of the military from political life in 1979 (Cowell, 
1982, para. 2). Undergirding the phenomena is the crisis posed by the pervasiveness of 
religion in politics, as a result of which it is observed that “Beginning with the Shagari 
administration, religious violence became one of the [nation’s] most serious crises of the 
1980s and beyond” (Falola, 1999, p. 168). 
One such prevalence of religious skirmishes and tensions in the north was the 
May 1980 crisis in Zaria, involving extensive destruction of mainly Christian property by 
some Muslims. Soon following this disturbance was a large-scale insurgency which 
broke out in Kano in 1980, and spreading in the years up to 1985, engulfed a number of 
major cities in the north. These insurgencies, referred to as “the Maitatsine riots” claimed 
the lives of thousands, as well as caused extensive property damage (Falola, 2002, p. 168) 
involving a fundamentalist Islamic sect led by one Mohammad Marwa of Cameroonian 
descent, said to have previously been expelled from the area due to disruptive activities 
(Jaynes, 1981). Observed as “combining Islam with sorcery” (Falola, 2002, p. 168) (see 
also Falola, 1998), Marwa had by 1980 established a following of about 3,000 to 5,000 in 
Kano, mostly unemployed youths (Cowell, 1982; Jaynes, 1981, para. 11), “willing to die 
for their belief,” some of them migrants from neighboring villages, the urban poor, and a 
number of them foreigners from Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (Falola, 2002, p. 168). 
Marwa denounced materialism and proffered a compelling substitute to the secular 
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government’s modernizing scheme, with his notion of a leader involving, being spiritual, 
unmaterialistic, and anti-West (Falola, 2002). This December 1980 violence in Kano, 
involved the loss of 4,177 lives, and stands out as the first religious upheaval with huge 
death toll and property damage (Akaeze, 2009, para. 4). 
Charging foreign scheming to have allegedly aimed to derail its programs by 
instigating the riots, the federal government’s set-up investigation tribunal on the 
violence, however, found “no credible evidence to support the accusation of foreign 
instigation…Rather, religious violence was a response to internal economic and political 
decay” (Falola, 2002, p. 168). Marwa was observed to have constantly confronted the 
police from 1972 until 1982 when he died, as a result of his followers’ activities-incited 
his preaching. The sect envisioned their riots to be a jihad and their struggles end-
product, and they were trained and prepared psychologically for war, and had also 
acquired varied weaponry. The Maitatsine riots targeted security agents and the wider 
populace, and aiming to checkmate the insurgencies, the government started encroaching 
on religious matters which involved issuing regulations to control preachers. The 
government’s antagonism only further emboldened and strengthened their resolve to 
violence. Hostile to non-members, they targeted both mainstream Muslims and non-
Muslims alike; they were known to harass, kidnap, rape, and kill innocent people (Falola, 
1998). Thus, as Marwa, however, also espoused Islamic beliefs that were said to be 
deviant from traditional Islam (Jaynes, 1981), the Maitatsine movement triggered off 
violent conflicts with Islamic undertones, as his versions of religious dogmas were 
viewed heretically by mainstream Muslims. Hence, the period witnessed inter-religious 
clashes with other Muslim groups as a result of the sect’s “splintered brand of Islam, 
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which claims some 40 million adherents” (Colwell, 1982, para. 5). Additionally, others 
replicated Marwa’s example, though with different orientations and motivations, as the 
worsening economic conditions drive more people into fundamentalist Islamic 
organizations (Falola, 2002). 
Sequel to the heightened religious fervency among other Muslim groups, 
triggered by the Maitatsine uprisings, young fundamentalists in the Kano metropolis 
attacked churches and alcohol serving hotels, sacking or closing them down with death 
toll (presumably, of Christians) also recorded (Cowell, 1982, para. 9). Hence, other than 
the Maitasine uprisings which movement was basically intra-religious with its lethal 
uprisings in the region’s Muslim cities against security agents and the populace at large, 
there were also significant inter-group and intra-group tensions between the Tijanniyya 
and Quadriyya who were the major brotherhoods, as well as tensions between them, and 
within the Muslim Brothers (Shiites) and the Izala who were the more radical or 
puritanical movements (Osaghae, Suberu, & University of Oxford, 2005, p. 20). 
In addition to intra-religious tensions dotting the period, inter-religiously, 
relationships involving Muslim and Christian organizations moved into an era of 
pronounced tension. In October 1982, eight prominent churches were set on fire by 
Muslim rioters in Kano which marked, as Falola (2002) observes, “the beginning of what 
would become a complicated national problem” (p. 169). The investigating tribunal 
ordered by the government as further observed attributed the causation to Christians’ 
growing influence in an Islamic city, in addition to the influence of Iran originated radical 
literature with recommendation made, thus, “that caution must be exercised in locating 
churches among the Muslims” (Falola, 2002, p. 169). This development gave Christians 
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the opportunity to bring to the fore, a multiplicity of “complaints of discrimination in 
jobs, land allocation, and access to radio broadcasting, and the takeover of their schools” 
(Falola, 2002, p. 169). Thus commenced the on-going bitter and drawn out confrontation 
between Muslims and Christians which has precipitated a fear of the country being 
engulfed in religious wars (Falola, 2002). 
Then, also exacerbating religious tension in the period was the issue of the 
Babangida administration’s registering of Nigeria in 1985 into membership of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), a body which unites Islamic nations on 
economic and political concerns with funding committal from each member and member 
borrowing privileges from the organization. Babangida is observed to have pushed the 
country clandestinely into the OIC, where “previous Nigerian leaders had rejected such a 
move” (Falola, 1999, pp. 187-188). A prolonged period of tension ensued as a result, as 
the move was construed by Christians as a move towards turning the country to become 
an Islamic state. The period, therefore, also witnessed major clashes between Muslims 
and Christians which occurred primarily in the northern cities of Kano, Bauchi, Zango-
Kataf, and Kaduna, all of which recorded extensive damages of worship centers and high 
death toll (Brooke, 1987b; Falola, 1999, p. 188). 
Additionally, there have also been fights in the country’s Constituent Assembly 
by Northern delegates over Sharia’s inclusion in the judicial system. The National Party 
of Nigeria (NPN) is observed to have manipulated religion as a strategy in its 
electioneering campaigns, vigorously seeking the support of emirs and religious leaders, 
while also using political songs and religious verses (Falola, 2002). And, further 
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evidencing the nation’s religious divide, as well as this politicization of religion, Osaghae 
observes that: 
Although religious conflicts have roots going back to the foundation of the 
Nigerian state under colonial rule, and the pragmatic involvement of the state in 
religious activities, religion became an explosive political issue from the time the 
Sharia issue divided the Constituent Assembly in 1977/8. The Maitatsine riots and 
other Muslim uprisings of the 1980s, and allegations of Muslim fundamentalist 
uprisings of the 1980s, and allegations of Muslim dominance in the Buhari regime 
were evidence of growing religious tension and politicization. (1998b, p. 249) 
Furthermore, in March 1986 Muslims and Christians are recognized to have 
engaged in a superiority contest that was sparked off in Ilorin by an Easter procession. 
This was followed in March 1987 by confrontation between the two groups in 
Kafanchan, a town in Southern Kaduna in which native Kajes and Christians were 
accused of having destroyed some mosques, and that led to lives being lost and properties 
destroyed. In a supposed reprisal attack on the same day, Muslims chanted war songs as 
they marched the streets in Kaduna, Gusau, Katsina, Zaria, and Funtua razing churches 
and Christian properties, once again recording extensive death toll in the  disturbance 
(Akaeze, 2009, para. 12-13). On the magnitude of this crisis that engulfed parts of the 
north, Falola observes:  
Very rapidly, the violence spread to other places, where it acquired all the 
characteristics of the Kafanchan outbreak. But whereas Christians had been strong 
in Kafanchan, they were to be bested in other places. Many Muslims, mostly 
youth, organized in small groups to attack Christians in Kaduna, Zaria, Samaru, 
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Wusasa, Kankia, Malumfashi, Katsina, and Funtua, all in Kaduna state. Their 
targets included churches and residential houses, Christian-owned business and 
property, and people. By the time the violence abated, 113 churches had been 
burned to the ground.  
The crisis ended in heavy losses to the Christians. Across the region, 152 
churches (as compared to five mosques) were burned, most notably in Kafanchan, 
Zaria, Kaduna, Wusasa, Funtua, and Kaduna. Christians suffered the most 
damage in Zaria, where the Muslims overpowered and devastated them. (1998, 
pp. 183, 185) 
Applying the Genocide Proclivity Model: Phase II – 1976 to 1987. The coding 
list for the emergent nodes or codes for the study Phase II are provided in Appendix C: 
Coding List B. The application of the emergent nodes from study Phase II to the 
Genocidal Proclivity Model on page 199 follows. 
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena  
 Relating to Genocidal Proclivity: 
 Phase II - 1976 to 1987 
 
This second phase of the study shows causal conditions which lead ultimately to 
genocidal proclivity under the four causation factors outlined above as: immediate or 
trigger factors; underlying or root causes; perceived threat of the “otherness,” and 
exclusive ideological framing.  
The study data for this phase reveal immediate or trigger factors including arrests 
or persecution of sect members, religious extremism and violence or other 
fundamentalists activities. For instance, the study data reveal subsequent Matatsine 
conflicts as trailing from the sect’s 1980 clash in Kano with the military in which 
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Muhammad Marwa (the sect’s leader) and 400 died (Cowell, 1982, para. 10). Other 
trigger factors include insurgency, uprising, or anti-Government riots, as in the Maitatsine 
riots or insurgencies; Islam degraded, desecration or misinterpretation of Koran which 
involved the Muslim mob attacks of Christians in Kafanchan in March 1987 in which 11 
people were killed and 14 churches burned as a result of uncomplimentary remarks made 
by a Christian preacher on the Koran (Brooke, 1987a, para. 1-2). Also under trigger 
factors for this phase was reprisal mission or revenge as in the March 1987 attack on 
Christians in Zaria which was said to have been in retaliation to the Kafanchan clash 
between the two groups, the aftermath of which eight Koran teachers were killed by 
Christian mobs (Brooke, 1987b). Additionally, earlier confrontations of the Maitatsine 
cult with security agents leading to Marwa’s son had triggered retaliatory clashes in 
which about 50 policemen were killed by the sect in December 1980. Also said to have 
triggered the clashes was a deadline given by the authorities for the group to leave Kano 
(Jaynes, 1981). The group targeted the local authorities, and government forces deployed 
to quell the uprising, ended with the annihilation of the sect, with Marwa and most of his 
followers killed on December, 1980 (Jaynes, 1981). 
Additionally under this study phase are underlying or root causes which include 
historical factors; culture of bad governance and corruption or oppressive military rule; 
and Al Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian links including illegal aliens, as in 
the December 1980 Maitatsine riots in Kano, said to have been Libyan-backed (Jaynes, 
1981). Further underlying causation in this study phase are nodes for political 
underpinnings or power struggle, including factors of political elites or Kaduna Mafia, 
which Cowell (1982) observes as “a larding of politics that cannot be ignored” with 
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allegations of fanning the flames of violence being made by rival political parties (para. 
12). This study phase also includes socio-economic factors involving poverty, 
unemployment, lack of education, and discontent. The study data reveal, for instance, that 
“severe unemployment and a general economic depression were blamed for the condition 
of hordes of listless youths receptive to any call to violence” (Kotch, 1987, para. 8). 
Marwa was said to have established in 1980 a following of about 3,000 to 5,000 group 
members in Kano (Jaynes, 1981, para. 7) which were drawn mainly from unemployed 
youths (Cowell, 1982). 
Furthermore, the Maitatsine exclusive ideological framing had his followers 
holding him as the true prophet and not Mohammed, while the orthodox Muslims view 
the sect’s interpretation of the Koran as heretical (Cowell, 1982, para. 10). Such 
perception of differences in, for instance, the Maitatsine sect’s exclusive ideological 
framing vis-à-vis those of the orthodox Muslim groups creates divisions which fan and 
ignite the embers of intra-religious conflict among the groups involved. The study data 
further observe that: 
The strands of Islam in northern Nigeria are diffuse, fractured among contentious 
sects and social groups that do not have the cohesion of the Shiites of pre-
revolutionary Iran, or a recognized leader with the authority of Ayatollah 
Khomeini. But the ferment is there. There are three major sects and within 
them…are divisions between the traditionalists and those young fundamentalists 
who assert that their forefathers have corrupted the faith and diluted its values. 
(Cowell, 1982, para. 11) 
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More so, as the study data also reveal, Marwa whose ideology denounced materialism 
was said to have also espoused Islamic beliefs that were deviant from traditional Islam 
(Jaynes, 1981). 
Additionally this study phase shows perceived threat of the “otherness” as a third 
set of causal conditions, and these include ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions 
and animosities. The study data point to rivalries among the country multi-ethnic groups 
as often paralleling religious rivalries, with the conflict in the north in March  1987 
involving “largely Hausa and Fulani northern Moslems who attacked Yoruba and Ibo 
southern Christians” (Brooke, 1987b, para. 10). Also under the perceived threat of the 
“otherness,” the data further reveal the theme of annihilation attempts by targeting or 
forceful conversion of Christians to Islam. For instance, following a March 1987 Muslim 
and Christian clash in Kafanchan, Muslim mobs went to town in Zaria “chanting ‘Islam 
Only!’ and ‘Allah is Great!’” and dousing “all of the city’s 75 or so churches” with 
gasoline and burning them down, while also threatening a Christian community “Either 
Wusasa will accept Islam or it will be burned to ashes,” and they razed the family stead 
of Yakubu Gowon and St. Bartholomew church said to be northern Nigeria’s oldest 
church (Brooke, 1987b, para. 8, 10-11). 
Also in this study phase is the fourth set of causal conditions of exclusive 
ideological framing including religious dimensions, anti-Western or ideological 
differences. On the Maitatsine riots, for instance, the study data reveal that the cult, 
enthused by their ideology of infallibility to guns, staked out against the police for four 
days until their resistance was broken with a barrage of mortar by security agents. It is 
further observed that: 
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Many ordinary people, regarded by the cult as heretics and infidels, were cut 
down and mutilated even as the police moved in. Some witnesses, from the 
humble suburb of Bulumkutu where the killings took place, say, too, that the cult 
members drank the blood of their fallen to renew their strength and covered 
themselves with magical powders to deflect the police bullets. (Cowell, 1982, 
para. 7) 
Other exclusive ideological framing in this study phase include fundamentalism 
and religious fervency (Cowell, 1982; Dash, 1984; Jaynes, 1981; Kotch, 1987); and 
Sharia or Islamic law institution in northern Nigeria, involving the theme of imposing 
Sharia across Nigeria or establishing of Islamic state (Brooke, 1987b). In the 1987 
Kaduna state crisis where a gruesome pogrom was meted on Christians in several cities, 
with about 75 churches in Zaria burned down, even as “mobs also burned Christian-
owned businesses, the homes of Christians and hotels serving beer,” it is observed that 
“Moslems want to extend the Islamic legal code of Shariah from the north to the entire 
nation. [And that] Christians were outraged…when Nigeria joined the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference” (Jaynes, 1987, para. 11, 13). As already noted, ideological 
framing underlie much of the excessive blood-letting which continues to occur in 
northern Nigeria, especially with the introduction of Sharia in some northern states. 
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors 
 Underlying Causation, Perceived Threat of the 
 “Otherness” and Exclusive Ideological Framing: 
 Phase II - 1976 to 1987 
 
This phase of the study also shows that the causal conditions—the trigger factor, 
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing 
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in the different conflict situations and contextual settings—resulted in differing degrees 
and forms of exterminations and killings between different Muslim groups, between 
Muslims and Christians, and between different ethnic groups with conflict drawn inter-
relatively along ethnic as well as religious lines. This study phase phenomena as 
identified in the study data reveal core categories of attacks and violence which are 
unleashed to target victims with themes including assault, shoot-out, killings, arson and 
looting (“300 Believed Killed,” 1982; Jaynes, 1981); bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, 
mayhem, massacres or barbarism (Brooke, 1987b); religious and ethnic violence (“1,000 
Are Reported Dead,” 1984; “300 Believed Killed,” 1982; Brooke, 1987b; Jaynes, 1981);  
sectarian violence; and spiral or escalation of violence (“100 Nigeria Policemen,” 1982; 
Brooke, 1987b; Cowell, 1982;). 
Phenomenal nodes for this phase also include targeted, pre-meditated or 
orchestrated killings and assaults (Brooke, 1987b; Kotch, 1987). For instance, in the 
March 1987 crisis in which “Moslem rioters burned a 2,000-seat ecumenical Christian 
chapel at Ahmadu Bello University” (ABU), Zaria, the ABU faculty association 
chairman expressed the association’s “horror and disgust” at “the obviously premeditated 
and coordinated acts of arson and assault” (Brooke, 1987b, para. 21-22). Other 
phenomenal nodes are tit-for-tat killings in northern states; uprising, anti-government 
rioting, protests or demonstrations (Brooke, 1987b; “Hundreds Die in Religious Riots,” 
1984; Kotch, 1987); and violent or deadly clashes, rioting or gun battles (“1,000 Are 
Reported Dead,” 1984; “718 Deaths,” 1984; Brooke, 1987b; Cowell, 1982; Dash, 1984; 
Jaynes, 1981). By comparing and contrasting such phenomenal nodes and categories, the 
two major categories of targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and assaults; and 
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bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism are recognized to be 
closely associated with the proclivity to genocide.  
3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious 
 Conflict and Genocidal Proclivity  
 Developed: Phase II - 1976 to 1987 
 
This study phase also shows contextual themes involving the social space or 
lebensraum, the framework on which genocide or its proclivity can develop (Wood, 
2001).  The contextual settings identified in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict 
in the study data in this second phase of the research include Northern region or states, 
Adamawa state, in Yola, and Jimeta; Borno state, in Maiduguri; Gombe state; Kaduna 
state, in Kaduna, Kafanchan, and Zaria; and Kano state, in Kano (see Tables 1 and 2 for 
the various contexts, respectively for the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, and 
for the reprisal attacks in the south). 
Also providing the contextual framework are the different conflict parties in 
varying phenomenal settings in this study phase including Muslim mobs or sect and 
security forces (“100 Nigeria Policemen,” 1982; Cowell, 1982; Dash, 1984; Jaynes, 
1981); Muslim mobs, sect or groups and Christians (“1,000 Are Reported Dead,” 1984; 
“300 Believed Killed,” 1982; Brooke, 1987a; 1987b; Dash, 1984; “Hundreds Die in 
Religious Riots,” 1984; “Nigerian Toll,” 1982); Muslim sect and other Muslims or sect 
(“718 Deaths,” 1984; Dash, 1984; “Hundreds Die in Religious Riots,” 1984); Muslim 
sect or civilian mobs or gangs and Ibos; or conflict involving different ethnic groups, for 
instance, in the March 1987 attack in which Muslim mobs mainly Hausa and Fulani were 
attacking southerners involving Yoruba and Ibo Christians (Brooke, 1987b, para. 10). 
The conflict parties’ nodes were analyzed by comparison and contrast with the 
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phenomenal conflict nodes and categories, and their causal conditions to identify 
conflicts with the plausibility of a conceptualized annihilating difference (Hinton, 2002) 
which give rise to exterminations involving perpetrator and victim situations. Other 
conflicts devoid of such annihilating difference are considered as clashes or fighting 
between parties without an overt inclination to genocide. 
Additionally, varying perpetrator-groups identified in this study phase using the 
annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties described above include the 
Matatsine fundamentalist group involving, for instance, as Dash observes: 
Battles between members of a Moslem sect and policemen, soldiers and civilian 
vigilantes in northern Nigeria appear to have left as many as 1,000 people dead 
and laid waste wide swaths of a state capital… 
It was the third such uprising in northern Nigeria in a little more than three 
years. Authorities Sunday removed at least 500 bodies from the streets of the 
Gongola state capital of Yola following shootouts between members of the sect 
and vigilantes opposing them…The troops were sent to Yola…to restore order 
after the local police force was overwhelmed by the religious zealots. 
The rioters are members of the Maitatsine sect, an offshoot of Islam, who 
physically attack other Muslims whom they consider infidels. (1984, para. 1-3) 
Perpetrators in this phase of the study also include Muslim mobs, rioters or 
rampaging Muslim youths as revealed in the study data. For instance, a March 1987 clash 
between Muslims and Christians in Kafanchan which ensued from an allegation of 
misinterpretation of the Koran by a Christian pastor in an evangelist revival meeting, as 
the conflict escalated and spread to Kaduna, Zaria and some other northern cities, it was 
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observed that Muslim mobs wreaked a “horrible pogrom” in such cities against Christians 
(Jatau as cited in Brooke, 1987, para. 7). Further remarking on the extent of carnage 
perpetrated in this episode, it was noted that “Twenty years after a bloody civil war was 
fought to preserve Nigeria unity, dozens or perhaps hundreds of churches were destroyed 
in what the Government said were orchestrated attacks by Muslim mobs on the Christian 
Minority” (Kotch, 1987, para, 2). 
However, this study phase also identifies perpetrator nodes for Christian militia or 
youths, involving the same March 1987 Muslim/Christian clash, on which it is observed 
that 
Within hours, slaps escalated to stone-throwing, beatings and the destruction of 
three mosques. [And] Two days later, on March 8, a Christian mob laid siege to a 
hostel for itinerant teachers of the Koran here. When the fires died down, eight 
teachers lay dead, seven with their throats cut and one killed by an arrow. 
(Brooke, 1987b, para. 5) 
 Details of the involvement of the perpetrator groups in the different conflict settings of 
this study phase are analyzed and discussed in Phase II synopsis above. 
This study phase also reveals target victims which enable the development of 
annihilating difference amidst a perpetrator group and social space environment to 
produce a complete and well-rounded contextual setting for proclivity to genocide. 
Identified target or victim groups for this phase of the study include Christians and 
churches, also involving Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian villages; civilian 
targets; Southerners who are predominantly Christians, and especially Ibos as targets; 
security agents - police officers, military and government officials; symbols of 
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government authority; media offices and journalists; beer parlors, hotels, banks and other 
facilities which represent structures or institutions with Western connotations; Muslim 
clerics or mainstream/orthodox Muslims; and Muslims, Hausa-Fulani herders, Muslim 
sect, Northerners or mosques. Details of the victimhood of the targets in the different 
conflict settings of this study phase are also analyzed and discussed in Phase II synopsis 
above. 
4. Intervening Conditions Influencing 
 Proclivity to Genocide: 
 Phase II – 1976 to 1987 
 
This phase of the study further identified intervening conditions in the differing 
contextual settings of the conflict, in addition to the context node involving such general 
or broad conditions which influence by increasing or diminishing the tendency or 
proclivity to genocide. Intervening conditions in this study phase include press censorship 
and manipulation or deflation and inflation of casualty figures—this casualty information 
manipulation factor was used by government parties on occasions to minimize but also 
sometimes scale-up reprisals or tit-for-tat violence, as in the October 1982 Matasine riots 
in Maiduguri in which unofficial estimate of toll is 450, with local estimate put at over 
1,000, while the government official figures were, however, put the toll of civilians and 
sect members that died at 133 with 16 police officers, while local estimates indicate that 
100 officers were killed (Cowell, 1982, para 6). Other intervening conditions include 
extrajudicial killings and army involvement in policing. 
The study data reveal, for instance, that in the December 1980 Maitatsine 
disturbances, following the sect’s attack on the Governor’s residence, the army deployed 
to contain the group shelled their base, resulting in a massive slaughter. According to the 
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study data “They were killing them like goats, like donkeys even. It was unfortunate 
really, but they were given a warning” (Jaynes, 1981, para. 17). It is, thus, noted that the 
death toll officially put at 1,000, was said to be at least 10,000, with some witnesses 
giving a figure of about 7,000 bodies “piled on garbage trucks and buried in mass graves” 
(Jaynes, 1981, para. 18). It was also observed that in the days following, prisoners were 
executed summarily, with civilians totaling about 80 including children gunned down 
(Jaynes, 1981). 
Additional intervening conditions in this study phase include government 
ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government, regarding which the study data observed 
on the Maitatsine killings, for instance, that “The army…might have quelled the 
disturbances more rapidly before the cult members began their massacre of civilians. 
But…calling on the army could have meant a tacit concession of civilian inability to keep 
Nigeria's house in order” (Cowell, 1982, para. 18). Intervening conditions in this study 
phase also include the presence of collaborators or bystanders involving local 
collaborators, as in the study data on the Maitatsine riots which reveal General Ibrahim 
Babangida, military president at the time, as stating “We cannot stand by and allow a 
group of ambitious and mindless power- seekers to push us into yet another civil war,” 
with summary justice to be meted to the instigators of the riots (Kotch, 1987, para 3-4). 
Gen. Babangida is said to be alluding to such fomenters of the riots as “‘group interest’ 
and powerful subversives,” noted in the data as “Kaduna Mafia,”  or northern political 
elites “whose influence has waned since Gen. Babangida seized power in 1985” (Kotch, 
1987, para. 11-13). There is also an indication of foreign collaborators leading to the 
internationalization of the conflict, and local collaborators or bystanders. For instance, it 
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is observed in the study data on the Maitasine sect that “Despite the absence of proof, 
Western diplomats in Lagos tend to believe that Libya had a hand in the troubles here, if 
only in providing financial assistance to the cult” (Jaynes, 1981, para. 12). 
This study phase also reveals that further influencing the tendency to increase or 
deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control the violence, 
with their implementation. Intervention efforts in this study phase include attempts at 
dialogue, appeals for intervention or mediation; control measures taken such as curfews 
and road checks by security agents, investigations and commissions of inquiries set up; 
and mopping-up of rioters or arrests made. 
5. Strategies Foreshadowing  
 Proclivity to Genocide: 
 Phase II – 1976 to 1987 
 
This study phase further reveals different strategies foreshadowing genocidal 
tendencies within the contextual settings and intervening conditions which generated the 
above described resultant phenomena. Such strategies include organization, planning, and 
weaponry; and extermination plot involving mass murders or ideological and ethnic 
cleansing, for instance, by burning of churches, or the forceful conversion of Christians to 
Islam. For instance, in the aftermath of the Kafanchan Muslims and Christians clash in 
March 1987 which was sparked off by a lady’s public slapping of a Christian pastor for 
allegedly misinterpreting the Koran during a crusade, Muslim mobs invaded “all 75 or so 
churches” in Zaria, doused them with gasoline, and burned them, reciting “Islam Only!” 
and “Allah is Great!” while also, threatening to burn down a Christian community, 
Wusasa, if it does not accept Islam (Brooke, 1987b, para. 8, 10). Furthermore, the 
strategies emergent in this phase include indoctrination and manipulation or instigation, 
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as in General Babangida’s alluding to “powerful subversives” that were recognized as 
“the sinister men who instigated the riots in Kaduna state” in March 1987, by sponsoring 
“the rabble of young and uneducated Moslems” who attacked Christians and their 
property (Kotch, 1987, para. 4-5, 11). 
6. Consequences or Effects of 
 Proclivity to Genocide: 
 Phase II – 1976 to 1987 
 
The strategies adopted by perpetrators in this study phase have various effects or 
consequences in the different conflict settings examined. Consequences identified in this 
phase include death toll and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned corpses, for instance, 
the study data reveal that the Kano Maitatsine riots of 1980 had a death toll of over 1,000 
people (Jaynes, 1981, para. 1, 20), and 452 toll in the Maitatsine October 1982 riots in 
Maiduguri, with another 18 toll in Kaduna where the sect moved to as security agents 
attempted to arrest the sect members (“Nigerian Toll,” 1982). It is further observed that 
this Maiduguri uprising had about 100 police officers killed in four days fighting with the 
sect (“100 Nigerian Policemen,” 1982, para. 1), with another 1,000 toll reported in Yola 
in March 1984 also involving the Maitatsine riots (“1,000 Are Reported Dead,” 1984, 
para. 1). Other consequences include refugees and displaced persons, and/or persons 
fleeing homes or taking refuge or shelter for safety (Brooke, 1987b); mass graves or mass 
burials (“1,000 are Reported Dead,” 1984; Jaynes, 1981); churches burned, bombed or 
destroyed (Brooke, 1987a, 1987b; Cowell, 1982; Kotch, 1987); mosques burned or 
destroyed in retaliation by Christians (Brooke, 1987b); police stations and barracks, 
government buildings bombed or burned (Brooke, 1987a); Christian businesses, homes, 
hotels and properties destroyed (Brooke, 1987a, 1987b; Cowell, 1982; Kotch, 1987); and 
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destroying, looting and razing of properties (Brooke, 1987b; “Death Toll Put at 300,” 
1984; “Hundreds Die in Religious Riots,” 1984). 
Consequences also include denial of freedom of worship and desecration of 
Christian religion as in the threat by Muslim mobs to the Wusasa Christians to accept 
Islam or have their community burned down (Brooke 1987b). Further consequences 
nodes are security threat, apprehension, anxiety or political and social chaos (Brooke, 
1987b; Dash, 1984; Jaynes, 1981; Kotch, 1987); and the consequences category also 
reveals normalcy or calm returning after episodes of gruesome killings, evidencing the 
intermittency of the killing episodes as in the March 1984 Maitatsine riots in which it is 
reported “that ‘normalcy’ had returned to the city” of Yola following a week’s fighting 
between the sect and security agents, which left about 1,000 dead, and “Hundreds of 
people had fled their homes, many of which were burning, and the streets of Yola were 
littered with bodies” (“Hundreds Die in Religious Riots,” 1984, para. 5).  
End of Model Application for Phase I 
Study Phase III – 1987 to 1996: Synopsis. The third study phase spans from 
1987 to 1996 and is inclusive of the years 1987 up to 1991 when nine additional states 
and the Federal Capital Territory (now Abuja) were created bringing the states of Nigeria 
to 30 in total (see Map V in Appendix A). This phase also includes the years 1991 up to 
1996 when additional states were created, bringing the total to the present 36 states of 
Nigeria (see Map I in Appendix A). The phase witnessed various regime changes in the 
political sphere; as with the fall of the second republic in 1983, the country once again 
entered another prolonged era of military rule. During the Babangida regime which 
spanned from 1985 to 1992, there was an unsuccessful coup in April 1990 involving 
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some Middle Belt Christian officers led by Major Gideon Orkar to overthrow Babangida. 
In 1992 in an attempt to return to civilian rule, Babangida established two political 
parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention 
(NRC). Thus, Nigeria’s third Republic marks the country’s unsuccessful attempt at 
restoring democracy as initiated by the Babangida government during which civilian state 
governors took office in January 1992 following their elections, but a presidential 
election won by Moshood K. O. Abiola on June 12, 1993 was, however, annulled by 
Babangida. In August 1993 amidst pressure from the AFRC (Armed Forces Ruling 
Council), Babangida was forced to step down from office, handing over to Ernest A. O. 
Shonekan who assumed power as Interim Head of State. Shonekan was ousted in a palace 
coup which brought Defense Minister Sani Abacha into power as Head of State, and he 
established the Provisional Ruling Council of Nigeria in November 1993. In March 1995 
the Abacha administration arrested Obasanjo for allegedly supporting a secret coup plot 
(Falola & Heaton, 2008; Osaghae, 1998b). 
This study phase witnessed a period of prolonged tension marked with religious 
riots and unrest in which thousands of lives were lost with properties and buildings 
destroyed, and Nigeria was on the verge of a religious war between Christians and 
Muslims, as political leaders opportunely manipulated the nation’s diversity problem. 
More so, economic problems caused by the failure of Babangida’s Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP), a policy aimed at revamping the down-sliding economy, intensified a 
general feeling of discontent and the quest for alternative socio-political means of 
survival. Recourse to religion provided the way out for the teeming masses. It is observed 
that “Millions of people were driven to religion, as both Islam and Christianity 
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accelerated their conversion process, drawing from angry, poor frustrated people” 
(Falola, 1999, p. 187). The increased religiosity brought about a new wave of 
fundamentalism in its wake, with radical organizations preaching against secularism and 
military rule. Recognized to have manifested differently in both religions, Falola (1999) 
observes that “Among Christians, fundamentalism took the form of evangelism that could 
be reactionary and conservative in form, among Muslims, the influence of the West, 
materialism, and secular governments was severely attacked” (p. 187). 
Also deriving from the people’s discontent with military rule, was resurgence 
among the Muslims of the Mahdi or coming Messiah ideal which would save the nation, 
as well as reform Islam. Furthermore, Sheikh Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, a preacher who led the 
Shi’ites (a Muslim group who were also increasing in number), began to demand for the 
creation of Nigeria’s Islamic republic. The Shi’ites engaged in, and clashed severally 
with the government in different northern cities including Kaduna, Zaria, Kano, 
Maiduguri, Bauchi, and Katsina, and made demands for a theocratic, God-fearing led 
state government (Falola, 1999). 
Additionally contributing to the riotous period were mainstream religious groups 
with media and government access to their leaders. For the Muslims were the Supreme 
Council for Islamic Affairs (SCIA) and the Jama’tu Nasril Islam (JNI) both of which 
defended Islamic interests and made politically charged demands, for instance, “replacing 
Sunday with Friday as a holiday and removing the symbols of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition in schools and courts” (Falola, 1999, p. 187). For the Christians, there was the 
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) which was their most prominent defender, and it 
called for a distancing of the government from Islam. It is also observed that these 
262 
 
 
religious organizations began to take on the semblance of political parties, such that in 
addition to making important demands, their members were on occasions also being 
mobilized for protest. This inherent politicization of religion derives from the country’s 
drawn-out military rule. Falola (1999) observes that “Military rule succeeded in turning 
religion into a platform from which to organize politics,” and argues that “While the 
politicians were afraid of being excluded from power or being put in detention, religious 
leaders were relatively free of harassment” (p. 187). 
In April 1991, in the semblance of the Maitatsine sect of the 1980s and the havoc 
unleashed on the society was the Katsina Shi’ite sect led by one Yahaya Yakubu who 
staged a bloody protest with his members in the town. Following this was the Bauchi 
eruption in April 1991, which was reported as: 
…the worst religious crisis the country has witnessed since 1984 when the 
Maitatsine religious fanatics struck in Jimeta, Gongola State, and about 764 
Nigerians were killed. For four days, Bauchi State was engulfed in the fire of 
religious violence. Thousands of hoodlums, many of them teenagers, using 
religious cover, went on rampage in some towns, including the state capital, 
Bauchi. The tale of terror was beyond comprehension as casualty figures mounted 
and scores of homes, churches, hotels and some public property were torched. 
(Newswatch report as cited in Akaeze, 2009, para. 14) 
The Bauchi riots while “not instigated by any particular sect” and “had no leader,” 
were triggered by an incidence involving a Muslim and a Christian butcher in the Tafawa 
Balewa town abattoir which engulfed different parts of Bauchi (Falola, 1998, p. 204). 
The crisis had about five hundred houses razed down within twenty-four hours, with 
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fifteen hotels burned in the Bayangeri quarter in which most of the city’s hotels situate, 
also with cars, houses, and a neighborhood Deeper Bible Church burned down (Falola, 
1998, p. 207). At the Hospital Road, a Christian designated zone in which most of the 
city’s churches were situated, the rioters burned all of the twenty churches in the area 
including “St. John’s Catholic Church, the Basara Baptist Church, COCIN Church, Christ 
Apostolic Church, and St. Paul’s Anglican Church” (Falola, 1998, p. 207). Only the 
ECWA church close to the army barracks escaped the ravaging Muslims, even as they 
“descended on all the mission houses and destroyed their property, cars, and buses, 
burning it all,” with the Christian Pilgrims Board property, offices, and cars equally 
destroyed (Falola, 1998, p. 207). Proceeding next to Tudun Wada Street, an area 
occupied by non-natives, the rioters chanting anti-ethnic and anti-Christian slogans and 
carrying gasoline and weapons moved against their targets, with the Seyawa, a Christian 
minority group “selected for destruction” along with other non-native Christians in the 
area (Falola, 1998, p. 207).  On the enormity of venom meted on the victims, most of 
which were brutally killed, many burned, stoned, or machete to death, with others 
decapitated (The Bauchi Massacre as cited in Falola, 1998), and on the magnitude of this 
killing episode, it is observed  that: 
Casualties were high. Hundreds of homes, churches, and public buildings were 
burned or destroyed. While official sources initially put the death toll at eighty, 
mortuary figures had it at five hundred. Thousands more  were injured and 
hundreds hospitalized, Corpses littered the streets of Bauchi City, and the threat of 
disease from the decomposing bodies forced health authorities to collect these 
corpses and bury them in mass graves outside the city. People now callous to 
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death stood by as the corpses were piled into trucks. (Death and Destruction as 
cited in Falola, 1998, p. 208) 
Shortly following the Bauchi incident the religious conflagration train got to 
Kano, where in October 1991, the Izala sect initially presumed peaceful demonstration to 
stop an evangelical crusade being organized for Reinhard Bonnke suddenly turned into a 
violent Muslim-Christian clash, with high death toll and casualty figures, and loss of 
enormous property (Akaeze, 2009, para. 15). The sect had earlier been denied the 
permission of using the venue—the public Race Course for a foreign preacher they had 
invited—and were enraged by this in addition to CAN’s “aggressive publicity” for the 
crusade (Falola, 1998, p. 211). To avert probable unrest, the state government change of 
venue which, while not publicized, in addition to CAN’s posters already printed 
infuriated the Muslims some militant of whom reckoned they were being challenged by 
the infidels (Falola, 1998). Even more infuriating was the Christians’ use of the public-
address system to broadcast Jesus Christ as coming to redeem souls, which to Muslim 
leaders was a pollution of the city, “raising the name of Jesus over that of Prophet 
Muhammad” and deemed “that the minority Christian element was acting outside its 
place” (Falola, 1998, p. 212). The widespread riots claimed lives and had extensive 
property damage, including forty-two shops, thirty-four houses, hotels, cars, trucks, and 
many public buildings, even as carnages were wrought in the non-natives’ Sabon Gari 
neighborhood, and Christians and southerners fled to the police barracks and air force 
base for safety, abandoning their homes (Falola, 1998). Observed as an unprecedented 
crisis in the state of Kano where religious violence predominates, it is noted that “the sole 
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targeting of Christians for destruction on such a massive scale was something new” 
(Falola, 1998, p. 212). 
Furthermore, in December 1994 Kano once again made headlines when Muslim 
fundamentalists lynched an Igbo trader, “and had his head paraded on a spike on the 
streets of Kano after he was accused of desecrating the Koran by inscribing some 
blasphemous words against Mohammed in his shop at the Sabon Gari area of the town” 
(Akaeze, 2009, para.16). A Muslim and Igbo trader fracas escalated the episode into 
widespread riots in May 1995, and in the ensuing communal violence, churches, shops, 
and houses were once again razed down with extensive damage and toll before order 
could be restored (Falola, 1998). 
It is, thus, essential to recognize the increasingly religious tonation of the northern 
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. Anthony (2002) observes, for instance, that since the 
1980s and 1990s, religion seems to have supplanted ethnicity as the “defining fault line” 
(p. 234) of the Hausa communities and Kano’s Igbo (and by extension Igbos and other 
Christian ethnic groups in the North). Ethnicity and religion are said to have, thus, long 
become “intimately entangled” in “the frontier between Hausa Muslims and Igbo 
Christians” which, with national discourses increasingly turning to issues of religion, 
have perceptibly shifted intergroup relations in Kano (and, by extension in the entire 
North) (Anthony, 2002, pp. 234-235). Relationship between both groups was observed to 
have remained tense after the 1991 Reinhard Bonnke crusade crisis, as well as the 
Hausa/Igbo 1995 fracas and ensuing killings, however, with violence occurring in each 
case “without the explicit manipulation of ethnicity that was present in 1966” on the basis 
of which each of the disturbances are seen as religious conflict which mostly unfolded 
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between both ethnic groups, as a result of affiliation patterns and circumstances 
(Anthony, 2002, p. 238). Thus, on the dynamics of this shift from ethno to religious bend 
in the Igbo-Hausa interactions, Anthony observes that: 
The centrality of Islam to Hausa identity and Kanawa’s often axiomatic 
association of Christianity with Igbos has meant past grievances, some long 
dormant, others lingering, were available for both sides to tap into, and almost 
inevitably surfaced…While the unresolved baggage was not in and of itself 
sufficient to lead to open controversy or violence, in moments of anger and 
tension, it reappeared, and became part of the new moment. Fortunately, unlike 
the crises of 1966, this happened without the benefit of elite agendas to focus 
those issues, recruit behind them, or provide rioters with the organizational 
infrastructure necessary for a massive escalation. (2002, pp. 238-239) 
However, the religious crisis was not restricted to Kano as other cities including 
Jos, Wase, Zangon Kataf, Funtua, Yelwa- Shendam, and Funtua also took their shares of 
the upheavals, sometimes with flimsy quarrel or political difference between the 
opposing faiths sparking off killing sprees which security officials would find 
challenging to stop. An instance of this was a May 1992 communal feud between Katafs 
indigenes and Hausas in Kaduna State, which subsequently assumed religious coloration 
and later spread to other cities in the state leaving destruction and huge death toll in its 
trail (Akaeze, 2009, para. 17). The Zangon-Kataf crisis which is said to be “the 
culmination of an age-old conflict between two groups divided by both ethnicity and 
religion,” broke out on May 14 following altercations of farmlands invasions between the 
Muslim Hausas and the Christian Katafs (Falola, 1998, p. 213). By May 15, there was a 
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resultant toll of eighty-five to the crisis, and by May 16, the town was destroyed 
completely with its hundreds of residents killed. Intervention was delayed as the people 
destroyed themselves while the government and the police did nothing for three days, 
even as “Over four hundred corpses littered the streets, and most of the houses were 
burned to the ground (“Massacre in Kaduna” as cited in Falola, 1998, p. 217). Most dead 
sustained massive machete and dagger wounds, or were shot using poisoned bows and 
arrows, on occasions shot with guns, or burned in their homes or cars, with all major 
churches as well as mosques also destroyed (Falola, 1998). The Zangon-Kataf episode is, 
thus, recognized to have been so destructive and bitter that the Zaria, 1987 crisis paled 
comparatively to it, with every valuable in Zangon-Kataf destroyed completely even as 
the violence spread to Kaduna. As news of the Zangon-Kataf got to Kaduna and other 
parts of the north, Hausas in Kaduna launched massive attacks on southern Zarian 
residents in Kaduna, attacking every neighborhood in which they were concentrated 
(Falola, 1998, p. 218). 
According to Falola (1998) “A pogrom similar to the attack on the Igbo in 1966 
resulted,” and being mostly Christians, the southern Zarians “made an easy target” as 
they attended church on May 17, oblivious of any plans of ambush (p. 218). Many 
worshippers and church ministers were gruesomely slaughtered in various churches in 
Kaduna including the Aminu Road ECWA church where many were killed, the Bardawa 
Heken church, the Angwar Baptist church, the Rhema church, and the African Baptist 
church, with these last two also having extensive casualties. Some worshippers fled to the 
sanctuary of private homes abandoning their cars, even as roadblocks were mounted by 
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the Hausas to entrap worshippers as they fled, and once again, the police just stood by, 
observing the rioters (Falola, 1998). 
Thus, this study phase also witnessed major clashes between Muslims and 
Christians which occurred primarily in the northern cities of Kano, Bauchi, Zango-Kataf, 
and Kaduna, all of which recorded extensive damages of worship centers and high death 
toll (Falola, 1999, p. 188). 
Applying the Genocide Proclivity Model: Phase III – 1987 to 1996. The 
coding list for the emergent nodes or codes for the study Phase III are provided in 
Appendix C: Coding List C. The application of the emergent nodes from study Phase III 
to the Genocidal Proclivity Model on page 199 follows. 
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena  
 Relating to Genocidal Proclivity:  
 Phase III – 1987 to 1996 
 
This phase III of the study also shows the four types of causal conditions of 
immediate or trigger factors, underlying or root causes, perceived threat of the 
“otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing which lead ultimately to genocidal 
proclivity.  In this study phase, the immediate or trigger causes include insurgency, 
uprising, or anti-government riots; and arrests or persecution of fundamentalist sect 
members, religious extremism and violence, or other fundamentalists’ activities. 
Additionally, this study phase has underlying or root causes as a second set of 
causal conditions including colonial influences, as in the Zangon-Kataf May 1992 crisis 
which also engulfed Kaduna, in which it is observed that “The violence here has roots at 
least as far back as British rule, which ended in 1960, and is fueled by conflicts over land 
ownership and religious affiliation” (Noble, 1992c, para. 16). Other underlying causes in 
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this phase include, political underpinnings or power struggle involving political elites or 
Kaduna mafia, as in the “powerful subversives” that President Babangida alluded to as 
fomenters of trouble who instigated the May 1987 Kaduna riots in which “hundreds of 
churches were destroyed” in attacks said to have been orchestrated by Muslim mobs 
against the Christian minority (Kotch, 1987, para. 2, 4, 11). Further underlying causes in 
this phase are socio-economic factors including ethnic groups vying for control of fertile 
lands, political and economic power as in the August 1992 ethnic crisis between the Tivs 
and the Jukuns with extensive death toll, on which Noble observes that: 
The episode ended in the deaths of at least 30 people and the certainty of more 
battles in the spreading land dispute between two Nigerian ethnic groups, the Tivs 
and the Jukuns. The violence here and in another Jukun village nearby, Kente, is 
typical of scores of incidents since October in this thinly populated and ruggedly 
beautiful region of eastern Nigeria.  
No definitive accounting of casualties has been compiled. But Western 
diplomats, Nigerian journalists and other travelers through Wukari, where the 
fighting has centered, as well as Nigerians with friends and relatives in the area, 
say that at least 1,000 and perhaps as many as 5,000 have been killed. (1992a, 
para. 6-7) 
Underlying causes in this phase also include, poverty, unemployment, lack of 
education, and discontent, for instance, in the May 1992 Zangon-Kataf crisis that spread 
to Kaduna in which it is observed that: 
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The anti-Government riots were triggered by a severe economic slump. Nigeria, 
the leading oil exporter of Africa, has been devastated by low prices for oil, which 
accounts for more than 95 percent of the country's export earnings. 
African and Western analysts have portrayed the explosion of discontent 
as the most serious threat to plans by Nigeria's military leader, Gen. Ibrahim 
Babangida, to hand over power…to a civilian government. (Noble, 1992c, para. 
4-5) 
Also included in this phase are the third set of causal factors of the perceived 
threat of the “otherness” involving, ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and 
animosities, as in the Taraba state, Tiv-Jukun conflict that emanates from “historical 
animosity” between the two ethnic groups, whose intermittent, but protracted clashes 
have left most of the region “a war zone of charred huts” (Noble, 1992a, para. 15, 17).  
Further causal factor category of the perceived threat of the “otherness” are the nodes for 
North-South split or largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south; and annihilation 
attempts by targeting as in the October 1991 Kano crisis, for instance, in which Muslim 
Hausa mobs targeted and “attacked a Christian neighborhood, setting fire to houses, cars, 
markets and a church,” with over 200 people killed and many more injured (Noble, 
1992a, para. 22). 
Lastly in this study phase is the fourth set of causal conditions of exclusive 
ideological framing which underlie much of the excessive blood-letting that continues to 
occur in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. Ideological framing factors in this 
phase of the study include fundamentalism and religious fervency as in the May 1992 
Zangon-Kataf crisis where it is observed that “Deadly clashes frequently erupt between 
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Christian and Muslim activists in the northern states. [And] Tensions have grown as 
young Africans flock to fundamentalist Islamic sects and more people from the 
predominantly Christian south move to the Islamic north” (“100 Feared Dead,” 1992, 
para. 9). Other ideologically framed causations in this phase involve the institution of 
Sharia or Islamic law in northern Nigeria as in the 1992 Muslim militants’ 
demonstrations calling for the establishment of Sharia law in Katsina state, in which 
some people were killed and several others injured (“2 Killed,” 1992, para. 1). 
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors, 
 Underlying Causation, Perceived Threat of the 
 “Otherness” and Exclusive Ideological Framing:  
 Phase III – 1987 to 1996 
 
This study phase also shows that the causal conditions—the trigger factor, 
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing 
in different situations and contextual settings—resulted in varying degrees and forms 
exterminations and killings primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians, as well 
as between other conflict parties which are mostly divided along ethnic and religious 
lines. Such  phenomena as identified in this study phase reveal violence and attacks 
which are unleashed to different target victims, including assault, shoot-out, killings, 
arson and looting; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism. 
For instance, in the Zangon-Kataf crisis which engulfed other cities in Kaduna state, it is 
observed that “Mortuaries overflowed with mutilated corpses” in Kaduna, with people 
being slaughtered “as if they were dogs” (“Nigeria Quells,” 1992, para. 12-13). Further 
phenomenal themes in this phase include religious and ethnic violence; sectarian 
violence; spiral or escalation of violence; and targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated 
killings and assaults. In the May 1991 Kano crisis, for instance, in which “Thousands of 
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lives were lost and properties valued in millions of Naira were destroyed” (Newswatch as 
cited in Ezeibe, 2009, para. 30), it is observed that “Muslims pursued their hunt for 
Christians…in religious rioting,” with the observation also that “Much of the violence 
was centered on Kano's Sabongari neighborhood, which has a large population of 
Christians” (“At Least 8 Dead,” 1991, para. 1, 10). Other phenomenal nodes in this phase 
include uprising, anti-government rioting, protests or demonstrations; and violent or 
deadly clashes, rioting or gun battles. By comparing and contrasting such phenomenal 
nodes, this study phase also shows the two major categories involving targeted, pre-
meditated or orchestrated killings and assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, 
mayhem, massacres or barbarism which are identified as being closely associated with 
the proclivity to genocide. 
3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious  
 Conflict and Genocidal Proclivity 
 Developed: Phase III – 1987 to 1996 
 
Additionally in this study phase are contextual nodes involving social space or 
lebensraum which provides the geographic base (Wood, 2001) that enables the fostering 
of genocidal inclinations. The contexts are in the northern region or states including 
Bauchi state, in Bauchi; Kaduna State, in Kaduna, Zonkwa, and Zangon-Kataf; Kano 
state, in Kano; Katsina state, in Katsina; Nasarawa state; and Taraba state, in Akwana 
(see Tables 1 and 2 for the various contexts, respectively for the northern Nigeria ethno-
religious conflict, and for the reprisal attacks in the south). 
Also providing the contextual framework are different conflict parties in the 
various phenomenal settings in this study phase including Muslim mobs or sect and 
security forces; Muslim mobs, sect or groups and Christians; security agents and 
273 
 
 
unidentified civilians; different ethnic groups; and Fulani herdsmen and/or Hausa-Fulani 
group and Christian or host communities. Such emergent nodes for the conflict parties 
were again analyzed by comparison and contrasted with the phenomenal conflict nodes 
and categories and their causal conditions to identify conflicts with the  plausibility of 
conceptualized annihilating difference (Hinton, 2002) that give rise to exterminations 
involving perpetrator and victim situations, with other conflicts which are devoid of such 
annihilating difference considered as clashes or fighting between parties without an overt 
inclination to genocide. 
Additionally, there are varying perpetrator-groups identified in this study phase 
using the annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties described above including 
Muslim mobs, rioters or rampaging Muslim youths; and security agents, 
soldiers/army/military, Hausa/Northern troops. Details of the involvement of the 
perpetrator groups in the different conflict settings of this study phase are analyzed and 
discussed in Phase III synopsis above. 
Also included in the study data in this phase are the victim or target groups, which 
enables the fostering of annihilating difference amidst a perpetrator group and social 
space environment for a well-rounded and complete contextual setting for genocidal 
proclivity to flourish. Identified in this phase are target victim groups including 
Christians and churches involving Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian villages 
as in the May 1992 Kaduna crisis in which it is observed that “Churches have been 
burned and…two or three pastors were killed in churches” in Kaduna (Ogbonyomi as 
cited in “100 Feared Dead,” 1992, para. 4). Target victim groups also include civilian 
targets; security agents - police officers, military and government officials; and media 
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offices and journalists. Details of the victimhood of the targets in the different conflict 
settings of this study phase are also analyzed and discussed in Phase III synopsis above. 
4. Intervening Conditions  
 Influencing Proclivity to  
 Genocide: Phase III – 1987 to 1996 
 
In addition to the context nodes, this study phase also identified intervening 
conditions in the different contextual settings of the conflict, involving such broad 
conditions which influence by increasing or diminishing the proclivity to genocide. 
Intervening conditions in this study phase include press censorship and manipulation or 
deflation and inflation of casualty figures, which can be used by government parties on 
occasions to minimize but also sometimes scale-up reprisals or tit-for-tat violence. For 
instance, in the October 1991 Kano crisis in which it is observed that “The Government 
said 8 people had been killed since the rioting began…but an unconfirmed report…said 
300 had died” (“At Least 8 Dead,” 1991, para. 2). Other intervening conditions in this 
study phase include government ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government as in the 
Tiv/Jukun 1992 killings at Akwana in which it is observed that “Assaults on unarmed 
civilians have inevitably stirred deep concern, but almost as disquieting is what many 
here view as the Government's inability to clamp down hard on those from both sides 
believed involved in the campaign of killing and terror” (Noble, 1992a, para. 18). 
This study phase further reveals that additionally influencing the tendency to 
increase or deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control 
the violence with their implementation. Intervention efforts in this study phase include 
control measures taken such as curfews and road checks by security agents as in the May 
1992 crisis in Kaduna state which started in Zangon-Kataf, in which “Troops in armored 
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cars and helicopters put down riots in northern Nigeria,” which was said to have in three 
days “taken the lives of more than 200 Christians and Muslims” (“Nigeria Quells,” 1992, 
para. 1). Other intervention nodes in this phase include investigations and commissions of 
inquiries set up, mopping-up of rioters or arrests made, attempts to dialogue, appeals for 
intervention or mediation, and reconciliation attempts as in the Tiv/Jukun protracted 
conflict in which it is observed that: 
…Nigeria's Vice President, Augustus Aikhomu, called the traditional spiritual 
leaders of the two peoples to Abuja in an effort to negotiate an end to the conflict. 
…a delegation of traditional rulers from the northern states, led by the 
Sultan of Sokoto, the leader of Nigeria's Muslims, began its own diplomatic 
initiative. The Sultan, Ibrahim Dasuki, told reporters that the conflict posed a 
potential “threat to our survival as one nation.” 
…the wave of killings prompted Nigeria's military Government to send 
soldiers to the area. Along nearly every major thoroughfare in Wukari roadblocks 
are manned by edgy soldiers and armored vehicles patrol the roads at all hours. 
(Noble, 1992a, para. 12-14) 
5. Strategies Foreshadowing 
 Proclivity to Genocide:  
 Phase III – 1987 to 1996 
 
The study data also reveal strategies which foreshadowed the tendency towards 
genocide within the contextual settings and intervening conditions to produce the above 
described resultant phenomena. Strategies deployed in this phase include organization, 
planning, and weaponry, as in the August 1992 Akwana killings in which the attackers 
fell on their victims at dawn, armed with “bows and arrows…machetes and spears, 
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and…automatic weapons,” and firing at point-blank range, killing and wounding dozens 
(Noble, 1992a, para. 1). Other strategies for this phase include extermination plot 
involving mass murders as in the May 1992 pogrom of mostly Christian southern Zarian 
residents in Kaduna by extremist Muslims who gruesomely slaughtered them in their 
neighborhoods, as well as in various churches while they were worshipping (Falola, 
1998, p. 218; Noble, 1992c). Further strategies for this phase include ideo-ethnic 
cleansing (or ideological and ethnic cleansing), involving burning of churches as in the 
April 1991 Tafawa Balewa crisis in Bauchi state in which all twenty churches at the 
city’s Hospital Road area razed, with the ECWA church only narrowly escaping the 
perpetrators’ ideological cleansing of churches by reason of its close proximity to the 
army barracks (“Battle in Northern Nigeria,” 1991; Falola, 1998, p. 207). 
Other strategies in this phase are forced migration, for example refugees and 
displaced persons as in the Tiv/Jukun conflict in which many have been forcibly 
displaced with the razing of several homes in the area (Noble, 1992a, para. 17, 19). 
Strategies deployed in this phase also include indoctrination, manipulation, or instigation. 
It is observed in the May 1992 Kaduna crisis, for instance, “that the military authorities 
and a cabal of banned or discredited politicians, have joined to foment ethnic and 
religious hostilities as the means of gaining power” (Jatau as cited in Noble 1992c, para. 
12), and also “that much of the violence was the result of a sophisticated scheme by the 
military authorities to derail Nigeria's transition to civilian government” (Aboubacargumi 
as cited in Noble, 1992c, para. 14). 
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6. Consequences or Effects of 
 Proclivity to Genocide:  
 Phase III – 1987 to 1996 
 
The strategies adopted by perpetrators in this study phase have different 
consequences and effects in the different conflict settings involved. Consequences 
identified in this phase include death toll and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned 
corpses, as in the May 1992 Kaduna killings in which it is observed that the “Estimates of 
casualties vary, but political analysts and ordinary Nigerians say that at least 500 people, 
and perhaps as many as 800, have been killed and hundreds more have been hurt” 
(Noble, 1992c, para. 2). Other consequences in this phase include refugees and displaced 
persons, involving people fleeing homes or taking refuge or shelter for safety; and 
churches burned or destroyed as in the May 1992 Kaduna crisis in which it is observed 
that “several Christian churches had been razed” (“100 Feared Dead,” 1992, para. 3). 
Consequences in this phase also include destroying, looting and razing of properties; and 
security threat, apprehension, anxiety or political and social chaos. In the May 1992 
Kaduna state killings, for instance, Noble (1992) observes that “After 10 days of bitter 
fighting between Muslims and Christians in which hundreds have been killed or 
wounded, Nigeria is sliding toward political and social chaos in the worst crisis its 
military leaders have faced since they seized power seven years ago” (para. 1). 
Additionally, this study phase also has consequences category for normalcy or 
calm returning after the intermittent upsurges of the conflict and gruesome killings as in 
the Kaduna may 1992 killings in which Noble observes that: 
after nearly a week of violence here, Kaduna began to return to its own distinctive 
normalcy. Legions of armed men patrolled the streets, though they were soldiers 
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sent by the federal Government rather than the marauding gangs that recently held 
sway over entire neighborhoods. Storefront traders and banks opened their 
shutters, and the few foreign consulates and international relief organizations that 
had been evacuated are again doing business. (1992c, para. 9) 
End of Model Application for Phase III 
Study Phase IV – 1996 to 2005: Synopsis. The fourth phase of the study spans 
from 1996 to 2005. The present 36 state-structure was operative in this phase of the study 
(see Map I in Appendix A). This phase witnessed Abacha who was in power from 
November 1993 and died in office in June 1998, and Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-1999) 
became the Head of State and Chairman of the Provisional Ruling Council of Nigeria. 
Abubakar’s transitional government enabled the registering of political parties and 
released Obasanjo from prison. Obasanjo (1999-2007) was elected President and sworn 
into office in May 1999, ushering in the Fourth Republic, and he was re-elected May 
2003 for a second term in office (Falola & Heaton, 2008, pp. 234-235). 
All through the late 1970s up to the early 1980s Nigeria debated the issue of the 
place of Sharia or Islamic law in the country’s judicial system, and as the turn of the new 
century ushered in a southern Christian as the country’s president, the Sharia debate was 
renewed with it (Anthony, 2002), and throughout Obasanjo’s term in office religious 
tensions is known to have remained high. With the country’s return in 1999 to democratic 
rule, twelve states (see Map VI in Appendix A) out of the nineteen northern states 
instituted Sharia law in their penal code, involving stricter implementation forms such as 
the punishing of thieves by amputation of a hand, and death sentence by stoning for the 
crime of adultery, which measures have occasioned national as well as international 
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controversies (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The implementation of such Sharia measures 
heightened tension in northern Nigeria, with Christians criticizing its harshness and 
Muslims on the other hand, arguing that crime rates have significantly reduced as a result 
of the newly adopted legal codes (Harunah as cited in Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 238). 
The issue of Sharia implementation in some northern states has posed a thorny quagmire 
for the country. In May 2000, for instance, thousands were killed in Kaduna as non-
Muslims opposing Sharia’s introduction clashed with Muslims demanding its 
implementation in the state (Adekoya, 2009). 
This phase of the study witnessed a recurring spate of religious uprisings 
interlaced with ethnic clashes, each conflict seemingly bloodier and more ferocious than 
the preceding (Adekoya, 2009). It is observed in Jos, September 2001 for instance, that a 
Muslim-Christian violence that flared up after the Muslim prayers had about 915 people 
killed in the riots, according to a September 2002 state government panel report on the 
conflict (Adekoya, 2009, para. 9). Ethnic tensions had built up before the riots as a result 
of a federal government appointment of a Muslim politician as local coordinator for its 
poverty alleviation program in the state. Seen as part of the detrimental political policies 
that would bar their religious freedom, Christians were disturbed that appointing a 
Muslim in a community they predominated was an attempt to politically, as well as 
religiously, dominate them (Minchakpu, 2001). However, the conflict sparked off as, 
“…a Christian woman attempted to cross a barricaded street, which led to a scuffle 
between her and a group of Muslims…The fight spread to other parts of the city, where 
Christians were spontaneously attacked by Muslims” (Minchakpu, 2001, para. 10-11). 
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In May 2004, a Christian militia was reported to have attacked an essentially 
Muslim town of Yelwa with deaths in hundreds—put at 630 (Adekoya, 2009, para. 10; 
Reuters; and Agence France-Presse as cited in “Hundreds Die in Attack on Nigerian 
Village,” 2004, para. 3) involving “the latest eruption in a longstanding dispute between 
herders and farmers. [Of which] The herders are Muslims from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic 
group, while the farmers are ethnic Tarok Christians” (“Hundreds Die in Attack on 
Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 1-2). It is, however, warned by the president of the Nigeria 
Red Cross who was unable to confirm the number “that casualty figures could be inflated 
by self-interested parties in a strife-torn area,” while also the police estimate for the toll 
was reported at 67, even as the security agents were unable to enter Yelwa as access into 
the town was blocked by the attackers (CSW, n.d., pp. 1, 6, 11; “Hundreds Die in Attack 
on Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 5-6). 
Countering this version of the conflict which is said to have “gained International 
currency,” however, the non-Muslims in the state who view the incident differently and 
are said to be exasperated that their version of the episode has not been reported widely. 
To them the Yelwa attack was not an isolated incidence, but rather part of the continuing 
violence which has plagued the area since 2002, as there had been earlier attacks in 
February 2004 in which extremist Muslims targeted and killed Christians prior to the 
May attack. Furthermore, the Yelwa attack said to have been by Christian militia, they 
argue that “there is no such thing as a ‘Christian Militia,’” (CSW, n.d., p. 1). Rather, the 
assailants involved in the attack were local non-Muslim farmers who had taken laws into 
their hands in a retaliatory attack against the violent displacement from their lands amidst 
government ineptitude in dealing with their plight (CSW, n.d., p. 12). They argued that,  
281 
 
 
“…the term ‘Christian Militias’ was widely published by the international media, fuelling 
the perception of a planned conspiracy against Muslims in Plateau State, and rendering 
Christian leaders vulnerable to prosecution on false grounds” (CSW, n.d., p. 12). 
Furthermore, they disputed the 630 death toll of the Yelwa attack, “stating that this 
widely publicized estimate served to heighten Muslim anger, guaranteeing a violent 
reaction” (CSW, n.d., p. 2). 
Furthermore, on this alarming spate of violence in Plateau state, Kendal observes 
the conflict as: 
…escalating, taking on the dimensions of a religious war. The Muslims are 
recruiting Islamic mercenaries from Chad and Niger, while the "Christian" militia 
that attacked Yelwa was allegedly armed and supported by retired generals, 
further escalating the violence. The state government seems to have made little 
effort to stop the violence. (2004, para. 13) 
Furthermore, as the reports of the Yelwa incident in which over 600 Muslims were said 
to have been massacred reached Kano, which is “traditionally a hotbed of religious 
tensions,” a seemingly peaceful protest led by Muslim leaders on May 11, 2004 soon 
turned violent as “angry Muslims hunted for ‘nonbelievers’ whom they then killed with 
machetes before burning the bodies” (Kendal, 2004, para. 21). The Muslim protesters, 
carrying daggers, clubs, and sickles, were said to have searched cars for Christians and 
animists, and asked that passengers to recite the Muslim prayers. Three young women, 
“nonbelievers” of Islam wearing Western styled outfits were noted to have been 
macheted, escaped with bleeding head injuries following some sort of intervention 
(Kendal, 2004, para. 23). The toll for this Kano episode, which militants, Muslims, and 
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Christians were said to have “fought bloody street battles” was estimated at about 500-
600, mostly Christians, killed in the two days of Muslim rioting (Adekoya, 2009, para. 
10). However, putting the death toll for this Kano crisis rather at about 3,000, while 
decrying “the biased reporting of sections of the international media,” it is observed that 
Christians saw the Kano events as predictable “given the inaccurate reporting of the 
Yelwa incident” (CSW, n.d., p. 2). 
On the brutality and enormity of this May 2004 killing episode in Kano, it is 
observed that: 
Christians and non-indigenes were hacked and battered to death; their homes, 
churches and properties were set on fire. Others are reported to have been shot 
dead by policemen. 
…children appear to have been targeted as…mobs descended on schools, 
separated Muslim children from non-Muslims and killed the non-Muslims. Local 
sources put the final death toll at over 3000, a fact the Kano State government is 
at pains to deny…‘some bodies were burned in wells. Even little children were 
killed. The bodies of pregnant women were ripped open and their bodies 
burned’…following the violence the State Government ensured that cleaners were 
on the streets by 5am, and that trucks…were being used to gather corpses for a 
mass burial. (CSW, n.d., pp. 6-7) 
Prior to the Yelwa killings, Zamfara state in the implementation of its “Sharia 
Phase 2” program, (Kendal, 2004, para. 6) “had ordered the destruction of all churches” 
in the state. It is, therefore, observed that there is the possibility of using the Yelwa 
killings “to justify all manner of repression and persecution being unleashed upon an 
283 
 
 
already besieged Christian minority,” given the ripple effect the Yelwa incidence had on 
some northern states (Kendal, 2004, para. 6). In Bauchi state, for instance, security was 
said to have been tightened “after leaflets were found calling on Muslims to avenge the 
Yelwa killings and on Christians to leave the region,” as well as in Kaduna as tensions 
ran high (Kendal, 2004, para. 6). 
Furthermore, violent Muslim-Christian conflicts persisted in northern Nigeria in 
the period, with the conflicts increasingly linked to events in the international scene. For 
instance, in 2001 a peaceful demonstration staged by Muslims in Kano in protest of 
America’s Afghanistan campaign turned into a bloody riot with an estimated toll of about 
100. It is observed that “youths trooped out of poor Muslim neighborhoods, where posters of 
Osama bin Laden have become hugely popular. They invaded the Christian quarter, whose 
residents fought back with arms, waving T-shirts emblazoned with American flags and 
shouting pro-American slogans” and, in the ensuing three-day riot about 100 people died, 
according to the Red Cross (Onishi, 2001b, para. 2-3). In November 2002 also, following 
violent protests which involved a death toll of over 200 in Kaduna, the Miss World 
beauty pageant earlier scheduled in Abuja was relocated to London. The protests had 
been ignited by an article in a Nigerian newspaper which was suggestive that the Prophet 
Mohammed might have approved of the beauty pageant, probably choosing a wife 
amongst the contestants (“Hundreds Flee,” 2002, para. 3), the riots indicative of the 
Muslims’ frustrations “over the perceived alliance between their government and 
Western, secular powers” (BBC News as cited in Falola & Heaton, 2008, pp. 238-239). 
In Kaduna, over 100 people were “stabbed, bludgeoned or burned to death,” and another 
500 injured (Mcveigh, 2002, para. 6). Also observed is that “At least 22 churches and 
eight mosques were destroyed in the mayhem…Ten hotels were…damaged, [and] more 
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than 200 people had been killed” (“Hundreds Flee,” 2002, para. 14), and hundreds fled 
Kaduna even as 4,500 were left homeless (“Hundreds Flee,” 2002, para. 12). 
These conflicts have been identified as stemming “from the rise of Islam as a 
political force and the stunning spread of hardline Islamic law from one small Nigerian 
state in 1999 to a third of the country’s 36 states today” (Onishi, 2001b, para. 3).  The 
stakes are observed to have remained high, as Muslims as well as Christians vie for their 
greater representation and control at the state as well as federal government levels. It is 
noted that Obasanjo in his eight years tenure as president was incapable of defusing these 
(Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 239), and since the military power handover in 1999, about 
5,000 Nigerians have died in in religious clashes according to the Red Cross (Onishi, 
2001b, para. 3). 
Applying the Genocide Proclivity Model: Phase IV – 1996 To 2005. The 
coding list for the emergent nodes or codes for the study Phase IV are provided in 
Appendix C: Coding List D. The application of the emergent nodes from study Phase IV 
to the Genocidal Proclivity Model on page 199 follows. 
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena  
 Relating to Genocidal Proclivity:  
 Phase IV – 1996 to 2005 
 
Phase IV of the study also shows the four causal conditions of immediate or 
trigger factors, underlying or root causes, perceived threat of the “otherness,” and 
exclusive ideological framing which lead ultimately to genocidal proclivity.  In this 
phase, the trigger or immediate causes include insurgency, uprising or anti-government 
riots; arrests or persecution of fundamentalist sect members, religious extremism, and 
violence or other fundamentalist activities; Islam degraded, desecration and/or 
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misinterpretation of Koran; and reprisal mission or revenge, and the massacres of Ibos 
and returning refugees. For example, in Aba “after corpses of Igbo killed in the north 
were brought back to Aba,” the locals started attacking the Hausas, turning from Muslim-
Christian battle in the North to ethnic search for anyone that might be a northerner 
(Onishi, 2000, p. 22). 
This phase also reveals underlying causation as a second set of causal conditions 
to the conflict which include historical factors; colonial influences, exploitation and fear 
of balkanization; culture of bad governance and corruption or oppressive military rule; Al 
Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian Links including illegal aliens; and political 
underpinnings or power struggle, involving issues of infiltration and politicization of 
religion. In the Jos crisis, for instance, it is observed that: 
…the Emir of Wase appears to be implicated in fomenting and financing the 
violence in southern Plateau State…as the killing of non-Muslim Tarok got 
underway in 2002, the Emir… refused to direct the military and police forces to 
quell the violence and informed the Governor of Plateau state that all was 
well….the Emir…used his position as an Islamic traditional leader to attract 
mercenaries from Chad and Niger to participate in the violence in the name of 
Jihad. (CSW, n.d., p. 4) 
Additional underlying causal conditions in this study phase include political elites 
or Kaduna mafia. This phase also showed underlying causal factors involving socio-
economic factors which include indigenes and settlers issues; and poverty, 
unemployment, lack of education, and discontent. In the October 2001 Muslim protests in 
Kano against the U.S.-led Afghanistan air strikes, for instance, thugs rather than religious 
286 
 
 
tensions were blamed for the crisis, as rioters were observed “looting stores and homes” 
shortly following the protests (“Violent,” 2001, para. 11). 
Furthermore, this study phase also includes a third set of causal factors of 
perceived threat of the “otherness”  which include ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, 
divisions and animosities; North-South split or largely Muslim north and mainly 
Christian south; and annihilation attempts by targeting or forceful conversion of 
Christians to Islam (Onishi, 2001a). For instance, Kendal observes that: 
Islamic zeal is strong in the northern state of Kano. Kano’s governor, Ibrahim 
Shekarau, was elected on a radical, hardline, pro- Sharia platform. Christians 
suffer intense persecution in Kano, their schools and churches having been closed 
and burned. It is compulsory for all public-school girls to wear Islamic hijab, and 
as the Christian schools have been closed Christians don’t have much choice. On 
the night of Shekarau’s election…pastor Chikezie (Sunday) Madumere and his 
whole family were burned to death in their home in “No Man’s Land” Kano city, 
by Muslim mobs celebrating Shekarau’s win. (2004, p. 17) 
This study phase also includes a fourth set of causal conditions involving the 
thematic category of exclusive ideological framing, comprising, religious dimensions, 
anti-Western or ideological differences; fundamentalism and religious fervency; and 
Sharia or Islamic law institution involving imposing Sharia across Nigeria or establishing 
of an Islamic state; non-Muslim opposition to Sharia, the unconstitutionality and 
violation of fundamental rights of Christians; and Sharia implementation, anti-
establishment or anti-Western ideology (“Religious Strife,” 2001; Lacey, 2002; Mcveigh, 
2002). Kendal observes, for instance, that: 
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Kano… introduced a Mobile Court to monitor and deal with people selling and 
screening foreign films or videos, and selling or playing foreign audio CDs. The 
Mobile Court will be guided by Sharia law and is charged to work toward the 
institutionalization of Islamic norms in all spheres of life. 
…Sheik Kabo informed Kano’s Sharia Enforcement enforcers (HISBA) 
that the Kano State Sharia Commission would no longer permit any area or any 
person to be exempt from Sharia. He recommended that anyone who is not 
willing to adhere to Sharia should leave the state. (2004, para. 18) 
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors, 
 Underlying Causation, Perceived Threat of the 
 “Otherness” and Exclusive Ideological Framing:  
 Phase IV – 1996 to 2005 
 
This study phase further shows that the causal conditions of trigger factors, 
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing 
in the different situations and contextual settings, resulted in variant degrees and forms of 
killings and exterminations mainly between extremist Muslims and Christians, as well as 
between different ethnic groups which are divided mainly along ethnic and religious 
lines. Such  subjective phenomena as identified in the study data reveal attacks and 
violence unleashed to different target victims including assault, shoot-out, killings, arson 
and looting; bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism (“Hundreds 
Flee,” 2002; Koinange, 2001; Obateru & Mamah, 2004; Onishi, 2001a); and genocide 
(“Nigerian Muslims,” 2004). Other phenomenal themes in this phase include political 
violence, coup d’état and political assassinations; and religious and ethnic violence 
(“Deadly Rioting,” 2000). Phenomenal themes also include reprisals from southern states 
(Onishi, 2000; “Violent,” 2001); sectarian violence; and spiral or escalation of violence. 
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Kendal (2004) observes, for instance, the escalating cycle of violence in Plateau state, 
which crisis precipitating event for the May 2004 attack started in February 2004 with the 
trampling of Tarok crops by Fulani cattle, and in retaliation the Tarok farmers were said 
to have stolen and killed Fulani cattle, with crops and cattle respectively as both groups’ 
means of livelihood. The Fulani seeking redress for their loss of cattle, and aided by hired 
Chadian and Niger Islamic mercenaries, attacked and killed 90 Tarok farmers in Yelwa 
inclusive of 48 axed to death inside a church where they had sought refuge, with the 
church then razed. A few days after this killing, Christians from the Gerkawa community 
in a retaliatory attack, killed some 40 Muslim neighbors with cutlasses or swords, and 
burned their bodies. Following this development, the army moved in to evacuate about 
3,000 Muslims from Gerkawa to Yelwa, while Christians fearing further attacks fled 
Yelwa (Kendal, 2004, para. 11-12). 
Other phenomenal nodes in this study phase include targeted, pre-meditated or 
orchestrated killings and assaults (Onishi, 2001a); terrorist activities; and threats or fears 
of more attacks, protests or warnings of full scale war (“Dozens Dead,” 2004; “Nigerian 
Muslims,” 2004; Simmons, 2000; “Violent,” 2001). Further phenomenal nodes that 
emerged from this phase are tit-for-tat killings in northern states (“Religious and Ethnic 
Clashes,” 2001; Sengupta, 2004a, 2004b). Further phenomenal nodes in this study phase 
are uprising, anti-government rioting, protests or demonstrations; and violent or deadly 
clashes, rioting or gun battles. By comparing and contrasting of these phenomenal nodes 
and categories, two major categories involving targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated 
killings and assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism 
are identified as being closely associated with the proclivity to genocide. 
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3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious  
 Conflict and Genocidal Proclivity  
 Developed: Phase IV – 1996 to 2005 
 
Additionally included this study phase is the contextual framework which proffers 
the geographic dimension of social space or lebensraum for genocide proclivity to foster 
(Wood, 2001). These contexts are Northern region or states including Abuja;  Bauchi 
state; Benue state, in Gbeji, Vaase, and Zaki-Biam; Kwara state, in Ilorin; Kaduna state, 
in Kaduna, Kafanchan, and Zaria; Kano state, in Kano - Sabon-Gari; Kebbi state; 
Nasarawa state; Niger state; Plateau state, in Jos, Kadyal, Kanam District, Langtang, and 
Yelwa; Sokoto state; Taraba state; and Zamfara state. The study data also showed 
reprisals or retaliatory killings in Southern states including Abia state, in Aba; Anambra 
state, in Onitsha; Lagos state, in Lagos; and Niger Delta state in Odi where there occurred  
extrajudicial killings and the ethnic violence in Lagos. (See Tables 1 and 2 for the various 
contexts for this phase, respectively for the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, and 
for the reprisal attacks in the south). 
Further providing the contextual framework in this study phase are varying 
conflict parties in the different phenomenal settings for the conflict. The conflict parties 
identified in this phase include Muslim mobs/gangs, civilian mobs or sect and Ibos 
(“Deadly Rioting,” 2000; Onishi, 2000; Tostevin, 2000). Conflict parties for the phase 
also include Muslim mobs or sect and security forces (Sengupta, 2004b); Muslim sect 
and other Muslims or sect; Muslim mobs, sect or groups and Christians; security agents 
and unidentified civilians; and different ethnic groups as in the Tiv/Jukun long-drawn 
crisis (“Nigeria: Government Sets Up Inquiry,” 2001). Other conflict parties in this phase 
are northern states government and Christians (Ahiante 2004); and Fulani herdsmen or 
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Hausa-Fulani group and Christian or host communities (“At Least 30 Killed,” 2003; 
“Muslim Mobs,” 2004; “Nigerian Muslims,” 2004; Sengupta, 2004b). Such conflict 
parties were analyzed by comparison and contrast with the phenomenal conflict nodes 
and categories and their causal conditions to identify conflicts with plausibility of a 
conceptualized annihilating difference (Hinton, 2002) which lead to exterminations 
involving perpetrator and victim situations, while conflicts devoid of such annihilating 
difference are considered clashes or fighting between parties without overt genocidal 
proclivity. 
Additionally identified in this study phase are varying perpetrator-groups using 
the annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties described above which include 
Muslim mobs, rioters or rampaging Muslim youths (Ahiante, 2004; “Dozens Dead,” 
2004; “Muslim Mobs,” 2004; Onishi, 2001b). Other perpetrator groups include Fulani 
herdsmen or Fulani-Hausa group or gunmen (Sengupta, 2004b); and also emergent under 
the perpetrator category are Christian militia or youths, which other than the reprisals in 
the south, primarily involve the Yelwa May 2004 killing of Muslims presumably by 
Christian militia. It is thus noted, however, that in this killing episode of Yelwa Muslims 
said to have been done by Christian militia, that “Yelwa had already witnessed one of the 
worst atrocities of the conflict in February, when Muslim militia killed almost 100 
Christians, including 48 killed in a church that they later burned” (“Nigerian Muslims,” 
2004, para. 24). Moreover, while also contesting the allegation of the Yelwa May 2004 
killings, Christians counter that: 
…the use of the term ‘Christian Militia’ implied that the Church has armed and 
trained people to launch attacks on Muslims, when in reality the church has gone 
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to great lengths to discourage retaliation. Local sources point out that assailants 
were local non-Muslim farmers who had been violently displaced from their lands 
and had waited several years in some instances for government protection and 
redress. When this was not forthcoming, they took the law into their own hands 
and launched the attack on Yelwa. (CSW, n.d. p. 12) 
Other perpetrator groups identified in this study phase are security agents, 
soldiers, the army/military, and Hausa/Northern troops, and these involve extrajudicial 
killings. For instance, in the May 2004 Kano killings that were supposedly retaliatory to 
the Yelwa killings of May 2 killings (“Muslim Mobs,” 2004), CAN condemned some 
Muslim policemen’s brutality who were observed “to have intentionally and 
indiscriminately shot and killed many Christians in Sabon Gari and other parts of the 
state” (CSW, n.d., p. 7). Details of the involvement of the perpetrator groups in the 
different conflict settings of this study phase are analyzed and discussed in Phase IV 
synopsis above. 
Additionally, this study phase reveals target victim groups which foster the 
developing of annihilating difference amidst a perpetrator group and social space 
environment to produce a complete and well-rounded and contextual setting for the 
flourishing of a tendency to genocide (Hinton, 2002). Target or victim groups identified 
in this study phase include Christians and churches (Ahiante, 2004; “Dozens Dead,” 
2004; Koinange, 2001; Lacey, 2002; Mcveigh, 2002; “Muslim Mobs,” 2004; “Nigerian 
Muslims,” 2004; Obateru & Mamah, 2004; “Religious Riots,” 2001; Simmons, 2000; 
“Violent,” 2001); and Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian villages (Sengupta, 
2004b). Target victims in this phase also include civilian targets (“13 Nigerians Die,” 
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2001; “At Least 30 Killed,” 2003; “Hundreds Flee,” 2002; Mcveigh, 2002; “Nigeria: 
Government Sets Up Inquiry,” 2001; Onishi, 2001a). Other target victims are Southerners 
who are predominantly Christians as in the reprisals in Lagos in which Yorubas were the 
primary target victims (“3rd Day,” 2002), and especially Ibos as targets (Ahiante, 2004; 
“Deadly Rioting,” 2000; “Dozens Dead,” 2004; “Muslim Mobs,” 2004; Onishi, 2000; 
“Religious Riots,” 2001; “Violent,” 2001). 
Target victims in this phase also include security agents - police officers, military 
and government officials; media offices and journalists; beer parlors, hotels, banks and 
other facilities (structures or institutions with Western connotations); and Muslims, 
Hausa-Fulani herders, Muslim sect, Northerners or mosques as in reprisals in southern 
states (“Deadly Rioting,” 2000; Onishi, 2000) and in the November 2002 Miss World 
pageant crisis in Kaduna in which it is observed, for instance, that: 
One policeman and one soldier were arrested on allegations of dragging 15 
Muslim men out of their homes and killing them…The victims' bodies were then 
thrown into a river… 
There were also reports that police officers and soldiers gunned down 
more than a dozen other civilians without provocation, he said. A police 
spokesman could not immediately confirm the reports. (“Hundreds Flee,” 2002, 
para. 15-16) 
Other target victims identified in this phase are Muslims, Hausa-Fulani herders, 
Muslim sect, Northerners or mosques, involving mainly the Yelwa, May 2004 killings, 
presumably by Christian militia (CSW, n.d.; “Hundreds Die in Attack on Nigerian 
Village,” 2004; “Muslim Mobs,” 2004; “Nigerian Muslims,” 2004). Details of the 
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victimhood of the targets in the different conflict settings of this study phase are also 
analyzed and discussed in Phase IV synopsis above. 
4. Intervening Conditions  
 Influencing Proclivity to  
 Genocide: Phase IV – 1996 to 2005 
 
This study phase additionally  identified intervening conditions in the different 
conflict contextual settings in addition to the contexts which are factors generally 
involving such broad conditions which influence by increasing or diminishing the 
proclivity to genocide. Intervening conditions in this phase of the study include, press 
censorship and manipulation or deflation and inflation of casualty figures, which used by 
government officials on occasions to minimize or scale-up reprisals or tit-for-tat violence 
tactics. For instance, the toll for the Kano May 2004 killings said to be about 500-600, 
were confirmed to have been over 3000 by CAN Kano, who “also alleged that in an 
effort to hide the true number of casualties, the state government had thrown the bodies 
of some victims into the Challawa River and given several others a mass burial” (CAN as 
cited in CSW, n.d., p. 7). 
Other intervening conditions in this phase are extrajudicial killings and army 
involvement in policing as in the May 2004 Kano killings. Intervening conditions in this 
phase also include government ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government. For 
instance, in the Jos Muslim-Christian incessant upheavals in Plateau state, it is observed 
in 2004, that: 
On Sunday 22 February Yamini village was completely destroyed by Fulani 
herders who claimed to be chasing cattle thieves. Then on 24 February, came the 
attack on Yelwa during which 41 people were killed and burnt in a church and 38 
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murdered outside it. Every church in Yelwa was destroyed save one that was no 
longer in use, and the Christian population fled the area as it became clear that the 
state government was unable to protect them. (CSW, n.d., p. 5) 
Other intervening conditions in this study phase are collaborators or bystanders 
involving both local and foreign collaborators that lead to an internationalization of the 
conflict. Onishi (2001b) observes, for instance, that “To Christians in Jos, Muslims are 
more aggressive and are getting strong support from the Arab world. By contrast, African 
Christians can no longer rely on the backing of a secular West” (para. 31). Thus, there is 
an indication of foreign involvement in the persisting Muslim-Christian clashes in 
Plateau state, with Christians affirming that: 
…the bulk of this violence has been perpetrated by Hausa-Fulanis accompanied 
by paid fighters from neighboring Republics, and whose victims have 
overwhelmingly been Christians and traditional believers. They feel the constant 
presence of foreigners during these attacks indicates the international dimensions 
of the violence in Plateau State and northern Nigeria, linking the perpetrators of 
the violence with the global Islamist movement. (CSW, n.d. p. 1) 
This phase of the study also reveals that further influencing the tendency to 
increase or deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control 
the violence with their implementation. Intervention efforts in this study phase include 
aid and relief support, rehabilitation efforts or calls for rebuilding of churches, 
reconciliation attempts; control measures taken such as curfews and road checks by 
security agents, investigations and commissions of inquiries set up, calls to address the 
constitutionality of Sharia law and security issues, mopping-up of rioters or arrests made, 
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warnings or calls for action, restraint, justice, or self-defense, and attempts to dialogue, 
and appeals for intervention or mediation. 
5. Strategies Foreshadowing 
 Proclivity to Genocide:  
 Phase IV – 1996 to 2005 
 
This study phase also reveals different strategies foreshadowing the tendency 
towards genocide within the contextual settings and intervening conditions with the 
resultant phenomena as described above including organization, planning, and weaponry; 
and extermination plot involving mass murders or ideological and ethnic cleansing 
involving, for instance, burning of churches, or forceful conversion of Christians to 
Islam. For example, following an attack and flight of non-Muslims from Yamini village 
in Plateau state, it is observed (CSW, n.d. p. 5) that: 
…portraits of Osama Bin Laden were hoisted in Yelwa, and the area was declared 
as part of Zamfara State in a mock celebration marking ‘the total eradication of 
the infidels and all that belongs to them’…The crowd went on to attack Nshar, a 
settlement of the Gomai people situated close to Yelwa. Churches, buildings and 
the Yam Market were razed to the ground. This was followed by attacks on the 
villages of Ajikamai, Lakushim Tumbi, Tukung, Goedo, Mangoro, and Pandam, 
and official targets in Kwapjur…1,500 people were killed during this orgy of 
violence (CSW, n.d. p.5). 
The strategies identified in this study phase also include indoctrination, 
manipulation ,or instigation. It is noted on the Plateau state conflicts, for instance, that: 
The Emir’s appointee as Chairman of the Wase Local Government Area…was 
accused of fuelling the violence along with his boss. Not only is he reported to 
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have attempted to incite hatred during the violence in 2002 by falsely claiming to 
have seen the corpses of 5000 Muslims scattered in the bush…he also initially 
refused to pay for the feeding of soldiers stationed around Kadarko, the largest 
remaining Christian town in Wase. [He]…commandeered a local government 
vehicle and sent it…to gather mercenary reinforcement from Bashar and its 
surrounding areas. (CSW, n.d. p. 4) 
6. Consequences or Effects of 
 Proclivity to Genocide: 
 Phase IV – 1996 - 2005 
 
The strategies adopted by perpetrators in this study phase have different 
consequences or effects in the different conflict settings examined. Consequences 
identified in this phase include death toll and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned 
corpses (“3rd Day,” 2002; Ahiante, 2004; “Deadly Rioting,” 2000; “Dozens Dead,” 
2004; Koinange, 2001; Lacey, 2002; Mcveigh, 2002; “Miss World,” 2002; “Muslim 
Mobs,” 2004; “Nigerian Leader Admits,” 2002; “Nigerian Muslims,” 2004; Obateru & 
Mamah, 2004; Onishi, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; “Religious and Ethnic Clashes,” 2001; 
Sengupta, 2003, 2004b). Other consequences include refugees and displaced persons, as 
well as persons fleeing homes or taking refuge or shelter for safety; mass graves or mass 
burials (“Nigerian Muslims,” 2004; Onishi, 2001a; Simmons, 2000; “Violent,” 2001);  
churches burned, bombed or destroyed (“13 Nigerians Die,” 2001; Ahiante, 2004; 
“Hundreds Flee,” 2002; Koinange, 2001; Lacey, 2002; “Miss World,” 2002; Sengupta, 
2003, 2004b); and mosques burned or destroyed (“13 Nigerians Die,” 2001; “Hundreds 
Flee,” 2002; Lacey, 2002; Onishi, 2000). Consequences in this phase also include 
Christian businesses, homes, hotels and properties destroyed (Ahiante, 2004; “Hundreds 
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Flee,” 2002; Simmons, 2000); destroying, looting and razing of properties; and denial of 
freedom of worship and desecration of Christian religion. For instance, in a press 
conference by northern executives of CAN in Lagos, following the May 2004 crises in 
Yelwa and Kano, it is observed that: 
Today, we are not only being denied freedom of worship, but also freedom of 
association. We were told at the early stage of the Sharia introduction that it will 
not affect non- Muslims. We can tell you without fear of contradiction that this is 
far from the truth. For example, while Churches have been demolished in some of 
the Sharia states, a number of others have also been marked out for demolition in 
Zamfara State. The case in Kano has been worst…. (Ahiante, 2004, para. 30) 
Also in this phase are consequences for security threat, apprehension, anxiety or 
political and social chaos (“Dozens Dead,” 2004; Simmons, 2000; Tostevin, 2000; 
“Violent,” 2001). Consequences also revealed normalcy or calm returning after episodes 
of gruesome exterminations, showing an intermittency of occurrence in the killings 
(Sengupta, 2004a).  
End of Model Application for Phase IV 
Study Phase V – 2006 to Present: Synopsis. The fifth study phase spans from 
2006 to present, with Nigeria’s present 36 states still operative (see Map I in Appendix 
A). The preceding and incumbent presidents of the country over this phase of the study 
include Umaru Yar’Adua who was elected and became President and Commander in 
Chief of the Federal republic of Nigeria in May 2007. Yar’Adua died in office May 2010 
and his Vice President Goodluck Jonathan became President from May 2010, and re-
elected, May 2011, Jonathan is the Nigeria’s incumbent president. 
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This study phase also evidences the increasing direct links between religious 
tensions in the country and outside happenings in the world, as seen in the February 2006 
entire Islamic world demonstrations in response to a Danish newspaper cartoon satirizing 
the Prophet Mohammed, which turned violent in Nigeria with the riots claiming dozens 
of lives in Maiduguri, Bauchi, Katsina, and Onitsha (BBC News as cited in Falola & 
Heaton, 2008, p. 239). On the extent of carnage that was perpetrated in the cartoon riots 
in Maiduguri, it is observed that: 
At least 65 Christians were killed, 57 churches were destroyed and hundreds of 
Christian businesses razed to the ground when Muslims rampaged through 
Maiduguri on 18 February, allegedly in protest at the publication in Denmark the 
previous year of cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed. Many victims were 
burnt alive, often by neighbors they had known for years. The final death toll may 
be much higher than stated. After the arrival of the mutilated corpses of Igbo 
victims occasioned retaliatory attacks on Muslims by Igbo youths in southern 
Nigeria, the Borno State Government refused to immediately release any more 
bodies for burial, fearing that such a move might provoke further violence. It 
sought permission to conduct a mass burial for the remaining victims, but the 
Christian community was loath to agree to this. As a result of this impasse, many 
corpses remained in the local morgue instead of receiving immediate burial, and 
the final death toll is still unknown. (CSW, 2008b, p. 10) 
The violence began and in Maiduguri with the Danish cartoon protests and spread 
with 30 churches razed to the ground and with eighteen people killed, mostly Christians 
(“Toll Rises,” 2006, para. 4). It involved a week’s rioting by Muslim and Christian mobs, 
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which claimed about 157 lives in Maiduguri (Adekoya, 2009, para. 8). Further on this 
crisis, Fisher observes that: 
Mobs of Muslim protesters swarm through Maiduguri…with machetes, sticks and 
iron rods…One group threw a tire around a man, poured gas on him and set him 
ablaze.  
Thousands of rioters burned 15 churches in a three-hour rampage 
… [and] protesters attacked and looted shops owned by minority 
Christians, most of them with origins in the country's south… [And] three 
children and a priest were among those killed. (2006, para. 5-7) 
Additionally, in Bauchi 25 were killed as Muslims attacked Christians, as noted 
by the Red Cross, with the violence said to have been fuelled by allegation of desecration 
of the Koran by a Christian teacher. And, in Onitsha there were reprisals in response to 
the attacks on Christians in the north, with about 30 people (mostly northern Muslims) 
killed and two mosques burned, even as the violence sparked off with rumors of some 
northerners having attacked and killed some children in a primary school (Polgreen, 
2006; “Toll Rises,” 2006, para. 5-7, 9). 
Furthermore, in November 2008, a disputed election of a local government 
chairmanship position led to Muslim-Christian gang clashes in which about 400 people 
were killed in Jos, Plateau state (Adekoya, 2009, para, 9). Countering this positioning on 
the crisis, however, the CSW observes that: 
Several international news agencies have reported that the violence was triggered 
by the results of a local government election. However, sources in Jos point out 
that voting passed off peacefully and the violence broke out in the early hours of 
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Friday 28 November before electoral results had even been announced. Moreover, 
instead of targeting political institutions, rioters armed with guns, spears, 
machetes and other weapons immediately attacked Christian businesses, churches 
and the homes of clergymen. A local source informed Christian Solidarity 
Worldwide: “As usual they took Jos by surprise, and are now hiding behind 
election results to launch and excuse their mayhem.” (CSW, 2008a, para. 2) 
It is further observed in this November 2008 conflict in Jos that there was an 
errant reporting of about 300 Muslims who were said to have been killed by Christians, 
with the bodies deposited in a mosque. The men were noted rather to have been shot as 
they launched fresh attacks in defiance to the authorities imposed night curfew, while 
also staging a large-scale unsuccessful attack on police barracks. According to the CSW, 
“the men died while obeying orders from a mosque in the Dilimi area, which was using 
its loudspeakers to instruct all Muslims to defy the authorities, participate in the ‘jihad’, 
loot properties for money and then burn them” (CSW, 2008a, para. 3). Additionally, 
about 16 churches were noted burned down, with the death toll of Christians killed in the 
attack put at about 100, including four or more pastors shot dead, one of the Church of 
Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) and another of the Evangelical Church of West Africa 
(ECWA), and two others (CSW, 2008a, para. 4). 
Furthermore, in January 2010 there were sporadic clashes between Muslims and 
Christians in Jos which resulted in a death toll estimate that ranged from 30 to 300 in 
three days of fighting. The violence is observed to have started on “Sunday when Muslim 
youths attacked a church…and they were resisted by church members” (Nossiter, 2010a, 
para. 4), resulting in the macheting of several persons most of who are Christians, with 
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more than 100 bodies seen in Red Cross trucks being carried to the morgue (Rev. Joel as 
cited in Nossiter, 2010a, para. 6). 
Moreover, in March 2010 also, in a “vicious ethnic violence” said to have been 
reprisal attacks for the January 2010 crisis in Jos, about 500 people (mostly women and 
children) were killed in Dogon Na Hauwa near Jos in Plateau state by Hausa-Fulani 
herders (Nossiter, 2010f, para. 1). It is also observed in this killing episode that: 
The dead were Christians and members of an ethnic group that had been feuding 
with the Hausa-Fulani, Muslim herders whom witnesses and police officials 
identified as the attackers. 
Early Sunday, the attackers set upon the villagers with machetes, killing 
women and children in their homes and ensnaring the men who tried to flee in 
fishnets and animal traps, then massacring them, according to a Nigerian rights 
group whose investigators went to the area. Some homes were set on fire. 
A few miles south of the city nearly 400 of the victims were buried in a 
mass grave in Dogon Na Hauwa, the village where the worst violence occurred. 
Some of the bodies had been mutilated. (Nossiter, 2010f, para. 2-3, 8) 
This phase is equally, also interlaced with religious upheavals primarily involving 
a fundamentalist Islamic sect, the Boko Haram group whose Arabic name translated, 
means Western education is forbidden or illegal (Adekoya, 2009), with goal to institute 
Sharia in Nigeria (“700 die,” 2009; “Boko Haram,” 2012; “Christian Groups,” 2009; 
“Emergency Declared,” 2011; “In Nigeria’s North,” 2011; Lobel, 2012; Mohammed & 
Idonor, 2012; Mojeed & Nossiter, 2012; “Muslim Sect,” 2011; “Thousands Flee,” 2009; 
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“Toll Rises,” 2006). In 2009 there was the Boko Haram uprising which was an 
insurgency by a fundamentalist Islamic group, Boko Haram, against security forces. 
In July 2009, following the arrest of some Boko Haram members, the sect staged 
attacks in Bauchi in which over 50 people were killed, with more than 100 arrests made 
(Adekoya, 2009, para. 2). The violence soon spread to Borno, Kano, and Yobe states, 
with 5 policemen and 60 others killed, and in Potiskum, Yobe state, a Police station was 
burned down (Adekoya, 2009, para. 4). In Maiduguri, Borno state, over 100 were 
reported killed in the bloodbath that ensued (BBC report as cited in Adekoya, 2009, para. 
5). In an encounter with the Boko Haram group following the deployment of troops to the 
area, 43 of the sect members were killed in Hawan Malka in Yobe State, while the leader 
of the sect, one Mohammed Yusuf who was arrested in Maiduguri, was shortly killed in 
custody (Adekoya, 2009, para. 6-7). In Bauchi state, further violence led to additional 
death toll of about 11 with 28 gravely wounded, as well as the razing down of churches, 
mosques, and several houses (Adekoya, 2009, para. 9). 
The Boko Haram has since this 2009 confrontation with security forces become 
more proficient and increasingly sophisticated in its attacks, claiming responsibility or 
being blamed for various attacks on different targets including security agents, symbols 
of government authority including the United Nations which was bombed in August 
2011, and police stations (“Deadly Christian-Muslim Clash,” 2011; “Multiple 
Explosions,” 2011; “Nigeria Group Threatens,” 2011). The sect has been involved in 
“numerous instances of violence…in Nigeria, including many targeting Christians,” as in 
the “car bomb attack…outside a Catholic church in Jos that left six dead…And on 
Christmas Day, a string of bombings struck churches in several cities” (Akau, 2012, para. 
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9-11). Thus, the sect has repeatedly mounted attacks on several churches in the north 
amidst worship services (Bello, 2012; Ohai, 2012; Orude, 2012a, 2012b) as in the 
December 2011, Christmas day bombing of a church in Madalla (Akau, 2012; “Christmas 
Carnage,” 2012). On this onslaught on Christians it is observed that: 
The Boko Haram sect made good its threat to bomb churches and other places 
across the nation on Christmas Day. An alleged suicide bomber smashed a bomb-
laden vehicle into a throng of Christian faithful streaming out of St. Theresa’s 
Catholic Church, Madalla, Niger State, after an early morning Christmas Day 
Mass, killing no fewer than 43 persons and severely injuring over 73. 
The bombing in Madalla, on the outskirts of Abuja, caused no little stir as 
pictures of decapitated bodies from the incident splashed across local and 
international media, putting the nation’s serious security predicament in bold 
relief on the global stage. (Sokunbi, 2012, para. 1-2) 
Furthermore, in January 2012 Boko Haram in a bloody attack wave in Gombe and 
Mubi, Adamawa State, with the assailants firing into the crowd, killed 28 people 
wounding several others in the region. The sect launched a deadly attack on a Deeper 
Life Christian Church in Nassarawo, Gombe state, during the church’s prayer service, 
with the assailants armed with AK47 rifles and many in number shot through the church 
windows, killing six worshippers including the pastor’s wife and wounding 10 others. 
This episode was shortly followed by the sect’s storming of a meeting venue of Ibos 
gathered in Mubi, Adamawa state, to plan on transporting a kinsman’s body that was shot 
dead by unidentified assassins and killing all the Ibo mourners at the venue (Ohai, 2012, 
para. 1-2, 8). It is observed that “Both attacks came before the expiration of a three-day 
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ultimatum issued by Boko Haram to southern Christians living in northern Nigeria to 
pack and leave the region or face dire consequences” (Ohai, 2012, para. 6), as panic 
spreads among southerners living in Mubi (Ohai, 2012) and the entire north. 
This study period, thus, also evidences a continued deliberate targeting of 
Christians and southerners, particularly Ibos, during episodes of violence in the northern 
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. For instance, while addressing the human rights 
concerns of the individual’s entitlement to state protection against bodily harm and 
violence under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) it is observed that: 
A feature of the violence in northern Nigeria is the fact that people from the Igbo 
tribe are targeted, whether or not they profess Christianity. The victimization of 
Igbos by the Hausa Fulanis regardless of their religious creed may largely stem 
from historical reasons. However, the regularity of targeted attacks on a specific 
racial group and the lack of legal consequences for its perpetrators and organisers 
may amount to a violation, albeit by omission, of Nigeria’s obligations under 
CERD. (CSW, 2008b, p. 13) 
Additionally, in March 2012, 11 people were killed and 22 injured in a bomb 
attack on St. Finbarr's Catholic Church in Jos on a Sunday morning (Ehiabhi, 2012a, 
para. 1), and it is noted as “the second attack on a church in less than a month after the 
explosion at Church of Christ in Nigeria, COCIN which left 3 dead and 38 injured” 
(Tilley-Gyado, 2012, para. 3). Moreover, in April 2012 about 25 people were killed and 
13 wounded in an Easter Sunday bombing in Kaduna, on which it is observed that “dead 
bodies littered the road…after a massive explosion that…shattered windows of a nearby 
305 
 
 
church where worshipers were celebrating Easter” (Akau, 2012, para. 1). Also on Easter 
Sunday morning in Kaduna, a suicide car bomber turned away from church premises to 
attack Christians holding Easter services struck a busy road killing about 38 people and 
injuring many others, even as it is observed that “Churches have been increasingly 
targeted by violence on holy days in Nigeria” (“Suicide Bombing,” 2012, para. 7). More 
so, in April 2012 also, 22 people including two professors were killed and several others 
wounded in a coordinated attack of bomb blasts and gun fire on a Catholic church at the 
Bayero University, Kano even as “the bombers threw bombs to draw out the worshippers 
having laid siege on the churches,” such that “The worshippers who escaped the bomb 
blasts rushed out of the theatre to heavy gunfire” (Bello, 2012b, p. 2-3). It is also further 
observed that in April 2012, “A bomb was detonated in the Sabon-Gari area of Kano 
City…on Sunday,” an area that “is mostly occupied by Christians and non-indigenes in 
the ancient city,” even as “Earlier in the year, Kano City was rocked by multiple bomb 
blasts which killed hundreds of people” (Ehiabhi, 2012c, para. 1, 7-8). 
In June 2012, two churches were bombed in Bauchi, killing 15 people and 
wounding 42 others even as “the suicide bomber forced his [explosive laden] car into a 
group of worshippers” outside the churches, the “Living Faith and Harvest Field, both 
located in the Yelwa Tudu area of the Bauchi metropolis” (Alli & Tsenzughul, 2012, 
para. 1, 3, 19). Also in June 2012 three suicide bomb attacks were made on churches in 
Kaduna state, killing 21 people and injuring about 100 others. Two of the bomb blasts 
were said to have “occurred within minutes of each other and targeted churches in the 
city of Zaria,” killing at least one person in addition to the bomber, and wounding 51 
others, while “A third blast hit a church in the city of Kaduna about half an hour later,” 
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killing 10 people and wounding 29 others (“Nigerian Church Blasts,” 2012, para. 1-3). 
Again in August 2012 there was mass shooting at Deeper Life Church near Okene, Kogi 
state, in which 19 people were killed including the pastor of the church, by three 
unidentified gunmen (“Nigeria Church Attack,” 2012). Such gruesome exterminations 
and killings have continued unabated in the north, and these “attacks, especially on 
churches and Christians, have prompted the Christian Association of Nigeria to warn that 
Christians would be forced to defend themselves against being made sitting ducks if the 
government cannot guarantee their safety” (Onah et al., 2012, para. 10). 
Applying the Genocide Proclivity Model in Phase V – 2006 to Present. The 
coding list for the emergent nodes or codes for the study Phase V are provided in 
Appendix C: Coding List E. The application of the emergent nodes from study Phase V 
to the Genocidal Proclivity Model on page 199 follows. 
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena  
 Relating to Genocidal Proclivity: 
 Phase V – 2006 to Present 
 
This fifth study phase also shows causal conditions which lead ultimately to 
genocidal proclivity under the four identified causation factors of immediate or trigger 
factors, underlying or root causes, perceived threat of the “otherness,” and exclusive 
ideological framing. This phase reveals trigger or immediate causal factors including 
arrests or persecution of fundamentalist sect members, religious extremism, and violence 
or other fundamentalists activities; election-related and engineered violence; insurgency, 
uprising, or anti-government riots; Islam degraded, desecration and/or misinterpretation 
of Koran, the Danish Cartoon; and Massacres of Ibos and returning refugees, as in the 
January 2012, in which Boko Haram in Mubi, Adamawa State stormed a community 
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meeting of Ibos gathered to plan on transporting the body of a kinsman that was shot 
dead by unidentified assassins (Ohai, 2012, para. 1-2, 8). Other emergent trigger factors 
include reprisal mission or revenge. For instance, in the March 2010 killings in Dogo Na 
Hauwa, Nossiter (2010d) observes that “dozens of…herdsmen descended on a 
slumbering village…and slaughtered hundreds with machetes, knives and cutlasses in a 
brutal act of sectarian retribution,” with about 500 people reported to have been “killed in 
the early hours of [the] morning, in three different villages” (para. 3). 
This study phase also includes a second set of causal conditions comprising 
underlying or root causes to the conflict involving historical factors among others. For 
instance, in the said Dogo Na Hauwa, Plateau state vicious killing of over 500 of a 
Christian ethnic group by the Hausa-Fulani herdsmen, it is observed that: 
Nigeria’s Middle Belt, a band of fertile land that straddles the largely Muslim 
north and the Christian south, has always been a hotbed of ethnic and religious 
violence, and Plateau State, of which Jos is the capital, has borne the brunt. 
Most of the state’s original inhabitants come from tribes that are almost 
entirely Christian and animist, but the farmland and grazing pasture has attracted 
migrants for centuries, especially Muslim Hausa and Fulani people from the more 
arid north. (Polgreen, 2008, para. 10-11) 
Other underlying causal factors in this study phase include culture of bad 
governance and corruption or oppressive military rule (Murray & Nossiter, 2009); and Al 
Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian links including illegal aliens (“Nigeria 
Group Threatens,” 2011; “Nigerian Death Toll From Boko Haram,” 2012; “Nigerian 
Death Toll Rises,” 2009; Nossiter, 2010d, 2011; “Nigeria: Police Arrest,” 2012; “Scores 
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Killed,” 2011; Shuaibu, 2012; Smith, 2009; “Unidentified Gunmen,” 2011). Further 
underlying causation in this phase are political underpinnings or power struggle which 
include issues infiltration and politicization of religion; and political divisions and 
tensions (“Boko Haram,” 2012; Nossiter, 2010e; Ojo, 2012; Sokunbi, 2012; “Thousands 
Flee,” 2009). Other emergent underlying causation nodes in this phase also include socio-
economic factors involving ethnic groups vying for control of fertile lands, political and 
economic power; indigenes and settlers issues; and poverty, unemployment, lack of 
education, and discontent (“At Least 200 Die,” 2008; “At Least 21 Are Killed,” 2011; 
Murray & Nossiter, 2009). 
Additionally, this phase comprises the third set of causal factors of perceived 
threat of the “otherness” including ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and 
animosities; and North-South split or largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south. 
Polgreen (2008) observes, for instance, that “the religious divide in this nation of more 
than 250 ethnic groups mirrors a geographical one, between a historically Muslim north 
and a Christian and animist south, as well as deep political divisions that cross religious 
lines” (para. 8). Other perception of “otherness” threat nodes are annihilation attempts by 
targeting (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Chidiogo, 2012; Garrison 1968a; Mgboh, 2012a; 
Nossiter, 2010f; Orude 2012) and/or forceful conversion of Christians to Islam (Ahiante, 
2004; Brooke, 1987b; “Christian Groups,” 2009); and ultimatum to southern Christians 
living in the North to leave the region (Ohai, 2012; Onah et al., 2012). 
This study phase also shows emergent nodes and categories for the fourth set of 
causal conditions of exclusive ideological framing which include issues with religious 
dimensions, anti-Western or ideological differences (“Nigerian Villages,” 2010; Nossiter, 
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2010c, 2011; Polgreen, 2008); and fundamentalism and religious fervency (“‘Irate 
Youths’ Burn Down,” 2006; Nossiter, 2010c; Orude, 2012). Other emergent exclusive 
ideological framing nodes in this phase include Sharia or Islamic law institution in 
northern Nigeria, involving non-Muslim opposition to Sharia, unconstitutionality and 
violation of fundamental rights of Christians and other non-Muslims in Sharia operative 
states (Adekoya, 2009; Fisher, 2006; Lobel. 2012); gender segregation matters (Nossiter, 
2010c); Sharia implementation, anti-establishment, or anti-Western ideology (“700 die,” 
2009; “Christian Groups,” 2009; Mojeed & Nossiter, 2012; Mshelizza, 2011); and moves 
towards imposing Sharia across Nigeria or establishing an Islamic state (“Boko Haram,” 
2012; Lobel, 2012; Mohammed & Idonor, 2012; “Nigerian Death Toll From Boko 
Haram,” 2012). 
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors,  
 Underlying Causation, Perceived Threat of  
 the “Otherness” and Exclusive Ideological  
 Framing: Phase V – 2006 to Present 
This study phase also shows that the causal conditions—the trigger factor, 
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing 
in varying situations and contextual settings—resulted in different degrees and forms of 
killings and exterminations primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians and 
other conflict parties which are divided mostly along ethnic and religious lines. The 
subjective phenomena identified from the study data in this phase reveal violence 
unleashed to different target victims including, assault, shoot-out, killings, arson and 
looting; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism as in the July 
2009, Boko Haram crisis in Maiduguri which “led to the beheading of 11 Christians 
including three Pastors and the burning of 20 churches” (Adekoya, 2009; “Christian 
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Groups,” 2009, para. 2; Nossiter, 2010e). Further phenomenal nodes in this study phase 
include bombings, coordinated gun and bomb attacks (Ohai, 2012; Pedro, 2011; Tilley-
Gyado, 2012); as well as phenomenal nodes for genocide as in the July 2009 Boko 
Haram onslaught on Christians in Maiduguri in which it was observed that: 
“The Boko Haram sect went about wielding dangerous weapons and abducting 
Christians to the enclave of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf in the name of 
implementing Sharia in Nigeria. They were forcefully converted to Islam after 
they were tortured.” 
“Three pastors and eight other Christians who resisted the forceful 
conversion were beheaded on the order of the leader of the Islamic sect. while 20 
churches were burnt to ashes by the fundamentalists.” (Dogo as cited in 
“Christian Groups,” 2009, para. 10-11) 
Other phenomenal nodes in this phase include political violence, coup d’état and 
political assassinations; religious and ethnic violence; reprisals from southern states; 
sectarian violence; spiral or escalation of violence; and targeted, pre-meditated or 
orchestrated killings and assaults. It is observed, for instance, that in the February 2006 
Danish cartoons episode, Christians in Maiduguri were targeted even as “Protesters in 
Maiduguri turned on the Christian minority, burning churches and shops, and troops… 
[And] Most of the victims in Maiduguri are believed to be Christians because they were 
attacked in churches...A Roman Catholic priest was among those killed” (Myers, 2006, 
para. 14-15). Further phenomenal nodes in this phase include terrorist activities; and 
threats or fears of more attacks, protests or warnings of full scale war (Marama, 2012; 
“Sectarian Attacks Kill 15,” 2012; Sokunbi, 2012; “Violence in Northeast,” 2011). 
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Phenomenal nodes in this phase also include tit-for-tat killings in northern states; 
uprising, anti-government rioting, protests or demonstrations; and violent or deadly 
clashes, rioting or gun battles (“700 die,” 2009; “At Least 200 Die,” 2008; “Boko 
Haram,” 2012; Chidiogo, 2011; Ohai, 2012). By comparing and contrasting such 
phenomenal nodes and categories, two major categories involving targeted, pre-meditated 
or orchestrated killings and assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, 
massacres or barbarism are identified as being closely associated with the proclivity to 
genocide. 
3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious Conflict  
 and Genocidal Proclivity Developed: 
 Phase V – 2006 to Present 
 
The study data for this phase also include the different social space or lebensraum, 
which provides a geographic framework on which genocide proclivity can develop 
(Wood, 2001). This involves Northern Region or States including, Abuja – Jabi, and 
Zuba communities; Adamawa State, in Yola, Jimeta, Lamurde, and Mubi; Bauchi State, 
in Bauchi; Benue State, in Makurdi, Dooga, Kpata, Lokobi, Ajimaka, Ekeae, Giza, 
Yogbo, and Mbgawem border communities, Gwer West Local Government Area, Zongo 
Akiki, Nyijir, Tse Taki, and Agbeke in Guma areas; Borno State, in Maiduguri, Dala, 
Yan’tebura, Bulukuntu Tsallake, and Zajeri; Jigawa State, in Dutse; Gombe State; 
Kaduna State, in Kaduna, Kafanchan, Kufara, Ori-Apata, Zaria, Zonkwa, and Zango-
Kataf; Kano State, in Kano, Bompai, and Sabon-Gari; Katsina State, in Katsina; 
Nasarawa State, in Alago, Doma Town, Eke and Giza Areas, Kadarko, Tiv settlements at 
Kpata, Donga, Lokobi, and Ajimaka; Niger State, in Minna - Angwan Kuje, and Madalla; 
Plateau State, in Jos, Barkin Ladi,  Bukuru, Dogon Na Hauwa, Kuru Karama, Wareng, 
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Yelwa, Zot, and Ratsat; Sokoto State; Taraba State, in Jalingo; and Yobe State, in 
Damaturu, Gadaka, Geidam, Hawan Malka, and Potiskum; Zamfara State. The phase also 
showed contexts for Southern States where reprisals occurred including Anambra State, 
in Onitsha, Awka, Nnobi, and Nnewi; Delta State, in Asaba; Imo State and Niger Delta. 
(see Tables 1 and 2 for the various contexts, respectively for the northern Nigeria ethno-
religious conflict, and for the reprisal attacks in the south). 
Also providing the contextual framework in this study phase are different conflict 
parties in the different phenomenal settings of the conflict. These include Muslim mobs, 
sect, civilian mobs or gangs and Ibos; Muslim mobs or sect and security forces; Muslim 
mobs, sect or groups and Christians; security agents and unidentified civilians; different 
ethnic groups; northern states government and Christians; and Fulani herdsmen or Hausa-
Fulani group and Christian or host communities. Such emergent conflict nodes were 
analyzed by comparison and contrasted with the phenomenal conflict nodes and 
categories and their causal conditions to identify conflicts with plausibility of a 
conceptualized annihilating difference (Hinton, 2002) which lead to exterminations 
involving perpetrator and victim situations, with other conflicts that are devoid of such 
annihilating difference considered as clashes or fighting between parties without an overt 
inclination to genocide. 
Additionally, varying perpetrator-groups identified in the study using the 
annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties described above include Boko 
Haram Islamic fundamentalist group (“700 die,” 2009; Abdulkadir, 2012b; Akau, 2012; 
“Boko Haram,” 2012; Mgboh, 2012; Ohai, 2012; Onah et al., 2012; Orude, 2012a; 
2012b); Fulani herdsmen or Fulani-Hausa group or gunmen (Ebije & Alabelewe, 2011; 
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Ejembi, 2012; Iferi, 2011; Nossiter, 2010b, 2010d 2010f; Perefoy, 2010; Shiaondo, 
2011); and Muslim mobs, rioters or rampaging Muslim youths (Bello, 2012; Biniyat, 
2012; Chidiogo, 2011; “Deadly Christian-Muslim Clash,” 2011; Myers, 2006; Mojeed & 
Nossiter, 2012; Nossiter, 2010b; Shuaibu, 2012). The perpetrator groups identified also 
include rampaging or under-aged youths and arrested suspects (Connors, 2008; “Deadly 
Christian-Muslim Clash,” 2011; “‘Irate Youths’ Burn Down,” 2006; “Unidentified 
Gunmen,” 2011); and civilian mobs, unidentified attackers or gunmen (“At Least 200 
Die,” 2008; “Attacks Kill,” 2011; Ola & Orude, 2012). 
Also identified are perpetrator nodes for Christian militia or youths which are 
mostly reprisal killings, as in the February 2006 Danish Cartoons reprisals in Onitsha 
(Polgreen, 2006); or the August 2011 revenge attack on a Ramadan gathering in Jos for 
the bomb attacks on Christmas Eve (“Deadly Christian-Muslim Clash,” 2011), and other 
retaliatory killings as in the 2011 Jos reprisals (“Boko Haram,” 2012), and the February 
2012 reprisal killing of two Muslims by Christian youths following the bombing of the 
COCIN church in Jos in which 38 people were killed (Abdulkadir, 2012b). Further 
perpetrator groups are security agents, soldiers, the army or military, Hausa or Northern 
troops as in the numerous cases of extrajudicial killings, unlawful battering and 
indiscriminate firing of unarmed citizens by soldiers and police (“700 die,” 2009; 
Adetunji, 2011; Chidiogo, 2011; Connors, 2008; Nossiter, 2009a, 2010b; Okoye, 2011; 
Tilley-Gyado 2012). Details of the involvement of the perpetrator groups in the different 
conflict settings of this study phase are analyzed and discussed in Phase V synopsis 
above. 
Additionally, this study phase also reveals target victims groups which support the 
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fostering of annihilating difference amidst a perpetrator group and social space 
environment, producing a complete, well-rounded contextual setting for the flourishing of 
proclivity to genocide. Target victim groups identified in this study phase include 
Christians and churches, also involving Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian 
villages (Myers, 2006; Purefoy, 2010; Chidiogo, 2011; Akau, 2012; Ehiabhi, 2012c; 
Onah et al., 2012); civilian targets; Southerners who are predominantly Christians, and 
especially Ibos as targets (“Boko Haram,” 2012; “Christian Groups,” 2009; Ebije & 
Alabelewe, 2011; Ohai, 2012); security agents - police officers, military and government 
officials (“700 die,” 2009; Chidiogo, 2011; Ehiabhi, 2012b; Ola & Orude, 2012); 
symbols of government authority (including the United Nations offices in Abuja) 
(Adekoya, 2009; Mark, 2012; “Nigerian Death Toll Rises,” 2009; “Nigerian Death Toll 
From Boko Haram,” 2011; Pedro, 2011); civilian centers, schools and school children 
(Akau, 2012; Nossiter, 2012; Ola & Orude, 2012; Onah et al., 2012); media offices and 
journalists (Mohammed & Idonor, 2012; “Nigerian Reporter,” 2012; Onyeose, 2012); 
beer parlors, hotels, banks and other facilities (structures or institutions with Western 
connotations); Muslim clerics, mainstream or orthodox Muslims as in the August 2009 
Boko Haram bloodbath in which over 700 were killed by including Muslim clerics 
(“Nigerian Death Toll Rises,” 2009); and Muslims, Hausa-Fulani herders, Muslim sect, 
Northerners or mosques as in reprisals on the post-election violence involving 800 death 
toll for which “In predominately Christian communities in Kaduna State, mobs of 
Christians retaliated by killing Muslims and burning their mosques and properties” 
(Chidiogo, 2011, para. 7). Details of the victimhood of the targets in the different conflict 
settings of this study phase are also analyzed and discussed in Phase V synopsis above. 
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4. Intervening Conditions Influencing 
 Proclivity to Genocide: 
 Phase V – 2006 to Present 
 
This phase of the study also identified intervening conditions in the different 
contextual settings of the conflict in addition to the context nodes. Such intervening 
factors which generally involve broad conditions that influence by increasing or 
diminishing the proclivity to genocide, and identified in this phase include press 
censorship and manipulation or deflation and inflation of casualty figures, which is used 
by government officials on occasions to minimize or scale-up reprisals or tit-for-tat 
violence; and extrajudicial killings and army involvement in policing (Adetunji, 2011; 
Chidiogo, 2011; Nossiter, 2009a; Tilley-Gyado, 2012). Other intervention nodes in this 
study phase include government ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government 
(“Christian Groups,” 2009; Connors, 2008; Okpi, 2012; Onah et al., 2012). 
Further intervention nodes in this phase are the presence of collaborators or 
bystanders involving both local and foreign collaborators which internationalizes the 
conflict. In the January 2012 Kano crisis involving about 185 death toll, for instance, 
about 80% of the 200 attackers arrested were Chadian “mercenaries” and “There were 
indications that the Chadians had been paid to participate in the recent attacks attributed 
to Boko Haram,” even as the group has long been suspected by Nigerian security agents 
“of smuggling arms into the country through the porous northeastern border with Chad 
and Niger” (“Nigeria: Police Arrest,” 2012, para. 1-2, 5-7). Furthermore, according to a 
UN regional security report, “there was evidence suggesting the Nigerian group had 
Chadian members who had received training from Al-Qaeda's North Africa affiliate” 
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(“Nigeria: Police Arrest,” 2012, para. 8), with warning of the group’s effort to “expand its 
activities deep into Central Africa” (“Nigeria: Police Arrest,” 2012, para. 9). 
This study phase further reveals that also influencing the tendency to increase or 
deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control the violence 
with their implementation. Intervention efforts in this phase include aid and relief support 
(“Christian Groups,” 2009; Orude, 2012a; Shiaondo, 2011); rehabilitation efforts or calls 
for rebuilding of churches; reconciliation attempts (Polgreen, 2008); control measures 
taken such as curfews and road checks by security agents (Onah et al., 2012); 
investigations and commissions of inquiries set up; calls to address the constitutionality 
of Sharia law and security issues; military assault or crackdown; mopping-up of rioters or 
arrests made; and warnings or calls for action, restraint, justice, or self-defense as in the 
September 2010, Human Rights Watch call “on the Nigerian government to allow the 
United Nations special adviser on the prevention of genocide, Francis Deng, to visit 
Plateau,” the request for which was not answered (Okoye, 2011, para. 14). Other 
intervention measures in this phase include attempts to dialogue, appeals for intervention 
or mediation (Adetunji, 2011; “Christian Groups,” 2009; “Nigeria: Police Arrest,” 2012). 
5. Strategies of Attack Foreshadowing 
 Proclivity to Genocide:  
 Phase V – 2006 to Present 
 
This study phase also reveals different strategies foreshadowing the tendency 
towards genocide within the contextual settings and intervening conditions with the 
resultant phenomena identified above. Strategies foreshadowing inclinations to genocide 
in this phase include organization and planning including weaponry. For example, in the 
Jos November 2008 violence it is observed that: 
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There is…evidence that the…violence may have been planned in advance. So far 
500 Muslim rioters have been arrested, some of whom were dressed in fake police 
and military uniforms. Two hundred are now known to be citizens of the 
neighboring Republic of Niger, while 300 are from the northern Nigerian states of 
Kano, Katsina and Sokoto. Some of the rioters informed police that they arrived 
in Jos three days prior to the violence. “They had weapons, many weapons” 
…“they were ready, very ready.” (CSW, 2008b, para. 5) 
Also in this phase are the strategies of extermination plot involving mass murders 
or ideological and ethnic cleansing including, for example, the burning of churches, or 
the forceful conversion of Christians to Islam as in the Boko Haram’s forceful conversion 
to Islam of Christians they abducted and killing those who refused to convert (“Christian 
Groups,” 2009). Further strategies include forced migration, for example, refugees and 
displaced persons, and the ultimatum by Boko Haram fundamentalist sect to southern 
Christians to leave the north (Lobel, 2012; Ohai, 2012; Onah et al., 2012; Orude, 2012a, 
2012b). The strategies for this phase also include coordinated attacks involving 
shootings, bombings, maiming, and arson, as well as drive-by or hit and run shootings 
and suicide bombings (“Boko Haram,” 2012; “Emergency Declared,” 2011; Mohammed 
& Idonor, 2012; “Nigerian Death Toll From Boko Haram,” 2012). 
6. Consequences or Effects of 
 Proclivity to Genocide: 
 Phase V – 2006 to Present 
 
The strategies adopted by perpetrators in this study phase have different 
consequences or effects in the different conflict settings examined. Consequences 
identified in this phase include death toll and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned 
318 
 
 
corpses (“At Least 200 Die,” 2008; Binniyat, 2012; Chidiogo, 2011; Mgboh, 2012a, 
2012b, 2012c; Myers, 2006; Okpi, 2012; Shuaibu, 2012). Other consequences include 
refugees and displaced persons, as well as persons fleeing homes or taking refuge or 
shelter for safety (“At Least 200 Die,” 2008; Bello, 2011b; Chidiogo, 2012; “Christian 
Groups,” 2009; Ejembi, 2012; Onah et al., 2011; Polgreen, 2008). Emergent consequence 
nodes also include mass graves or mass burials (Murray & Nossiter, 2009; Nossiter, 
2010d, 2010e, 2010f); churches burned, bombed or destroyed (Abdulkadir, 2012b; Akau, 
2012; “Boko Haram,” 2012; Chidiogo, 2011; “Christian Groups,” 2009; Ehiabhi, 2012a; 
Mgboh, 2012a; Myers, 2006; Polgreen, 2008); and mosques burned or destroyed mostly 
in retaliation or involving clashes between fundamentalist sect and Christians or security 
agents (Chidiogo, 2011; Nossiter, 2009a; “Thousands Flee,” 2009; “Violence in 
Northeast,” 2011). Further consequences in this phase include police stations and 
barracks, government buildings bombed or burned; and schools bombed, burned, 
destroyed or closed. For instance, on the Boko Haram attacks on schools, Nossiter  
observes that: 
Now it has an ominous new front: a war against schools. 
Public and private schools here have been doused with gasoline at night 
and set on fire. Crude homemade bombs - soda bottles filled with gasoline - have 
been hurled at the bare-bones concrete classrooms… 
…at least eight schools have been firebombed, apparently the work of 
Boko Haram, the Islamist group waging a deadly war…The group’s very name is 
a rallying cry against schools - “Boko” means “book” or “Western learning” in 
the Hausa language, and “haram” is Arabic for forbidden… 
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“We are Boko Haram, and we will burn the school,” the…watchman at 
Aruna’s school, the Abbaganaram Primary School, recounted the arsonists saying 
after they…ordered him at gunpoint to lie down, doused the school with gasoline 
and set it on fire…(2012, para. 5-6, 10-11) 
Additional consequences in this study phase include Christian businesses, homes, 
hotels and properties destroyed; destroying, looting and razing of properties; denial of 
freedom of worship and desecration of Christian religion. For instance, in a Kaduna press 
conference by CAN following the Boko Haram August 2009 attacks in Maiduguri  it is 
observed that: 
…the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in the 19 northern states and the 
Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja has rejected the attempt by the northern 
governors to regulate religious preaching in the north using traditional rulers, 
saying that it will not be practicable. 
CAN also said that it is holding the federal government and the five state 
governments where violence erupted during the Boko Haram crisis which it said 
led to the beheading of 11 Christians, including three Pastors and the burning of 
20 churches. 
[And noted that]…“the fundamental issue that motivated the Boko Haram 
movement to unleash terror on innocent Nigerians is the quest for the total 
implementation of sharia” in the country. (“Christian Groups,” 2009, para. 1-3) 
Other consequences in this study phase are security threat, apprehension, anxiety 
or political and social chaos, including infiltration of police, military and all areas of 
government by perpetrator groups. Consequences category also revealed normalcy or 
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calm returning after episodes of gruesome killings and exterminations, showing 
intermittency of occurrence (Connors, 2008; Nossiter, 2012).  
End of Model Application for Phase V 
Chapter Summary 
This study integrates the theoretical approach of Strauss and Corbin (1990) in 
examining the plausibility of genocidal undertone to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious 
conflict.  Newspaper articles of cases of the ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria 
were content analyzed and coded focusing on causation and intentionality to inquire on 
the plausibility of genocidal inclinations to the killings. Given the consistency of the 
emerging patterns (Stake, 1995) from the Nvivo software coding and analysis of the 
study data, these emergent categories and nodes or coding themes have been used to 
develop a theoretical model to explore the study’s meaning frame (Creswell, 2007) of 
determining genocidal tendencies to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict over the 
study’s delineated five phases. 
The chapter presents the grounded theory model for identifying inclination or 
proclivity to genocide in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict deriving from the 
theoretical framework of Strauss and Corbin (1990) which is developed from this study. 
The chapter further presents the application of the genocide proclivity model to each of 
the delineated five phases of the study. The presentation of the study’s findings indicates 
that the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict has genocidal undertones to the conflict. 
 
  
 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine the ethno-religious conflict in northern 
Nigeria to determine whether there are genocidal inclinations to the conflict with a view 
to identify adversarial implications, and utilizing the evidence to conceptualize findings 
from which a new theory and a theoretical model for determining proclivity to genocide 
emerged, with recommendations that would be of relevance to conflict analysis and 
resolution scholars and practitioners. This chapter utilizes the data analysis presented in 
Chapter 4 through the application of the theoretical model called the Model for 
Determining Proclivity to Genocide developed by the author. The analytical technique 
used to derive the theory is the Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) grounded theory approach to 
theory development. The chapter explores some key concepts in discussing the findings, 
focusing on the theory of dolus specialis or specific intent in genocide (Campbell, 2012; 
Jones, 2006) to present a narrative of the findings and intentionality to address the study’s 
main research question of genocidal inclination in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious 
conflict in each of the five phases of the study. The second research question of 
determining the extent to which religion foments and escalates the conflict is also 
addressed. The study identifies five findings from the data analysis which align with the 
study’s two research questions which are discussed in this chapter, and recommendations 
are proffered with a conclusion to the study. Implications of the study and areas for future 
study are also discussed. 
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Substantive Theory of Proclivity to Genocide 
A substantive theory which is rather particularistic in form (Glaser, 2007) is 
developed from the study’s specific inquiry area of genocidal inclination or proclivity in 
the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. The theory derives from the analytical 
technique of Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) grounded theory approach which essentially 
involves “a central phenomenon, causal conditions, strategies, conditions and context, 
and consequences” (Creswell, 1998, p. 58). The core category or central idea relates with 
the other categories of causal conditions which lead to the phenomenon, its contextual 
framework, intervening conditions, strategies deployed for the phenomenon, and its 
consequences. 
In the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict the grounded theory model 
developed in the study is applied to determine the core phenomenon of genocidal 
proclivity, which is evidenced as occurring in interplay of its six-part components. As 
identified in the conflict, the first of these components is causal conditions for genocidal 
proclivity involving: (i) immediate or trigger factors which are catalytic in form and 
which ignite the killings—for example, the first coup d’état and killing of mainly 
northern army officers; massacres of Ibos and returning refugees; secession and self-
determination (as in the Biafra war); insurgency, uprising or anti-government riots; 
Islamist fundamentalist activities; as well as issues of Islam desecration/misinterpretation 
of Koran, and fatwa declared publications such as the Danish Cartoon and Miss World 
publications, etc.; (ii) underlying or root causes which are entrenched into the conflict 
fabric, including historical and colonial influences on the region, culture of bad 
governance and political underpinnings, and socio-economic factors of poverty; 
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unemployment; and lack of education, etc.; (iii) perceived threat of the “otherness” which 
include ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and animosities; annihilation attempts 
by targeting or forceful conversion of Christians to Islam, ultimatum to southern 
Christians living in the North to leave; anti-Ibo rioting; dynamism and fear of Ibo or 
southern dominance; and North-South split or largely Muslim North and mainly Christian 
South, etc.; and (iv) exclusive ideological framing including factors of  religious 
dimensions, anti-Western or ideological differences; fundamentalism and religious 
fervency; and Sharia law institution, implementation, and moves to impose Sharia across 
Nigeria and establish an Islamic state etc.  
The second component which is the phenomena of genocidal orchestration 
emanates in interplay of identified causal factors and includes targeted, pre-meditated or 
orchestrated killings and assaults; and carnage, pogrom, massacres, bloodbath, barbarism 
or mayhem. The third component of the contextual framework in which ethno-religious 
conflict and genocidal proclivity developed, comprises the social space, or lebensraum 
(Wood, 2001); conceptualized annihilating difference; and identified perpetrator. The 
fourth component involves intervening conditions influencing or mitigating proclivity to 
genocide, and includes government ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government; 
press censorship and manipulation, deflation/inflation of casualty figures to escalate or 
abet killings/reprisals; extrajudicial killings and army involvement in policing; and 
collaborators or bystanders which could be local or international with a consequent 
internationalization of the conflict, etc. The fifth component involves the strategies of 
attack foreshadowing proclivity to genocide in the conflict, and includes organization, 
planning, and weaponry; indoctrination, manipulation, or instigation; extermination plot 
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involving blockade and starvation, and mass murders; coordinated attacks of shootings, 
bombings, maiming, looting, and arson; ideo-ethnic cleansing involving razing, bombing, 
or destroying of churches; targeting of Christians or forceful conversion of Christians to 
Islam; forced migrations; and ultimatum to southern Christians to leave the North, etc. 
The sixth component details the consequences or effects of proclivity to genocide 
identified in the conflict including sequential or complete victim annihilation; death toll 
and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned corpses; mass graves and mass burials; 
refugees and displaced persons; starvation; churches burned, bombed or destroyed; 
infringing human rights; and normalcy returns, etc.  
In applying this theoretical framework with findings focused on intentionality to 
address the main research question of genocidal inclination to the northern Nigeria ethno-
religious conflict in each of the study’s five phases, the study evidences a continuing, but 
intermittent perpetration of violence over the period. More so, the study evidences a 
constancy of the perpetrator groups primarily as Muslim groups against targeted groups 
which are mainly Christians or non-Muslims groups, on the basis of exclusionary 
religious ideology that is intentionally genocidal. 
The study’s substantive theory posits that there is genocidal proclivity to the 
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict resulting from causal factors which trigger and 
underlie the phenomena amidst a perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive 
ideological framing. Such perceived threat of “otherness” is evidenced through ethnic-
religious hatreds and animosities through annihilation attempts by targeting or forceful 
conversion of Christians to Islam, and/or ultimatum to southern Christians living in the 
North to leave the region. The theory posits that the intent to annihilate is framed by 
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exclusive ideological positioning on issues of religious dimensions, anti-Western, anti-
establishment, or ideological differences, fundamentalism and religious fervency, and 
Sharia’s institution and implementation amidst moves towards imposing Sharia across 
Nigeria and establishing an Islamic state. The theory argues that such exclusive 
ideological framing leads to violations of fundamental rights of Christians (mostly 
southerners) and other non-Muslim minority ethnic groups in the region, particularly the 
Sharia operative states, are being deprived of their right to existence through intermittent 
wanton killings. The theory also presents that the genocidal underpinning to the conflict 
has been episodic in nature, and intermittent in occurrence, as a result of which it has 
remained unacknowledged for decades, thus, presenting latency for recognition and a 
delusion as to what is going on in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. 
Genocidal Inclination and Specific Intent 
Establishing genocidal inclination to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict 
is a core issue in addressing the central research question of the plausibility of genocidal 
inclinations to the northern Nigeria conflict which is: Are there genocidal inclinations to 
the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria? Genocidal inclination borders on 
intentionality with the intent of the perpetrator group fundamentally defining genocide 
(Jones, 2006). It is recognized that “acts of destruction” which cause “total or partial 
destruction of a group” as in a revolution or conquest, for instance, are legally construed 
as intentional and hence, genocide, irrespective of the goal or motive where such acts 
were intentionally pursued (Gellately & Kiernan as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 21). Thus, as 
stated previously, actions are considered intentional where perpetrated with the 
reasonable expectation or knowledge of a resultant partial or whole destruction of a 
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human group, notwithstanding their claimed objective (Jones, 2006, p. 21). And, as per 
the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a person is deemed to have 
intent vis-à-vis conduct where that consequence is meant by that person to occur, or he or 
she “is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events” (Greenawalt as cited in 
Jones, 2006, p. 21). 
Intent can be established as in the Rwandan International Criminal Tribunal’s 
1998 Akayesu judgment that “the offender is culpable because he knew or should have 
known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group” (Schabas as 
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 21). 
Genocide intent is observed as combining the notion of specific intent, and 
constructive intent (Jones, 2006), with specific intent inferred “where actions with 
predictable results are taken over an extended period of time, and the consequences of 
these actions regularly confirm their outcome” (Reisman & Norchi quoted by Fein as 
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 21), with constructive intent involving cases where “the 
perpetrators did not intend to harm others but should have realized or known that the 
behavior made the harm likely… [And] clearly results in the destruction of that group of 
people, even if that result is neither intended nor desired” (Alvarez as cited in Jones, 
2006, p. 22). The notion of specific intent to destroy a racial group is fundamental to 
genocide (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 11; 2012). 
Genocide Two Phased Manifestations  
According to Campbell (2010, Video Series 25), Lemkin’s two Phases of 
Genocide first involve the destruction of the oppressed group’s national patterns. This 
entails destruction of the targeted group’s cultural practices, their religious beliefs, moral 
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foundation, economic practices, and psychological wellbeing, all of which constitute their 
social institutions and collectively constitute their national pattern. In essence, all things, 
criteria or signifiers which identify the population as such are aimed at by the oppressors, 
in attempt to destroy the oppressed group’s identity. Thus, the first phase is the 
destruction of the targeted group members, and the attempt to destroy their national 
pattern which is synonymous with their identity. 
The second phase of genocide is to replace that national pattern through 
imposition, i.e. to impose the national pattern of the oppressor where the national pattern 
of the targeted group once existed. Thus, while in the first phase there is the attempt by 
the oppressor to destroy the national pattern of the group, in the second phase there is the 
imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. Hence, there is destruction and 
imposition of national patterns (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25). 
Genocide, thus, essentially involves the destruction of a national group and their 
patterns of identity and a sort of imposition of the oppressor’s own patterns of identity. 
Hence, there is the imposition of national pattern, for instance, in occupied territories. 
And, while some national pattern imposition forms are extremely hostile and may result 
in occupying other people’s property, forcing them off their land, exterminations, 
biological destruction, and destruction of human groups, etc., other forms of imposition 
of the oppressor’s national pattern may not be so hostile, as such imposition basically 
arises from the notion of “enforced assimilation” (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25), and 
entails assimilation which is forced but rather, depicted as ‘opportunity’ (Lemkin as cited 
in Campbell, 2010, Video Series 30). 
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Core Research Question  
From the preceding chapter, data analysis which is elaborated further in this 
chapter through the discussions of two research questions of the study, the core of which 
addresses whether there are genocidal inclinations to the ethno-religious conflict in 
northern Nigeria, it is concluded that there are genocidal inclinations to the conflict. 
Study Phase I - 1966 to 1976: Discussion. Genocidally undertoned killings have 
intermittently been going on in northern Nigeria since the 1960s beginning with the May 
to October 1966 massacres of Ibos who are predominantly Christians in northern Nigeria 
by Muslim mobs and northern troops. Osaghae (1998b) notes, for instance, that the July 
1966 “counter-coup resonated in the Northern region in the form of renewed genocidal 
killings of Igbos and Easterners” (p. 61). The Ibo massacres in the north was followed 
through in the ensuing 3-year Biafra Nigeria War in which millions of Biafrans lost their 
lives through the Nigeria government policy of embargo and starvation (Emerson, 1970; 
Garrison, 1968b), also through killing of Ibo civilians in the enemy recovered territories 
of the war by Nigerian troops, and through the deliberate targeting and bombing of 
civilian centers during the war. Thus, Osaghae observes that: 
The war was presented as a genocidal one waged by the Muslims of Northern 
Nigeria who had declared a jihad exterminate the Igbos from the face of the earth 
(the massacres of Igbos in the North, as well as the strategies of economic 
blockade and starvation pursued throughout the war, seemed to lend credence to 
this). (1998, p. 66) 
Thus, genocidal episodes are seen manifesting through the first phase of the study 
delineated from 1966 to 1976, though with some few years respite after the war. 
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Study Phase II – 1976 to 1987: Discussion. Following a brief lull after the war 
in the 1970s, the genocidal episodes sparked off once again with the Maitatsine riots of 
the 1980s in which thousands of lives, this time Christians as well as mainstream 
Muslims who were considered heretics by the sect; the sect members and security agents 
were equally killed in the process of trying to subdue the sect. This second phase of the 
study spanning from 1976 to 1987, thus, saw religious extremism and violence or other 
fundamentalists’ activities, insurgency, uprising, or anti-Government riots, as in the 
Maitatsine riots or insurgencies. For instance, in episodes involving accusations of 
desecration of Islam or misinterpreted Koran in which Christians and Muslim mobs 
clashed in Kafanchan in March 1987 with people killed and churches burned, the 
aftermath on which eight Koran teachers killed by Christian mobs, Muslim mobs in a 
supposed reprisal attack on Christians, burned all the churches in Zaria, about 75 in 
number and threatened to forcefully impose Islam on a Christian community in Wusasa, 
Zaria (Brooke, 1987b).  This phase, thus, evidences exclusionary ideological framing 
involving ideo-ethnic cleansing or ideological and ethnic cleansing of burning of 
churches, as well as attempts at forceful conversion of Christians to Islam (Brooke, 
1987b). Exclusionary ideology frames genocide orchestration, which is evidentially 
present in its two-sub-set, as here again, there is the destruction of the ideology of the 
targeted group and the attempt at imposition of the ideology of the perpetrator group 
(Lemkin as cited in Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25). Thus, in this study phase also, 
genocidal inclinations are evidenced behind the exterminations, mass killings, forced 
migration and other core ethnic or ideological purgative tools of genocide. 
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The target victims or victim groups for this phase of the study include Christians 
and churches, also involving Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian villages; 
civilian targets; Southerners who are predominantly Christians, and especially Ibos as 
targets; security agents - police officers, military and government officials; symbols of 
government authority; and media offices and journalists; beer parlors, hotels, banks and 
other facilities which represent structures or institutions with Western connotations, 
involving the destruction of the national patterns of the targeted group, and imposition of 
the oppressed groups national patterns (Lemkin as cited in Campbell, 2010, Video Series 
25). Victims identified in this phase, however, also include Muslim clerics or 
mainstream/orthodox Muslims who were targeted by Islamic fundamentalists for 
nurturing opposing ideology to the Maitasine sect (Dash, 1984). It however, also includes 
Muslims, Hausa-Fulani herders, Muslim sect, Northerners or mosques, whose exception 
of victimhood derive from reprisals from Christians as in the March 1987, Kafanchan 
Koran misinterpretation clash (Brooke, 1987b; Kotch, 1987), and/or counter attacks by 
security agents, as in the December 1980 Maitasine clash in which the authorities sought 
to annihilate the cult (Jaynes, 1981). 
Study Phase III – 1987 to 1996: Discussion. The third phase of the study from 
1987 to 1996 witnessed insurgencies, uprising or anti-government riots, as well as 
religious extremism and fundamentalism with the Babangida’s administration’s 
registering of Nigeria in 1985 into the OIC which exacerbated religious tension in the 
period as Christians saw it as a “move to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state” (Brooke, 
1987b; Falola, 1999, p. 188). There was also extensive display of fundamentalism and 
religious fervency with Islamic militants calling for the institution of Sharia or Islamic 
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law in northern Nigeria, an ideological framing that underlies much of the excessive 
blood-letting which continues to occur in northern Nigeria. It was, therefore, a period of 
prolonged tension marked with religious riots and unrest in which thousands of lives 
were lost, properties and buildings destroyed, and the country at the verge of a religious 
war between Christians and Muslims, with political leaders opportunely manipulating the 
nation’s diversity problem. More so, in some northern states, there were also socio-
economic factors of ethnic groups contesting for control of fertile lands, political, and 
economic power, with poverty, unemployment, and educational lack amidst the down-
sliding economy intensifying a general feeling of discontent and a quest for alternative 
socio-political means of survival. The discontent led to the recourse to religion which 
provided the way out for the masses, resulting in a new wave of fundamentalism due to 
the increased religiosity. And, further fanning the embers of the conflict were  ethnic-
religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and animosities with most northern cities, other than 
the Middle Belt zone, delineated in terms of Muslim majority and Christian minority, and 
nationally, on the basis of the North-South split of largely Muslim north and mainly 
Christian south. 
This phase, thus, also witnessed annihilation attempts by targeting and 
exterminations or mass killings as in the April 1991 Tafawa Balewa riots in which the  
Christian ethnic minority “the Seyawa group, were selected for destruction,” as were 
many other Christian non-natives in Bauchi (Falola, 1998, p. 207). Here again, 
exclusionary ideology, destruction of oppressed group and their ideology, and the 
imposition of the ideology of the perpetrator group came to the fore (Lemkin as cited in 
Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25). Thus, such phenomena identified in this phase 
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involving violence and attacks unleashed to different target victims include targeted, pre-
meditated or orchestrated killings and assaults, and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, 
mayhem, massacres or barbarism which are identified as being associated with the 
proclivity to genocide. 
Study Phase IV – 1996 to 2005: Discussion. The fourth study phase spanning 
from 1996 to 2005 also witnesses insurgencies, uprising or anti-government riots, as well 
as religious extremism and fundamentalism for varying causal factors including the 
desecration of Islam or misinterpretation of Koran, with recurring spate of religious 
uprisings interlaced with ethnic clashes, each of which presented as bloodier and more 
ferocious than the previous (Adekoya, 2009). In essence, the period saw an escalating 
cycle of violence, notably in Plateau, Kano, Bauchi, and some other northern states, 
mostly with attacks and counter attacks between ethno-religious groups, each episode 
taking on a religious tonation with a resultant polarization in the conflict and, more often 
than not, with extremist Muslims hunting down and killing Christians in different parts of 
the region, on occasions aided by Islamic mercenaries from neighboring states. An 
instance of this was the February 2004 episode between Tarok Christian farmers and 
Muslim Hausa-Fulani herders, the redressing of which the Hausa-Fulani herders, aided 
by hired Chadian and Niger Islamic mercenaries, attacked and killed 90 Tarok farmers in 
Yelwa with 48 axed to death inside a church where they had sought refuge and with the 
church razed. In retaliation, Christians from the Gerkawa community attacked and killed 
some 40 Muslim neighbors with cutlasses or swords, and burned their bodies. In response 
to this development, the army moved in and evacuated about 3,000 Muslims from 
333 
 
 
Gerkawa to Yelwa, while Christians fled Yelwa in fear of further attacks (Kendal, 2004, 
para. 11-12). 
There was, however, the May 2004 killings in Yelwa, an essentially Muslim 
town, which presented as a notable exception to such frequent incidences of Muslims 
killing Christians, and it was reportedly carried out by a Christian militia with toll of 
about 630 (Adekoya, 2009, para. 10; “Hundreds Die in Attack on Nigerian Village,” 
2004, para. 3), and which, once again, was an  eruption in a long-drawn dispute between 
Muslim Hausa-Fulani herders and Tarok Christian farmers in the area (“Hundreds Die in 
Attack on Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 1-2). Also, there was a likely inflation of the 
casualty figures “by self-interested parties,” as the death toll estimate by the police had 
been put at 67 rather than 630 (CSW, n.d., pp. 1, 6, 11; “Hundreds Die in Attack on 
Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 5-6). It was further refuted that the idea of “Christian 
militia” as assailants in the episode did not exist (CSW, n.d., p. 1), but rather, it was the 
local non-Muslim farmers’ retaliatory attack against violent displacement from their 
lands amidst government ineptitude in dealing with their plight (CSW, n.d., p. 12). 
The phase also witnesses the Sharia implementation program, the launching of 
which started with the Zamfara state government’s ordering of “the destruction of all 
churches” in the state (Kendal, 2004, para. 6). There was exclusive ideological framing 
during the period involving issues with religious dimensions, fundamentalism, and 
religious fervency, and Islamic law institutionalization with aims to impose Sharia across 
Nigeria and to establish an Islamic state (Simmons, 2000). Such exclusive ideological 
framing with the institution of Sharia exacerbated conflict in the period as non-Muslims 
in opposition, contended the constitutionality of Sharia amidst glaring evidences of 
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violation of the fundamental rights of Christians in implementing Sharia’s anti-
establishment or anti-Western ideals (“Religious Riots,” 2001; “Violent,” 2001). For 
instance, in April 2004 Kano state introduced a Sharia guided mobile court for 
institutionalizing Islamic norms in every sphere of life, with the Sharia Enforcement 
agency (HISBA) informed that the state’s Sharia Commission would no longer permit the 
exemption of any person or area from Sharia, with recommendation “that anyone who is 
not willing to adhere to Sharia should leave the state” (Anthony as cited in Kendal, 2004, 
para. 19). Thus, once again in this study phase, is the wanton destruction of the national 
patterns of the targeted group and imposition of the oppressed group’s national patterns 
(Lemkin as cited in Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25). 
Furthermore, the period witnessed persistent violent Muslim-Christian clashes in 
the region with events in the international scene increasingly exacerbating the conflict, as 
in the Kano Muslims bloody riot in October 2001 in protestation of America’s 
Afghanistan campaign with a high death toll (Koinange, 2001; “Violent,” 2001). Other 
such crises in the period include the November 2002 Kaduna violent protests that had 
over 200 toll, and churches burned in the World beauty pageant riots which was ignited 
by a supposedly blasphemous newspaper article that made suggestive aspersions on 
prophet Mohammed (“Hundreds Flee,” 2002, para. 3). It is observed that these riots are 
indicative of the Muslims’ frustrations over their perception of alliance being forged by 
the government and the secular Western powers (BBC News as cited in Falola & Heaton, 
2008). Thus, such conflicts have emanated from Islam’s political rise as a force (Falola & 
Heaton, 2008), as well as from Sharia’s hardline spread from Zamfara state in 1999 to the 
present 36 states (Onishi, 2001b). According to Onishi (2001b) about 5,000 Nigerians 
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were said to have lost their lives in religious clashes between 1999 when the military 
handed power up to 2001 (para. 3), such killings of which manifested, more often than 
not, with extremist Muslims targeting and killing Christians and other non-Muslims 
(“Deadly Rioting,” 2000; Koinange, 2001; Onishi, 2000). 
The period, however, also saw reprisals in the south, for instance, in Aba where 
the locals attacked the Hausas following the killings of Igbos in the north as their corpses 
were brought to Aba (Onishi, 2000). Thus, the findings in this study period also evidence 
the identified two major categories of phenomenal attacks involving, targeted, pre-
meditated or orchestrated killings and assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, 
mayhem, massacres or barbarism are identified as being closely associated with the 
proclivity to genocide. 
Study Phase V – 2006 to Present: Discussion. The study fifth Phase from 2006 
to present also evidences increasing killings from Muslim fundamentalism with religious 
tensions in the country being impacted directly by outside world events (Falola & 
Heaton, 2008, p. 239). The Danish newspaper cartoons in February 2006, for example, 
saw a week-long violent riots in northern Nigeria which claimed 157 lives in Maiduguri 
alone (Adekoya, 2009, para. 8) with mostly Christians killed and 30 churches razed 
(“Toll Rises,” 2006, para. 4), even as more dozens of lives were lost in other places such 
as Bauchi, Katsina, and Onitsha (BBC News as cited in Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 239). 
As extremist Muslims attacked Christians in Bauchi, 25 were killed with the violence 
fuelled by allegation of Koran desecration by a Christian teacher, and in reprisals in 
Onitsha in the south, responding to the attacks on Christians in the north, 30 mostly 
northern Muslims were killed and two mosques burned (“Toll Rises,” 2006, para. 5-7, 9). 
336 
 
 
This phase also witnessed the killing of about 400 people in Jos, Plateau state 
over an election dispute involving Muslim-Christian gang clashes in November 2008 
(Adekoya, 2009, para, 9). It is observed, however, that in this mayhem launched by 
armed rioters, churches, Christian businesses, and homes of clergymen were attacked 
using the electoral results as excuse (Adekoya, 2009, para. 2). It is further observed that 
this episode is a wrong media reporting of 300 Muslims being killed by Christians, as the 
men were shot by security agents when they acted in defiance to an imposed curfew, 
rather obeying a “jihad” participation order from the Dilimi area mosque calling all 
Muslims to loot and burn properties, which ended with about 16 churches being razed 
and 100 Christians killed in the crisis including four or more pastors (CSW, 2008a, para. 
3-4). More so, the phase witnessed in March 2010, the killing of over 500 mostly women 
and children in an attack by Muslim Fulani machete-wielding hordes on Dogon Na 
Hauwa, a Christian village (“500 Dead,” 2010). This episode which was a Sunday, over 
three-hour orgy, had the victims atrociously entrapped in fishing nets and animal traps 
and hacked to death as they attempted to flee from their attackers, with the razing of the 
sleeping victims’ straw-thatched mud huts in the wee hours of the morning by the 
Muslim Fulani assailants first preceding the killing rampage (“500 Dead,” 2010, para. 2, 
4, 9). 
This last study phase is also equally interlaced with religious upheavals, uprisings, 
and insurgencies mainly involving the Boko Haram Islamic fundamentalist group which 
seeks to institutionalize Sharia in Nigeria based on an ideological positioning and an 
Arabic translated name that connotes a forbidding or non-acceptance of Western 
education (Adekoya, 2009). The sect staged attacks in different parts of northern Nigeria 
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beginning with the July 2009 Bauchi attack against security forces who sought to contain 
them in which lives were lost even as the violence spread to Borno, Kano, and Yobe 
states with more lives lost, including some of the sect members and with police stations 
burned down (Adekoya, 2009). An ensuing bloodbath in Maiduguri, Borno state saw 
over 100 people dead (BBC as cited in Adekoya, 2009, para. 5), with the sect’s leader 
arrested and killed in custody (Adekoya, 2009), and in further violence in Bauchi state, 
churches, mosques, and several houses were razed down with more death toll (Adekoya, 
2009). This study period saw the Boko Haram Islamic fundamentalist sect, since this 
2009 uprising, becoming more proficient and progressively more sophisticated in 
confrontation with security forces and attacks on different targets including security 
agents, symbols of government authority including the United Nations which was 
bombed in August 2011 and police stations (“Deadly Christian-Muslim Clash,” 2011), 
Christians and churches (Akau, 2012; Chidiogo, 2011; Ehiabhi, 2012a; Onah et al., 2012; 
Purefoy, 2010), civilian targets and schools. It is observed, for instance that “Boko 
Haram, whose name means ‘Western education is forbidden’ in the local Hausa language, 
has focused its attacks mainly on government and police sites in the north, and has also 
threatened to kill any Christians living there” (Mojeed & Nossiter, 2012, para. 17). 
The Boko Haram sect has, in particular in this study phase, repeatedly mounted 
attacks on churches including the 20 churches burned down in five northern states in the 
July 2009 crisis (“Christian Groups,” 2009), and the December 2011 “Christmas 
day…string of bombings [which] struck churches in several cities” (Akau, 2011, para. 
11; “Christmas Carnage,” 2011), notably the Christmas day bombing of the Madalla 
church which had a death toll of 43 persons and 27 others wounded (Olokor, 2011). 
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There have subsequently been several such bombings and attacks on churches, for 
example, the January 2012 Boko Haram invasion of a church service of the Deeper Life 
Christian Church, Nassarawo, Gombe state, killing six and wounding 10 others (Ohai, 
2012); the February 2012 bombing of the Church of Christ in Nigeria church (COCIN) 
headquarters in Jos, killing 3 and wounding 38 others (Abdulkadir, 2012a); the March 
2012 bombing of Finbarr’s Catholic Church, Jos killing 11 and wounding 22 others 
(Ehiabhi, 2012a); the Easter Sunday bombing in Kaduna, targeting Christians killing 25 
people (Akau, 2012); the April 2012 bombing of St. Stephen’s Catholic church in Bayero 
University, killing 15 including two professors (Mgboh, 2012a); and the August 2012 
mass shooting at the Deeper Life Church, Okene, Kogi state, said to have been by 
unidentified gunmen, killing 19 people including the church pastor (“Nigeria Church 
Attack,” 2012). 
Informing the apparent targeting and killing of Christians and razing and/or 
bombing of churches in the region, is the specific intent to cleanse the north of non-
Muslims or infidels, and through exclusivity of ideology of destruction of the target 
victims ideology to be followed by imposition of the ideology of the perpetrator group 
(Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25), which is equally being played out through 
exterminations and mass killings. For instance, it is observed in the January 2012 Boko 
Haram attacks on a Christian worship service in Maidiguri in which about 15 people 
died, that the attacks occurred after the sect “promised to kill Christians living in 
Nigeria’s largely Muslim north” (“Sectarian Attacks Kill 15,” 2012, para. 2). 
Also trailing the motivation to the killings through the identified causal factors 
that trigger or underlie the phenomena amidst a perceived “otherness” threat reflected 
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through ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and animosities, a North-South split 
or largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south, which manifests the country’s 
religious divide (Polgreen, 2008), as well as through annihilation attempts by targeting or 
forceful conversion of Christians to Islam, and ultimatum to southern Christians living in 
the North to leave the region. While this intent to annihilate is framed from an exclusive 
ideological positioning on issues with religious dimensions, anti-Western or ideological 
differences, fundamentalism and religious fervency, and Sharia’s institution and 
implementation, it leads to violations of fundamental rights of Christians and other non-
Muslims in the region particularly the Sharia operative states, as well as to gender 
segregation abuses. Such violations of which are further intensified with a bellicose 
undermining of non-Muslims’ opposition and contentions of Sharia’s unconstitutionality, 
amidst moves towards imposing Sharia across Nigeria or establishing an Islamic state. 
These covert and all-inclusive factors of religious extremism and fundamentalism 
in manifestations are often, rather, explained away by other wide-ranging causations. 
Such diverse factors for this study phase include election-related and engineered 
violence, insurgency, uprising or anti-government riots, degradation of Islam or 
misinterpretation and desecration of Koran, and massacres of Ibos and returning refugees. 
Also included are reprisal or revenge mission, an instance of which is the Dogon Na 
Hauwa slaughter of hundreds by Muslim Fulani herdsmen who descended on a sleeping 
village, macheting and butchering over 500 human lives in a brutal retributory sectarian 
violence staged against three mostly Christian villages (Nossiter, 2010d, para. 3). Hence, 
this study phase also identified causal conditions resulting in different degrees and forms 
of killings and exterminations primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians and 
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other conflict parties which are divided mostly along ethnic and religious lines, with 
violence unleashed to different target victims in attacks identified among others, in the 
two major categories involving targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and 
assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism are identified 
as being closely associated with the proclivity to genocide. 
Summary. Looking at all these, it is evident that latent genocide is creeping into 
Nigeria. Rwanda had a similar situation where the latent nature of the genocide was 
completely missed by the international community. This is a global concern, such 
instances of which abound as in the genocide in Armenia (Baum, 2008; Levene, 2005b; 
Rae, 2002), in Lebanon in Pakistan (Falola, 1998), in the German genocide killing the 
Jews (Baum, 2008; Gellately & Kiernan, 2003; Hinton, 2002; Levene, 2005b), in 
Cambodia where Pol Port aimed to kill off all its educated people (Baum, 2008; Gellately 
& Kiernan, 2003; Heidenrich, 2001), in the former Yugoslavia’s ethnic cleansing - in 
Bosnia and Kosovo (Falola, 1998; Rae, 2002), and in Rwanda (Baum, 2008; Gellately & 
Kiernan, 2003; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008). This latent genocide will destroy the nation 
and impose Islam as a control mechanism to keep people in bondage which, if Nigeria 
enters into, will be a replay of the recent Darfurian genocide in Sudan (Sternberg, & 
Sternberg, 2008). Thus, Adebayo evidentially observes: 
The culture of wanton, genocidal violence orchestrated to push a political agenda 
is an established practice in the North. From the 1953 Kano riots, when the 
Fulani-led Northern People's Congress set hoodlums to murder Southerners in 
Kano to make it clear that the "North" was not yet ready for independence in 
1957, to the massacre of Igbos after the Nzeogwu coup in 1966 to create mayhem 
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and seize power back to the April 2011 mass killings that accompanied the 
presidential election, the Fulani-controlled Muslim North has always used 
organized mass violence that targets members of specific religious and ethnic 
groups to further its political objectives - a sort of scorched earth war practice. 
(2012, para. 4) 
Thus, there is a latent episodic genocide to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious 
conflict, a problem where mostly Christians and indeed southerners and other non-
Muslim minority ethnic groups in northern Nigeria are being deprived of their right to 
existence through wanton killings and blatant violations of their fundamental human 
rights particularly in Sharia operative states. Ultimately the idea is to create an Islamic 
state. This is a global issue which, if left unchecked, will lead to a manifest open 
genocide either on the part of the north through a continued attack and killing of 
Christians and southerners in northern Nigeria while also encroaching southwards, or the 
southerners who would have had enough, may launch a retaliatory offensive to stage off 
the continued wanton exterminations. If the extremist Muslims succeed would it be that 
Nigeria will end? The global community needs to start addressing this latent genocide to 
avert Rwanda type genocide in Nigeria. 
Conclusion. The study has examined the parties to the conflict in the different 
phases of the conflict, and determined its ethno-religious undertones, mainly between 
ethnic groups along the Muslim and Christian divide. The mechanism that has been 
employed as revealed in the strategies adopted in the conflict, as well as investigating the 
conditions that have led to the conflict. The idea has been to focus on specific intent by 
examining the motivational factors underlying the killings. Thus, despite the fact that it 
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does not fulfill the generally outlined notion of genocide, it still satisfies the parameters 
of genocide on the basis of the specific intent of the perpetrators to the killings. The 
question, thus, is how is it still genocide? While it is recognized that genocide has 
nothing to do with numbers, the intermittent killings have on occasions involved mass 
killings with evidences of mass burials and mass graves identified in the conflict. 
However, proof of genocide is not by numbers but by intentionality, i.e. “dolus specialis” 
which is the specific intent to exterminate a people group based on their ethnicity or 
religion (Campbell, 2012, p. 1; Jones, 2006, p. 21). In the northern Nigeria ethno-
religious conflict, there is the specific intent to eliminate Christians and other non-
Muslim groups on the basis of religion or ethnicity. And, although the perpetrator groups 
may and do change from time to time, the underlying motivational factors have remained 
the same—the intent to eliminate Christians and non-Muslim groups based on an 
exclusive ideological framing. This genocidal undertone to the conflict has, thus, pitted 
perpetrator group(s) mostly, Islamic fundamentalist sect(s) such as the Maitasine and the 
Boko Haram sects, and on occasions Muslim Hausa/Fulani mobs in the north, against 
varied targeted groups, specifically northern Christians and southerners as the Ibos and 
Yoruba, as well as other minority non-Muslim ethnic groups in the north. 
Thus, beginning with the 1966 pogrom by northern mobs and troops against the 
Ibos (Osaghae, 1998b), which was also institutionally carried out by the Nigerian 
government against Biafrans as seen in the one million Biafrans that died of starvation 
(Garrison, 1968b), and the deliberate targeting and killing of Biafran civilians during the 
war (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1967b), genocidal episodes have continued 
unabated in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict up to present (Adebayo, 2012). 
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Furthermore, the region has continued to witness the scourging of churches through 
bomb attacks and arson, as are evidential in the Boko Haram on-going scourges of 
churches in the north, as well as the killings and extermination of Christians and other 
non-Muslim groups in the region. There has, thus, historically and systematically been 
the organizing and killing by perpetrator groups which are mainly Islamic, against victim 
groups that are Christians or non-Muslims, on the basis of A targeting B with the intent at 
eliminating B because of their religion and on occasions because of their ethnicity. This 
is genocide as defined by the United Nations 1948 Genocide Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC) (Heidenrich, 2001; 
Hinton, 2002; Jones, 2006). 
It is, therefore, argued that there are anti-Christian sentiments which are evidential 
from the motivating factors underlying the killings. Examples of these motivating factors 
abound, for instance, in the abuses of Islamic Sharia on Christians in northern Nigeria. 
The appeal of Sharia lends credence to an exclusionary ideology among extremist 
Muslims that is framed by the ideal to set themselves apart from others by means of an 
“othering” process, the basis on which genocide can be distinguished (Hinton, 2002, p. 
6). In this process, as Hinton observes: 
the boundaries of an imagined community are reshaped in such a manner that a 
previously “included” group…is ideologically recast (almost always in 
dehumanizing rhetoric) as being outside the community, as a threatening and 
dangerous “other”—whether racial, political, ethnic, religious, economic, and so 
on—that must be annihilated. (2002, p. 6) 
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It is thus, submitted that, in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, extremist 
Muslims are seen as wanting to be separate and distinct from others, and on the basis of 
exclusionary tendencies and Sharia implementation ideals and practices, Christians are 
being discriminated against, targeted, and exterminated in northern Nigeria, notably by 
perpetrator, mostly Muslim groups and Islamic fundamentalists (Kendal, 2004). As a 
result of the primarily religious tonation to the conflict, in addition to the Sharia operative 
states, the Middle Belt, particularly Jos in Plateau state which straddles the mostly 
Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south, has continued to witness escalated 
killings and attacks. For instance, following the 2004 upsurge of assaults on Christians in 
the state, it is observed that: 
Genuine followers of Jesus Christ are paying a heavy price for this ethnic and 
religious conflict. Obed Minchakpu reported for Compass Direct on 2 April that 
the violence in Plateau in late March had resulted in the deaths of 8 pastors and 
1,500 Christian believers, and the destruction of 173 churches. Reverend Dr. 
Alexander Mamdip Lar, President of the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), 
reports concerning the Plateau crisis (2 May), “We [COCIN] lost two ordained 
ministers in Jos and Rim [and] 117 of our churches were destroyed, while six 
pastors, one ordained minister and hundreds of members were killed in Wase, 
thus completely obliterating the church there.” As he says, the Church in Plateau 
is “under siege.” (Kendal, 2004, para. 26) 
However, there are a few instances that might be seen as being in objection to the 
author’s argument that might present as exclusions to this identified pattern of extremist 
Muslims killing Christians in the region. One such notable exception to the study’s 
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identified pattern of Muslim group(s) targeting Christians or non-Muslim group(s) for 
extermination in the Yelwa massacres of May 2004 where it is reported that Christian 
militia attacked an essentially Muslim town of Yelwa killing 630 people (Adekoya, 2009, 
Para. 10; Reuters; and Agence France-Presse as cited in “Hundreds Die in Attack on 
Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 3). 
On this episode, however, it is observed that the casualty figures were in 
contestation, with the police estimate put at 67 death toll, and there was warning that the 
figures were “inflated by self-interested parties” (Ijewere as cited in “Hundreds Die in 
Attack on Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 5-6), even also as “Christians and other non-
Muslims insist the death toll is actually 67 or thereabouts and hotly dispute the widely 
publicized death toll of 630” (CSW, n.d., p. 6). Furthermore, there is also contestation by 
Christians of the media report of a Christian militia perpetrating the killings on grounds 
that “there is no such thing as a ‘Christian Militia’” (CSW, n.d., p. 1). It is noted, thus, on 
the contrary, that the assailants were local, non-Muslim Tarok farmers who, seeking 
reprieve, had embarked on a retaliatory attack against the violent displacement from their 
lands by Fulani herders amidst government ineptitude in dealing with their plight (CSW, 
n.d., p. 12). Of paramount importance, however, is that reprisal attacks for this Yelwa 
episode in May 2004 in Kano resulted in about 500-600 deaths (put at over 3000 by CAN 
Kano) even as the state government, aiming to disguise the true number of casualties, 
gave mass burials to several of the victims, with some thrown into the Challawa River 
(Cited CAN in CSW, n.d., p. 7). More so, local witnesses narrated of truckloads of dead 
bodies being evacuated, with some of the corpses disposed of by burning them in wells, 
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even as the state government ensured that they were hastily gathered off the streets for 
mass burial (“The Madness of Kano” as cited in CSW, n.d.).  
Furthermore, it is not every Muslim that endorses or supports the violence being 
perpetrated against Christians in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, as in the 
February 2006 cartoon riots in Maiduguri, Borno state, in which it is observed that: 
Sources report that a week before the riots rumors were circulating of imminent 
violence against Christians. Agitators said to be from the Hausa Fulani tribe, who 
are not indigenous to Borno, were reported to have accused the Kanuri and Shuwa 
Muslims, who are indigenous to the area, of having been ‘too quiet’ in 
comparison to Muslims elsewhere who are engaged in a ‘jihad’ against 
Christianity. Local Christians state that they ignored these rumors, choosing 
instead to rest on Borno’s self-proclaimed reputation as ‘The Home of Peace’… 
The violence was organized and systematic…The violence targeted 
churches, Christians and especially clergymen. The assailants, who were 
predominantly Hausa Fulani, were said to hail from Kano, Katsina and Sokoto. 
CSW also heard several reports of indigenous Shuwa and Kanuri Muslims hiding 
and defending Christians from their attackers. (CSW, 2008b, p. 10) 
The study, therefore, mostly demonstrates a constancy of the perpetrator groups 
as extremist Muslims and the targeted group mainly as non-Muslims or Christians. The 
periodic nature of the phenomena in the sense that it has been sporadic and episodic has 
presented latency to the genocidal undertone of the conflict. There is, thus, proof of 
genocidal inclination to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, based on the 
determination of specific intent or ‘dolus specialis’ to destroy Christians on account of 
347 
 
 
their religious beliefs (Campbell, 2012; Jones, 2006), with the attempt at imposition of 
the Sharia as the perpetrators’ ideology (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 18, 25). 
Islamization and the institution of Sharia in the region constitute the ideological 
motivation among the myriad of causal factors to the conflict. 
However, because of the intermittency in the nature of the genocide being 
perpetuated in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, there has been covertness or 
latency in recognition of this episodic genocide, and it has remained a feature of the 
conflict for decades. This intermittency and episodic nature of the conflict continues to 
present a delusion that what is going on in the region is based on a subterfuge 
presentation of the conflict. 
Captured in a schematic form below, Figure 2 summarizes the conceptions of the 
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. This illustrates the vicious circle of attacks and 
reprisals or counter attacks nature of the conflict which, however, has a covert genocidal 
undertone that continues to be latent and elusive even to the international community. 
 
Figure 3. Schematic Model of the Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious Conflict. 
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Research Question II 
To what extent does the interplay between ethnicity and religion help to foment 
and escalate the conflict in northern Nigeria? 
Most studies on the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict have taken various 
perspectives, linking the conflict to a mirage of causes but such multiplicity of causation 
to the conflict are inexorably and intricately concomitant with the role and factoration of 
religion to the killings. Where, for instance, ethnicity is identified as the conflict’s 
underlying causation (Osaghae, 1998a), it can be argued that, while ethnocentricity may 
partially explain the ethno-based dimension to the killings in the north, it does not explain 
why the perpetrators identify themselves in terms of religion, and kill their victims based 
on religious identifications. Furthermore, where political factors are seen as orchestrating 
the conflict (Ukiwo, 2003), the conflict parties in the intermittent killings in the north can 
be seen, once again, defining themselves on the basis of religion rather than on the basis 
of the political parties to which they belong, with political motivation also failing to lend 
credence on why such monstrous killings are not, in turn, experienced in other parts of 
the country. Thus, to address this second research question of religious undertone to the 
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict calls for a closer examination of the identified 
causal and motivational factors to the conflict. Presented in Table D1 under Appendix D 
of the study are some over 50 cases of the religious crises in northern Nigeria from 1980 
to 2009 (Newswatch as cited in Ezeibe, 2009, para. 30). Reviewing the table listing, it is 
observed, for instance: 
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…that most of these conflicts destroyed properties of non Muslims mainly 
suggesting that these conflicts want change of property relations between 
Christians and Muslims where they occurred. Religious conflict became rampant 
during civilian rule of Obasanjo. Between July 1999 and September 2004 Nigeria 
recorded 33 different conflicts. (Ezeibe, 2009, para. 31) 
Thus, evidentially, an analysis of the study data has shown causal trigger factors, 
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing 
in different situations and contextual settings, resulting in varying degrees and forms 
exterminations and killings primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians, as well 
as between other conflict parties, but which are mostly divided along ethnic, but also 
primarily on religious lines, instances of which abound in the study. It is observed in the 
investigation of the November 2008, Jos crisis by Human Rights Watch (HRW), for 
instance, that: 
Witnesses described…how mobs of Muslim youth beat, burned, or bludgeoned to 
death Christians, in some cases specifically targeting pastors and church officials. 
One witness from the Yoruba ethnic group said five of his relatives…were among 
12 Christians burned alive by a mob of Muslims. Other witnesses described how 
hundreds of Muslim youth besieged and burned churches and homes belonging to 
Christian families. Church officials reported that seven Christian pastors and 
church leaders were killed in the violence and that 46 churches were burned. 
Local community leaders told Human Rights Watch that Muslim mobs burned 
133 houses in a predominately Christian area of the Ali Kazaure neighborhood. 
(2009, p. 5) 
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Hence, beginning with the 1966 massacres of Ibos in the north, for instance, 
which, while fundamentally presenting as ethno-based killings, essentially has religious 
tonation to the killings with the Ibo victim group basically defined as Christians their 
targeting and extermination of which was by the mostly Muslim mobs and northern 
troops (Garrison, 1966c). Further are the Maitatsine religious riots of the 1980s, with over 
4,000 people killed in Kano in 1980, the October 1982 Maiduguri uprising by the sect, 
with police unofficial toll of 450 deaths, but put at over 1,000 by the locals, while 
Government official estimate was put at 133 deaths including cult members, civilians, 
and policemen, although local estimate of officers killed was put at 100 (“100 Nigeria 
Policemen,” 1982; Cowell, 1982, para. 6; Dash, 1984). The riots culminated with the 
fanatic March 1984 Jimeta, (then) Gongola state uprising in which about 1000 people 
were killed (Dash, 1984). Furthermore, in 1985 was the Babangida attempt at enrolling 
the country into the OIC, for which “Christians were outraged,” even as the period once 
again saw escalated tensions with the observation that “Moslems want to extend the 
Islamic legal code of Sharia from the north to the entire nation” (Brooke, 1987b, para. 
13). It is, thus, evident that Islamic ideological framing underlie much of the excessive 
blood-letting which continues to occur in northern Nigeria, particularly with the 
introduction of Sharia in some northern states. 
On the characterization of the religious violence in the northern Nigeria ethno-
religious conflict, it is observed that in:  
[t]he heartland of Islam and such traditional cities as Kano and Katsina…violence 
has taken three forms - first, reformists, as in the case of the Shiites in Katsina or 
the Maitatsine, fighting the state; second, anti-Christian; and third, directed 
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against immigrant Christian settlers, as in Kano. Future conflicts are certain, 
especially between Muslims and immigrants. [In] Central Nigeria, and cities and 
towns on the fringes of Hausaland (usually marginalized “pagan” communities in 
the emirates of the nineteenth century) where violence is both religious and 
communal, involving confrontations between hegemonic religion (Islam) and 
ethnicity (Hausa-Fulani) and minority groups defined by ethnicity (Kataf) and 
minority religion (Christianity). The attempts to assert minority rights, using 
Christianity as a source of identity, will provoke an Islamic reaction and ensure 
the continuity of conflict. (Falola, 1998, p. 280) 
Moreover, further towing the argument of religious underpinnings to the conflict, 
the evidential instances are replete as in the Kafanchan March 1987 Christian-Muslim 
confrontation. Here again, the triggering event, which supposedly was an erroneous 
interpretation of the Koran, had an eruption of crisis, the aftermath in which Muslim 
mobs burned all the churches in Zaria, about 75 in number, and threatened to destroy the 
Wusasa Christian community, if not accepting of Islam (Brooke, 1987a; 1987b). And, as 
the crisis spread to other cities in the state, a total of 152 churches burned in the region, 
primarily “in Kafanchan, Zaria, Kaduna, Wusasa, Funtua, and Kaduna” relative to five 
mosques burned (Falola, 1998, p. 185). Additionally, the April 1991 Bauchi state 
eruption was recognized to have engulfed the state in a religious violence frenzy even as 
thousands of mainly teenage hoodlums under the cover of religion went on rampage in 
several cities including Bauchi, with casualty figures mounting, as churches, homes, 
hotels, and a number of public properties were razed (Newswatch as cited in Akaeze, 
2009, para. 14). 
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Furthermore, there is the instance of the October 1991 Kano killings, where the 
Izala sect initially presumed peaceful demonstration to stop an evangelical crusade being 
organized for Reinhard Bonnke suddenly turned into a violent Muslim-Christian clash, 
with high death toll and casualty figures and loss of enormous property (Akaeze, 2009, 
para. 15). There was also the beheading of an Ibo trader in December 1994 in Kano with 
the head paraded on a spike on the streets of Kano after he was accused of Koran 
desecration (Akaeze, 2009, para.16). More so, the study identifies religious riots and 
upheavals in several other northern cities including Kano, Jos, Wase, Zangon Kataf, 
Funtua, Yelwa-Shendam, and Funtua with genocidal killings sometimes with flimsy 
issues or political difference between opposing faiths sparking off killing orgies as in the 
communal feud between the Christian, Katafs indigenes, and the Muslim, Hausas in 
Kaduna State, which assumed religious coloration and spread to other cities in the state  
(Akaeze, 2009), with about 500 to 800 people killed in the crisis (Noble, 1992c, para. 2). 
Thus, as Kendal (2004) observes “Nigeria has seen some radical and devastating 
retaliatory attacks and rioting by northern Muslims in response to trivial ‘Christian’ 
infractions” on occasions, involving accusations of desecration of Islam, the Koran, or 
the prophet Mohammad (para. 2). An instance of this is the November 2002 Miss World 
publication which Muslims saw as disparaging prophet Muhammad, the bloody riot of 
which “left 200 dead, 1,000 injured, 11,000 homeless and 20 churches destroyed” 
(Kendal, 2004, para. 2). More so, revenge attacks by the Christian minority groups where 
they occur are on occasions presented in overwhelming proportions of even more 
extensive exterminations by Christians, as in the May 2004 Yelwa disputed killings of 67 
as against 630 people by “Christian Militia” (CSW, n.d. p. 1). The insidious and 
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escalatory effects of such amplification of casualties on violence-prone hordes and 
Islamic fundamentalists cannot be overstated. For instance, it is observed that: 
Even before the Yelwa massacre, Zamfara state had ordered the destruction of all 
churches in accordance with its implementation of “Sharia Phase 2.” It is possible 
that the Yelwa massacre will be used to justify all manner of repression and 
persecution being unleashed upon an already besieged Christian minority. 
Security has been tightened in the northern city of Bauchi after leaflets were 
found calling on Muslims to avenge the Yelwa killings and on Christians to leave 
the region. Security has also been increased in Kaduna as tensions are running 
high. (Kendal, 2004, para. 6) 
It is, thus, recognized that rioting and killings have become a regular feature of 
northern Nigeria life, and these ensure a state of perpetual, fear-induced submission for 
the Christian minority in the region (Kendal, 2004). 
Summary of Findings 
Findings #1: A North-South Split along a Religious, Muslim-Christian 
Divide. An analysis of the study data reveals a north south split in Nigeria along a 
religious fault line of a largely Muslim north with a sizable Christian minority and a 
predominantly Christian south, each region containing some animist minority. This 
divide is entrenched and further exacerbated by the country’s multi-ethnic factor and 
rooted in its history of colonial amalgamation of diverse ethnic groups of different socio-
cultural, socio-religious backgrounds into one nation (Aguwa, 1997). It is observed, for 
instance, that “the religious divide in this nation of more than 250 ethnic groups mirrors a 
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geographical one, between a historically Muslim north and a Christian and animist south, 
as well as deep political divisions that cross religious lines” (Polgreen, 2008, para. 8). 
There is, thus, an in-group out-group, majority/minority dichotomy based on 
religious categorization in the country. This dichotomy is evidentially manifest in 
northern states, particularly in the Sharia operative states where Muslims are in the 
majority with a government legitimacy that is also Muslim, while Christians are in the 
minority in such states where the conflict is most intense as in Bauchi, Kano, Kaduna, 
and Taraba (Ahiante, 2004, para. 26), as well as in Adamawa, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, 
Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara (Chidiogo, 2011, para. 3). It is further 
recognized that the Middle Belt region which “straddles the largely Muslim north and the 
Christian south, has always been a hotbed of ethnic and religious violence, and Plateau 
State, of which Jos is the capital, has borne the brunt” (Polgreen, 2008, para. 10). 
Such finding in the context of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict 
supports the social identity theory and validates the notion of in-group favoritism and 
discriminatory feelings against members of the out-group, with both Muslims and 
Christians projecting negative feelings towards each other. More so, the northern Nigeria 
ethno-religious conflict resonates negatively nationwide with the conflict being further 
fed and fuelled by such “longstanding mistrust and stereotypes for example, that the 
‘Christian south’ is pro-West and that the ‘Muslim north’ is backward and conservative” 
(Falola, 1998, p. 280). There is, therefore, polarization and religious divide between 
Christians and Muslims as opposing groups in the region, and by extension in the 
country. 
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This finding has far-reaching implications for the conflict in the sense that 
tensions involving northern indigenes tend to polarize along Muslim-Christian fault line 
other than on cases of intra-conflicts between different Muslim sects, while also 
additionally polarizing along Muslim north and Christian south lines where both northern 
as well as southern Christians are involved, on occasions, with the Christian Ibos as 
prime targets. Polarization, thus, accounts for the conflict causation factor of perceived 
threat of the “otherness” as identified in the study data which manifests in ethnic-
religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and animosities, as well as a North-South split or 
largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south, as the data analysis reveal. 
Findings #2: The Almajiri System in Northern Nigeria. The system of the 
almajirai (plural) known as “catechumens” is practiced in northern Nigeria, and used by 
“Islamic preachers and leaders…for recruitment,” involving an established Islamic 
practice whereby young Muslim boys are attached to Qur’anic teachers with whom they 
learn Arabic and the Koran, and about Islam (Falola, 1998, p. 148). Such almajirai, some 
of very tender ages, leave their homes sometimes to distant places to learn with the 
system observed as allowing “for indoctrination into particular beliefs and loyalty to a 
leader, who became a father figure” (Falola, 1998, p. 148). For instance, Marwa who led 
the Maitatsine sect had many of these almajiri (singular) boys, many of age ranges of 10 
to 14, and had a large following which he had to take care of, providing free houses in 
which they squatted, with their needs being rather small in view of their panhandling. The 
almajirai, in turn, were by law permitted to beg on the roads, at street corners, and in the 
mosques, keeping part proceeds of alms collected, and surrendering some portion to their 
leader (Falola, 1998). The tradition is said to be fraught with corruption and abuse as 
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“many preachers exploited young children for money” (Falola, 1998, p. 148), imposing 
weekly levies on almajirai with parents who could pay, while others are sent to beg for 
alms on the streets and to bring back part proceeds to their preacher-guardians (Falola, 
1998). It is thus, observed that: 
With urbanization, more and more children are sent to schools far from their 
families, and millions of Almajiri children are required to beg for alms 
(almajiranchi) to pay for their upkeep. While this system is ostensibly designed to 
prepare them for some of the hardships they may encounter later in life, in a 
context of urbanization and increasing poverty, it is open to abuse and may foster 
criminality. In cities like Kano and Kaduna, many of the alms-begging street 
children have graduated into Yandaba, adolescent groups that once served to 
socialize teenagers into adulthood but have now, in many cases, transformed into 
gangs. In 2005, the National Council for the Welfare of the Destitute estimated 
there were 7 million Almajirai children in northern Nigeria, mostly in the far 
northern states. (ICG, 2010, p. 10) 
Essentially, the almajiri system forms the bedrock of the northern Nigeria ethno-
religious conflict as it provides a ready supply of fundamentalists and Muslim mobs that 
resort to violence and suicide bombing attacks at the flimsiest opportunity. Such violence 
and mayhem are often played out either by looting for economic reasons as occasioned 
by their sprawling poverty levels and deprivation, or through elite mobilization of the 
almajiri masses to occasion riots, wanton killings and destruction in the north, for 
political agendas. As the study data reveal, significantly contributory to the conflict are 
the underlying socio-economic factors of poverty and unemployment. The almajirai in 
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the north, facing a lack of education and means to gainful employment, plod the streets 
and are prone to violence and looting at the slightest opportunity even without 
provocation, as in the “Maitatsine's followers, whose ranks have been swollen by the 
ready support of the youthful unemployed” (Cowell, 1982, para. 11). The negating 
impact of this almajiri factor to the conflict cannot be overstated. For instance, following 
the March 1984 Maitatsine riots in which over 1,000 people were killed in Yola including 
some members of the sect, Dash (1984) observes that:  
What has worried Nigerian officials since 1980 is the ability of the sect to 
replenish its membership from the daily drove of peasant youths flocking to the 
northern cities and the government's inability to predict where the next outbreak 
of violence will occur. (para. 5) 
Furthermore, in the March 1987 Kaduna state crisis that was sparked off by the 
alleged misinterpretation of Koran in a Kafanchan Christian crusade, which spread to 
several cities in the state with over 152 churches razed in Kaduna, Kafanchan, Funtua, 
Wusasa, and Zaria (Falola, 1998, p. 185) notably, where the city’s entire 75 churches 
were burned down, the violence was attributed to “small boys with strong minds who 
have been affected by all these Iranian ideas that have come into the country” (Brooke, 
1987b, para. 23). It is also observed in this episode of killings that “About 1,000 people 
were detained for rioting. [And] Visits to police headquarters in Zaria and in Kaduna 
found hundreds of boys from 8 to 16 years old squatting in the shade awaiting disposition 
of their cases” (Brooke, 1987b, para. 24). 
More so, the almajiri factor in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict is 
even more compounded by “The presence of Chadian and other ‘jihadis’ from 
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neighboring countries [which] has been a constant feature during outbreaks of communal 
violence in several northern and central states since 2000” (CSW, 2008b, p. 10). This 
foreign jihadist involvement intensifies the suicidal underpinnings of the perpetrators, 
while plausibly also adding an Al Qaeda dimension to the conflict (Jaynes, 1981; 
Mshelizza, 2011; Nossiter, 2010d; Shuaibu, 2012). The almajiri system, thus, serves as 
fodder to the inferno of killings in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, by 
readily providing violence prone Muslim mobs and fundamentalists which has continued 
to sustain and escalate the conflict. 
Findings #3: Government Culpability, Complicity/Ineptitude and 
Extrajudicial Killings. The playing out of genocidal inclinations to the northern Nigeria 
ethno-religious conflict do not occur in a vacuum, but rather within a context and ambit 
of the states(s) and governmental forces in which the exterminations and killings take 
place. Where not directly the genocide orchestrator as in this northern Nigeria conflict, a 
state’s intervening positioning may either help to abet or escalate conflict through acts of 
complicity or omissions as extrajudicial killings, government ineptitude, and press 
censorship or manipulation. Thus, it is acknowledged that “genocide was generally, 
although perhaps not exclusively, committed under the direction or…with the benign 
complicity of the State where it took place” (Schabbas, 2000, p. 1). The involvement 
and/or seeming ineptitude of various state governments in which wanton killings have 
been and are still being carried out in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict tend to 
support this argument. For instance, in the 1966 Igbo massacres in the north, the 
perpetrators in the carnages were civilian or Muslim mobs—mainly Hausas, and northern 
troops—as in Kano where soldiers mutinied to participate in the Ibo killings. Siollun 
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(2009) observes that the October 1, 1966 massacre was possibly “the worst of the 
mutiny,” even as “The participation of soldiers with firearms greatly increased the kill 
rate, and “Several thousand Igbos were killed that day alone in Kano due to the combined 
efforts of the 5
th
 battalion and civilian mobs” (p. 135). More so, on this 1966 Igbo 
massacres and the ensuing Biafra war which “was presented as a genocidal one waged by 
the Muslims of Northern Nigeria who had declared a jihad exterminate the Igbos from 
the face of the earth,” Osaghae (1998b) recognizes “the massacres of Igbos in the North, 
as well as the strategies of economic blockade and starvation pursued throughout the 
war” as lending credence to the conflict’s genocidal underpinnings Osaghae (1998b, p. 
66). 
The study also found several incidences of extrajudicial killings in the course of 
the intermittent northern Nigeria killings, which “are unlawful and deliberate killings 
carried out by order of a government or with its complicity or acquiescence,” with 
unlawful killings involving extrajudicial executions in addition to such other killings 
which result from “excessive use of force by law enforcement officials,” all such killings 
of which are said to violate a country’s constitutionally guaranteed “right to life” 
(Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 3). It is observed that “The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) 
is responsible for hundreds of extrajudicial executions, other unlawful killings and 
enforced disappearances every year,” most cases of which remain “uninvestigated and 
unpunished,” with the victims’ families having “no recourse to justice or redress,” while 
public anger at the country’s high incidence is exploited by the police for justifying their 
actions (Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 1). In the October 2001 extrajudicial killings in 
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Zaki Biam following the death of 19 soldiers in the Tiv/Jukun crisis, it is observed, for 
instance, that: 
On 22 October army officers went to the area around the town of Zaki Biam in 
Benue State, close to the Taraba State border in central Nigeria, where 19 soldiers 
had been killed two weeks earlier. They were seeking those responsible and to 
recover stolen weapons. Soldiers had been based in the area to quell 
intercommunal violence between the Tiv and Jukun ethnic communities. Over the 
next few days, more than 130 civilians – women and children among them – were 
deliberately shot dead or killed as a result of indiscriminate shelling, apparently in 
reprisal for the killing of the soldiers. Men in several villages in the area were 
reportedly assembled before being summarily shot. (Amnesty International, 2002, 
para. 7) 
The study, thus, identifies other perpetrator groups as security agents, soldiers, the 
army/military, and Hausa/Northern troops, many of which involve extrajudicial killings, 
as in the May 2004 Kano killings which occurred in retaliation to the Yelwa killings of 
May 2, 2004 killings, in which CAN noted that some Muslim policemen in brutality, 
“intentionally and indiscriminately shot and killed many Christians in Sabon Gari and 
other parts of the state” (CSW, n.d. p. 7). Furthermore, in the November 2009 sectarian 
clash between Muslims and Christians in Jos, Plateau state, Human Rights Watch also 
reports that: 
…deadly clashes between Muslim and Christian mobs and the excessive use of 
force by security forces left hundreds dead in Jos, Plateau State. [Also] Muslim 
and Christian authorities… collectively documented the deaths of more than 700 
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people in the two days of violence. In responding to the inter-communal violence, 
the Nigerian police and military were implicated in more than 130 arbitrary 
killings, mostly of young Muslim men from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. The 
vast majority of the killings by the police and military came…the same day that 
Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang issued a “shoot-on-sight” order to security 
forces. (2009, p. 1) 
Furthermore, in the May 2011 post-election rioting in which about 800 people 
were killed in the 12 northern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, 
Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara, it is observed that: 
Human Rights Watch estimates that in Kaduna State, at least 180 people, and 
possibly more, were killed in the cities of Kaduna and Zaria and their surrounding 
suburbs. There were cases of unlawful battering of citizens by the police and army 
officials in response to riots and sectarian violence. Such cases were reported in 
Kaduna, Bauchi, and Gombe. In Zaria and Kaduna, police and soldiers allegedly 
killed eight residents… 
Human Rights Watch documented eight cases of alleged unlawful killing 
of unarmed residents by the police and soldiers in the cities of Zaria and Kaduna, 
and received credible reports of more than a dozen other incidents. (Chidiogo, 
2011, para. 10, 13) 
There is, therefore, culpability, complicity, and/or government ineptitude in 
several northern states with the attendant exacerbating effect such positioning has on the 
conflict. In the May 2004 retaliatory attacks for the Yelwa killings, it is observed, for 
instance, that: 
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A total of 1,400 Christians were murdered by Muslims in Kano within two days 
while thousands of others were displaced following the looting and destruction of 
their homes and property…. nobody has been prosecuted for these killings, which 
were premeditated….the Governor Ibrahim Shekarau of Kano State had fore 
knowledge of the planned massacre of Christians in his state and gave his 
approval…The deed is done and those terrorists responsible for these killings are 
walking the street as freemen. (CAN as cited in Ahiante, 2004, para. 36) 
Evidences of government ineptitude abound in the northern Nigeria ethno-
religious conflict as the study findings reveal. More so, such ineptitude of government is 
further compounded by the lack of accountability or prosecution of perpetrators of the 
on-going heinous killings in the region, while the victims, who are mostly “Christians, 
rarely, if ever receive compensation for losses sustained during violence” (CSW, 2008b, 
p.13). It is thus, acknowledged that: 
In northern Nigeria perpetrators and organizers of religious violence are rarely, if 
ever, brought to justice. This lack of accountability has created a climate of 
impunity that encourages the continuation of such violence. In addition, the fact 
that violence erupts regularly and continues unchecked and its perpetrators are 
never brought to justice in turn causes a buildup of resentment of a kind that 
eventually fosters retaliation. (CSW, 2008b, p. 13) 
Findings #4: Problems of Indigenous/Settler Delineations. The findings in the 
study also reveal the problems of indigene and settler delineation as also compounding, 
sustaining, and exacerbating the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. For instance, 
in Jos, Plateau state which is in central Nigeria where “1,000 people died in religious 
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riots in 2001, and in 2004 hundreds more were killed in a nearby city of Yelwa,” it is 
observed that “Most of the state’s original inhabitants come from tribes that are almost 
entirely Christian and animist, but the farmland and grazing pasture has attracted 
migrants for centuries, especially Muslim Hausa and Fulani people from the more arid 
north” (Polgreen, 2008, para. 11). The indigene/settler problem in northern Nigeria, 
particularly in Jos as well as in Taraba state between the Jukuns and the Tivs (Noble, 
1992a), has occasioned episodes of attacks and counter-attacks as a result of which the 
conflict has become entrenched and deep-rooted. It is, thus, observed that in addition to 
religious and political divide in the country, “there are conflicts over land and political 
power, which are often intertwined as a result of traditional customs that hold the rights 
of indigenous people over those of migrants from other parts of the country [with] 
religion…almost always a proxy for those grievances” (Polgreen, 2008, para. 8). 
Hence, in the investigation of the November 2008 crisis in which over 700 people 
were killed in two days of inter-communal violence between Hausa-Fulani Muslims and 
Christians in Jos, Plateau state, for instance, it is recognized that: 
among the root causes of much of the inter-communal violence in Nigeria are 
government policies that discriminate against “non-indigenes”- people who 
cannot trace their ancestry to the original inhabitants of an area - essentially 
relegating millions of Nigerians to the status of second-class citizens. State and 
local governments throughout Nigeria have enacted policies that deny those 
designated as nonindigenes access to some of the most important avenues of 
socio-economic mobility…As poverty and unemployment have both become 
more widespread and severe in Nigeria, competition for scarce opportunities to 
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secure government jobs, education, and political patronage has intensified 
dramatically. Religious, political, and ethnic disputes often serve as mere proxies 
for the severe economic pressures that lie beneath the surface. (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009, p. 3) 
Findings #5: The International Media Dimension. The escalatory influence of 
media reportage on the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict with particular emphasis 
on some international media cannot be overemphasized. For instance, in the May 2004 
Yelwa killings which was said to have been carried out by Christian militia, it is observed 
that “…the term ‘Christian Militias’ was widely published by the international media, 
fuelling the perception of a planned conspiracy against Muslims in Plateau State, and 
rendering Christian leaders vulnerable to prosecution on false grounds” (CSW, n.d., p. 
12). Furthermore, on the attack’s reported death toll of 630 said to have been in dispute, it 
is noted “that this widely publicized estimate served to heighten Muslim anger, 
guaranteeing a violent reaction” (CSW, n.d., p. 2). Thus, as reports of the Yelwa incident 
of over 600 Muslims massacred reached Kano, a notable religious tension hotbed, there 
was an orgy of killings of Christians by Muslims in a seeming reprisal on the Yelwa 
incidence as irate Muslims hunted “nonbelievers,” killed, and burned them (Kendal, 
2004, para. 21). The toll for this Kano episode was estimated at about 500-600, mostly 
Christians killed in two days of Muslim rioting (Adekoya, 2009, para. 10). It is, however, 
observed that the death toll estimate for this Kano incidence is put at about 3,000 by 
Christians, who also decry the reporting bias of some international media on the episode 
(CSW, n.d., p. 2). 
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Additionally, in the November 2007 killing of about 400 people in Jos, Plateau 
state, over an election dispute involving Muslim-Christian gang clashes (Adekoya, 2009, 
para. 9), the CSW, arguing on Christians’ resentment of the international media’s 
inaccurate and biased events reporting, observed that even as the voting ended peacefully, 
violence started before the results were announced, with armed rioters attacking 
churches, Christian businesses, and homes of clergymen, launching a mayhem using the 
electoral results as excuse (CSW, 2008a, para. 2). Moreover, in this November 2007, Jos 
conflict it is argued that there was a wrong reporting of about 300 Muslims who were 
said to have been killed by Christians, with their bodies deposited in a mosque. The men 
were noted rather to have been shot as they launched fresh attacks in defiance to the 
authorities imposed night curfew, while also staging a large-scale unsuccessful attack on 
police barracks. Thus, it is observed that “the men died while obeying orders from a 
mosque in the Dilimi area, which was using its loudspeakers to instruct all Muslims to 
defy the authorities, participate in the ‘jihad’, loot properties for money and then burn 
them” (CSW, 2008a, para. 3). Additionally, about 16 churches were noted burned down, 
with the death toll of Christians killed in the attack put at about 100, including four or 
more pastors shot dead, one of Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), another of the 
Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA), and two others (CSW, 2008a, para. 4). 
Conclusion. The study has examined the northern Nigeria conflict focusing on 
the parties in the different phases of the conflict, and determined its ethno-religious 
undertones as mainly between ethnic groups along a Muslim/Christian divide. The 
mechanism that has been employed as revealed in the strategies adopted in the conflict, 
as well as investigating the conditions that have led to the conflict, have also been 
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examined. The idea has been to focus on specific intent by examining the motivational 
factors underlying the killings, and while the conflict may not fulfill the generally 
outlined notion of genocide, it still satisfies the parameters of genocide on the basis of the 
specific intent of the perpetrators to the killings. While genocide also has nothing to do 
with numbers, the intermittent killings have on occasions involved mass killings with 
evidences of mass burials and mass graves identified in the conflict. However, proof of 
genocide is not by numbers but by intentionality or the specific intent to exterminate a 
people group based on their ethnicity or religion (Campbell, 2012; Jones, 2006). In the 
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, there is the specific intent to eliminate 
Christians and other non-Muslim groups on the basis of religion or ethnicity. And, 
although the perpetrator groups may and do change from time to time, the underlying 
motivational factors have remained the same—the intent to eliminate Christians and non-
Muslim groups based on an exclusive ideological framing. 
Thus, beginning with the 1966 pogrom by northern mobs and troops against the 
Ibos (Osaghae, 1998b), which was also institutionally carried out by the Nigerian 
government against Biafrans as in the starvation to death of over one million and the 
deliberate targeting and killing of Biafran civilians during the war (“Africa: Race 
Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1967b, 1968b), and up to the present, genocidal episodes have 
continued unabated in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict (Adebayo, 2012). 
Furthermore, the northern region has continued to witness the scourging of churches 
through bomb attacks and arson, as are evident in the Boko Haram on-going scourges of 
churches in the north, as well as the killings and extermination of Christians and other 
non-Muslim groups in the region. It is, thus, evident from the study that there are anti-
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Christian sentiments which derive from the motivating factors underlying the killings. 
Examples of these motivating factors abound, for instance, in the abuses of Islamic 
Sharia on Christians in northern Nigeria. The appeal of Sharia lends credence to an 
exclusionary ideology among extremist Muslims that is framed by the ideal to set 
themselves apart from others by means of an “othering” process, the basis on which 
genocide can be distinguished (Hinton, 2002, p. 6). 
It is, thus, submitted that in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, 
extremist Muslims are seen as wanting to be separate and distinct from others, and on the 
basis of exclusionary tendencies and Sharia implementation ideals and practices, 
Christians and other non-Muslim groups are being discriminated against, targeted, and 
exterminated in northern Nigeria, notably by perpetrators that are mostly Muslim groups 
and/or Islamic fundamentalists (Kendal, 2004). As a result of the primarily religious 
tonation to the conflict, the Middle Belt particularly Jos in Plateau state which straddles 
the mostly Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south, as well as the Sharia 
operative states, notably, Bauchi, Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Taraba, and Yobe has continued 
to witness escalated killings and attacks on Christians. In essence, there has historically 
and systematically been the organizing and killing by perpetrator groups which are 
mainly Islamic, against victim groups that are Christians or non-Muslims, on the basis of 
A targeting B with the intent at eliminating B because of their religion and on occasions 
because of their ethnicity. This is genocide as defined by the United Nations 1948 
Genocide Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(UNGC) (Heidenrich, 2001; Hinton, 2002; Jones, 2006). 
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The genocidal undertone to the conflict has pitted perpetrator group(s) mostly, 
Hausa/Fulani Muslims, as well as Islamic fundamentalist sect(s) including Maitasine and 
Boko Haram sects, against varied targeted groups, specifically northern Christians and 
southerners as the Ibos and Yoruba, as well as the Tivs and other minority non-Muslim 
ethnic groups in the north. On the basis of this determination of specific intent to destroy 
Christians on account of their religious beliefs or ethnicity, there is, thus, proof of 
genocidal inclination to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict (Campbell, 2012; 
Jones, 2006). Furthermore, there is the attempt at imposition of the Sharia as the 
perpetrators’ ideology following the destruction of the targeted Christian group’s 
ideology (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 18, 25).  Islamization and the institution of 
Sharia in the region, thus, constitute the ideological motivation among the myriad of 
causal factors to the conflict. 
While there are few exclusions to the study’s identified pattern of Muslim 
group(s) targeting Christians or non-Muslim group(s) for extermination, as in the Yelwa 
massacres of May 2004 by Christian militia, which episode the casualty figures and 
reported perpetrator group were in contestation by Christians, on grounds of the non-
existence of a ‘Christian Militia’ in the region (CSW, n.d., p. 1), most other such episodes 
are more often than not, mainly retaliatory or revenge attacks by Christians groups in the 
region, as well as sometimes reprisal attacks on Hausa/Fulani Muslims in some southern 
states. 
While also, it is not every Muslim that endorses or supports the violence being 
perpetrated against Christians in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, the study 
mostly, however, demonstrates a constancy of the perpetrator groups as extremist 
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Muslims and the targeted group as non-Muslims or Christians. Thus, there is an episodic 
genocide to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, a problem where Christians and 
indeed southerners and other non-Muslim minority ethnic groups in northern Nigeria are 
being deprived of their right to existence through wanton killings and blatant violations 
of their fundamental human rights particularly in Sharia operative states. Ultimately, the 
idea is to create an Islamic state. The periodic nature of the phenomena in the sense that it 
has been sporadic and episodic has presented latency to the genocidal undertone of the 
conflict. 
Hence, because of the intermittency in the nature of the genocide being 
perpetuated in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, there has been covertness or 
latency in recognition of this episodic genocide, and it has remained a feature of the 
conflict for decades. This intermittency and episodic nature of the conflict continues to 
present a delusion that what is going on in the region is based on a subterfuge 
presentation of the conflict. This is a global issue which if left unchecked, will lead to a 
manifest open genocide either on the part of the north as they continue to attack and kill 
off Christians and southerners in northern Nigeria while also encroaching southwards, or 
the southerners who would have had enough may launch a retaliatory offensive to stage 
off the continued wanton exterminations of Christians and southerners alike. Would 
Nigeria cease to exist if the extremist Muslims succeed? The global community needs to 
start thinking of how to address this latent genocide to avert Rwanda type genocide in 
Nigeria. 
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Recommendations for Conflict Resolution 
The northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict is entrenched and protracted 
involving two powerful groups with two powerful positions maintained between these 
two groups, with a myriad of complex underlying causal factors that are historical, socio-
political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural, all of which are played out in a religious 
framework. Although there have been the introduction of collaborative efforts in some 
areas in attempt at conflict resolution, the conflict has continued unabated as a result of 
the two powerful positioning of these two groups. In Jos, Plateau state, for instance, 
following the 2001 riots, interfaith commissions were set up with aims at relationship 
building between the different faiths, as well as ethnic groups, with the undoing of its 
years of community bridge-building continuously being threatened by further eruptions 
of violence, as seen in the November 2008 crisis in the area (Polgreen, 2009). 
Thus, any attempt at conflict resolution would be one that aims at dislodging the 
entrenched underlying and delineating factors which feed on non-acceptance and 
intolerance between the two groups. There is the need for tolerance and acceptance in 
diversity in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, as well as multi-religious society such as 
Nigeria, and the north particularly, for such dislodgement of entrenched divisive 
perception of differences to be achieved. Tolerance and acceptance in diversity is an ideal 
that can be fostered through dialogue and collaboration between the two groups as 
represented by their national bodies such as the Jama’tu Nasril Islam (JNI) for the 
Muslims and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) for Christians. 
Furthermore, there is the need to address intercommunal violence which causes 
are rooted in the settler/non-indigene discriminatory practices as exist in Kaduna, Plateau, 
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Taraba, and such other applicable states through legislation by the national government 
with coverage nationwide. There is also the need to curb the widespread phenomenon of 
extrajudicial killings by security forces through close investigations of such allegations 
with due prosecution of the involved security officers. 
Most essentially, there is the need to adopt genocide prevention and intervention 
measures in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict in any attempt to curb the 
genocidal manifestations to the conflict. The adoption of such measures would be 
preemptive, notwithstanding the fact that genocide recognition presupposes a tenacity of 
primordial underlying factors which negate the tenets of universal human rights and 
democratic principles, in addition to its tendency of being conceptualized in the ambit of 
the Nazi Holocaust’s emotive power (Schabas, 2000). Also, even more crucial is the fact 
that the varied Genocide Convention implementation approaches has limited its impact, 
with the international community’s obligation for preventing and punishing genocide 
contradictorily resulting in Western authorities’ unwillingness to evoke the term. To 
which end, the Genocide Convention’s not-so-wide ratification by states following its 
1948 adoption is said to be “not in the existence of doubt about the universal 
condemnation of genocide” but in certain states’ unease with the treaty’s onerous 
obligations of prosecution and/or extradition of individuals, including heads of states 
(Schabbas, 2000, p. 3). However, with genocide continuing to be the international 
community’s prerogative for human rights prevention and punishment, a clarion call for 
intervention is being made on the global community to address the latent episodic 
genocide in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict to avert Rwanda and Sudan type 
genocide in Nigeria. 
  
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Implications 
Validity and Reliability 
While it is recognized that validity elements in content analysis are universal to 
any qualitative research design, additional reporting of its process is essential, given that 
its results are the categories’ described contents and meaning frames (Elo & Kyngä, 
2008). Thus, the study’s categories are conceptualized in essence, and grounded 
empirically (Dey, 1993) with the study data analyzed into categorical simple forms that 
reliably reflect the phenomena being studied (Kyngä & Vanhanen as cited in Elo & 
Kyngä, 2008). The credibility of the study’s findings is, thus, also evidenced by its 
categories’ effectiveness in covering the data, as well as the use of valid and reliable data 
sourcing for making defensible inferences (Weber as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008). 
Moreover, links were demonstrated between the data and the results to increase the 
study’s reliability, with maps, tables, and appendices for a greater understanding of “the 
process and procedures of the inquiry” (Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 112). Trustworthiness has 
been increased for the study by triangulation and authentic citations, with information on 
the data sourcing or the kinds of data categories originally formulated also provided 
(Patton as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008). The use of the Nvivo software program enabled 
the study’s ordered and manageable content analysis and also facilitated new analytic 
levels (Elo & Kyngä, 2008). 
Implications of the Study 
Nigeria is “a ‘regional giant’ whose internal religious politics could affect 
neighboring states in the West African region” (Chalk, 2004, p. 414). The prevalence of 
this conflict has been in northern Nigeria, where it has persisted for decades between 
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Muslims and Christians (Ibrahim, 1989, 1991; Osaghae, 1998b) primarily in the Middle 
Belt region, notably Jos, Plateau, and such other northern states as Kano, Bauchi, 
Kaduna, Katsina, and Borno, notably, Maiduguri, Yobe, and Adamawa state (Falola, 
1998; Falola & Heaton, 2008). Furthermore, the conflict has continued to manifest in 
sporadic genocidal killings and exterminations, primarily of Christians in these northern 
states (Falola, 1998). Nationally, the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict has 
exacerbated the polarization in the country with socio-political, socio-economic, and 
socio-religious relationships being defined in terms of the mainly Muslim north, and the 
largely Christian south, and the Christian/Muslim evenly balanced Middle Belt or central 
region straddling across the north and the south, constituting the battle grounds for 
Islam’s jihadist encroachment southwards. The implication of this encroachment cannot 
be gainsaid, considering the fact that since the institution of Sharia by its twelve operative 
northern states from 1999, over 50,000 lives have been lost (CSW, n.d.). It is, indeed, 
recognized that “For many non-Muslims in northern and central Nigeria daily life 
consists of a veneer of normality that barely conceals an underlying reality of chronic 
discrimination and tension which periodically erupts into deadly, but organized, 
violence” (CSW, n.d. para. 1). 
Further intensifying the nation’s polarization are the policies of “Northernization” 
in the regional era, and “Islamization” in the contemporary period which has consistently 
been pursued by the predominantly Muslim north since Nigeria’s independence in 1960. 
These policies align with Sudan’s exclusive “Arabization” and “Islamization” policies 
which Adar (2001) identifies (p. 86). The implication of Islamization for non-Muslims is 
their subjugation to Muslim rule, as was the case in the Islamic conquest of the early 
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centuries in which the jihad or holy war served under Islamic jurisdiction, as territory 
conquering and controlling means, while contemporarily Muslim leaders use jihad as 
propaganda and mobilization tool in the face of external or internal threats (Adar, 2001). 
Thus, Islamization is being used by the northern leadership and elites “as a religio-
political tool” for promoting unity and a means of survival, and thus, “becomes an 
important rallying point or mobilization tool for the north and the south” as was identified 
in Sudan (Adar, 2001, p. 105).  Islamization policy prohibits conflict resolution, and has 
indeed been a serious impediment to the forging of religious tolerance and coexistence 
between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria, and by extension between the north 
and the south, with Christians obviously not accepting of “its implied religious and 
political superiority and domination” (Adar, 2001, p. 105). While not applicable to all 
Muslims at large, Islamization particularly to Muslim fundamentalists carries with it the 
traits of exclusionary ideology involving the destruction of the ideology of the targeted 
group, and the imposition of the perpetrator group’s ideology (Campbell, 2010, Video 
Series 25). 
Thus, the country’s ethno-religious divide inhibits the establishment of a national 
identity, given the exclusionism of Islamization and Sharia positioning, with the 
north/south divergent perspectives preventing its formation as in southern Sudan which is 
observed as persistently rejecting the Islamization policy “because it is exclusionary and 
inherently discriminatory” (Adar, 2001, p. 105). Islamization policy, where pursued 
whether or not formally institutionalized, negates the essence of national identity in a 
pluralistic nation such as Nigeria, and according to Adar (2001) “the policy is a fallacy” 
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to the extent “that it renders the process of unity of the north and the south nugatory” (p. 
105). 
Globally, the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict has its implications. The 
genocidal undertone to the conflict is a global issue that needs to be addressed by the 
international community. This will lead to a manifest open genocide either on the part of 
the north as they continue to attack and kill off Christians and southerners in northern 
Nigeria while also encroaching southwards or the southerners who have had enough may 
launch their own offensives. Ultimately, the idea is to create an Islamic state. If extremist 
Muslims succeed would it be that Nigeria will end? The international community should, 
thus, take to heart what is happening in northern Nigeria in the wanton extermination of 
Christians and non-Muslims which has been episodic and, thus, latent in manifestation, 
and intervene. Genocide, involving the targeted destruction of the other on the basis of 
their religion and on occasions on the basis of their ethnicity, is occurring, the 
intervention for which is stipulated in the Genocide Convention guiding the conduct of 
nations. It is of paramount importance that the global community begins to address this 
latent episodic genocide to avert South Sudan or Rwanda type genocide in Nigeria. 
Limitations to the Study 
The limitations of content analysis methodology used in the study involve the 
analytical limitation of available and/or accessible archival materials, and the larger 
structural context within which the interactions take place (Druckman, 2005). The 
criticisms may, however, apply to the methodology’s specific applications, rather than to 
a general analytical approach of process or text. This study involves textual rather than 
process analysis of content, and focus will be given to the limitation which relates to 
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textual analysis. The problem of materials limitation restricting the analysis is recognized 
as a sampling rather than a methodological problem, with the observation that even 
“small unrepresentative texts or data sets can have dire implications for inference, 
whether the research consists of surveys, cases, or textual material” (Druckman, 2005, p. 
260). Thus, the comprehensiveness of any analysis underlies its adequacy, and content 
analysis research designs vary on such criterion. Data sourcing from various databases 
and newspaper websites helped to address the problem of materials limitation and data 
sampling was stratified based on relevance. 
Furthermore, content analysis study results may exhibit signs of incomplete 
process analysis, where the data has not been abstracted by the researcher, or there is the 
inclusion of so many different things in one category (Dey as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 
2008). Additionally, the abundance of categories may be indicative of inadequate data 
categorizing, with the results including categories that are not cancelled out by each 
other, while the process of abstraction is still going on. Where also saturation is 
incomplete, there may be difficulty in linking the data items to one another (Patton as 
cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008), with study results that are seemingly simple being 
indicative of incomplete analysis (Weber as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008). Such coding, 
categorizing, and abstracting limitations were addressed by the use of the Nvivo software 
which organizes and analyzes unstructured data for coding categorizing and data 
evidence recombination for meaning making, by enabling the researcher to remain close 
to source data at every stage of the study. 
Lastly, the limitations of content analysis also involve issues of the research 
questions being too extensive or ambiguous, as well as the problem of researcher bias 
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which is a generic qualitative methodological limitation (Elo & Kyngä, 2008). These 
limitations have been addressed in the study using different and multiple data sources, 
and triangulation of assertions and essential data requiring validation (Golafshani, 2003). 
The problem of researcher bias has been addressed by bracketing. 
Contributions of the Study 
The findings from this study may lend credence to the conception of genocidal 
intent and its covertness in situations of genocidal intermittency. The findings will be of 
relevance in the academic sphere, the Nigerian community, and the international arena. 
The study will broaden knowledge and contribute new perspectives to the conflict 
analysis and resolution field on alternative strategies to improve ethno-religious 
relationships and ensure a peaceful coexistence among different ethnic and religious 
groups. The study will also provide a better understanding of the underlying factors 
contributing to the continuing violent conflicts between Muslims and Christians in 
northern Nigeria. The findings will help determine how to proffer recommendations for 
policy formulations that will serve to eliminate the problem of religious intolerance in 
northern Nigeria. The study will additionally create further awareness on the need for 
national/international intervention on the sporadic killings in northern Nigeria, to avert 
further conflict escalation, and possibly avert another South Sudan or Rwandan type 
genocide in Nigeria. 
Directions for Future Study 
Further studies are required to determine nuances in the northern Nigeria ethno-
religious conflict between Sharia operative states and non-Sharia operative states in the 
region. Additionally, there is the need for further investigations on the extent to which 
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government involvement, ineptitude, and/or extrajudicial killings significantly impact the 
ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria. 
Reflections on the Completed Study 
This study contributes significant theoretical insights in understanding and 
identifying the inclinations to genocide in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. 
While not exhaustive in itself, with additional investigation required on the nuances of 
the genocidal undertones to the conflict, the study, however, presents an element of 
urgency for intervention in the conflict to prevent further escalation and stem the 
genocidal killings in northern Nigeria. The contributions of the study and its limitations, 
in essence, provide the setting for future research efforts. 
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Figure A3. Map III: Nineteen States of Nigeria: 1976 to 1987 (“Nigeria States 1976-1976,” 
2010). 
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Map IV: Twenty One States of Nigeria: 1987 to1991 
 
 
Figure A4. Map IV: Twenty One States of Nigeria: 1987 to 1991 (“Nigeria states 1987-
1991,” 2007). 
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Map V: Thirty States of Nigeria: 1991 to 1996 
 
 
Figure A5. Map V: Thirty States of Nigeria: 1991 to 1996 (“Nigeria 1991-1996,” 2007). 
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Map VI: Sharia Operative States in Northern Nigeria: 1999 to Present 
 
 
Figure A6. Map VI: Sharia Operative States in Northern Nigeria: 1999 to Present (“NG-
Sharia,” 2006). 
  
 
Appendix B: Coding List Summary 
Summary of Study Nodes or Coding Themes 
Attacks 
 Assault, Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting 
 Blockade, Embargo and Civil War 
 Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism 
 Bombings, Coordinated Gun and Bomb Attacks 
 Genocide 
 Political Violence, Coup D’état and Political Assassinations 
 Religious and Ethnic Violence 
 Reprisals from Southern States 
 Sectarian Violence 
 Spiral or Escalation of Violence 
 Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults 
 Terrorist Activities 
 Threats or Fears of More Attacks, Protests or Warnings of Secession or Full Scale 
War 
 Tit-For-Tat Killings in Northern States 
 Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations 
 Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles 
 
Causal Factors 
 
 Immediate Causes 
 First Coup D’état and Killing of Northern Army  Officers 
 Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots 
 Election-related Violence 
 Islam Degraded, Desecration or Misinterpretation of Koran, Danish Cartoon or 
Miss World Publication 
 Massacres of Ibos and Returning Refugees 
 Secession and Self-Determination 
 Reprisal Mission, Revenge or Counter-Coup 
 Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or 
Other Fundamentalists Activities 
 
 Remote or Underlying Causes 
 Historical Influences 
 Culture of Bad Governance and Corruption or Oppressive Military Rule 
 Colonial Influences, Exploitation and Fear of Balkanization 
 Al Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian Links or Anti U.S.-led 
Afghanistan Air Strikes 
 Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle 
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 Coalition Government or Federalism versus Regionalism Disputes 
 Dynamism and Fear of Ibo or Southern Dominance 
 Infiltration and Politicization of Religion 
 Political Divisions and Tensions 
 Political Elites or Kaduna Mafia 
 Socio-Economic Issues 
 Socio-Economic Issues 
 Ethnic Groups Vying for Control of Fertile Lands, Political and Economic 
Power 
 Indigenous Settlers and Migrants Issues 
 Poverty, Unemployment, Lack of Education, and Discontent 
 
 Perceived Threat of the “Otherness” 
 Anti-Ibo Rioting 
 Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities 
 Dynamism and Fear of Ibo or Southern Dominance 
 North-South Split or Largely Muslim North and Mainly Christian South 
 Annihilation Attempts by Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam 
 Ultimatum to Southern Christians living in the North to leave 
 
 Exclusive Ideological Framing 
 Religious Dimensions, Anti-Western or Ideological Differences 
 Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency 
 Sharia or Islamic Law 
 Gender Segregation 
 Imposing Sharia Across Nigeria or Establishing of Islamic State 
 Non-Muslim Opposition to Sharia, Unconstitutionality and Violation of 
Fundamental Rights of Christians 
 Strict Implementation of Sharia, Anti-Establishment  or Rejection of 
Westernized Institutions and Ideology 
Conflict Parties 
 Muslim Sect or Civilian Mobs or Gangs and Ibos 
 Muslim Mobs or Sect and Security Forces 
 Muslim Sect and Other Muslims or Sect 
 The Northern-led Federal Government and Ibos 
 Muslim Mobs, Sect or Groups and Christians 
 Nigeria Biafra War 
 Security Agents and Unidentified Civilians 
 Different Ethnic Groups 
 Northern States Government and Christians 
 Fulani Herdsmen or Hausa-Fulani Group and Christian or Host Communities 
Conflict Perceptions 
 Marginalization and Discrimination 
 Narratives and Experiences 
 Views and Contentions 
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Context 
 Eastern Region or Biafra 
 Mid-Western Region or State 
 North Eastern Region 
 Middle Belt or Central Region 
 Northern Region or States 
 Abuja 
 Adamawa State 
o Lamurde 
o Jimeta 
o Mubi 
o Yola 
o Jabi 
o Zuba 
 Bauchi State 
o Bauchi 
 Benue State 
o Zongo Akiki, Nyijir, Tse Taki, and Agbeke in Guma areas 
o Vaase 
o Dooga, Kpata, Lokobi, Ajimaka, Ekeae, Giza, Yogbo and 
Mbgawem border communities in Benue State 
o Gbeji 
o Gwer West Local Government Area 
o Zaki-Biam 
o Makurdi 
 Borno State 
o Yan’tebura, Bulukuntu Tsallake 
o Zajeri 
o Dala 
o Maiduguri 
 Gombe State 
 Jigawa State 
 Ilorin, Kwara State 
 Taraba State 
o Jalingo 
 Plateau State 
o Kuru Karama 
o Zot and Ratsat 
o Kadyal, Kanam District 
o Langtang 
o Barkin Ladi 
o Wareng 
o Bukuru 
o Dogon Na Hauwa 
o Yelwa 
o Jos 
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 Kaduna State 
o Ori-Apata 
o Kufara 
o Zonkwa and Zango-Kataf 
o Kafanchan 
o Zaria 
o Kaduna 
 Kano or Kano State 
o Bompai 
o Sabon-Gari 
 Katsina State 
 Nasarawa State 
o Kadarko 
o Alago 
o Tiv settlements at Kpata, Donga, Lokobi and Ajimaka 
o Doma Town 
o Eke and Giza Areas 
o Akwana 
 Niger State 
o Angwan Kuje, Minna 
o Madalla 
 Sokoto State 
 Yobe State 
o Hawan Malka 
o Geidam 
o Gadaka 
o Potiskum 
o Damaturu 
 Zamfara State 
 Southern States  
 Aba, Abia State 
 Anambra State 
 Asaba, Delta State 
 Eastern Region or Biafra 
 Imo State 
 Lagos, Lagos State 
 Niger Delta State 
 South-Eastern 
Effects 
 Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed 
 Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed 
 Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses 
 Denial of Freedom of Worship and Desecration of Christian Religion 
 Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties 
 Mass Grave and Mass Burial 
 Mosques Burned or Destroyed 
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 Normalcy Returns or Resume Schooling 
 Police Stations and Barracks, Government Buildings Bombed or Burned 
 Refugees and Displaced Persons 
 Fled Homes or Took Refuge 
 Schools Bombed, Burned, Destroyed or Closed 
 Secession and Civil War 
 Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos 
 Infiltration of Police, Military and all areas of Government 
 Starvation 
Intervening Factors 
 Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures 
 Extrajudicial Killings and Army Involvement in Policing 
 Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government 
 Collaborators or Bystanders 
 Foreign or Internationalization of Conflict 
 Local 
Intervention Efforts 
 Aid and Relief Support 
 Attempts at Dialogue, Appeals for Intervention or Mediation 
 Control Measures Taken, Investigations and Commissions of Inquiry 
 Calls to Address the Constitutionality of Sharia Law and Security Issues 
 Military Assault or Crackdown 
 Mopping-up of Rioters or Arrests Made 
 Warnings or Calls for Action, Restraint, Justice, or Self-Defense 
 Post-War Re-unification Policy, Rehabilitation Efforts or Calls for Rebuilding of 
Churches 
 Reconciliation Attempts 
 
Memorable Quotes 
Perpetrator Groups 
 Rampaging, Unemployed or Under-aged Youths 
 Christian Militia or Youths 
 Fulani Herdsmen or Fulani-Hausa Group or Gunmen 
 Civilian Mobs, Unidentified Attackers or Gunmen 
 Security Agents, Soldiers, The Army, Military, Hausa or Northern Troops 
 Muslim Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths 
 Islamic Fundamentalists or Sect 
 Boko Haram 
 Matatsine Sect 
Population or Religious Demographics 
Strategies of Attack 
 Organization and Planning Including Weaponry 
 Extermination Plot 
 Forced Migration 
 Mass Murders 
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 Blockade and Starvation 
 Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing 
 Co-ordinated Attacks - Shootings, Bombings, Maiming, Arson 
 Drive-By or Hit and Run Shootings 
Targets or Victims of Attack 
 Beer Parlors, Hotels, Banks and Other Facilities 
 Christians and Churches 
 Christian Neighborhoods or Mostly Christian Villages 
 Civilian Centers, Schools and School Children 
 Civilian Targets or Innocent Citizens 
 Media Offices and Journalists 
 Muslim Clerics or Mainstream or Orthodox Muslims 
 Muslims, Hausa-Fulani Herders, Muslim Sect, Northerners or Mosques 
 Security Agents - Police Officers, Military and Government Officials 
 Southerners 
 Symbols of Government Authority 
 Ibos as targets 
 
 
  
 
Appendix C: Coding Lists A to E for the Five Study Phases in the Northern Nigeria 
Ethno-Religious Conflict 
Coding List A 
Summary of Nodes for Study Phase I – 1966 to 1976 
Study Phase I spanning 1966 to 1976 is inclusive of the Nigeria-Biafra 1967 to 1970 war 
years.  
Attacks 
- Assault, Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting 
- Blockade, Embargo and Civil War 
- Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism 
- Bombings, Coordinated Gun and Bomb Attacks 
- Genocide 
- Political Violence, Coup D’état and Political Assassinations 
- Religious and Ethnic Violence 
- Spiral or Escalation of Violence 
- Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults 
- Threats or Fears of More Attacks, Protests or Warnings of Secession or Full Scale 
War 
- Tit-For-Tat Killings in Northern States 
- Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations 
- Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles 
Causal Factors 
Immediate Causes: 
- Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or 
Other Fundamentalists Activities 
- Election-related Violence 
- First Coup D’état and Killing of Northern Army Officers. 
- Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots 
- Massacres of Ibos and Returning Refugees 
- Reprisal Mission, Revenge or Counter-Coup 
- Secession and Self-Determination 
- Annihilation Attempts of Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam 
Perceived Threat of the Otherness: 
- Anti-Ibo Rioting 
- Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities 
- Dynamism and Fear of Ibo or Southern Dominance 
- North-South Split or Largely Muslim North and Mainly Christian South 
Remote or Underlying Causes: 
- Colonial Influences, Exploitation and Fear of Balkanization 
- Culture of Bad Governance and Corruption or Oppressive Military Rule 
- Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle: 
- Coalition Government or Federalism versus Regionalism Disputes 
- Infiltration and Politicization of Religion 
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- Socio-Economic Issues: 
Poverty, Unemployment, Lack of Education, and Discontent 
Exclusive Ideological Framing 
- Religious Dimensions, Anti-Western or Ideological Differences 
- Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency 
Anti-Establishment or Rejection of Westernized Institutions and Ideology 
Conflict Parties 
- Different Ethnic Groups 
- Muslim Mobs, Sect, Civilian Mobs or Gangs and Ibos 
- The Northern-led Federal Government and Ibos 
Context 
Eastern Region or Biafra 
Mid-Western State 
Northern Region or States: 
- Benue State/Makurdi 
- Borno State/Maiduguri 
- Kaduna State/Kaduna 
- Kano State/Kano  
- Plateau State/Jos; Bukuru 
Effects 
- Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed 
- Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed 
- Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses 
- Denial of Freedom of Worship and Desecration of Christian Religion 
- Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties 
- Refugees and Displaced Persons/ Fled Homes or Took Refuge 
- Secession and Civil War 
- Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos 
- Starvation 
- Normalcy or Calm Returns 
Intervening Factors 
- Collaborators or Bystanders: 
Foreign or Internationalization of conflict 
Local 
- Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government 
- Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures 
Intervention Efforts 
- Aid and Relief Support 
- Attempts at Dialogue, Appeals for Intervention or Mediation 
- Control Measures Taken, Investigations and Commissions of Inquiry 
Mopping-up of Rioters or Arrests Made 
Warnings or Calls for Action, Restraint, Justice, or Self-Defense 
- Post-War Re-unification Policy, Rehabilitation Efforts or Calls for Rebuilding of 
Churches 
- Reconciliation Attempts 
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Perpetrator Groups 
- Civilian Mobs, Unidentified Attackers or Gunmen 
- Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths 
- Security Agents, Soldiers, The Army, Military, Hausa or Northern Troops 
Strategies  
- Organization, Planning, and Weaponry 
- Co-ordinated Attacks - Shootings, Bombings, Maiming, Arson 
- Extermination Plot: 
Blockade and Starvation 
- Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing 
Targets or Victims of Attack 
- Christians and Churches 
- Civilian Centers, Schools and School Children 
- Civilian Targets or Innocent Citizens 
- Media Offices and Journalists 
- Southerners/Ibos or Easterners as targets 
- Targets or Victims of Attack\Symbols of Government Authority 
 
Coding List B 
 Summary of Nodes for Study Phase II – 1976 to 1987 
Attacks  
- Assault, Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting  
- Blockade, Embargo and Civil War  
- Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism  
- Religious and Ethnic Violence  
- Sectarian Violence  
- Spiral or Escalation of Violence  
- Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults  
- Tit-For-Tat Killings in Northern States  
- Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations  
- Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles  
Causal Factors 
Immediate Causes:  
- Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or 
Other Fundamentalists Activities  
- Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots 
- Islam Degraded, Desecration or Misinterpretation of Koran, Danish Cartoon or 
Miss World Publication  
- Reprisal Mission, Revenge or Counter-Coup  
Perceived Threat of the Otherness: 
- Annihilation Attempts of Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam  
- Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities  
Remote or Underlying Causes:  
- Al Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian Links or Anti U.S.-led 
Afghanistan Air Strikes  
- Culture of Bad Governance and Corruption or Oppressive Military Rule  
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- Historical Factors  
- Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle:  
Political Elites or Kaduna Mafia  
- Socio-Economic Issues: 
Poverty, Unemployment, Lack of Education, and Discontent   
Exclusive Ideological Framing 
- Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency 
- Sharia or Islamic Law: 
Imposing Sharia across Nigeria or Establishing of Islamic State  
Conflict Parties 
- Muslim Mobs or Sect and Security Forces  
- Muslim Mobs, Sect or Groups and Christians  
- Muslim Sect and Other Muslims or Sect 
- Muslim Mobs, Sect, Civilian Mobs or Gangs and Ibos  
- The Northern-led Federal Government and Ibos  
Context  
- Northern Region or States  
- Adamawa State/Jimeta; Yola  
- Borno State/Maiduguri  
- Gombe State  
- Kaduna State/Kaduna; Kafanchan; Zaria  
- Kano State/Kano  
Effects 
- Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed  
- Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed  
- Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses  
- Denial of Freedom of Worship and Desecration of Christian Religion  
- Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties  
- Mass Grave and Mass Burial  
- Mosques Burned or Destroyed  
- Police Stations and Barracks, Government Buildings Bombed or Burned 
- Refugees and Displaced Persons/Fled Homes or Took Refuge  
- Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos 
- Normalcy or Calm Returns  
Intervening Factors 
- Collaborators or Bystanders/Foreign or Internationalization of conflict  
- Extrajudicial Killings and Army Involvement in Policing  
- Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government  
- Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures 
Intervention Efforts 
- Attempts at Dialogue, Appeals for Intervention or Mediation 
- Control Measures Taken, Investigations and Commissions of Inquiry 
Mopping-up of Rioters or Arrests Made 
Perpetrator Groups 
- Christian Militia or Youths  
- Islamic Fundamentalists or Sect:  
434 
 
 
Matatsine Sect  
- Muslim Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths 
Strategies  
- Organization, Planning, and Weaponry 
- Extermination Plot: 
Mass Murders 
- Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing : 
Targeting of Christians or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam 
- Indoctrination and Manipulation or Instigation  
Targets or Victims of Attack: 
- Beer Parlors, Hotels, Banks and Other Facilities 
- Christians and Churches  
- Christian Neighborhoods or Mostly Christian Villages  
- Civilian Targets or Innocent Citizens  
- Media Offices and Journalists 
- Muslim Clerics or Mainstream or Orthodox Muslims  
- Muslims, Hausa-Fulani Herders, Muslim Sect, Northerners or Mosques  
- Security Agents - Police Officers, Military and Government Officials  
- Southerners/Ibos or Easterners as targets 
 
Coding List C 
Summary of Nodes for Study Phase III – 1987 to 1996 
Attacks 
- Assault, Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting 
- Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism 
- Religious and Ethnic Violence 
- Sectarian Violence 
- Spiral or Escalation of Violence 
- Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults 
- Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations 
- Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles 
Causal Factors 
Immediate Causes 
- Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or 
Other Fundamentalists Activities 
- Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots 
Perceived Threat of the Otherness 
- Annihilation Attempts of Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam 
- Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities 
- North-South Split or Largely Muslim North and Mainly Christian South 
Remote or Underlying Causes 
- Colonial Influences, Exploitation and Fear of Balkanization 
- Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle 
- Socio-Economic Issues 
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Exclusive Ideological Framing 
- Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency 
- Sharia or Islamic Law 
Conflict Parties 
- Different Ethnic Groups 
- Fulani Herdsmen or Hausa-Fulani Group and Christian or Host Communities 
- Muslim Mobs or Sect and Security Forces 
- Muslim Mobs, Sect or Groups and Christians 
- Security Agents and Unidentified Civilians 
Context 
Northern Region or States: 
- Bauchi State/Bauchi 
- Kaduna State 
- Kaduna State/Kaduna 
- Kaduna State/Zonkwa and Zango-Kataf 
- Kano or Kano State 
- Katsina or Katsina State 
- Nasarawa State 
- Taraba State/Akwana 
Effects: 
- Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed 
- Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed 
- Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses 
- Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties 
- Refugees and Displaced Persons 
- Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos 
- Normalcy or Calm Returns 
Intervening Factors 
- Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government 
- Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures 
Intervention Efforts 
- Attempts at Dialogue, Appeals for Intervention or Mediation 
- Control Measures Taken, Investigations and Commissions of Inquiry 
Mopping-up of Rioters or Arrests Made 
- Reconciliation Attempts 
Perpetrator Groups 
- Muslim Mobs, Rioters, Islamic Fundamentalists, Sect, or Suicide Bombers 
Muslim Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths 
- Security Agents, Soldiers, The Army, Military, Hausa or Northern Troops 
Strategies  
- Organization, Planning, and Weaponry 
- Extermination Plot 
Forced Migration or Displacement 
Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing 
Mass Murder 
- Indoctrination and Manipulation or Instigation 
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Targets or Victims of Attack 
- Christians and Churches 
Christian Neighborhoods or Mostly Christian Villages 
- Civilian Targets  
- Media Offices and Journalists 
- Security Agents - Police Officers, Military and Government Officials 
 
Coding List D 
Summary of Nodes for Study Phase IV – 1996 to 2005 
Attacks 
- Assault, Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting 
- Blockade, Embargo and Civil War 
- Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism 
- Genocide 
- Political Violence, Coup D’état and Political Assassinations 
- Religious and Ethnic Violence 
- Reprisals from Southern States 
- Sectarian Violence 
- Spiral or Escalation of Violence 
- Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults 
- Terrorist Activities 
- Threats or Fears of More Attacks, Protests or Warnings of Secession or Full Scale 
War 
- Tit-For-Tat Killings in Northern States 
- Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations 
- Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles 
Causal Factors 
Immediate Causes 
- Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or 
Other Fundamentalists Activities 
- Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots 
- Islam Degraded, Desecration or Misinterpretation of Koran, Danish Cartoon or 
Miss World Publication 
- Massacres of Ibos and Returning Refugees 
- Reprisal Mission, Revenge or Counter-Coup 
Perceived Threat of the Otherness: 
- Annihilation Attempts of Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam 
- Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities 
- North-South Split or Largely Muslim North and Mainly Christian South 
Remote or Underlying Causes: 
- Al Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian Links or Anti U.S.-led 
Afghanistan Air Strikes 
- Colonial Influences, Exploitation and Fear of Balkanization 
- Culture of Bad Governance and Corruption or Oppressive Military Rule 
- Historical Influences 
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- Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle 
Infiltration and Politicization of Religion 
- Political Elites or Kaduna Mafia 
- Socio-Economic Issues 
Indigenous Settlers and Migrants Issues 
- Poverty, Unemployment, Lack of Education, and Discontent 
Exclusive Ideological Framing 
- Religious Dimensions, Anti-Western or Ideological Differences 
- Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency 
- Sharia or Islamic Law 
Gender Segregation 
Imposing Sharia across Nigeria or Establishing of Islamic State 
Non-Muslim Opposition to Sharia, Unconstitutionality and Violation of 
Fundamental Rights of Christians 
Non-Muslim Opposition to Sharia, Unconstitutionality and Violation of 
Fundamental Rights of Christians 
Imposing Sharia across Nigeria or Establishing of Islamic State 
Sharia Implementation, Anti-Establishment or Anti-Western Ideology 
Conflict Parties 
- Different Ethnic Groups 
- Fulani Herdsmen or Hausa-Fulani Group and Christian or Host Communities 
- Muslim Mobs or Sect and Security Forces 
- Muslim Mobs, Sect or Groups and Christians 
- Muslim Sect and Other Muslims or Sect 
- Muslim Mobs, Sect, Civilian Mobs or Gangs and Ibos 
- Northern States Government and Christians 
- Security Agents and Unidentified Civilians 
Context 
Northern Region or States 
- Abuja 
- Bauchi State 
- Benue State/Gbeji; Vaase; Zaki-Biam 
- Kwara State/Ilorin 
- Kaduna State/Kaduna; Kafanchan; Zaria 
- Kano State/Kano; Sabon-Gari 
- Kebbi State 
- Nasarawa State 
- Niger State 
- Plateau State/Jos; Kadyal, Kanam District; Langtang; Yelwa 
- Sokoto State 
- Taraba State 
- Zamfara State 
Southern States: 
- Abia State/Aba 
- Lagos State/Lagos 
- Niger Delta State/Odi 
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Effects 
- Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed 
- Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed 
- Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses 
- Denial of Freedom of Worship and Desecration of Christian Religion 
- Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties 
- Mass Grave and Mass Burial 
- Mosques Burned or Destroyed 
- Refugees and Displaced Persons 
- Refugees and Displaced Persons/Fled Homes or Took Refuge 
- Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos 
- Normalcy Returns or Resume Schooling 
Intervening Factors 
- Collaborators or Bystanders/Foreign or Internationalization of conflict; Local 
- Extrajudicial Killings and Army Involvement in Policing 
- Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government 
- Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures 
Perpetrator Groups 
- Christian Militia or Youths 
- Fulani Herdsmen or Fulani-Hausa Group or Gunmen 
- Muslim Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths 
- Security Agents, Soldiers, The Army, Military, Hausa or Northern Troops 
Strategies  
- Organization, Planning, and Weaponry 
- Extermination Plot 
Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing 
Mass Murders 
Indoctrination and Manipulation or Instigation 
Targets or Victims of Attack 
- Beer Parlors, Hotels, Banks and Other Facilities 
- Christians and Churches 
- Christians and Churches\Christian Neighborhoods or Mostly Christian Villages 
- Civilian Centers, Schools and School Children 
- Civilian Targets  
- Media Offices and Journalists 
- Muslims, Hausa-Fulani Herders, Muslim Sect, Northerners or Mosques 
- Security Agents - Police Officers, Military and Government Officials 
- Southerners 
- Ibos or Easterners as Targets 
 
Coding List E 
Summary of Nodes for Study Phase V – 2006 to Present 
Attacks 
- Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting 
- Blockade, Embargo and Civil War 
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- Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism 
- Bombings, Coordinated Gun and Bomb Attacks 
- Genocide 
- Political Violence, Coup D’état and Political Assassinations 
- Religious and Ethnic Violence 
- Reprisals from Southern States 
- Sectarian Violence 
- Spiral or Escalation of Violence 
- Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults 
- Terrorist Activities 
- Threats or Fears of More Attacks, Protests or Warnings of Secession or Full Scale 
War 
- Tit-For-Tat Killings in Northern States 
- Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations 
- Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles 
Causal Factors 
Immediate Causes: 
- Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or 
Other Fundamentalists Activities 
- Election-related Violence 
- Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots 
- Islam Degraded, Desecration or Misinterpretation of Koran, Danish Cartoon or 
Miss World Publication 
- Massacres of Ibos and Returning Refugees 
- Reprisal Mission, Revenge or Counter-Coup 
- Secession and Self-Determination 
Perceived Threat of the Otherness: 
- Annihilation Attempts of Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam 
- Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities 
- North-South Split or Largely Muslim North and Mainly Christian South 
- Ultimatum to Southern Christians living in the North to leave 
Remote or Underlying Causes 
- Al Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian Links or Anti U.S.-led 
Afghanistan Air Strikes 
- Culture of Bad Governance and Corruption or Oppressive Military Rule 
- Historical Influences 
- Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle 
- Infiltration and Politicization of Religion 
- Political Divisions and Tensions 
- Socio-Economic Issues 
Ethnic Groups Vying for Control of Fertile Lands, Political and Economic Power 
Indigenous Settlers and Migrants Issues 
Poverty, Unemployment, Lack of Education, and Discontent 
Exclusive Ideological Framing 
- Religious Dimensions, Anti-Western or Ideological Differences 
- Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency 
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- Sharia or Islamic Law 
Gender Segregation 
Imposing Sharia across Nigeria or Establishing of Islamic State 
Non-Muslim Opposition to Sharia, Unconstitutionality and Violation of 
Fundamental Rights of Christians 
Strict Implementation of Sharia, Anti-Establishment or Rejection of Westernized 
Institutions and Ideology 
Conflict Parties 
- Different Ethnic Groups 
- Fulani Herdsmen or Hausa-Fulani Group and Christian or Host Communities 
- Muslim Mobs or Sect and Security Forces 
- Muslim Mobs, Sect or Groups and Christians 
- Muslim Mobs, Sect, Civilian Mobs or Gangs and Ibos 
- Northern States Government and Christians 
- Security Agents and Unidentified Civilians 
Context 
Middle Belt or Central Region 
North Eastern Region 
Northern Region or States: 
- Abuja/Jabi; Zuba 
- Adamawa State 
- Adamawa State/Yola; Jimeta; Lamurde; Mubi 
- Bauchi State/Bauchi 
- Benue State/Makurdi; Dooga, Kpata, Lokobi, Ajimaka, Ekeae, Giza, Yogbo and 
Mbgawem border communities; Gwer West Local Government Area; Zongo 
Akiki, Nyijir, Tse Taki, and Agbeke in Guma areas 
- Borno State/Maiduguri; Dala; Yan’tebura, Bulukuntu Tsallake; Zajeri 
- Jigawa State/Dutse 
- Gombe State 
- Kaduna State/Kaduna; Kafanchan; Kufara; Ori-Apata; Zaria; Zonkwa and Zango-
Kataf 
- Kano State/Kano; Bompai; Sabon-Gari 
- Katsina State/Katsina 
- Nasarawa State; Alago; Doma Town; Eke and Giza Areas; Kadarko; Tiv 
settlements at Kpata, Donga, Lokobi and Ajimaka 
- Niger State/Minna - Angwan Kuje; Madalla 
- Plateau State/Jos; Barkin Ladi; Bukuru; Dogon Na Hauwa; Kuru Karama; 
Wareng; Yelwa; Zot and Ratsat 
- Sokoto State 
- Taraba State/Jalingo 
- Yobe State/Damaturu; Gadaka; Geidam; Hawan Malka; Potiskum 
- Zamfara State 
Southern States 
- Anambra State/Awka; Nnobi; Nnewi; Onitsha 
- Delta State/Asaba 
- Imo State 
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- Niger Delta  
Effects 
- Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed 
- Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed 
- Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses 
- Denial of Freedom of Worship and Desecration of Christian Religion 
- Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties 
- Mass Grave and Mass Burial 
- Mosques Burned or Destroyed 
- Police Stations and Barracks, Government Buildings Bombed or Burned 
- Refugees and Displaced Persons/Fled Homes or Took Refuge 
- Schools Bombed, Burned, Destroyed or Closed 
- Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos 
Infiltration of Police, Military and all areas of Government 
- Normalcy or Calm Returns  
Intervening Factors 
- Collaborators or Bystanders/Foreign or Internationalization of conflict; Local 
- Extrajudicial Killings and Army Involvement in Policing 
- Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government 
- Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures 
Intervention Efforts 
- Aid and Relief Support 
- Attempts at Dialogue, Appeals for Intervention or Mediation 
- Control Measures Taken, Investigations and Commissions of Inquiry 
- Calls to Address the Constitutionality of Sharia Law and Security Issues 
Military Assault or Crackdown 
Mopping-up of Rioters or Arrests Made 
Warnings or Calls for Action, Restraint, Justice, or Self-Defense 
- Post-War Re-unification Policy, Rehabilitation Efforts or Calls for Rebuilding of 
Churches 
- Reconciliation Attempts 
Perpetrator Groups 
- Christian Militia or Youths 
- Civilian Mobs, Unidentified Attackers or Gunmen 
- Islamic Fundamentalists or Sect: 
Boko Haram 
- Fulani Herdsmen or Fulani-Hausa Group or Gunmen 
- Muslim Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths 
- Rampaging or Under-aged Youths  
- Security Agents, Soldiers, The Army, Military, Hausa or Northern Troops 
Strategies  
- Organization, Planning, and Weaponry 
- Co-ordinated Attacks - Shootings, Bombings, Maiming, Arson 
Drive-By or Hit and Run Shootings 
- Extermination Plot 
Blockade and Starvation 
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Forced Migration 
Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing 
Mass Murders 
- Indoctrination/Manipulation or Instigation 
Targets or Victims of Attack 
- Beer Parlors, Hotels, Banks and Other Facilities 
- Christians and Churches 
- Christians and Churches/Christian Neighborhoods or Mostly Christian Villages 
- Civilian Centers, Schools and School Children 
- Civilian Targets  
- Media Offices and Journalists 
- Muslim Clerics or Mainstream or Orthodox Muslims 
- Muslims, Hausa-Fulani Herders, Muslim Sect, Northerners or Mosques 
- Security Agents - Police Officers, Military and Government Officials 
- Southerners/Ibos or Easterners as Targets 
- Symbols of Government Authority 
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Appendix D: Selected Cases of Religious Crises 
Table D1 
Selected Cases of Religious Crises in Northern Nigeria from 1980 to 2009 
S/N Date  Location  Principal Actors  
1. Thursday, May 
01, 1980 
Zaria (Kaduna 
State) 
Disturbances in Zaria during which property 
belonging to mainly Christians were destroyed  
2. December, 18-
29m 1980 
Yan-Awaki Ward 
in Kano (Kano 
State) 
Riots by Maitatsine Sects. 118 people died. 
Extensive damage to property  
3. October 29-30, 
1982 
Bullumkutu, 
Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Kala-Kato and Maitatisine sects. 118 people died. 
Extensive damage to property. 
4. October 29-30, 
1982 
Kano (Kano State) Muslim demonstrators burnt down churches  
5. February 27-
March 5, 1984 
Dobeli Ward,  Maitatsine Sect. 568 died. Wanton destruction of 
property  
6. April 26-28, 
1985 
Pantami Ward, 
Combe (Bauchi 
State)  
Maitatsine Sect. 105 died. Wanton destruction of 
property 
7. March, 1986 Ilorin (Kwara 
State) 
Muslims and Christians clashed during a Christian 
procession at Easter  
8. March, 1987 Kafanchan 
(Kaduna State) 
Class between Muslims and Christians at the 
College of Education, Kafanchan. Loss of some 
lives and the burning of some mosques by 
Christians and natives Kajes. 
9. March 1987 Katsina, Funtua, 
Zaria, Gusau and 
Kaduna (Kaduna 
State)  
Wave of religious riots in which Muslims burnt 
downs numerous church building s, and damaged 
properties belonging to Christians. Many lives were 
lost.  
10. February. 1988 Kaduna, Kaduna 
Polytechnic 
(Kaduna State) 
Religious riots, ostensibly among students, 
destroyed the foundation walls of the Christian 
chapel  
11. April, 1991 Katsina (Katsina 
State) 
Religious violence spear headed by Malam Yahaya 
Yakubu, leader of the fundamentalist Shiite sect in 
Katsina. It was protest over a blasphemous 
publication Fidi Times. Several lives were lost and 
property destroyed.  
12. April, 1991 Tafawa Balewa 
(Bauchi State) 
Started as a quarrel between a Fulani man and a 
Sayawa meat seller in Tafawa Balewa. Escalated 
into full blown violence and later took the 
colouring of a religious war in Bauchi. Several 
lives were lost and property valued over hundreds 
of million naira was destroyed. 
13. October, 1991  Kano (Kano State) A peaceful procession initiated by the Izala sect to 
halt Rev. Reinhard Bonnke from having a crusade 
in Kano later degenerated into a very violent and 
bloody religious confrontation. Thousands of lives 
were lost and properties valued in millions of Naira 
were destroyed.  
14. May, 1992 Zangon Kataf, 
(Kaduna state) 
A communal feud between the Katafs and the 
Hausas later took the dimension of inter-religious 
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ware between Muslims and Christians in other 
major cities of Kaduna State. Several lives were 
lost and properties were destroyed  
15. January, 1993 Funtua, (Katsina 
State) 
The Kalakato religious sect assaulted the village 
head and burnt down the police vehicle. Lives and 
property were also lost  
16. December, 
1994 
Kano (Kano State) Communal violence triggered oil by the beheading 
of a Christian who had allegedly desecrated the 
Quoran.  
17. May, 1995 Kano (Kano State) Communal violence triggered off by quarrel 
between Hausa and Ibo led to the burning of 
houses, churches and shops and killing of innocent 
people.  
18. Thursday, July 
22, 1999 
Kano Reprisal 
Killing  
Hausa/Fulani youth took vengeance on the killing 
of their Kith and Kin in Sagamu. Their target was 
the Yoruba community. 
19. February 28, 
2000 
Kaduna Mayhem 
(Kaduna State) 
Kaduna city exploded in violence as Muslim and 
Christian extremists and other hoodlums clashed 
over the proposal to introduced Sharia. 
20. Friday, April 
14, 2000 
Agyragu Crisis 
(Nasarawa State) 
Communal clash that started with a protest again 
the location of Local Government Headquarters. 
The militant youth group started the riot and later 
took to the streets, killing and destroying.  
21. July 2000 Tsagari Crisis 
(Kwara) 
Clash between Tsagari and Share communities of 
Kwara State which claimed several lives  
22. September 8, 
2000  
Kaltungo religious 
(Combe State) 
A religious violence that was sparked off by the 
presence of the states Sharia implementation 
committee.  
23. October 17, 
2000 
OPC-Hausa/Fulani 
(Kwara) 
A faceoff between the militant members of OPC 
and Hausa/Funlani community over supremacy of 
Emirate system in the state. 
24. Saturday, 
October 27, 
2000 
Minna reprisal 
(Niger)  
Violent ethnic crisis erupted after the OPC assaults 
in Kwara and Lagos States. 
25. Saturday, 
December 02, 
2000 
Hadejia Crisis 
(Jigawa) 
A sectarian disturbance that was caused by a debate 
between Muslim and Christians in Hadeja (Jigawa). 
There was wanton destruction of worship places  
26. Thursday, 
June, 28,2001 
Azara crisis 
(Nasarawa) 
An ethnic conflict between the Tiv and the Azara 
indigences. It started with gruesome killing of an 
Azara traditional leader, and later spread to the Tiv 
village, with the Tiv community on the defense. 
27. Friday, 
September 07, 
2001 
Jos crisis  A violent ethnic/religious crisis between the 
Muslim/Hausa Fulani and Christian/Indigences. 
The subject of discovered between the Jasawa 
Development Association and Plateau Youth 
council was over political appointment in Jos 
North. 
28. October 12, 
2001 
Kano Riot  A peaceful anti-American protest over the bombing 
of Afghanistan turned violent, taking ethnic and 
religious dimension, it degenerated into 
uncontrollable violence which claimed lives and 
damaged properties and places of worship. 
29. Monday, 
October, 29, 
Tiv-Jukun/Fulani 
Conflict  
An ethnic clash between Tivs and Jukun/Fulani 
which was an extension of the May 2001 clash and 
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2003 could be linked to the protracted dispute between 
both sides. Newswatch reported that 16 soldiers 
were killed which later led to the gruesome revenge 
on the Tivs, by the Nigerian Army. 
30. Friday, 
November 02, 
2001 
Gwantu crisis  A clash that started on a political ground (over the 
relocation of LG Headquarters) later took on ethno-
religious dimension in which places of worship 
were destroyed 
31. Sunday, 
December 30, 
2001 
Vwag crisis  A violent communal conflict in Vwang district 
between the indigenes and non-indigenes exploded 
in the backdrop of the September 7 Jos crisis. It 
started when an illegal group of 40 men attacked 
the district Head of vwang. It also had religious 
colouring. 
32. January 18, 
2002 
Awe crisis  A renewed communal clash between two 
indigenous communities in Awe Local Government 
of Nasarawa State. The cause was not certain but 
two people were killed and several others injured.  
33. May 2, 2000 Jos Mayhem  Another mayhem that followed PDP congress but 
later took an ethno-religious colour  
34. May 2, 2002 Fulani-Irigwe crisis  An ethnic clash between the Hausa/Fulani and the 
Irigwe indigences in Basa, Plateau which was said 
to be a reprisal attack. 
35. Saturday, June 
01, 2002 
Yelwa-Shendam 
Mayhem (Plateau) 
A religious-cum ethnic fracas between the native 
people (predominantly Christians) and Hausa 
settlers (predominantly Muslims). This violence 
extended to about four Local Government councils 
in Southern Plateau.  
36. Monday, July 
01, 2002 
Wase (Plateau) The Yelwa-Shendam riots spilled over to Wase  
37. Tuesday, July 
01, 2003 
Edo/Kogi Communal clashes between border communities in 
Edo and Kogi States Ekepedo and Ogori over ladn 
ownerships. 
38. Thursday, 
January 1, 
2004 
Ganye, Adamawa  Clash between Fulani herdsmen and farmers over 
grazing lands. 
39. Thursday, 
January 1, 
2004  
Yobe Militant Islamic group operating under the name of 
Muhajiran launched a Taliban-like attack on police. 
Men of the Nigerian Army killed five and arrested 
several others.  
40. Sunday; 
February 1, 
2004 
Wase/Kanam 
(Plateau) 
Violent clash between Mavo and Taroh 
communities, which claimed II lives. Suspected 
Taroh youth were alleged to have raided Mavo 
villages.  
41. Saturday, 
February 1, 
2004 
Wase/Kanam 
(Plateau) 
Communal clash over land ownership between 
Minda and Kparev groups. Several lives were lost.  
42. Saturday, 
April 3, 2004 
Makarfi, Kaduna  Religious protest in Makarfi twon over the 
desecration of the Quran by a Christian teenager.  
43. Sunday; April 
11, 2004 
Lantang South, 
Plateau 
Continued clashes that led to the sacking of Taroh 
villages in Lantang South LGC by suspected 
Hausa-Fulani insurgents.  
44. Monday, April 
26, 2004 
Bakin Chiyawa 
Plateau  
Renewed hostilities launched by suspected 
displaced Fulani herdsmen. The conflict was 
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believed to be spill over of the ethno religious crisis 
that has been bedevil ling southern Plateau Local 
Government of Langtang South and North, Wase, 
Kanam and Shendam.  
45. Saturday, May 
1, 2004 
Yelwa Shendam, 
Plateau State 
A fresh ethno religious mayhem that claimed over 
650 lives and over 250 women abducted by 
suspected Taroh militia.  
46. Wednesday, 
May 12, 2004 
Kano Kano may hem following the Yelwa Shendam 
ethno religious crisis in Plateau. Non-Muslims were 
attacked in reprisal of the Plateau crisis. Over 200 
lives were lost and the traditional ruler of the area 
deposed.  
47. Saturday, June 
8, 2008 
Konshisha Gwer, 
Benue  
Boundary disputes between neighbouring 
Konshisha and Gwer communities. Thirteen lives 
were lost. 
48. Tuesday, June 
8, 2004 
Numan, Adamawa  Ethno-religious crisis in Numan over the 
contruction of a mosques minaret over the Humma 
Bachamas palace. Over 50 people were feared 
killed and the traditional ruler of the area deposed.  
49. Tuesday, 
August 3, 
2004 
Quanpam, Plateau Fresh outbreak of violence in Lankaka village. 
Suspected armed milita from neighbouring state 
allegedly stormed the village community killing 
two and razing twenty houses.  
50. Monday, 
September 27, 
2004 
Limankara, Borno  A self-styled Taliban group hiding on the Goza 
hills and Madara mountains on the north-eastern 
border with Cameroon raid police station killing 
officers and stealing ammunition.  
Source: Newswatch Magazine November 2, 2009 (as cited in Ezeibe, n.d., para. 29). 
